Horn v. Ford County Sheriff's Office

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DAVID HORN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 21-cv-02253-JES

)

FORD COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER AND OPINION

This matter is now before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Doc.

27 (the “Motion”). Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. 28), and Defendant filed a Reply. Doc. 29. For

the following reasons, the Motion as to Count I is GRANTED and Count II is REMANDED to

State court for further proceedings. Thus, the Motion as to Count II is DENIED as moot.

I. Background

A. Procedural Background

On May 21, 2021, Plaintiff David Horn filed suit against the Ford County Sherriff’s Office

(“Defendant” or “the Sheriff’s Office”) in the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Ford

County, Illinois. See Doc. 1-2 (Complaint) at 1. Mr. Horn alleges that Defendant withheld his

medication while he was imprisoned, which caused him to suffer a stroke. He claims that such

willful and wanton conduct violated his civil rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He also claims

that the conduct renders Defendant liable for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

(“IIED”).1 On October 13, 2021, Defendant removed the case to federal court. See Doc. 1 (Notice

of Removal). Defendant answered on October 20, 2021. Doc. 6 (Answer). The Motion followed.

1 Significantly, Plaintiff has only named the Sheriff’s Office as a defendant. And, Plaintiff’s

sole state law claim is for IIED. So, the Court’s analysis is confined to the claims before it, which

are addressed in this Order and Opinion.

B. Summary Judgment Briefing

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff's brief disregards the Local Rules of the Central District

of Illinois and well-known standards applied in summary judgment briefing. As the Court has

informed parties in previous cases,

While strict, the requirements imposed on the parties by Rule 56 and Local Rule

7.1(D) are not meant to be punitive. “Rather, they are intended to alert the court to

precisely what factual questions are in dispute and point the court to the specific

evidence in the record that supports a party’s position on each of these questions.

They are, in short, roadmaps, and without them the court should not have to proceed

further, regardless of how readily it might be able to distill the relevant information

from the record on its own.” Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 923

(7th Cir. 1994) .... Because summary judgment is such a drastic remedy, the Court

regularly informs the parties when they fail to adhere to these strict requirements,

and exercises its discretion to decide whether to apply the rule strictly or to overlook

any transgression. Id.

McMahon v. Dunlap Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 323, 274 F. Supp. 3d 836, 842–43 (C.D. Ill. 2017);

see also Lugg v. Sutton et al., JES-18-1412, 2021 WL 3673824, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 18, 2021).

As relevant to Plaintiff's failures here, Local Rule 7.1(D)(2)(b) provides that a response to

a summary judgment motion must state, in separate subsections: undisputed material facts,

disputed material facts, disputed immaterial facts, undisputed immaterial facts, and additional

material facts. With regard to the undisputed material facts section, the plaintiff is instructed to

“[l]ist by number each fact from Section B of the motion for summary judgment which is conceded

to be undisputed and material.” CDIL-LR (D)(2)(b)(1) (emphasis added). Local Rule

7.1(D)(2)(b)(6) cautions, “[a] failure to respond to any numbered fact will be deemed an admission

of the fact.” Id. Likewise, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) provides that when a party fails to properly

address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may, inter alia,

“consider the fact undisputed for the purposes of the motion.”

Here, Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment failed to address

any of Defendant’s statements of material fact, by number, noting whether such facts were

undisputed or disputed and material or immaterial. Instead, Plaintiff skirted the rule and

“incorporated by reference the Statement of Facts contained within Defendant’s instant Motion,”

and, in narrative format, added “additional facts, including disputed facts.” Doc. 28 at 2.

The court has fully considered Defendant’s concern regarding Plaintiff’s failure to abide

by the Local Rules in drafting the facts section. See Doc. 29 at 1-6. Notably, Defendant suggests

that the “Court would be within its authority to simply strike Plaintiff’s ‘Statement of Facts.’” Id.

at 2. This would be too extreme a remedy. Even though Plaintiff failed to adhere to the Local

Rules, Plaintiff at least cites to the transcript of Mr. Horn’s deposition to support his narrative of

facts. See Doc. 28 at 2-4; cf. Sanders v. Moss, JEH-16-1366, 2023 WL 2164520, at *2 (C.D. Ill.

Jan. 24, 2023). Furthermore, Defendant devotes a significant amount of briefing to distinguishing

what it believes are the additional and disputed facts discussed by Plaintiff. See Doc. 29 at 3-5.

Although Defendant was under no impetus to prepare such briefing, it nonetheless alleviates at

least some prejudice that Defendant may otherwise suffer. However, to the extent it appears that

Defendant could not properly respond to Plaintiff’s additional or disputed facts due to Plaintiff’s

failure to comply with the Local Rules, the Court shall deem Defendant’s statement of fact to be

admitted. See Poole v. United States GAO, 1 Fed. Appx. 508, 510 (7th Cir. 2001); Bordelon v.

Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 233 F.3d 524, 527 (7th Cir. 2000)).

Moreover, Latko v. Cox, No. 20-2634, 2021 WL 5234863 (7th Cir. Nov. 10, 2021),

provides guidance as to the effect of a plaintiff’s failure to comply with Local Rule 7.1(D) on a

court’s ability to consider the record outside the parties’ briefings. The court stated, id. at *2:

As a threshold matter, we note that Latko failed to submit a compliant statement of

undisputed material facts. See C.D. Ill. R. 7.1(D)(1)(b). Rather than strike his filing,

the district court, in its discretion, consulted “other materials in the record.[sic]”

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(3), namely the transcript of Latko’s deposition, which Cox

had submitted. See Igasaki v. Illinois Dep’t of Fin. & Pro. Regul., 988 F.3d 948,

957 (7th Cir. 2021). Neither the district judge nor this court must comb the record

in search of factual disputes, but we are “free to consider” the evidence placed in

the summary-judgment record. Arroyo v. Volvo Grp. N. Am., LLC, 805 F.3d 278,

285 (7th Cir. 2015). In this case we find it prudent to consider the same evidence

that the district judge relied upon to fill in the gaps in the parties’ submissions. See

Horne v. Elec. Eel Mfg. Co., Inc., 987 F.3d 704, 710 (7th Cir. 2021).

So, too, does the Court here exercise its discretion in reviewing the transcript of Mr. Horn’s

deposition and other materials, as the Court “is confident in its ability to understand which material

facts are actually in dispute, as supported by the record.” White v. Felchner, SEM-19-3181, 2021

WL 3223067, at *2 (C.D. Ill. July 29, 2021).

C. Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts2

As indicated above, Plaintiff failed to properly respond to Defendant’s statement of

undisputed material facts, therefore, unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed.

See CDIL-LR 7.1(D)(2)(b)(6); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).3

Medication Verification and Administration at the Jail

During the relevant time, Defendant contracted with a third-party company, Advanced

Correctional Healthcare (“ACH”), to provide medical services at the Ford County Jail (the “Jail”).

SOF ¶ 3 (citing Doc. 27-6 at 1-3 (Bruens Decl.)).4 The Jail has a licensed medical physician on

call at all times. SOF ¶ 4 (citing Doc. 27-6 at 2). The Sheriff’s Office’s written policy requires

2 I note that Defendant has, at times, submitted duplicates of its exhibits. For example, Doc.

27-6 at 52-57 and Doc. 27-12 are the same exact document, i.e., Plaintiff’s booking information.

3 Unless otherwise indicated, the Court takes the undisputed facts from Defendant’s Motion

at Doc. 27, which are cited as SOF ¶ ___. Given the narrative format of Plaintiff’s facts section,

when a disputed or additional fact is appropriately before the Court, it shall be relegated to a

footnote. The Court notes when a fact proffered by Defendant is not supported by the record.

4 Stacie Bruens serves as a lieutenant in the Sheriff’s Office, where she acts as the head

administrator for the Jail. Doc. 27-6 at 1. And, the Sheriff’s Office is responsible for operating the

Jail. SOF ¶ 2 (citing Doc. 27-6 at 1).

officers to follow the instructions of ACH medical personnel regarding inmate medical issues.

SOF ¶ 5 (citing Doc. 27-6 at 2; (Doc. 27-6 at 4-50 (the “Policy”)).

The Policy provides officers with guidance on how to properly order, dispense, administer,

and record medication, and, the Policy requires that officers be trained on these procedures by the

responsible physician (or the physician’s designee). SOF ¶ 6 (citing Doc. 27-6 at 2, 41-43). Per the

Policy, an officer cannot administer an inmate’s medication unless the officer receives prior

approval from ACH’s physician. SOF ¶¶ 7-9 (citing Doc. 27-6 at 2-3, 41-43). And, the physician’s

instructions for administering an inmate’s medicine are to be catalogued in a Medication

Administration Record and followed accordingly. Id. Significantly, the Policy provides that an

officer is not to administer medication if there is an error in the Medication Administration Record

or if the officer has any other question. Doc. 27-6 at 42. Instead, the officer is directed to contact

ACH. Id.

Mr. Horn’s Medical History5

Mr. Horn had at least one stroke in March of 2020 and was also diagnosed as being diabetic.

SOF ¶ 10 (citing Doc. 27-1 (Horn Depo.) at 9, 10, 12.). As a result, he was prescribed: “Aspirin,”

for stroke prevention; “Lyrica,” to treat seizures; ‘Glimepiride,” to treat Type II diabetes; and

5 The Defendant, not Plaintiff, proffered Mr. Horn’s medical records. Neither party

petitioned the Court to seal Mr. Horn’s medical records. But, under the circumstances, the Court

believes sealing is appropriate as to certain medical records, not integral to the resolution of the

Motion. See Chapman v. Raemisch, LA-05-1254, 2009 WL 425813, at *7 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 20,

2009) (sealing medical records that are not “so relevant to plaintiff’s claim that they have been

cited or quoted by the parties or the court in other documents.”).

To the extent the MVR and MAR are relevant to the outcome of the case, they are excerpted

into the facts section. Otherwise, the issue of causation relies so heavily on the expert reports and

testimony, so those filings shall not be subject to sealing.

The parties are free to raise an objection to the Court’s sua sponte decision to seal certain

records.

“Atorvastatin,” to treat high cholesterol. SOF § 11 (citations omitted).° Mr. Horn did not miss a

dosage of his medication prior to his arrest on July 2, 2020. SOF § 11 (citing Doc. 27-1 at 20).

Mr. Horn’s Arrest and Booking’

At 11 pm on July 2, 2020, Mr. Horn was arrested and taken to the Jail, pursuant to an arrest

warrant. SOF 1, 13 (citing Doc. 27-6 at 1; Doc. 27-1 at 16; Doc. 27-11 (the warrant)). Mr.

Horn’s medications were also transported to the Jail. SOF 4 14 (citing Doc. 27-1 at 15, 16).

Mr. Horn was booked into the Jail during a process that lasted about one hour, from 11:30

pm on July 2, 2020, until 12:41 am on July 3, 2020. SOF § 15 (citing Doc. 27-7 at 2); see also

Doc. 27-12. During the process, Mr. Horn indicated to the booking officer that he required an

aspirin before bed and his other medicines before breakfast. SOF 4 16 (citing Doc. 27-1 at 17).

At 11:45pm, Officer Timothy Woodmansee completed Mr. Horn’s Medication

Verification Record (“MVR”). SOF § 16 (citing Doc. 27-7 at 1-3 (Woodmansee Decl.)). The MVR

is contained in the record as follows, Doc. 27-7 at 4 (blank space intentionally omitted:

Medication Verification Form

Date 27/52/30 Time Ales Detaineename: Aiann Do wet) O Ih _

Allergies: Oeohenkwcd racine load sugar ectlts (ffindforhd)1__——= Peale fe

Vitale (findleted BYP Temp: Repel

me

ae Pe2—] Ose Tab ia the am | ¥

Tree

we | z/ineninidhe fue Yuh in then 2

= er

ee a re eee

6 Lyrica is also referred to in the record as pregabalin. Defendant does not offer a citation

for the assertion that Lyrica is used by Mr. Horn to treat his seizures. However, Plaintiff does not

dispute this statement of fact.

7 Any reference to the exact time that a particular event occurred is only an approximation.

After finishing the MVR, Officer Woodmansee called Dr. Lochard, the Jail’s on-call

physician, who approved all of Mr. Horn’s medications and then gave Officer Woodmansee a

schedule for administering the medications. SOF □□ 17-19 (citing Doc. 27-7 at 2, 4).° By the time

Dr. Lochard instructed Officer Woodmansee as to Mr. Horn’s medication schedule, it was the

early morning of July 3, 2020. SOF § 20 (citing Doc. 27-7 at 2).

Dr. Lochard indicated to Officer Woodmansee that Mr. Horn should take his Lyrica before

bed, and that Mr. Horn’s other medications could be administered in the morning. SOF § 21 (citing

Doe. 27-7 at 2).? Officer Woodmansee then documented Dr. Lochard’s instructions in Mr. Horn’s

Medication Administration Record (“MAR”). SOF 4 22 (citing Doc. 27-7 at 2). The MAR is

proffered into the record as follows, Doc. 27-7 at 5 (blank space and allergy information

intentionally omitted):

(MEDICATION ADMINISTRATION RECORD C DIAMOND PHARMACY SERVICES

3 alimepiride ewol | oigd | PP

Viet □□□ irr

eee rly Ne cely Oe

FM ne {tte POPPE EEE

tT TT

1-3 toroastehin OEE EEE EEE EEE

me Ory ROCA

| fab ome chily COCR

ee OO

15 Asprin Po Serr rr rrr

me alma | CAPE CECE CECE Pe eeee

| J Aas olan TOP rrr yyy reper ly □□

8 Dr. Lochard’s full name and credentials do not appear in the record.

° Defendant devotes a significant amount of briefing to inform the Court that Officer

Woodmansee mistakenly filled out the MAR, as he supposedly misunderstood Dr. Lochard’s

instructions that Mr. Horn’s medications were to be given on the morning of July 3, 2020, rather

than the morning of July 4, 2020. See SOF {[§| 23-25 (citations omitted). As noted infra, in

discussion, this characterization of the facts is not persuasive, and is also undermined by the record.

After Mr. Horn was fully booked into the Jail, sometime between 11:20 pm on July 2,

2020, and 12:40 am on July 3, 2020, the booking officer gave Mr. Horn one of his Lyrica pills.

SOF ¶ 26 (citing Doc. 27-1 at 17, 37).10 Mr. Horn did not communicate with any other officer after

being placed in his cell and prior to falling asleep. SOF ¶ 27 (citing Doc. 27-1 at 19).

Mr. Horn’s Stroke on July 3, 2020

After Mr. Horn woke up July 3, 2020, he told officers throughout the day that he was

concerned about not receiving his medications. SOF ¶ 28 (citing Doc. 27-1 at 19-20). The officers

uniformly responded by telling Mr. Horn that they would investigate the status of his medications,

but the officers never followed up with Mr. Horn. SOF ¶ 29 (citing Doc. 27-1 at 19, 21). And, Mr.

Horn’s wife called the Jail several times to express apprehension that Mr. Horn was not receiving

his medications. SOF ¶ 30 (citing Doc. 27-1 at 23).11

On the evening of July 3, 2020, Mr. Horn’s physical condition quickly deteriorated. SOF

¶ 31 (citing Doc. 27-1 at 21). Mr. Horn then fell over on his bed and shortly after, a guard shook

him awake. SOF ¶ 32 (citing Doc. 27-1 at 22).12 Mr. Horn was not given his medication until he

was being placed on the stretcher. Doc. 27-1 at 23. At that point, a guard arrived at Mr. Horn’s cell

to administer his medications. SOF ¶ 34 (citing Doc. 27-1 at 24). Mr. Horn was then rushed away

from the Jail, by ambulance, to a hospital. SOF ¶ 35 (citing Doc. 27-1 at 22-23). It was then

10 Plaintiff asserts that, during this time, the booking officer indicated that Mr. Horn would

not receive any medication while in the Jail, aside from the Lyrica. Doc. 28 at 3 (citing Doc. 27-1

at 17). As discussed, infra, the record does not support Plaintiff’s statement.

11 Plaintiff points to Mr. Horn’s testimony that officers at the Jail ordered his wife to stop

contacting them, and also threatened to file harassment charges against her if she did not stop

calling. Doc. 28 at 3 (citing Doc. 27-1 at 22-24). Defendant suggests the Court should not consider

this fact as it is immaterial and only supported by inadmissible hearsay. Doc. 29 at 2-3.

12 It is unclear as to how the guard discovered that Mr. Horn’s needed medical care. SOF

¶ 33 (citing Doc. 27 at 22).

determined that on July 3, 202013, Mr. Horn suffered a stroke while imprisoned in the Jail. SOF ¶

36 (citations omitted).14

II. Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 7477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The moving party has the

burden of providing proper documentary evidence to show the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. Id. at 323-24. Once the moving party has met its burden, the opposing party must

come forward with specific evidence, not mere allegations, or denials of the pleadings, which

demonstrates that there is a genuine issue for trial. Gracia v. Volvo Europa Truck, N.V., 112 F.3d

291, 294 (7th Cir. 1997). “[A] party moving for summary judgment can prevail just by showing

that the other party has no evidence on an issue on which that party has the burden of proof.”

Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176, 1183(7th Cir. 1993). 15

13 Both in the Complaint (Doc. 1-2 at 3) and in the Response (Doc. 28 at 3), Plaintiff

incorrectly states that he suffered a stroke in the Jail on July 2, 2020.

14 Defendant also provides, in its statement of undisputed material facts, a description of

expert testimony regarding medical causation. See SOF ¶¶ 37-38. These facts are detailed, infra,

in the discussion section.

15 Plaintiff appears to suggest that the Court should be wary of the self-serving nature of

the sworn statements provided by Defendant in support of its Motion. Doc. 28 at 5. The Court

recognizes that “self-serving statements in affidavits without factual support in the record carry no

weight.” Butts v. Aurora Health Care, Inc., 387 F.3d 921, 925 (7th Cir. 2004) (emphasis omitted).

But, the record “may include the self-serving affidavit itself, provided that the affidavit meets the

usual requirements for evidence on summary judgment—including the requirements that it be

based on personal knowledge and that it set forth specific facts showing that there was a genuine

issue for trial.” Accordingly, only to the extent that Defendant’s affidavits, in whole or in part,

meet the necessary requirements, shall the Court consider the affidavits in resolving the Motion.

See Cooper–Schut v. Visteon Auto. Sys., 361 F.3d 421, 429 (7th Cir. 2004). Furthermore, Plaintiff’s

argument belies the fact that he largely relies on his own deposition testimony in support of his

Response. See Doc. 28.

The non-movant cannot rest on the pleadings alone, but must designate specific facts in

affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or admissions that establish that there is a

genuine triable issue; he “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt

as to the material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256-57 (1986) (quotation

and citation omitted)); Hot Wax, Inc. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 191 F.3d 813, 818 (7th Cir. 1999). Finally,

a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant’s position is not sufficient to successfully

oppose a summary judgment motion; “there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably

find for the [non-movant].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.

III. Discussion

A. Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I)

Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant is liable under § 1983 for violating Mr. Horn’s civil

rights by displaying deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Doc. 1-2 at 3.

Notably, the Sheriff’s Office “is not a legal entity separable from the county government

which it serves and is therefore” considered a municipality for the purpose of ascertaining potential

liability under § 1983. Whiting v. Marathon County Sheriff's Dept., 382 F.3d 700, 704 (7th Cir.

2004) (citation omitted); see, e.g., Vasquez v. Will County Sheriff’s Office, MFM-18-3137, 2019

WL 4189477 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 2019); Wuerffel v. Cook County Sheriff’s Office, CPK-14-3990,

2016 WL 1660497 (N.D. Ill Apr. 27, 2016); Newell v. Kankakee County Sheriff’s Department, 968

F. Supp. 2d 973 (C.D. Ill. 2013). And, a § 1983 claim may only be lodged against a municipality

pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978). Thus,

Plaintiff’s § 1983 action is analyzed under the framework set forth in Monell.

“To begin, a § 1983 plaintiff must always show that he was deprived of a federal right.”

Dean v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 18 F.4th 214, 235 (7th Cir. 2021) (citation and quotation

omitted). Furthermore, “[m]unicipalities do not face respondeat superior liability under section

1983 for the misdeeds of employees or other agents. Only actions of the entity will suffice.” Flores

v. City of South Bend, 997 F.3d 725, 731 (7th Cir. 2021). So, “[t]he central question is always

whether an official policy, however expressed ... caused the constitutional deprivation.” Glisson v.

Ind. Dep't of Corr., 849 F.3d 372, 379 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). Accordingly, the Plaintiff must

satisfy “three requirements to establish [his] Monell claim—policy or custom, municipal fault, and

‘moving force’ causation.” Bohanon v. City of Indianapolis, 46 F.4th 669, 676 (7th Cir. 2022).

Defendant argues that the case should be dismissed as Plaintiff cannot show a constitutional

injury. Doc. 27 at 10-11. And, Defendant asserts that even if Plaintiff was subject to a constitutional

deprivation, Plaintiff cannot connect Woodmansee’s conduct to an official custom or policy of the

Sheriff’s Office (id. at 11-13), nor can Plaintiff show causation between Woodmansee’s actions or

omissions and Plaintiff’s injury. Id. at 13-14. In response, Plaintiff argues that he has adequately

pled deliberate indifference by Defendant as to his medical care. Doc. 28 at 4. Plaintiff also avers

that he is entitled to further discovery to uncover additional evidence of an institutional policy or

custom, and that a determination as to the issue of causation is premature. Id. at 5.

Because Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee (Doc. 27-6 at 1; Doc. 27-7 at 1), his rights arise

under the Fourteenth Amendment. Miranda v. Cty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. 2018).

Detainees are entitled to adequate medical care. Id. at 353-54. To establish a Fourteenth

Amendment violation, a detainee must show: “(1) there was an objectively serious medical need;

(2) the defendant committed a volitional act concerning the [plaintiff's] medical need; (3) that act

was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances in terms of responding to the [plaintiff's]

medical need; and (4) the defendant act[ed] purposefully, knowingly, or perhaps even recklessly

with respect to the risk of harm.” Gonzalez v. McHenry Cnty., Illinois, 40 F.4th 824, 828 (7th Cir.

2022) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether a challenged action

is reasonable, the court must consider the “totality of facts and circumstances,” Mays v. Dart, 974

F.3d 810, 819 (7th Cir. 2020).

As to the first element, it is abundantly clear from the record that Plaintiff had a serious

and objective need for his medication, as his medication was, inter alia, prescribed to treat his

diabetes and prevent stroke. Doc. 27 at 4. Plaintiff’s satisfaction of the remaining three elements,

however, is more opaque. And, prior to analyzing these elements, it is important to distinguish the

actors and the conduct in question.

In particular, the Motion focuses on Officer Woodmansee’s apparent blunder in filling out

the MAR. See Doc. 27. It is true that nothing in the record can be fairly construed to find that

Officer Woodmansee acted intentionally and maliciously in completing the MAR. Rather, Officer

Woodmansee’s mistake appears to derive from some level of negligence or even gross negligence.

If this were the only complained-of incident, it would not appear that the error would rise to the

level of a constitutional injury. See Miranda, 900 F.3d at 353-54. But, the thrust of Mr. Horn’s

alleged injury is not isolated to Officer Woodmansee’s faulty completion of the MAR. Rather,

relevant actions and omissions also occurred on July 3, 2020, from the time Mr. Horn woke up

until his stroke which occurred that evening. During this time, Mr. Horn, as well as his wife,

repeatedly informed the Jail officers throughout the day that Plaintiff required medication. Yet, the

record does not indicate whether any officers followed up on Plaintiff’s requests. As to Officer

Woodmansee, the record is not clear as to whether he was even working at this time.

I pause to note that, non-medical personnel, like the officers here, are generally justified in

relying on the instructions of medical professionals. See Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 656 (7th

Cir. 2005); see, e.g., Tyner v. Nowakowski, JRB-19-1502, 2021 WL 4318085, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept.

23, 2021) (“As Plaintiff himself alleges, [the defendant] was aware of Plaintiff’s condition, aware

he had medication on order, and aware that he was receiving care from medical staff. [The

defendant] thus was justified in his reliance on the medical expertise of those tasked with Plaintiff’s

care.”); Daniels v. Janca, GF-17-906, 2019 WL 2772525, at *5 (N.D. Ill July 2, 2019) (“[I]t was

not unreasonable for [the defendant] to decline [plaintiff’s] request for his medication instead of

“second-guess[ing]” the pill line report and [plaintiff’s] medical records.”). Indeed, it is the rare

case where “it would be evident to a layperson that a prisoner is receiving inadequate or

inappropriate treatment.” Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1011 (7th Cir. 2006) (internal

quotation omitted).

Notwithstanding the above, non-medical professionals cannot “simply ignore an inmate’s

plight,” and a plaintiff must show that his “communication, in its content and manner of

transmission, gave the prison official sufficient notice to alert him or her to an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety.” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 755-56 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Farmer

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). Once an official knows of such a risk, “the refusal or

declination to exercise the authority of his or her office may reflect” the requisite disregard. Arnett,

658 F.3d at 756 (internal quotation omitted); see also Dobbey v. Mitchell-Lawshea, 806 F.3d 938,

940 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[A] guard who is aware of complaints of pain and does nothing to help a

suffering prisoner obtain treatment is likewise exhibiting deliberate indifference.”).

Mr. Horn and his wife pleaded with several officers to administer Plaintiff’s medication.

Doc 27 at 7; Doc. 27-1 at 22. But the officers refused the request, despite Mr. Horn’s warning that

he would be at risk of death or stroke if he did not take his medication. Doc. 27-1 at 17, 18.

Nevertheless, Defendant suggests that an officer would be trained to review the MAR as

not requiring the dispensation of Plaintiff’s medication until 11 pm on July 3, 2020. See Doc. 27-

1 at 3. However, it is indisputable that the MAR stated that three of Mr. Horn’s medications should

be given at 6:30 am on a daily basis. See Doc. 27-7 at 5. And, the MVR was consistent, indicating

that Mr. Horn’s medications should be administered in the morning on a daily basis. See Doc. 27-

7 at 4. Furthermore, the record clearly shows that Mr. Horn was booked into the Jail on July 2,

2020, i.e., well before 6:30 am on July 3, 2020. See Doc. 27-6 at 1; Doc. 27-7 at 1. And, it would

be reasonable to expect, in the event of a shift change or some other occurrence, that any given

officer would have the ability to readily determine whether Mr. Horn had been given any

medication on the morning of July 3, 2020. In light of the above, it would be unreasonable for an

officer to ignore Mr. Horn’s continued requests for his medication.

That is not to suggest, however, that an officer should have actually given Mr. Horn any

medications. The Defendant admits that the Jail utilizes a licensed medical physician who is

available and on-call 24-hours a day and seven days a week. See Doc. 27-6 at 2. So, at the very

least, the physician should have been contacted, as is required by the Policy. Id. at 43 Nothing in

the record suggests that an officer actually contacted the physician, or for that matter, did anything

to respond to Mr. Horn’s complaints, outside of stating that the issue would be investigated. Doc.

27 at 7. Moreover, the act of calling an ambulance to take Mr. Horn to the hospital for treatment

after he began to experience severe medical symptoms does not serve to remedy what seems to be

an appropriately characterized willful ignorance in the face of Mr. Horn’s repeated requests for

medication. See Lewis v. McLean, 864 F.3d 556, 565 (7th Cir. 2017) (condemning prison personnel

for doing “literally, nothing” despite having notice of prisoner’s medical complaints and issues).

Viewing the inferences in favor of Plaintiff as the non-movant, there is, at a minimum, a

question of material fact as to whether the officers’ conduct in ignoring Mr. Horn’s continued

requests for needed medical care was objectively unreasonable and in reckless disregard of risk to

Mr. Horn’s health. Accordingly, Plaintiff has met the threshold inquiry of showing an infringement

of his constitutional rights.

Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s “claim fails on the basic proposition that he has sued for damages

under § 1983 and alleged a constitutional tort [] without then developing evidence of a recoverable

injury.” Lord v. Beahm, 952 F.3d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,

278 (1985)). Indeed, “to succeed in a § 1983 suit, a plaintiff must ‘establish not only that a state

actor violated his constitutional rights, but also that the violation caused the plaintiff injury or

damages.’” Gabb v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 945 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting

Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 864 (7th Cir. 2011)); see also Bart v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 625 (7th

Cir. 1982) (“Section 1983 is a tort [and] [a] tort to be actionable requires injury.”).

Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot show that he suffered injury due to the alleged

constitutional deprivation, i.e., Plaintiff’s stroke, was caused by a delay in receiving his

medication. Doc. 27 at 13-14. Defendant has retained two medical experts who have provided

reports and testimony as to the issue of causation, and which Defendant cites in support of its

Motion. Id. The first expert, Dr. Abraham Kocheril, the Director of Cardiac Electrophysiology at

OSF HealthCare Cardiovascular Institute Urbana, reports that Mr. Horn’s neurological episode on

July 3, 2020, is characterized as a lacunar stroke. See Doc 27-2 at 1-3 (Dr. Kocheril’s Report); id.

at 4-53 (Dr. Kocheril’s Curriculum Vitae); Doc. 27-4 (Dr. Kocheril Depo.)16 The second expert,

Dr. Paul Later, the Neurology Medical Director at North Region Northwestern Medicine, is in

agreement as to the type of stroke suffered by Mr. Horn. See Doc. 27-3 at 1-4 (Dr. Later’s Report);

16 The Court notes that the digital pagination of Dr. Kocheril’s deposition testimony is

inconspicuously omitted.

id. at 5-9 (Dr. Later’s curriculum vitae); id. at 10 (Dr. Later’s Fee Schedule); Doc. 27-5 (Dr. Later

Depo.).

After an extensive review of Mr. Horn’s medical history, Dr. Kocheril determined, to a

reasonable degree of medical certainty (Doc. 27-2 at 3), that “[i]t is not reasonable to say that lack

of access to the medications he was taking, over a 24 hour period, led to his stroke.” Id. at 2. In

particular, Dr. Kocheril reported that “[m]issing a day or two of aspirin or atorvastatin would not

have caused [the] kind of clot” suffered by Mr. Horn. Id. And, “Pregabalin would not have had

any bearing on causation of stroke.” Furthermore, “[a]fter review of the medical records from OSF

and Riverside,” i.e., where Mr. Horn received medical treatment on July 3 and July 5, 2020, Dr.

Kocheril “f[ou]nd no evidence of any physicians’ opinion that the patient missing medications

caused the stroke of July 2020.” Id.

Consistent with Dr. Kocheril’s report, Dr. Later made the following finding (Doc. 27-3 at

3) (emphasis added):

In summary, it is unfortunate that Mr. Horn suffered a stroke recurrence on

7/3/2020 but his not receiving aspirin, atorvastatin and gliperimide for 1 or even 2

days while in the Ford County Jail was not to blame for his 7/3/2020 stroke. Rather,

the risk factors above overwhelmingly are responsible for causing the 7/3/2020

stroke. Tobacco abuse, diabetes, hypertension, hyperlipidemia, sedentary lifestyle

(family history of stroke plays some role) are the risk factors that put him at risk

for this stroke 7/3/20 as well as the previous 2 strokes identified on his MRI scans.

A lack of long term control of these risk factors predisposed him to all of his 3

strokes including the stroke on 7/3/2020. The stroke he suffered 7/3/20 was no

more the fault of the Ford County Jail than his 2 prior strokes had been.

Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence that refutes these reports. Indeed, Plaintiff has

failed to cite to the deposition testimony of either medical expert as somehow contradicting or

undermining the information contained within the reports. Instead, Plaintiff only addresses these

reports by arguing that “the testimony of Plaintiff’s treating physicians in the case at bar regarding

causation, specifically that Defendant’s failure to administer medication to Plaintiff and his strokes

were likely coincidental, is more in the nature of an estimation and not based on definite

physiological evidence, as the question of whether Defendant’s failure (or refusal) to provide

Plaintiff with his medication led to his suffering strokes would better be decided at trial.” Doc. 28

at 5.

The Court notes that Plaintiff mistakenly states that the expert witnesses were Plaintiff’s

treating physicians. Doc. 28 at 5: see Doc. 27-4 at 3; Doc. 27-5 at 4. And, it appears, contrary to

Plaintiff’s assertion, that the expert reports are based on definite physiological evidence. Dr.

Kocheril and Dr. Later both reviewed an extensive array of Mr. Horn’s medical records, including

radiologic images taken during Mr. Horn’s treatment of his stroke in July 2020. See Doc. 27-2 at

1; Doc. 27-3 at 3-4. The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s position, as Plaintiff’s argument is

“underdeveloped, conclusory, [and] unsupported by law.” Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709,

718 (7th Cir. 2012).

In light of the evidence proffered by Defendant, and the complete dearth of evidence

provided or even alluded to by Plaintiff, the Court concludes that no reasonable jury would find

that Mr. Horn’s delay in access to his medication, i.e., his constitutional injury, caused his stroke.

See Arce v. Wexford Health Sources Inc., 75 F.4th 673, 680 (7th Cir. 2023) (finding that plaintiff

failed to support that “the ten-day gap in medical care caused him some harm.”) (citing Williams

v. Liefer, 491 F.3d 710, 714–15 (7th Cir. 2007)).

Furthermore, assuming arguendo that the constitutional injury resulted in a stroke, that

would not be enough to establish a § 1983 claim, as filed by the Plaintiff. As previously noted, the

Plaintiff did not bring action against any individual defendants but chose instead to bring the action

against the Sheriff’s Office. The Sheriff’s Office is not liable under § 1983 for the actions or

omissions of its employees under a theory of respondeat superior. Instead, Plaintiff must connect

his constitutional injury to a policy or custom of the Sheriff’s Office.

In the Complaint, Plaintiff does not allege a constitutionally violative policy or custom.

But, even if Plaintiff had made such a claim, it would not pass muster. Under Monell there are

“three bases for municipal liability: ‘(1) an express policy that causes a constitutional deprivation

when enforced; (2) a widespread practice that is so permanent and well-settled that it constitutes a

custom or practice; or (3) an allegation that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with

final policymaking authority.’” Spiegel v. McClintic, 916 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting

Estate of Sims ex rel. Sims v. Cty. of Bureau, 506 F.3d 509, 515 (7th Cir. 2007)). Additionally, a

“‘policy of inaction’ in light of notice that its program will cause constitutional violations ‘is the

functional equivalent of a decision by the city itself to violate the Constitution.’” Connick v.

Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61–62 (2011) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 395 (1989)

(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).

Defendant argues that it has proffered evidence showing the existence of a constitutionally

compliant policy concerning medication administration. Doc. 27 at 11-12. Defendant avers that it

trains its employees on how to administer medication, and that its policies provide for the timely,

not untimely, administration. Id. at 12-13. Defendant’s undisputed statement of fact supports its

assertion. See SOF ¶¶ 3-9. Plaintiff does not controvert any of Defendant’s arguments concerning

the policy or identify facts to the contrary. See Doc. 28. Rather, Plaintiff seems to suggest that it

is not required to demonstrate at the Motion for Summary Judgment phase “that Defendant’s

misconduct and/or ineptitude was part of a custom, policy and/or practice in its treatment of

Plaintiff…” Id. at 5 (citing Daniel v. Cook County, 833 F.3d 728, 735 (7th Cir. 2016)).

Plaintiff misstates the holding, standard, and facts set forth in Daniel, 833 F.3d 728. For

one, the Seventh Circuit clearly stated that a plaintiff “must show more than the deficiencies

specific to his own experience, of course.” Id. at 734 (citation omitted). And, the plaintiff “must

come forward with evidence that could allow a reasonable trier of fact to find… systemic and gross

deficiencies in staffing, facilities, equipment, or procedures in a detention center’s medical care

system.” Id. at 735 (citing Dixon v. County of Cook, 819 F.3d 343, 348 (7th Cir. 2016)). But, a

plaintiff “need not present evidence that these systemic failings affected other specific inmates.”

Daniel, 833 F.3d at 735 (citing Davis v. Carter, 452 F.3d 686, 695 (7th Cir. 2006)).

Plaintiff has proffered a pittance of evidence. Nothing in the record, or even posited by

Plaintiff, could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendant’s failure to provide Mr. Horn’s

medication was more than a single, isolated incident. In contrast, the plaintiff in Daniel “provided

substantial evidence of systemic deficiencies in the Jail's medical care, including extensive

testimony from Jail medical staff.” Daniel, 833 F.3d at 735.

To further buttress his argument as to the required evidentiary burden under Monell at

summary judgment, Plaintiff makes the rather bizarre assertion that further “discovery in the

instant case should enable Plaintiff to uncover additional evidence of lapses by Defendant in

administering medication to other prisoners at the Ford County Jail…” Doc. 28 at 5. The deadline

for discovery has long since passed. See Text Order Dated July 18, 2022. And, “[t]he flow of cases

through a busy district court is aided, not hindered, by adherence to deadlines.” Spears v. City of

Indianapolis, 74 F.3d 153, 157 (7th Cir. 1996). Indeed, judges routinely admonish counsel for

failing to abide by the terms of a discovery deadline. See Alight Solutions v. Thomson, JC-20-3043,

2021 WL 5119111, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 2021) (“In the end, a scheduling order is not a frivolous

piece of paper, idly entered, which can be cavalierly disregarded by counsel without peril.”)

(citation and quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff has not identified an entitlement to additional

discovery or even asked for it. This is not the time for conjecture as to what additional discovery

might have revealed. See Waldridge, 24 F.3d at 920 (7th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original) (“[I]f

the non-movant [in a summary judgment proceeding] does not come forward with evidence that

would reasonably permit the finder of fact to find in her favor on a material question, then the court

must enter summary judgment against her.”) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–87 (1986)). Summary judgment is the stage where a plaintiff “‘must

show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of events.’”

Beardsall v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 953 F.3d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Johnson v.

Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2003)).

While it is not clear, Plaintiff appears to suggest that Defendant is liable under a failure-to-

train theory. Plaintiff suggests that Defendant is liable under Monell for deliberately refusing “to

accurately follow and competently adhere to the regimen established by the consulting physician

on call for Defendant, for administering Plaintiff’s medication.” Doc. 28 at 4. This argument fails,

however, as liability for the failure to train carries “a stringent standard of fault” that requires a

“pattern of similar constitutional violations,” except for a “narrow range of circumstances” in

which “a pattern of similar violations might not be necessary to show deliberate indifference.”

Connick, 563 U.S. at 62-94 (citation omitted). In such cases, the “risk of constitutional violations

[is] so high and the need for training so obvious that the municipality's failure to act can reflect

deliberate indifference and allow an inference of institutional culpability, even in the absence of a

similar prior constitutional violation.” J.K.J. v. Polk County, 960 F.3d 367, 380 (7th Cir. 2020).

“Qualifying circumstances under this doctrine are rare; [a] constitutional violation must be a

blatantly obvious consequence of inaction for single-incident liability to apply.” Giese v. City of

Kankakee, 71 F.4th 582, 590 (7th Cir. 2023) (quotation and citation omitted).

Nothing in the record indicates a pattern of similar constitutional violations. Nor is it

blatantly obvious that the Sheriff’s Office medication dispensation training program was so

deficient that it created a high risk of constitutional injury.17 No reasonable jury could conclude

that Plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of a policy or custom that contributed to the violation

of Mr. Horn’s constitutional rights.18

In light of the foregoing, Defendant’s Motion as to Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint is

GRANTED.

B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count II)

Plaintiff also brings a state law claim for IIED. Doc. 1-2 at 4.19

17 Similarly, a claim lodged under a failure to supervise theory would fail as well, as such

claims “are a ‘tenuous’ form of Monell liability.” Ruiz-Cortez v. City of Chicago, 931 F.3d 592,

599 (7th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).

18 As Plaintiff has not alleged a constitutionally violative policy or custom, Plaintiff cannot

show that the Sheriff’s Office “policy or custom demonstrates municipal fault.” First Midwest

Bank ex rel. LaPorta v. City of Chi., 988 F.3d 978, 986 (7th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation and

citation omitted); see also Thomas v. Cook County Sheriff's Dep’t., 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir.

2010) (“To demonstrate that the County is liable for a harmful custom or practice, the plaintiff

must show that County policymakers were ‘deliberately indifferent as to [the] known or obvious

consequences.’”) (quoting Gable v. City of Chi., 296 F.3d 531, 537 (7th Cir. 2002)). For the same

reason, Plaintiff cannot possible connect a custom or policy with his constitutional injury. See

Orozco v. Dart, 64 f.4th 806, 824 (7th Cir. 2023) “[A] plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality

liable must show causation. ‘That is, a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken

with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the

municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.’”) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan

Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)).

19 Plaintiff’s claim is presumably lodged under a theory that the Defendant is vicariously

liable for the conduct of its employees. It is true that “[a]n employer may be vicariously liable for

the tort of an employee[, including IIED], if the tort is committed within the scope of the

employment.” Bagent v. Blessing Care Corp., 224 Ill.2d 154, 308 Ill. Dec. 782, 862 N.E.2d 985,

991 (2007); see also Richards v. U.S. Steel, 869 F.3d 557, 565-68 (7th Cir. 2017). And, “[f]or

“[T]he general rule [is] that ‘when all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the district

court should relinquish jurisdiction over pendent state-law claims rather than resolving them on

the merits.’” McHugh v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 55 F.4th 529, 532 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Lalowski

v. City of Des Plaines, 789 F.3d 784, 794 (7th Cir. 2015)). “But, judicial economy, convenience,

fairness and comity may point to federal retention of state-law claims ... when it is absolutely clear

how the pendent claims can be decided.” Donald v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 982 F.3d 451,

461 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Wright v. Associated Ins. Cos. Inc., 29 F.3d 1244, 1251 (7th Cir.

1994)). As a result, the Court will examine the sufficiency of the IIED allegations, as well as the

merits of the Motion, to determine whether it should retain or relinquish jurisdiction.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s IIED claim should be rejected, as Plaintiff cannot

establish that Officer Woodmansee’s conduct was extreme and outrageous. Doc. 27 at 15-16. And,

Defendant asserts that Officer Woodmansee did not intend to cause Plaintiff’s injury (id. at 14-

15), nor did a delay in administering medication to Plaintiff cause an injury. Id. at 16. In response,

Plaintiff argues that he is not required to show intent, rather, reckless disregard suffices. Doc. 28

at 6. Plaintiff also suggests that Defendant’s refusal to act on Mr. Horn’s repeated requests for

medication, as well as the booking officer’s comments regarding Mr. Horn’s access to medication,

is conduct that satisfies the basis of a claim for IIED. Id. at 6-7.

“Illinois sets a ‘high bar’ for intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.” Trahanas

v. Northwestern University, 64 F.4th 842, 859 (7th Cir. 2023) (internal citation omitted). Under

Illinois law, a plaintiff may recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress only if

conduct to be within the scope of employment it must: (1) be of the kind the employee is employed

to perform; (2) occur substantially within the authorized time and space limits; and (3) be

performed, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master.” Boston v. U.S. Steel Corp., 816 F.3d

455, 467 (7th Cir. 2016).

the plaintiff shows “‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intent by the defendant to cause or a

reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress, (3) severe or extreme emotional

distress suffered by the plaintiff, and (4) an actual and proximate causation of emotional distress

by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.’” Carter v. Illinois State Police Dep’t, SLD-22-01089,

2023 WL 4747669, at *4 (C.D. Ill. July 25, 2023) (quoting Hayes v. Illinois Power Co., 225

Ill.App.3d 819, 826, 167 Ill. Dec. 290, 294 587 N.E.2d 559, 563 (1992)); see also Feltmeier v.

Feltmeier, 207 Ill.2d 263, 278 Ill. Dec. 228, 798 N.E.2d 75, 80 (2003)).

“To meet the ‘extreme and outrageous’ standard, the defendants’ conduct ‘must be so

extreme as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as intolerable in a

civilized community.’” Swearnigen-El v. Cook Cty. Sheriff's Dep’t, 602 F.3d 852, 864 (7th Cir.

2010) (quoting Kolegas v. Heftal Broad. Corp., 154 Ill.2d 1, 21, 180 Ill. Dec. 307, 317, 607 N.E.2d

201, 211 (1992)). In determining whether conduct meets the “extreme and outrageous” standard,

courts consider three main factors: “(1) “the more power or control the defendant has over the

plaintiff, the more likely the conduct will be deemed extreme”; (2) “whether the defendant

reasonably believed its objective was legitimate”; and (3) “whether the defendant was aware the

plaintiff was ‘peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress, by reason of some physical or mental

peculiarity.’” Franciski v. Univ. of Chi. Hosp., 338 F.3d 765, 769 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting

McGrath v. Fahey, 126 Ill. 2d 78, 127 Ill. Dec. 724, 533 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1998)). The Illinois

Supreme Court has explained, “Conduct is of an extreme and outrageous character where

‘recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment

against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’” Doe v. Calumet City, 161 Ill.2d 374,

204 Ill. Dec. 274, 641 N.E.2d 498, 507 (1994) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, cmt.

D, at 73 (1965)).20

Moreover, “emotional distress alone is not sufficient to give rise to a cause of action. The

emotional distress must be severe.” Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, Ill., 434 F.3d 1006, 1030 (7th

Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted). “Although fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, worry,

etc. may fall within the ambit of the term ‘emotional distress,’ these mental conditions alone are

not actionable.” Id. at 1030 (quoting Kleidon v. Rizza Chevrolet, Inc., 173 Ill.App.3d 116, 122 Ill.

Dec. 876, 527 N.E.2d 374, 377 (1988)). “‘Severe emotional distress’ is distress so severe that no

reasonable person could be expected to endure it.” Lifton v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago,

416 F.3d 571, 579 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Thomas v. Fuerst, 345 Ill. App. 3d 929, 281 Ill. Dec.

215, 803 N.E.2d 619, 625 (Ill. App. 1 Dist. 2004)). “[W]hen the distress has manifested itself either

through physical symptoms or has necessitated medical treatment, Illinois courts have been more

inclined to characterize the emotional distress as severe.” Honaker v. Smith, 256 F.3d 477, 495

(7th Cir. 2001) (collecting cases). Courts often “merge the issue of the outrageousness of the

defendant's conduct with the issue of the severity of the plaintiff's emotional distress.” Bristow v.

Drake Street Inc., 41 F.3d 345 (7th Cir. 1994).

Under the above referenced framework, the Court does not find it abundantly clear whether

Mr. Horn’s can satisfy the elements necessary to establish his IIED claim. And so, the Court

20 Of relevance here, federal district courts in Illinois routinely conclude that denying a

prisoner access to necessary medication may lay the foundation for an IIED claim. See, e.g., Hardy

v. Butler, GCS-15-437, 2020 WL 888039, at *7 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 2020); Dorsey v. Obaisi, ARW-

16-7884, 2019 WL 1254896, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2019); Hardy v. Illinois Dept. of Corr.,

Wexford Health Serv. Inc., MJR-15-437, 2016 WL 7099964, at *5 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 2016); Awalt

v. Marketti, 74 F. Supp. 3d 909, 941-43 (N.D. Ill. 2014); Liebich v. Hardy, RWG-11-5624, 2013

WL 4476132, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2013); cf. Harrison v. Wexford Health Sources Inc., JBM-

17-1383, 2018 WL 659862, at *8 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2018) (highlighting that a single instance of

conduct including, inter alia, withholding medicine, was not sufficiently severe or outrageous).

concludes that remand is appropriate. In particular, the evidentiary record as to Mr. Horn’s IIED

claim, especially when contrasted to his § 1983 claim, is presently underdeveloped by both parties.

Furthermore, the Court cannot properly address the IIED claim due to the deficiencies in the

parties’ argumentation. See White Eagle Co-Op Association v. Conner, 553 F.3d 467, 476 (7th Cir.

2009). Specifically, certain key areas, such as whether the individual officers acted within the

scope of their employment with Defendant and whether Plaintiff suffered severe emotional

distress, are inadequately briefed. Additionally, both parties’ briefing appears misguided at

times.21 As such, because both the record and briefing are insufficient, the Court has not expended

substantial enough resources to warrant keeping the claim in federal court on the basis of furthering

judicial economy.

Although the Court cannot decide whether Plaintiff’s IIED claim should ultimately be

heard at trial, it is nevertheless not the type of “‘doomed litigation’” that would undoubtedly be

dismissed on remand, and therefore not serve federal-state comity. Groce v. Eli Lilly & Co., 193

F.3d 496, 502 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting Sullivan v. Conway, 157 F.3d 1092, 1095 (7th Cir.1998)).

And, the Court’s decision to remand the case the state court in which the cause of action was

originally filed certainly seems to convenience the parties. Furthermore, the dismissal of Plaintiff’s

federal claim does not have a “preclusive effect” on the supplemental state-law claim, nor are the

21 For example, Defendant seems to conflate the causation aspect of the IIED claim in

arguing that the officers’ conduct did not cause Mr. Horn’s stroke, rather than addressing whether

the relevant conduct caused Mr. Horn’s emotional distress. See Doc. 27; Doc. 29. Similarly, As

was the case with Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim, Defendant ignores the facts surrounding Mr. Horn’s

repeated requests for his medication, and almost exclusively briefs the Court on the relevance of

Officer Woodmansee’s conduct to Plaintiff’s IIED claim. See id.

As to Plaintiff’s briefing on the IIED claim, he cites to the Complaint as evidence of the

mental or emotional harm he suffered. Doc. 28 at 4-5. At this stage in the litigation, Plaintiff “can

no longer depend on the allegations in [his] complaint.” Blanton v. RoundPoint Mortgage

Servicing Corp., 825 Fed. Appx. 369, 372 n.1 (7th Cir. 2020).

supplemental and federal claims “so entangled” that “the rejection of the latter probably entails

rejection of the former.” In re Repository Technologies, Inc., 601 F.3d 710, 725 (7th Cir. 2010)

(citations and internal quotations omitted).

Finally, the Court cannot ignore the undisputed fact that two important events occurred on

July 3, 2020, that is, Mr. Horn was denied medication that was prescribed to prevent strokes and

that he subsequently suffered a stroke. While the court is unable to address the contours of liability

that may or may not attach in state court, Mr. Horn, in the spirit of fairness, deserves to have his

claim heard in an appropriate forum. Therefore, judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and

comity weigh in favor of remanding the case to State court. See Taflinger v. U.S. Swimming, Inc.,

435 Fed. Appx. 559, 562 (7th Cir. 2011) (concluding that the district court's failure to consider

judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in remanding case to state court constituted

an abuse of discretion) (citations omitted).

In light of the foregoing, Count II is REMANDED to State court for further proceedings.22

Thus, the Motion as to Count II is DENIED as moot. See Barnett v. Alcoa, Inc., RLY-06-184, 2007

WL 1183823 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 18, 2007) (denying dispositive motion as moot upon remanding case

to state court).

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 27) as

to Count I is GRANTED and as to Count II is DENIED as moot.

This cause of action is hereby REMANDED to the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Ford County,

22 The Court reminds Plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Dunn, of his ethical and moral duty to

zealously represent his client. This duty obliges Mr. Dunn to brief reasoned arguments relevant to

the posture of the case and to adequately develop the record in support of his client’s claims.

Illinois without apportionment of costs or expenses. The District Clerk is to mail a certified copy

of this order to the clerk of the State court. The State court may thereafter conduct all further

proceedings in this case.

The District Clerk is directed to SEAL the following docket entries: Doc. 27-6 at 53-57;

Doc. 27-7 at 4-5; Doc. 27-8; Doc. 27-9; and Doc. 27-12 at 2-6.

The District Clerk is directed to CLOSE the case.

Entered on this 2nd day of October 2023.

/s/ James E. Shadid

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE