Hota v. Wallerich

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER GAUTAM HOTA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) No.: 22-cv-1404-JBM

)

KYLE WALLERICH, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, files a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that

his constitutional rights were violated while he was detained at the McLean County Detention

Facility (“MCDF”). (Doc. 1). The case is before the Court for a merit review pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A. In reviewing the Complaint, the Court accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally

construing them in Plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649-51 (7th Cir. 2013).

However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to

“state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422

(7th Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). While the pleading standard does

not require “detailed factual allegations,” it requires “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-

unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Wilson v. Ryker, 451 F. App'x 588, 589 (7th Cir. 2011)

(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff files suit against Assistant Jail Superintendent Matthew Proctor, Sergeant Kyle

Wallerich, and Correctional Officers Shane Bassette, Megan Kohrt, and Lt. Loftus.

Plaintiff alleges that on July 27, 2022, Defendant Kohrt charged him with indecent

exposure because he was naked in his cell. “Indecent exposure” is listed a “Major Rule Violation,”

according to MCDF policy. Plaintiff admits that he was naked.

A “Major Rule Hearing” conducted by Defendants Wallerich, Loftus, and Bassette was

held on July 28, 2022, and Plaintiff was allowed to present his defense. Plaintiff requested

Defendant Kohrt to attend the hearing, but Defendant Wallerich explained that, as a matter of

policy or protocol, officers who accuse detainees of rule violations are prohibited from

participating in the disciplinary process. Plaintiff was disciplined with fifteen days of in-cell

confinement and placed on a “twenty-three and one” schedule. During this time, he remained in

his cell for twenty-three hours a day and was allowed to spend one hour in the common areas.

Plaintiff states that this discipline did not harm him, as he was already in protective custody.

On July 31, 2022, Plaintiff submitted a “Disciplinary Appeal.” He alleges that he was

limited to only two lines to explain the grounds of his appeal. He claims that this prevented him

from submitting a coherent and exculpatory appeal. Defendant Proctor, the Assistant Jail

Superintendent, allegedly reviewed the appeal without contacting Plaintiff to “receive the full heft

of the appeal.” Id. at 8. Defendant Proctor denied Plaintiff’s appeal, stating: “Hota claims that he

should be able to do this because he is in his cell. This is not true as the jail is a public building

and he should be clothed unless using facilities such as the shower. It is a rule violation for this to

occur and this is why he was cited and found guilty of such.” Id.

ANALYSIS

The review of a procedural due process claim requires a two-part analysis: whether the

plaintiff was deprived of a protected liberty or property interest, and if so, what process was due.

Hamlin v. Vaudenberg, 95 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 1996). In other words, if a constitutional right

is identified, then procedural due process must be provided. Brokaw v. Mercer Cnty., 235 F.3d

1000, 1020 (7th Cir. 2000). A due process violation may be implicated if “the defendants deprived

[plaintiff] of a liberty interest by imposing an ‘atypical and significant hardship on [him] in relation

to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” McCoy v. Atherton, 818 F. App’x 538, 541 (7th Cir. 2020)

(quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). The Court must examine not just the

severity, but the duration of the complained-of conditions. Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 640, 644

(7th Cir. 1997); see also Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 2009)

(characterizing up to 90 days in segregation a relatively short period, depending on the conditions

imposed).

Here, Plaintiff states that he was disciplined for indecent exposure and placed on “in-cell

confinement” for fifteen days. During this time, he remained in his cell for twenty-three hours and

was allowed out in the common areas for one hour each day. He does not plead that the conditions

of his confinement were atypical. In fact, he states that the discipline imposed was “not materially

concerning.” (Doc. 1 at 7). Plaintiff states that he had requested to be in protective custody and

was already assigned to a “twenty-three and one” schedule prior to the tribunal’s ruling. Plaintiff

states that he “preferred it that way.” Id. As a result, it appears that there was nothing atypical

about his confinement. This is not enough to state a due process claim. See Lekas v. Briley, 405

F.3d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 2005) (90 days in segregation with loss of contact visits, loss of telephone

and commissary privileges, and the inability to participate in programs did not implicate protected

liberty interests); see also Williams v. Brown, 849 F. App’x 154, 156 (7th Cir. 2021) (only lengthy

period of segregation and harsh conditions will violate due process). Therefore, the Court finds

that Plaintiff fails to plead a due process claim against Defendants. Plaintiff’s Complaint is

DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Any amendment would be futile, as Plaintiff cannot allege a

constitutional claim based on these allegations.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Any amendment to the Complaint would be

futile because Plaintiff cannot allege a cognizable claim on these facts. This case is therefore

closed. The Clerk is directed to enter a judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 58.

2. This dismissal may count as one of Plaintiff's three allotted strikes pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(g). The Clerk of Court is directed to record Plaintiff's strike in the three-strike log.

3. Plaintiff must still pay the full docketing fee of $350 even though his case has been

dismissed. The agency having custody of Plaintiff shall continue to make monthly payments to the

Clerk of Court, as directed in the Court's prior order.

4. If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, he must file a notice of appeal with this

Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). A motion for leave to appeal

in forma pauperis MUST identify the issues Plaintiff will present on appeal to assist the Court in

determining whether the appeal is taken in good faith. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c); see also

Celske v Edwards, 164 F.3d 396, 398 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that an appellant should be allowed

to submit a statement of the grounds for appealing so that the district judge “can make a reasonable

assessment of the issue of good faith”); Walker v O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2000)

(providing that a good-faith appeal is an appeal that “a reasonable person could suppose . . . has

some merit” from a legal perspective). If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the

$505.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of the appeal.

ENTERED: 4/5/2023

s/ Joe Billy McDade

Joe Billy McDade

U.S. District Court Judge