Harris v. Renken

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

RAKEEM HARRIS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 23-1213-JEH-JES

)

CHRIS RENKEN, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER AND OPINION

Plaintiff, a non-prisoner, has filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a petition to

proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) (Doc. 3). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion

for Leave to Proceed IFP (Doc. 3) is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

The IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(1), is designed to ensure indigent litigants

meaningful access to the federal courts. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). In cases

asserted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, district courts must “screen the case before granting the

privilege to proceed without prepayment of fees.” United States v. Durham, 922 F.3d 845, 846

(7th Cir. 2019) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). The Court is to review the sufficiency of the

complaint and deny IFP status if: (1) the allegation of poverty is untrue; (2) the action is

frivolous; (3) the action fails to state a claim; or (4) the action seeks monetary relief against an

immune defendant. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2).

The Court has reviewed the IFP petition where Plaintiff attests under penalty of perjury

that he is “technically homeless,” sleeps at “various locations,” and receives SNAP food stamp

benefits. (Doc. 3 at 1). Although Plaintiff has $543.00 in a checking account, he attests to having

no source of income and no driver’s license with which to earn income. The Court finds that

Plaintiff has established indigency for purposes of IFP status and will now consider the

sufficiency of the complaint.

When evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has stated a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B),

courts use the same standards that apply to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motions.

Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1027 (7th Cir. 2013). Therefore, the court will

take as true “all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint” and view them “in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. (citing Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011)). The

complaint must describe the claim in sufficient detail to put defendants on notice as to the nature

of the claim and its bases, and it must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief. Bell

Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint need not allege specific

facts, but it may not rest entirely on conclusory statements or empty recitations of the elements

of the cause of action. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The allegations “must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges violations of his First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth

Amendment rights as well as state law claims of unlawful restraint, false imprisonment,

malicious prosecution, assault, and battery. Plaintiff names McLean County officers Chris

Renken, Nathan Haynes, Dakota Demoss, Jonathan Albee, Winston Gresham, and David Fritts in

their official and individual capacities, and asserts various Monell1 claims against the McLean

County Sheriff’s Office. That is, the officers acted pursuant to an unconstitutional policy or

practice promulgated or allowed by the Sheriff’s Office. Plaintiff pleads unrelated claims arising

from incidents on June 3, 2021, June 23, 2021, and May 16, 2022.

1 Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (finding municipality liability where

a constitutional injury results from the municipality’s policy, practice, or custom).

DISCUSSION

THE JUNE 3, 2021 INCIDENT

Plaintiff asserts violations of his Sixth Amendment and due process rights on June 3,

2021, by Defendant Officers Demoss, Haynes, and Albee when they prevented him bringing “an

electronic device,” not otherwise identified, into the courthouse. He also asserts under Monell,

that Defendants acted pursuant to an unconstitutional policy of the Sheriff’s Office. Plaintiff

alleges that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, in this case, the right to represent himself, was

infringed when he was not allowed to bring the device into the courthouse, something only

attorneys and staff are allowed to do. Plaintiff does not claim that he could not file paper copies,

only that he could not use a portable electronic device to file. He asserts, in part, “[w]ithout their

Portable Electronic Devices, court users are without a way to communicate with their family,

employers, or friends while in the courthouses and, therefore, are unable to seek assistance,

coordinate rides, or inform their employers of being in court.” (Doc. 1 at 15). Plaintiff claims that

there should be storage for portable electronic devices at the security entrance but confusingly

claims that he intended to use the device while in the courthouse. He does not explain how he

would be able to use this device if had had to check it at the entrance as he recommends.

This claim does not state a Sixth Amendment violation as Plaintiff cannot assert a “right”

to counsel under § 1983. See Curet v. Bloom, No. 20-412, 2022 WL 489526, at *1 (E.D. Wis.

Feb. 17, 2022) (“a civil litigant has ‘neither a constitutional nor statutory right’” to counsel). The

claim fails even if generously construed as a lack of access to the courts. Plaintiff has the

opportunity to mail filings to the Clerk or to appear in person with paper copies. In fact, on the

day in question, Plaintiff was in the courthouse and presumably could have filed paper copies.

The lack of e-filing capability does not result in Plaintiff being unable to meaningfully represent

himself or to meaningfully access the courts. It results only in Plaintiff being unable to file in his

preferred manner. See Hobbs v. Shesky, No. 22-680, 2023 WL 2391113, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 7,

2023) (finding federal court rule which did not allow pro se parties to e-file did not violate the

constitution). As Plaintiff cannot state a claim for relief under these facts, the June 3, 2021 claims

are dismissed with prejudice as frivolous. See Barlow v. Wolfson, No. 22-1152, 2022 WL

3443657, at *1 (C.D. Ill. June 29, 2022), appeal dismissed, No. 22-2441, 2022 WL 18673313

(7th Cir. Sept. 30, 2022) (“The Court is not required ‘to accept without question the truth of the

plaintiff's allegations’ when determining whether the complaint is frivolous . . . the Court can

‘pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual

contentions are clearly baseless.’”) (internal citation omitted); Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025,

1026 (7th Cir. 2000) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of a non-prisoner’s claim as

frivolous). “To sue in bad faith means merely to sue on the basis of a frivolous claim, which is to

say a claim that no reasonable person could suppose to have any merit.”

THE JUNE 23, 2021 INCIDENT

Plaintiff pleads that on June 23, 2021, Officer Demoss, aided by Officers Albee and

Gresham, stopped his vehicle because it appeared that he did not have a “legitimate license

plate.” Based on this, Plaintiff asserts Monell, First, and Fourth Amendment claims, failure to

intervene, and malicious prosecution. Plaintiff claims that there was no probable cause for the

stop even though 625 ILCS 5/3-402 of the Illinois motor vehicle code requires with limited

exceptions, none of which Plaintiff claims, that “[e]very motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer and

pole trailer when driven or moved upon a highway shall be subject to the registration and

certificate of title provisions of this Chapter . . .” Plaintiff asserts that this statute is inapplicable

as the automobile he was driving was not a motor vehicle under 18 U.S. Code § 31 (a)(6), a

federal criminal statute relating to damage to commercial aircraft and commercial motor

vehicles. For purposes of that statute “motor vehicle” is defined as “every description of carriage

or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes

on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or

cargo.”

Plaintiff seeks to juxtapose the federal criminal statute’s definition of a motor vehicle

with the Illinois statute to arrive at the conclusion that the vehicle he was driving was not a motor

vehicle subject to the Illinois statute. Plaintiff, in fact, pleads, “[s]ince Harris was not in a motor

vehicle, he was not required to have Secretary of State registration license plates.” (Doc. 1 at 11).

This conclusion is nonsense and Plaintiff pleads nothing to support that the 18 U.S. Code § 31

(a)(6), definition of motor vehicle is to be read into the Illinois motor vehicle code.

Plaintiff also alleges a malicious prosecution claim arising from this incident. Plaintiff

was cited for the offense which was eventually terminated in his favor. He pleads that Officer

Demoss wrongly “initiated criminal proceedings on Harris due to his private automobile not

having Secretary of State registered plates” (Doc. 1 at 12). The Court has already found frivolous

Plaintiff’s claim that there was no probable cause for the stop, and he cannot assert malicious

prosecution without a credible challenge to probable cause. See Gallagher v. Gentile, No.18-

6413, 2021 WL 963766, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2021) (“probable cause provides a complete

defense to an Illinois malicious prosecution claim.”) (internal citation omitted); Martinez v. City

of Chicago, 900 F.3d 838, 849 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[t]o state a claim for malicious prosecution

under Illinois law, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) he was subjected to judicial proceedings; (2)

for which there was no probable cause...”).

Plaintiff also asserts a Monell claim arising from this incident. That is, officers are

impermissibly trained “to treat every car on the road as a ‘Motor Vehicle’ . . . . [and] to initiate

traffic stops and write citations on automobiles that do not have Secretary of State registered

plates.” (Doc. 1 at 10-11). This fails to state a claim for the reasons previously given.

Plaintiff also claims that his First Amendment rights to the free exercise of his religion

were violated in this incident. Plaintiff pleads that at the time, he was on his way to worship and

pray at an undisclosed location. He asserts that the stop by Defendant Demoss interrupted this

religious exercise with the result that Demoss, Gresham, and Albee are liable for the

infringement; and the Sheriff’s Office liable under Monell. Plaintiff premises the Free Exercise

claim on Defendants’ alleged “demand for Harris to operate in a commercial capacity with

Secretary of State registered license plates. In order to avoid seizure and punishment undermines

the moral and religious duty to refrain from commercializing the worship ceremony in any way.”

(Doc. 1 at 13). The named Defendants, however, did not make such a demand, as this was made

by the Illinois legislature in enacting the motor vehicle code.

To effectively plead a Free Exercise claim Plaintiff must allege that Defendant’s actions

substantially burdened his religious exercise. See Schworck v. City of Madison, No. 19-312, 2021

WL 1820779, at *13 (W.D. Wis. May 6, 2021), aff’d as modified, No. 21-2055, 2022 WL 832053

(7th Cir. Mar. 21, 2022) (“The Supreme Court has explained that a ‘substantial burden’ is

something that ‘seriously violates [one’s] religious beliefs,’ regardless of whether alternative

means of religious exercise are available.”) (citing Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015)).

Here, the traffic stop apparently delayed Plaintiff’s religious exercise, but the facts do not

support that the stop violated his religious beliefs.

Still not done, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Gresham and Albee failed to intervene

during the unlawful stop by Demoss. As noted, Plaintiff has not successfully pled that the stop

was unlawful. If there were no constitutional violation, Defendants Gresham and Albee had no

obligation to intervene. The allegations regarding the June 23, 2021 stop are dismissed with

prejudice in their entirety as frivolous.

The May 16, 2022 Incident

Plaintiff pleads that on May 16, 2022, he was at the Courthouse “to handle personal

business.” As he headed to the elevators, Defendant Officers Renken and Haynes approached and

asked him why he was not responding to the name “Michael Anderson.” Plaintiff informed the

officers that he was not Michael Anderson and did not look like Michael Anderson. When

Plaintiff entered the elevator, Defendants Renken and Haynes also entered, blocking the elevator

doors. Defendant Renken claimed that Plaintiff was lying about his identity and threatened to

arrest him for obstruction.

At some point, the two officers stepped back, and Plaintiff headed for the stairwell.

Plaintiff claims that Defendants “rushed” and “cornered” him, requesting his ID. Plaintiff asked

if he was suspected of committing a crime to which the officers replied “No.” When Plaintiff

refused to produce an ID, Defendant Renken told him he was free to go. However, as Plaintiff

entered the stairwell, Defendant Renken grabbed his arm. Plaintiff wrestled his arm free, exited

the stairwell, and headed toward a jail security officer, yelling for help. Renken showed Plaintiff

a picture of Michael Anderson, stating “[S]o you [sic] telling us this does not look like you?”

Plaintiff responded, “[Y]ou act as if we all look alike.” At that point, Renken ordered Plaintiff to

either proceed upstairs to the third floor where he was originally headed or leave the courthouse.

Plaintiff refused to do either, and Defendant Renken yelled at him up close, spraying saliva and

threatening him with arrest if he did not leave. It appears that Plaintiff vacated the courthouse at

this point.

Plaintiff has adequately pled Fourth Amendment and state law false imprisonment claims

against Defendants Renken and Haynes for allegedly seizing him in the elevator and stairwell on

May 23, 2023. Plaintiff also sufficiently pleads state law claims of assault and battery against

Defendant Renken. Plaintiff’s claim of “unlawful restraint” is part and parcel of the false

imprisonment claim and not considered a separate tort. See Gauger v. Hendle, 954 N.E.2d 307,

327 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2011) (“False arrest or false imprisonment is the unlawful restraint of

an individual's personal liberty. The elements of false arrest “are that the plaintiff was restrained

or arrested by the defendant, and that the defendant acted without having reasonable grounds to

believe that an offense was committed by the plaintiff.”) (emphasis in original) (internal citations

omitted).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed IFP (Doc. 3), is

GRANTED. This case will proceed as to the allegations of the May 23, 2022 incident against

Defendants Renken and Haynes only. The allegations of June 3, 2021, and June 23, 2021, are

DISMISSED with prejudice as frivolous.

The Clerk is hereby directed to issue to Defendants Renken and Haynes the summonses

attached to the complaint (Doc. 1-2 at 1- 4)

and to dismiss the remaining Defendants. The Office of the U.S. Marshal is to serve the

complaint, summons, and a copy of this Order on Defendants in accordance with the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, without cost to Plaintiff. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(d).

Signed on this 3rd day of August 2023.

s/James E. Shadid

James E. Shadid

United States District Judge