Garcia v. Smith

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION

DAVID GARCIA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 23-cv-1060

)

J SMITH, et al. )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, alleges Defendants violated his constitutional rights.

Several matters are before the Court.

A. Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief based on events that occurred at Centralia

Correctional Center from April to June of this year. Plaintiff alleges he has received

inadequate response to his sick call requests related to a skin rash, stiff joints, confusion,

renewal of his inhaler, pain medications, and chest congestion. Plaintiff complains

about being assigned to cell with “difficult” inmate Bruhnsen, who was sick with a

coughing illness that Plaintiff then caught.

Plaintiff seeks immediate parole, and if not, seeks to keep his prison job, seeks to

have single-cell status if his current cellmate is moved out of his cell, and seeks not to be

held liable for actions of his cellmate.

A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that

should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of

persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997); accord Winter v. Natural Res.

Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary

remedy never awarded as of right”). To prevail, “the moving party must demonstrate:

(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a lack of an adequate remedy at law; and (3)

an irreparable harm will result if the injunction is not granted.” Foodcomm Int’l v Barry,

328 F.3d 300, 303 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). If the moving party meets the first

three requirements, then the district court balances the relative harms that could be

caused to either party. Incredible Tech., Inc. v. Virtual Tech., Inc., 400 F.3d 1007, 1011 (7th

Cir. 2005).

The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) further limits the scope of the Court’s

authority to enter an injunction in the corrections context. Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679,

683 (7th Cir. 2012). Under the PLRA, preliminary injunctive relief “must be narrowly

drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires

preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.” 18

U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2); see also Westefer, 682 F.3d at 683 (the PLRA “enforces a point

repeatedly made by the Supreme Court in cases challenging prison conditions: prison

officials have broad administrative and discretionary authority over the institutions

they manage.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Here, Plaintiff’s allegations relate to his imprisonment at Centralia Correctional

Center. As discussed below, any federal lawsuit related to those allegations must be

brought in a separate lawsuit in the Southern District of Illinois.

Addressing the substance of Plaintiff’s complaints, Plaintiff must show deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need to establish a likelihood of success on the merits

of his allegations. A medical professional acts with deliberate indifference only if the

evidence shows that “no minimally competent professional would have so responded

under those circumstances.” Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894-95 (7th Cir. 2008). Or, stated

differently, when the decision constitutes “such a substantial departure from accepted

professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to demonstrate that the person

responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Petties v. Carter, 836

F.3d 722, 729 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc).

Plaintiff has not provided any medical records to establish the medical care he is

currently receiving or to substantiate his claims. At best, Plaintiff’s allegations permit a

reasonable inference that he disagrees with the course of treatment medical staff at

Centralia have offered, that those persons chose a course of treatment different from

that previously provided, or that Plaintiff desired alternative or additional treatment,

none of which are sufficient to show a constitutional violation. Petties, 836 F.3d at 729

(“Evidence that some medical professionals would have chosen a different course of

treatment is insufficient to make out a constitutional claim.”) (emphasis in original);

Harper v. Santos, 847 F.3d 923, 928 (7th Cir. 2017) (prisoner is not entitled to dictate

medical treatment); Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 1996) (disagreement with

course of treatment not sufficient to show constitutional violation). The Court finds that

Plaintiff has not shown a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits.

The Court cannot order Plaintiff released on parole through this lawsuit. See

Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499.

The Court also finds that the relief Plaintiff requests specific to the Court

dictating his celling assignments, single cell status, immunity from discipline, and

specific medical interventions, to run counter to the requirements of the Prison

Litigation Reform Act. See Rasho v. Jeffreys, 22 F.4th 703, 712-13 (7th Cir. 2022) (injunction

that defined how prison officials should address a particular problem violated the

PLRA’s least-intrusive-means requirement).

The Court, however, is not insensitive to Plaintiff’s complaints. To ensure that

prison officials are aware of his complaints and to mitigate any issues concerning

Plaintiff’s access to medical treatment, the Court will direct the Clerk to forward a copy

of this Order to Centralia’s warden.

B. Motion to Request Counsel

The Court undertakes an initial two-part inquiry: (1) whether the plaintiff made

a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or has been effectively precluded from doing so,

and, if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to

litigate it himself. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 655 (7th Cir 2007).

In analyzing the second step, a court must consider the factual and legal

difficulty of a plaintiff’s claims, and the plaintiff’s competence to litigate them, while

accounting for the plaintiff’s literacy, communication skills, educational level, and

litigation experience, plus the plaintiff’s intellectual capacity and psychological history

if information on those topics is before the court. Watts v. Kidman, 42 F.4th 755, 760 (7th

Cir. 2022).

Plaintiff’s pleadings are clearly written, and demonstrate a sound grasp of the

facts of his experiences and of the claims he wishes to pursue. Plaintiff identifies certain

difficulties he faces, including mental health issues. However, at this early stage of the

case, and given the general understandability of Plaintiff’s pleadings, Plaintiff’s Motion

to Request Counsel (Doc. 4) is DENIED with leave to renew if he files an amended

complaint consistent with this Order.

C. Merit Review Order

The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint, and through such process identify

and dismiss any legally insufficient claim, or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C. §

1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant

who is immune from such relief.” Id.

The Court accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in the

plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). Conclusory

statements and labels are insufficient—the facts alleged must “state a claim for relief

that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013)

(citation omitted).

Plaintiff’s sprawling 123-page Amended Complaint seeks to sue 29 defendants

regarding events occurring from 2018 through 2023, at Pontiac Correctional Center and

at Centralia Correctional Center.

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint will be dismissed with leave to replead, subject

to the following.

Joinder. “A prisoner may join Defendants in the same action only if the claims

against each one ‘aris[e] out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions

or occurrences ….” Mitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492, 502–03 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Fed.

R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)). “Joinder that requires the inclusion of extra parties is limited to

claims arising from the same transaction or series of related transactions.” Wheeler v.

Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2012). “To be precise: a plaintiff

may put in one complaint every claim of any kind against a single defendant, per Rule

18(a), but a complaint may present claim #1 against Defendant A, and claim #2 against

Defendant B, only if both claims arise ‘out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series

of transactions or occurrences.’” Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 683

(7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Rule 20(a)(1)(A)).

“[D]istrict courts should not allow inmates to flout the rules for joining claims

and Defendants, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 18, 20, or to circumvent the Prison Litigation Reform

Act’s fee requirements by combining multiple lawsuits into a single complaint.” Owens

v. Godinez, 860 F.3d 434, 436 (7th Cir. 2017).

The Seventh Circuit “target[s] for dismissal ‘omnibus’ complaints—often

brought by repeat players—that raise claims about unrelated conduct against unrelated

Defendants.” Mitchell, 895 F.3d at 503. However, “judges may sever unrelated claims

into separate suits (rather than dismiss the claims) if the statute of limitations has

otherwise lapsed.” Morris v. Kulhan, 745 F. App’x 648, 649 (7th Cir. 2018).

Doe defendants. Plaintiff has not appropriately identified several of the

Defendants, merely listing numerous Jane or John Does. Plaintiff may sue Doe

defendants if he does not know an individual’s name, but he must also provide some

identifying information. For instance, the job title, the hours worked, specific contacts

with Plaintiff including the day and time of the interaction, and physical descriptions of

the individual. Plaintiff has included some of this information as to some Doe

Defendants, but if he seeks to replead he must provide some identifying information

regarding each Doe Defendant.

Duplicate allegations. Plaintiff is pursuing two other actions in this District as of

today: Garcia v. Durbin et al., CD IL Case No. 22-1283-JES, and Garcia v. Jeffreys et al., CD

IL Case No. 23-1187-SLD. All three lawsuits appear to contain overlapping claims and

Defendants as well as distinct claims and Defendants. A merit review order has been

entered in Case No. 22-1283, defining the claims proceeding in that action. Consistent

with the joinder rules discussed above, Plaintiff should not duplicate claims between

cases. Further, to the extent a judge has ruled that a set of allegations do not state a

claim for relief, those allegations should not be repleaded again here. The proper way to

challenge such a ruling is through an appeal following the conclusion of the lawsuit

where rulings on the viability of those claims was made.

Claims from Centralia. Plaintiff should exclude allegations related to

occurrences in Centralia unless such claims can be asserted consistent with the joinder

rules discussed above. Centralia Defendants are highly unlikely to be properly joined

with Pontiac Defendants and if Plaintiff seeks to join any such Defendants, he must

plainly state how doing so would comply with joinder rules. Any federal lawsuit based

on occurrences in Centralia would be properly brought in the United States District

Court Southern District of Illinois as Centralia is in that District, not this one.

Release from custody. Plaintiff’s pleadings, at times, ask for his release from

prison. E.g., (Doc. 15). Plaintiff cannot seek his release from custody in a § 1983 lawsuit.

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973) (“when a state prisoner is challenging the

very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a

determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that

imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.”). Plaintiff cannot

seek his release from custody in this lawsuit and should refrain from filing pleadings

seeking that relief.

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to replead.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order [16]

is DENIED. Clerk to mail a copy of this Order to the Warden at Centralia

Correctional Center.

2. Motion to Request Counsel [4] is DENIED.

3. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend [14] is GRANTED.

4. Plaintiff's Motion for Status [12] is MOOT.

5. Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time [17] which seeks an unspecified 5-

week extension within which to "deal with" this case and Case No. 23-1283

is DENIED.

6. Pursuant to its merit review of the Amended Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §

1915A, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief.

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice.

7. The Court will allow Plaintiff an opportunity to file a Second Amended

Complaint clarifying his claims, within 30 days of this Order. Failure to file

a Second Amended Complaint will result in the dismissal of this case,

without prejudice, for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff's Second Amended

Complaint will replace Plaintiff's Amended Complaint in its entirety. The

Second Amended Complaint must comply with the pleading standards

discussed in this Order or it will be dismissed.

Entered this 5th day of September, 2023.

s/Michael M. Mihm

MICHAEL M. MIHM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE