Williams v. Haleighs Hope, Inc

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

SYDNEY WILLIAMS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 22-3090

)

JAMIE BRAMBLETT, in her individual )

capacity, GLEN CURRY, in his )

individual capacity, ANGELA KRAMP, )

in her individual capacity, CAMELOT )

CARE CENTERS, LLC, ERIN )

HELMHOLZ, and KATHY HENKE, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:

Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss (d/e 28) filed by

Defendants Jamie Bramblett, Glenn Curry, and Angela Kramp

(collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiff Sydney Williams seeks, in

Count III of her Complaint (d/e 1), compensatory damages, with

interest, and punitive damages against the defendants in their

individual capacities for alleged violations of Plaintiff’s rights under

the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff’s allegations stem from the

child removal proceedings in Illinois state courts from 2019 which

resulted in Plaintiff being removed from her parents’ custody until

she reached the age of majority. But Plaintiff’s allegations against

Defendant Bramblett concern the actions Bramblett took in

presenting the case to the state Juvenile Court which is protected

by absolute immunity. However, the remaining allegations concern

Defendant Curry’s and Kramp’s actions in directing Defendant

Bramblett as supervisors during the Juvenile Court proceedings.

Those allegations plainly assert a claim on which relief may be

granted under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

And at the pleadings stage, the Court determines that factual

development is still required before Plaintiff’s claims may be

dismissed on the basis of qualified immunity. Defendants’ Motion

(d/e 28) is, therefore, GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Defendants move to dismiss the allegations against them and

proceed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). “A Rule

12(b)(6) motion tests ‘the legal sufficiency of a complaint,’ as

measured against the standards of Rule 8(a).” Gunn v. Cont’l Cas.

Co., 968 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Runnion v. Girl

Scouts of Greater Chicago and Northwest Indiana, 768 F.3d 510,

526 (7th Cir. 2015)). Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief.” The complaint need not contain “detailed

factual allegations” to pass a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge but still must

“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). The moving party bears the burden

of establishing that the complaint’s allegations, taken as true at the

pleadings stage, are insufficient to state a claim. Marcure v. Lynn,

992 F.3d 625, 631 (7th Cir. 2021).

Before reciting the facts alleged in the Complaint, the Court

must first address Defendants’ presentation of matters outside the

pleadings. Because a Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the pleadings,

district courts are ordinarily confined to the allegations stated

within the complaint. Fin. Fiduciaries, LLC v. Gannett Co., 46

F.4th 654, 663 (7th Cir. 2022). If matters outside the pleadings are

presented to and not excluded by the court on a motion under Rule

12(b)(6), the court generally must convert the motion under Rule

12(d) to one for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).

An exception to the Rule 12(d) conversion requirement is the

incorporation-by-reference doctrine. Under the doctrine, a district

court may consider, without converting a defendant’s 12(b)(6)

motion under Rule 12(d), documents outside the pleadings if those

documents are “(1) referenced in the plaintiff's complaint, (2)

concededly authentic, and (3) central to the plaintiff's claim.”

Gannett, 46 F.4th at 663 (citing Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp. v. Lease

Resol. Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1080 (7th Cir. 1997)). District courts

have discretion when deciding whether to consider such materials.

Defendants attach and cite to five documents in their 12(b)(6)

motion Defendants argue fall within the incorporation-by-reference

doctrine. See Defs.’ Mem. (d/e 29) p. 4, n. 2. Those documents are

(1) the transcript of the Shelter Care Hearing held on June 7, 2019

in which Plaintiff alleges Defendant Bramblett made false

statements and misrepresented facts at the direction of Defendants

Curry and Kramp (Defs.’ Ex. A (d/e 31)); (2) the May 16, 2019 Order

on First Appearance in which the Circuit Court of the Seventh

Judicial Circuit of Illinois, Sangamon County, Juvenile Division

granted DCFS the temporary protective custody of Plaintiff and

which forms the basis of Plaintiff’s action against Defendants (Defs.’

Ex. B (d/e 31-1)); (3) the June 7, 2019 Order as to Shelter Care in

which the same court ordered Plaintiff be placed in shelter care

pending further proceedings (Defs.’ Ex. C (d/e 31-2)); (4) the June

26, 2020 Order of Adjudication in which the same court found

Plaintiff to be neglected (Defs.’ Ex. D (d/e 31-3)); and (5) the July

24, 2020 Dispositional Order in which the same court ordered

Plaintiff be made a ward of the court and placed Plaintiff in the

custody of the Guardianship Administrator for the Illinois

Department of Children and Family Services. (Defs.’ Ex. E (d/e 31-

4)).

The Court agrees with Defendants. As detailed further below,

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants stem from her removal from

her parents’ custody as a minor based on Defendants’ alleged

actions in “misrepresent[ing] facts to and with[olding] exculpatory

evidence from the juvenile court.” Compl. (d/e 1) ¶ 78. The alleged

actions were, according to Plaintiff, “breaches of duties owed to”

Plaintiff and “were a proximate cause of [her] continued withholding

from her parents and damages.” Id. at ¶ 79. The testimony of

Defendant Bramblett, which forms the basis of Plaintiff’s claims, is

contained within the Shelter Care Hearing Transcript and resulted

in the four Orders entered by the Juvenile Division of the Circuit

Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit of Illinois, Sangamon County.

Each of those documents are clearly referenced in Plaintiff’s

Complaint, authentic, and central to Plaintiff’s claims. Gannett, 46

F.4th at 663. The Court, therefore, has discretion to, and does,

consider the documents without converting under Rule 12(d).

II. BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint and

the documents attached to Defendants’ Motion. The facts taken

from the Complaint are accepted as true and all reasonable

inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff. United States ex rel. Berkowitz v. Automation Aids, Inc.,

896 F.3d 834, 839 (7th Cir. 2018).

Plaintiff Sydney Williams was diagnosed with a selective

immunodeficiency when she was five years old which was

characterized by recurrent pneumonias and gastroesophageal reflux

disease, i.e., frequent vomiting. Compl. ¶ 2. Plaintiff was diagnosed

with gastroparesis when she was six. Id. Plaintiff’s condition did

not improve during her childhood, and she was diagnosed with

multiple illnesses including but not limited to eosinophilic

esophagitis, gastroparesis, mitochondrial myopathy, and cyclical

vomiting syndrome. Id. at ¶ 3.

Plaintiff’s parents helped her manage her illnesses while

Plaintiff was young. Id. at ¶ 4. One way Plaintiff’s parents did so

was by using an over-the-counter Cannabidiol (CBD) oil sold by

Haleigh’s Hope, Inc. Id. at ¶ 6, 19, & 30. The CDB oil contained

trace levels of Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), though, despite

containing no label warning Plaintiff or her parents of that. Id. at ¶

6, 30, 32. Those trace levels of THC triggered a positive TCH lab

test performed on Plaintiff while she was being treated at a hospital

for dizziness, nausea, and vomiting. Id. at ¶ 6.

Once a doctor at the hospital received the positive THC test,

the doctor concluded that Plaintiff was being abused by her parents

and placed a hotline call to the Illinois Department of Children and

Family Services (DCFS). Id. at ¶ 7. Defendant Jamie Bramblett

was assigned to Plaintiff’s case as lead investigator and caseworker

under the supervision of Defendants Glenn Curry and Angela

Kramp, each a Public Service Administrator at DCFS with

supervisory duties over Bramblett. Id. at ¶ 35. According to the

Complaint, Defendant Bramblett testified at a June 7, 2019 Shelter

Care Hearing that “she reviewed [Plaintiff’s] medical records and

there was no diagnosis to explain Sydney’s dizziness, nausea, and

vomiting.” Id. at ¶ 36. According to the Shelter Care Hearing

Transcript, Defendant Bramblett testified that Plaintiff had been

hospitalized nine times in five different states in the two years prior

to the hospital visit. Defs.’ Ex. A at 22–23. As a result of that

testimony, the Juvenile Court ordered Plaintiff be placed in shelter

care. Defs.’ Ex. C.

Plaintiff alleges that the testimony provided by Defendant

Bramblett was “untruthful and misleading.” Compl. at ¶ 36.

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Bramblett “distorted the

truth by limiting the review of medical records to the 2-year period

preceding the report of abuse.” Id. at ¶ 38. According to Plaintiff,

Defendant Bramblett “discussed her testimony with her

supervisors, Ms. Kramp and Mr. Curry, who were also aware” that

Bramblett’s testimony was misleading and Bramblett “could not

have single-handedly limited review of the medical records to the 2-

year period preceding the report of suspected abuse.” Id. at ¶ 41.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Bramblett, Kramp, and Curry all

came to possess “new and additional information” after the June 7,

2019 Shelter Care Hearing but “refused to reconsider their position”

on the removal of Plaintiff from her parents’ custody “or notify the

Juvenile Court” of the new information. Id. at ¶ 43.

These alleged acts by Defendants Bramblett, Kramp, and

Curry led to the eventual removal of Plaintiff from her parents’

custody on May 3, 2019. Id. at ¶ 11. Plaintiff was placed in the

Illinois foster care system until September 2020, the month in

which she turned 18 years old. Id. at ¶ 12 & 40. After that,

Plaintiff returned to her parents’ home as her permanent residence.

Id. at ¶ 13.

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on June 2, 2022. See Compl. In

Count III of her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the actions by

Defendants Bramblett, Kramp, and Curry constitute violations of

her Fourteenth Amendment right to familial relations. Id. at 72–76;

see also id. at 50–58. Defendants now move to dismiss the claims

against them.

III. ANALYSIS

Defendants raise several challenges to Plaintiff’s Complaint.

Defendants first argue that Plaintiff’s claims are jurisdictionally

barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which holds that federal

courts do not have jurisdiction to consider certain claims arising

from state court proceedings. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s

Complaint does not, on its face, adequately state a Fourteenth

Amendment due process claim. Moving to immunities and

affirmative defenses, Defendant Bramblett argues that she is

absolutely immune from any claims against her while Defendants

Curry and Kramp argue that no claims can proceed against them

because they are entitled to qualified immunity.

A. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply here.

The Rooker Feldman doctrine generally prohibits federal

courts, other than the Supreme Court, from considering claims

seeking review of state court judgments. Long v. Shorebank Dev.

Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Rooker v. Fidelity

Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923), and D.C. Court of Appeals

v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482–86 (1983)). This jurisdictional bar

applies to claims “actually raised before the state court” and to

claims that are “inextricably intertwined with state court

determinations.” Id.

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants approach the border of

Rooker-Feldman but do not cross it. Plaintiff does not seek this

Court’s review of the underlying Juvenile Court Orders; indeed,

those Orders are moot and unenforceable now that Plaintiff has

reached the age of majority. Cf. Felzak v. Hruby, 876 N.E.2d 650,

657 (Ill. 2007) (holding moot the appeal of issues raised in a

visitation order once the subject of the visitation order reached

adulthood). Plaintiff’s claims do not seek relief from any state court

order or a declaration that the Juvenile Court Orders were wrongly

decided.

Instead, Plaintiff alleges that the way in which Defendants

investigated and pursued the removal proceedings in her case

violated her rights to due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth

Amendment. Those claims require the review of Defendants’

actions in the state court proceedings, not the review of the

Juvenile Court’s Orders which were the result of those proceedings.

That distinct difference renders Rooker-Feldman inapplicable in

this case.

B. Plaintiff has sufficiently pled violations of her Fourteenth

Amendment Right to Familial Relations.

Defendants next argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim

under the Fourteenth Amendment. The right to familial relations

generally has been recognized as protected by the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brokaw v. Mercer Cty., 235

F.3d 1000, 1018 (7th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases). This right is

“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” Moore v. City

of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977), and includes the “right

of a child to be raised and nurtured by [her] parents.” Brokaw, 235

F.3d at 1018. States may only interfere with a family’s right to

remain whole if the state “has some definite and articulable

evidence giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that a child has been

abused or is in imminent danger of abuse.” Id. at 1019.

Supervisory officials may also be liable for the actions of their

subordinates if the supervisor is “personally involved in” the alleged

constitutional violation by “knowingly facilitat[ing], approv[ing], or

condon[ing]” the subordinate’s actions. Milchtein v. Milwaukee

Cty., 42 F.4th 814, 824 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing Gill v. City of

Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 344 (7th Cir. 2017) and Matthews v. City

of East St. Louis, 675 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2012)).

Plaintiff alleges in Count III of her Complaint that Defendant

Bramblett “misstated facts and withheld exculpatory evidence from

the Juvenile Court” during the removal proceedings and that

Defendants Curry and Kramp “were directly aware of [Bramblett’s] .

. . misrepresentations” and “exculpatory evidence” and did not

correct Bramblett’s actions. Compl. at ¶ 73–74. Plaintiff further

alleges that Defendants Curry and Kramp “directed, supervised, or

ratified Bramblett’s acts and omissions.” Id. at ¶ 49C. While, as

stated earlier, these allegations cannot form constitutional claims

which attack the Juvenile Court’s rulings or findings, these

allegations adequately state claims that Defendants improperly

interfered with Plaintiff’s right to familial relations under the

Fourteenth Amendment. And because Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants Curry and Kramp “directed” Defendant Bramblett’s

actions (see Compl. at ¶ 49C), Plaintiff has alleged “enough to affix

liability” to Curry and Kramp as supervisors. Brokaw, 235 F.3d at

1014 (collecting cases and holding that allegations that a supervisor

directed actions which eventually led to a minor’s removal were

sufficient to state a claim). Defendants Curry’s and Kramp’s

respondeat superior defense, therefore, does not defeat Plaintiff’s

claims.

Defendants point to the Order on First Appearance, the

Shelter Care Hearing Order and Transcript, and the other Orders

entered by the Juvenile Court to argue against this finding.

Defendants argue that “there [was] ample evidence giving rise to a

reasonable suspicion that Plaintiff was abused or neglected or in

danger of neglect. Def. Mem. at p. 10. Defendants’ argument is

that Plaintiff’s claims cannot proceed because the Juvenile Court’s

Orders were appropriate based on the evidence. But that argument

is one which seeks this Court’s review of the Juvenile Court’s

Orders, in other words, precisely that which would be barred by

Rooker-Feldman. More to the point, though, is the fact that

Plaintiff’s allegations are that Defendant Bramblett, in concert with

and at the direction of Defendants Curry and Kramp, deprived

Plaintiff of her constitutional rights by initiating and continuing an

investigation and removal proceedings when they possessed

evidence which would have tended to negate the need for removal.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s allegations implicate the Defendants and their

actions, not the Juvenile Court.

To the extent Defendants argue Plaintiff’s claims fail to

specifically identify what exculpatory evidence Defendants withheld,

such arguments are premature. At the pleadings stage, Plaintiff is

not required to provide “detailed factual allegations.” Ashcroft, 556

U.S. at 678. All that is required of Plaintiff is that she provide “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing [she] is entitled to

relief.” Rule 8(a)(2). To require more would be to encroach into the

realm of summary judgment. Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants

withheld exculpatory evidence from the Juvenile Court. That is

enough at this stage to put Defendants on notice of the claims

against them. On the face of the Complaint, Plaintiff states a claim

and Defendants have not carried their burden to show otherwise.

C. Defendant Bramblett is absolutely immune from liability,

while further factual development is required before

addressing Defendants Curry’s and Kramp’s claim of

qualified immunity.

With no jurisdictional bar and adequately stated claims under

the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court lastly considers Defendants’

asserted immunities.

i. Defendant Bramblett is absolutely immune.

Defendant Bramblett argues that she is absolutely immune

from Plaintiff’s claims against her because the claims stem from the

actions Defendant Bramblett took in presenting the removal case to

the Juvenile Court. “[S]ocial workers and like public officials are

entitled to absolute immunity in child custody cases on account of

testimony and other steps taken to present the case for decision by

the [juvenile] court.” Millspaugh v. Cty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare of

Wabash Cty., 937 F.2d 1172, 1176 (7th Cir. 1991); see also

Milchtein, 42 F.4th at 825. This immunity comes from the absolute

immunity afforded to both prosecutors and witnesses for alleged

injuries based on their actions in court. Millspaugh, 937 F.2d at

1175. At its core are an individual’s “motives in asking a court to

do certain things” and the “selection of evidence to present” in

advancing the request. Id.; Milchtein, 42 F.4th at 825. And while a

social worker’s “acts of applying for physical custody and retrieving

the children” are protected by the more fact-intensive protections of

qualified immunity, Milchtein, 42 F.4th at 825, “the acts of

presenting . . . evidence to (or withholding it from) the [juvenile]

court receive [the] greater protection” of absolute immunity.

Millspaugh, 937 F.2d at 1176. This is true even if the social worker

is proven to have presented or withheld the evidence based on an

improper motive because the social worker’s actions “could yield no

harm . . . unless the court agreed.” Id. at 1175.

Plaintiff argues that this immunity should not apply because,

in Plaintiff’s view, Defendant Bramblett is not like the social

workers at issue in either Millspaugh or Milchtein. Plaintiff argues

that the social workers in those cases were acting like prosecutors

whereas Defendant Bramblett was a “Child Protection Specialist,” a

position that does not serve a prosecutorial function in Illinois.

The Court disagrees. Defendant Bramblett’s title of “Child

Protection Specialist” does not render either Millspaugh or Milchtein

inapplicable. Neither does the fact that Defendant Bramblett does

not serve a prosecutorial role. Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument

otherwise, neither Millspaugh nor Milchtein were narrow holdings

only applicable to social workers whose specific functions were

prosecutorial. Indeed, both cases explicitly applied to “social

workers and like public officials.” Milchtein, 42 F.4th at 825

(emphasis added); Millspaugh, 937 F.2d at 1176 (same). The basis

for that protection was in the immunity afforded to “prosecutors

and witnesses, both of whom are entitled to absolute immunity for

their actions taken in court.” Milchtein, 42 F.4th at 825 (emphasis

added); Millspaugh, 937 F.2d at 1175. And the reason for the

extension of the prosecutor and witness immunity to social workers

and like public officials is because the presentation of testimony or

evidence to, or the withholding of the same from, a court “is

something that could cause no loss unless the court pressed on to

decision.” Millspaugh, 937 F.2d at 1175.

The same reasoning applies to Defendant Bramblett’s actions

here. Even taking the Complaint as true, Plaintiff’s allegations

against Defendant Bramblett only implicate her actions in

presenting evidence to, and withholding evidence from, the Juvenile

Court. Those actions are protected by absolute immunity.

Milchtein, 42 F.4th at 825; Millspaugh, 937 F.2d at 1176.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Bramblett must be

dismissed.

ii. Further factual development is required before

determining whether Defendants Curry and Kramp are

entitled to qualified immunity.

As stated earlier, Plaintiff alleges in Count III that Defendants

Curry and Kramp, as supervisors, directed Bramblett’s actions and,

therefore, caused Plaintiff’s constitutional injury. In response,

Defendants Curry and Kramp raise the affirmative defense of

qualified immunity. Generally, qualified immunity protects

government officials performing discretionary functions from suit

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless their conduct violated clearly

established law of which a reasonable person operating in the

officials’ capacity would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.

800, 818 (1982); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). Once

a defendant raises the qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff

must show that the constitutional question was beyond doubt at

the time the defendants acted. Upton v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 1209,

1212 (7th Cir. 1991). A plaintiff can accomplish this by either

“point[ing] to closely analogous cases decided prior to the

defendants’ challenged actions,” id., or “proving the defendant[s’]

conduct was so egregious and unreasonable that . . . no reasonable

[officials] could have thought [they were] acting lawfully.” Reed v.

Palmer, 906 F.3d 540, 547 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation and

additional citation omitted). This is a fact-intensive question and as

such is rarely decided at the pleadings stage. Id. at 548–49.

Defendants Curry and Kramp argue that Plaintiff cannot point

to a sufficiently analogous case to show they violated clearly

established law. But as made clear above, that is not the only

method to show a violation of clearly established law. “[B]inding

precedent is not necessary to clearly establish a right.” Brokaw,

235 F.3d at 1022. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Curry and

Kramp “directed, supervised, and ratified Bramblett’s acts” in

making material misrepresentations to the Juvenile Court, and

withholding relevant evidence from the Juvenile Court. Compl. at

¶¶ 41–43, 49C. That alleged conduct constitutes an independent

constitutional violation from Defendant Bramblett’s alleged

misconduct, see Milchtein, 42 F.4th at 824, and is severe enough

that no reasonable official in Defendant Curry’s or Kramp’s

positions would have thought what they were doing was reasonable.

See Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1022 (“Specifically, a reasonable person

would have known that it was unconstitutional to use the

government's power to cause, or conspire to cause, the unjustified

removal of a six-year-old child from his parents in order to destroy

the family.”) And though it is unclear whether the ultimate facts of

this case may fully prove Plaintiff’s claims, when the allegations in

the Complaint are taken as true as the must at this stage, the

Complaint sufficiently states claims of violations of clearly

established law. See id. at 1023. On the pleadings, Defendant

Curry’s and Kramp’s assertion of qualified immunity must be

denied.

D. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff sufficiently pled claims of violations of her Fourteenth

Amendment right to familial relations which are not barred by the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. On the allegations in the Complain,

Defendant Bramblett is entitled to absolute immunity from these

claims, while Defendants Curry and Kramp are not entitled to

qualified immunity at this time. It is therefore ordered,

(1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (d/e 28) is GRANTED IN

PART and DENIED IN PART.

(2) Defendant Bramblett is absolutely immune from

Plaintiff’s claims in Count III of the Complaint, and so the

claims against her therein are dismissed without

prejudice.

(3) Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Curry and Kramp

may proceed.

(4) Plaintiff is given leave to file an Amended Complaint

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 within 14

days of the entry of this Order. Defendants Curry and

Kramp shall file their Answer(s) or other applicable

responsive pleading, if any, within 28 days of the entry of

this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: February 24, 2023.

FOR THE COURT

/s/ Sue E. Myerscough____________

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE