Hernandez v. Austin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

JESUS HERNANDEZ, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 3:21-cv-03237-SEM

)

ADAM EVANS et al., )

Defendants. )

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, United States District Judge:

Defendants Adam Evans and Nicholas Reeder move for

summary judgment, claiming that Plaintiff did not exhaust his

administrative remedies before filing his lawsuit [25]. Plaintiff has

responded [29] and later filed motions for status [30, 31].

Defendants have also filed a motion to stay [32] proceedings until

the Court enters a ruling on their affirmative defense.

The Court denies Defendants’ motion for summary judgment,

which moots the parties’ motions for status and to stay.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff pro se Jesus Hernandez is incarcerated at Centralia

Correctional Center. In November 2021, Plaintiff filed suit [1] under

42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional violations that occurred

during his imprisonment at Graham Correctional Center

(“Graham”). After screening Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court

determined that Plaintiff stated Eighth Amendment conditions of

confinement claims against Defendants. (ECF 8: p. 6, ¶ 3.)

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). “A dispute is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

Zaya v. Sood, 836 F.3d 800, 804 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). The moving party

has the burden of providing documentary evidence to show the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). “If the moving party has properly

supported his motion, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to

come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Spierer v. Rossman, 798 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir.

2015).

A party opposing a supported motion for summary judgment

must cite parts of the record or show that the materials cited do not

demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute. Melton v. Tippeconoe

County, 838 F.3d 814, 818 (7th Cir. 2016). All facts must be

construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and

all reasonable inferences must be drawn in his favor. Ogden v.

Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010). “Only disputes over

facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A scintilla of evidence supporting the

nonmovant’s position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary

judgment; “there must be evidence on which the jury could

reasonably find for the [non-movant].” Id. at 252.

III. THE ILLINOIS ADMINISTRATIVE CODE

Because Defendants base their dispositive motion on Plaintiff’s

alleged failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, that

procedure is summarized as follows.

The Illinois Administrative Code outlines the process for

resolving inmate grievances within the Illinois Department of

Corrections (“IDOC”). See 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.800 et seq.

(2017), promulgated in 41 Ill. Reg. 3908-14 (Mar. 31, 2017),

effective April 1, 2017.

An inmate begins the administrative process by filing a written

grievance addressed to the prison counselor. Id. § 504.810(a).

Except for “[g]rievances related to allegations of sexual abuse,” all

grievances must be initiated within sixty days “after the discovery of

the incident, occurrence, or problem that gives rise to the

grievance.” Id. If an inmate believes his issue is still unresolved

after receiving the counselor’s response, he can submit the

grievance to the grievance officer. “The grievance officer shall

consider the grievance and report his or her findings and

recommendation in writing to the Chief Administrative Officer

[(CAO)] within two months after receipt.” Id. § 504.830(e). The CAO

is typically the warden of the facility.

The CAO then reviews the grievance officer’s findings and

recommendations and decides the grievance. Id. The inmate may

appeal the CAO’s decision to the IDOC Director (“Director”). Id. §

504.850. The Administrative Review Board, which acts as the

Director’s designee, reviews the inmate’s appeal and submits

findings and recommendations to the Director, who makes a final

determination. Id.

IV. MATERIAL FACTS

Plaintiff’s October 5, 2021, complaint alleges Defendants

Evans and Reeder violated his constitutional rights in December

2020, by exposing him to COVID-19. (1: pp. 4-6.) Plaintiff

documented in his pleading that (1) a grievance procedure was

available at Graham, (2) he did not file a grievance about the facts

alleged in his complaint, and (3) the grievance process was not

complete. (Id. p. 2.) As to the incomplete grievance process, Plaintiff

added, “Global pandemic not living condition.” (Id.)

V. ANALYSIS

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Standard

Section 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)

provides the following guidance about administrative remedies:

No action shall be brought with respect to

prison conditions under section 1983 of this

title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner

confined in any jail, prison, or other

correctional facility until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies

to all inmate suits about prison life ….” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S.

516, 532 (2002).

“Exhaustion of administrative remedies serves two main

purposes.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006). First, it

provides an agency the “opportunity to correct its own mistakes

with respect to the programs it administers before it is haled into

federal court and it discourages disregard of the agency’s

procedures.” Id. Second, “exhaustion promotes efficiency” because

claims can generally “be resolved much more quickly and

economically in proceedings before an agency than in litigation in

federal court.” Id.

The Seventh Circuit has taken a strict compliance approach to

exhaustion, which requires a prisoner to pursue all available

administrative remedies and follow the prison’s procedural rules

and deadlines. Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir.

2002). “To exhaust remedies, a prisoner must file complaints and

appeals in the place, and at the time, the prison’s administrative

rules require.” Id. If an inmate does not follow the grievance

procedure rules, her claims will not be exhausted but instead

forfeited, and he will be barred from filing suit in federal Court even

if administrative remedies are for practical purposes not available

due to his procedural default. Id. “Proper exhaustion demands

compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural

rules because no adjudicative system can function without

imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.”

Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-91.

B. Defendants’ Affirmative Defense

Defendants Evans and Reeder contend that Plaintiff did not

exhaust his administrative remedies based on Plaintiff’s earlier

mentioned admissions in his complaint. However, Plaintiff does not

have to plead around an affirmative defense in his pleading. See

Davis v. Indiana State Police, 541 F.3d 760, 763 (7th Cir. 2008)

(holding that “complaints need not anticipate, and attempt to plead

around, potential affirmative defenses”).

To grant Defendants’ summary judgment motion based on the

facts in Plaintiff’s pleading, Plaintiff would have to admit all the

elements of Defendants’ affirmative defense decisively. See Khan v.

U.S., 808 F.3d 1169, 1172 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he district court can

dismiss a complaint as untimely if the plaintiff has admitted all the

elements of the affirmative defense.”).

Plaintiff states that his general comment regarding “[g]lobal

pandemic not living condition” was a summary of the response he

received from Defendant Evans and Reeder when Plaintiff asked

them for a grievance form. (29-1: p. 4.) Plaintiff explains that when

he asked Defendants to provide him a grievance form during the

COVID-19 lockdown, they responded, “this is a global pandemic[.

W]e do not have any grievances.” (29-1: p. 5.) Defendants have not

addressed Plaintiff’s assertion.

Furthermore, the Court notes that Defendants’ mention

grievances Plaintiff filed on December 28, 2021, January 9, 2022,

and January 31, 2022, on issues they claim are unrelated to his

COVID-19 allegations against Defendants. However, besides

mentioning these grievances, Defendants neither append them to

their motion nor argue their significance. Without more, Plaintiff’s

later submission of grievances on unrelated issues does not show

the absence of a genuine dispute that would entitle Defendants to

summary judgment for Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his

administrative remedies on his conditions of confinement claims.

Accordingly, because the Court concludes that Defendants

Evans and Reeder have failed to satisfy their burden of persuasion

on their affirmative defense, the Court denies their motion for

summary judgment. See Hernandez v. Dart, 814 F.3d 836, 840 (7th

Cir. 2016) (Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense for which

the defendants carry the burden of proof.)

The entry of the Court’s Order moots the parties remaining

motions for status and stay. The Court amends its Scheduling

Order as follows: discovery closes on August 6, 2023, and

dispositive motions are due on September 6, 2023.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) The Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on the issue of exhaustion [25] for the reasons

stated in the Court’s Order.

2) The Court’s order renders MOOT, Plaintiff’s motions for

status [30], [31], and Defendants’ motion to stay discovery

[32].

3) The Court amends its Scheduling Order as follows:

discovery closes on August 6, 2023, and dispositive

motions are due on September 6, 2023.

Entered March 20, 2023.

s/ Sue E. Myerscough

_________________________________________

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE