Collis v. Commissioner of Social Security

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ROCK ISLAND DIVISION

JOHN C.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 4:21-cv-04168-JEH

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

Order

Now before the Court is the Plaintiff John C.’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. 10), the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Affirmance (Doc.

13), and the Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. 14).1 For the reasons stated herein, the Court

DENIES the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANTS the

Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Affirmance.2

I

John C. filed an application for disability insurance benefits (DOB) on March

29, 2018, alleging disability beginning on February 4, 2016. His DIB claim was

denied initially and upon reconsideration, and a hearing before the Honorable

Susan F. Zapf (ALJ) was held thereafter, on January 7, 2020. At that hearing, John

was represented by an attorney, and John, his wife, and a vocational expert (VE)

testified. The ALJ next issued an unfavorable decision, but the Appeals Council

(AC) ultimately remanded the case in October 2020 for the ALJ to evaluate the

1 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S. Magistrate Judge. (Docs. 5, 6).

2 References to the pages within the Administrative Record will be identified by AR [page number]. The Administrative Record

appears at (Doc. 8) on the docket.

medical necessity of an assistive device, give further consideration to John’s RFC,

and properly evaluate his medical source’s medical opinions.

A second hearing was held on February 16, 2021, before the same ALJ. At

the second hearing, John was represented by the same attorney, and he again

testified as did a different VE. Following the hearing, John’s DIB claim was denied

on April 14, 2021. His request for review by the AC was denied on August 24,

2021, making the ALJ’s April 2021 Decision the final decision of the Commissioner.

John timely filed the instant civil action seeking review of the ALJ’s April 2021

Decision on October 13, 2021.

II

John challenges the ALJ’s Decision for the following reasons: 1) the ALJ

erred in improperly assessing opinion evidence from John’s treating physician; 2)

the ALJ erred in assessing whether an assistive device was medically necessary; 3)

the ALJ erred in improperly assessing John’s subjective complaints; and 4) the ALJ

erred in improperly assessing John’s residual functional capacity.

III

The Court’s function on review is not to try the case de novo or to supplant

the ALJ’s findings with the Court’s own assessment of the evidence. See Schmidt

v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 970, 972 (7th Cir. 2000); Pugh v. Bowen, 870 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir.

1989). Indeed, “[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any

fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Although great deference is afforded to the determination made by the ALJ, the

Court does not “merely rubber stamp the ALJ’s decision.” Scott v. Barnhart, 297

F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 2002). The Court’s function is to determine whether the

ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and whether the proper

legal standards were applied. Delgado v. Bowen, 782 F.2d 79, 82 (7th Cir. 1986).

Substantial evidence is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support the decision. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.

389, 390 (1971); Henderson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 507, 512 (7th Cir. 1999).

In order to qualify for disability insurance benefits, an individual must show

that his inability to work is medical in nature and that he is totally disabled.

Economic conditions, personal factors, financial considerations, and attitudes of

the employer are irrelevant in determining whether a plaintiff is eligible for

disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566. The establishment of disability under the Act

is a two-step process.

First, the plaintiff must be suffering from a medically determinable physical

or mental impairment, or combination of impairments, which can be expected to

result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous

period of not less than 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Second, there must be

a factual determination that the impairment renders the plaintiff unable to engage

in any substantial gainful employment. McNeil v. Califano, 614 F.2d 142, 143 (7th

Cir. 1980). The factual determination is made by using a five-step test. See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520. In the following order, the ALJ must evaluate whether the

claimant:

1) is performing substantial gainful activity;

2) suffers from an impairment that is severe and meets a

durational requirement, or suffers from a combination of

impairments that is severe and meets the durational

requirement;

3) suffers from an impairment which meets or equals any

impairment listed in the appendix and which meets the

duration requirement;

4) is unable to perform her past relevant work which includes an

assessment of the claimant’s residual functional capacity; and

5) is unable to perform any other work existing in significant

numbers in the national economy.

Id. An affirmative answer at Steps Three or Five leads to a finding that the plaintiff

is disabled. Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 352 (7th Cir. 2005).

The plaintiff has the burdens of production and persuasion on Steps One

through Four. Id. However, once the plaintiff shows an inability to perform past

work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show ability to engage in some

other type of substantial gainful employment. Weatherbee v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 565,

569 (7th Cir. 2011).

In the instant case, John claims error on the ALJ’s part at Step Four.

A

At Step one, the ALJ determined John had not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since February 4, 2016, the alleged onset date. AR 28. At Step Two, the

ALJ determined John had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc

disease and asthma. Id. At Step Three, the ALJ determined John did not have an

impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the

severity of one of the listed impairments. AR 30. At Step Four, the ALJ made the

following residual functional capacity (RFC) finding:

[T]he claimant has the [RFC] to perform sedentary work as defined in

20 CFR 404.1567(a) except he can never climb ladders, ropes or

scaffolds, but can occasionally climb ramps and/or stairs, and can

occasionally stoop, crouch, crawl and balance. He must avoid

concentrated exposure to extreme cold, extreme heat and humidity,

and to fumes, odors, dusts, gasses and poor ventilation. He can no

more than occasionally reach overhead bilaterally. He can engage in

frequent but not constant handling and fingering bilaterally. He can

never reach overhead with the bilateral upper extremities.

Id.3 At Step Five, the ALJ determined that considering John’s age, education, work

experience, and RFC, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the

national economy that John could perform. AR 37. Thus, the ALJ concluded John

had not been under a disability from February 4, 2016 through the date of the

Decision, April 14, 2021. AR 38.

B

1

John first argues that the ALJ just summarized medical records that

supported a finding of not disabled and omitted or misconstrued records that

supported John’s allegations and treating doctor Emmanuel C. Nwumeh, M.D.’s

opined-to restrictions that would preclude all work. The crux of his argument is

that the ALJ erred where he discredited Dr. Nwumeh’s opinions as based upon

subjective evidence which, instead, was objective evidence. The Commissioner

counters that the ALJ sufficiently supported her analysis of Dr. Nwumeh’s

opinions, which the ALJ found lacked supportability and consistency with the

other substantial evidence.

Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a), an ALJ is required to consider the

persuasiveness of medical opinions using several factors, though the most

important factors are supportability and consistency. See also 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520c(b)(2) (providing the factors of supportability and consistency “are the

most important factors we consider when we determine how persuasive we find a

medical source’s medical opinions . . . to be”) (emphasis added); 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520c(c)(1) (providing that the “more relevant the objective medical evidence

and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or

her medical opinion(s) . . . the more persuasive the medical opinions . . . will be”);

3 While there appears to be a discrepancy between “can no more than occasionally reach overhead bilaterally” and “can never reach

overhead with the bilateral upper extremities,” no party mentions it and so the Court will address it no further.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2) (providing the factor of consistency will be considered

when considering medical opinions such that the “more consistent a medical

opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from

other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive

the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be”). Here,

at the outset of considering the medical opinions of record, the ALJ stated that

those opinions “have little support in or consistency with the record as a whole.”

AR 35.

The ALJ explained it was “necessary to clarify” that Dr. Nwumeh’s May

2019 medical source stated (MSS) finding John significantly limited in sitting,

standing, walking for even short distances, and lifting and finding John unable to

engage in extended reaching bilaterally, bending at the waist, squatting, kneeling,

working on ladders, and operating a company vehicle or its hazardous machinery

was “generally persuasive.” AR 35. She elaborated the opinion was persuasive

because “it, along with the other medical evidence as listed by the undersigned in

the 2020 decision supports the finding that the claimant is restrict to a reduced

range of sedentary work.” Id. The ALJ also explained, specifically with regard to

Dr. Nwumeh’s December 2015, September 2016, August 2017, and May 2019

MSSs, that she considered those “checkbox forms that were routinely used by Dr.

Nwumeh to report the claimant’s work status to his employer throughout the

treatment record[.]” AR 36.

Delving into her particular reasons for finding Dr. Nwumeh’s opinions not

sufficiently persuasive of disability so as to entitle John to benefits, the ALJ began

with her observation that “it is clear by the succession of records that these were

only temporary restrictions, as the claimant was scheduled for another

appointment to determine [John’s] release back to work shortly after each.” Id.

The ALJ also considered that Dr. Nwumeh’s contemporaneous examinations

revealed that John was always positive for subjective tenderness, reduced lumbar

flexion, and sometimes extension due to pain, but he was always neurologically

stable. From evidence of only one positive straight leg raise test and difficulty

lifting his legs at an ER visit in September 2016, reports of diminished sensation

and reflexes in the left leg at a 2016 pain clinic examination, decreased strength

with no estimate of deficit at an April 2019 ER visit, and mild (4/5) lower extremity

weakness at a July 2019 neurological examination, the ALJ reasoned those findings

were “notably rare” in the record and were never observed by Dr. Nwumeh who

most regularly examined John. Id. The ALJ thus found that Dr. Nwumeh’s

contemporaneous examinations did not support debilitating symptoms, and, in

turn, his opinions were not supported by either his own examinations or the

record as a whole.

Next, the ALJ identified internal inconsistencies in Dr. Nwumeh’s 2017 and

2019 MSSs; he noted John could barely lift any weight, but assessed John remained

capable of sedentary physical activity in the 2017 form and of light activity in the

2019 form. The ALJ then rejected Dr. Nwumeh’s indication that John was likely

never to be able to return to work where “the determination of inability to perform

certain work or to assess that the claimant is disabled” was reserved to the

Commissioner and could not be delegated. Id. The ALJ again concluded Dr.

Nwumeh’s opined-to restrictions omitted from the RFC and his conclusion that John

would likely never work again were not persuasive, in particular, because they

were not supported by his own examinations or the record as a whole. As for Dr.

Nwumeh’s January 2021 MSS, the ALJ recited the opined-to limitations at that

time and concluded, “In the same manner that the doctor’s prior opinions are not

convincing, this one is not supported by or consistent with the medical evidence.”

Id.

The ALJ more than sufficiently articulated her assessment of the evidence

such that this Court can trace the path of her reasoning with regard to Dr.

Nwumeh’s multiple opinions. See Carlson v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 180, 181 (7th Cir.

1993) (stating that an ALJ must “sufficiently articulate his assessment of the

evidence to assure us that the ALJ considered the important evidence . . . and to

enable us to trace the path of the ALJ’s reasoning”). In so doing, the ALJ made

clear that she also correctly applied 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c in that she paid particular

attention to the supportability and consistency of Dr. Nwumeh’s opinions. She

also certainly relied upon substantial evidence. See Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct.

1148, 1154 (2019) (“substantial evidence . . . means – and means only – such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion”).

To repeat, in rejecting Dr. Nwumeh’s more extreme opined-to limitations

for John, the ALJ referred back to the record as a whole in addition to Dr.

Nwumeh’s own examinations. Elsewhere in her Decision, the ALJ observed that

John’s June 2018 consultative physical examination was unremarkable where he

had normal strength, range of motion, sensation, and reflexes throughout. At a

December 2020 ER visit for low back pain, John had no swelling, edema, or

deformity and had full grip, quadriceps, hamstring, plantar, and dorsiflexion

strength, and was neurologically unremarkable with intact sensation and no

motor weakness or abnormal muscle tone. At a neurological consultation in

February 2021, John was neurologically unremarkable with normal muscle tone.

The ALJ detailed John’s 2019 MRI revealed degenerative changes, “but such were

described in terms such as mild, small, minor and not worrisome.” AR 33. John’s

electromyography/nerve conduction velocity testing was normal with no

evidence of neuropathy or radiculopathy of the upper or lower limbs. His 2021

lumbar spine MRI revealed postsurgical change with areas of slight disk bulge and

foraminal narrowing in the lower lumbar spine, but grossly unchanged from the

prior 2019 exam. His 2021 cervical spine MRI noted mild diffuse disk bulge and

disk height loss at C6-C7 and mild to moderate right-sided osseous foraminal

narrowing. The ALJ observed John did not receive the medications or treatment

prescribed for severe and unremitting pain, the usual objective signs of severe pain

were not indicated in the record, and she mentioned John’s activities of daily

living.

With regard to evidence more favorable to John’s claim (and as he clearly

believes, supportive of the extent of limitation to which Dr. Nwumeh opined), the

ALJ acknowledged that John’s examinations were “always positive for subjective

tenderness and reduced lumbar flexion, and sometimes extension, due to pain,”

that he had a greatly reduced active range of lumbar motion at his June 2018

consultative examination, that he had mild stiffness in rotation of the neck and

slight weakness in the hands when examined by Dr. Nwumeh in 2020, and that he

had some mid-thoracic muscle tightness in February 2021. While John argues the

ALJ “cherry picked” the record, the Decision, read as a whole and detailed above,

disproves that argument. See Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 370 n.5 (7th Cir. 2004)

(explaining that it is proper to read the ALJ’s decision as a whole).

As for the crux of his argument - that the ALJ erred where he discredited

Dr. Nwumeh’s opinions as based upon subjective evidence which, instead, was

objective evidence – commonsense dictates otherwise. True, the record includes

numerous instances during objective examination where John was positive for

tenderness and restricted range of motion in his back (and sometimes neck), but

an element of subjectivity remains in those “objective” examination results. After

all, many of the notations specifically provided there was reduced motion “due to

pain.” A doctor can observe a patient stop moving, but whether the patient

stopped moving due, in fact, to pain actually felt is a different matter. As for John

charging the Commissioner with post-hoc rationalization insofar as the ALJ did

not explicitly explain why less weight was entitled to a checkbox form, the

Commissioner did not violate the Chenery doctrine. See Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d

920, 922 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87-88 (1943),

“forbids an agency’s lawyers to defend the agency’s decision on grounds that the

agency itself had not embraced”). The ALJ specifically described Dr. Nwumeh’s

MSSs as appearing in “checkbox form” and stated that such forms were “routinely

used by Dr. Nwumeh[.]” AR 35-36. The ALJ was rather obviously implying Dr.

Nwumeh’s curt answers just were not enough. And those curt answers – e.g.,

imaging results – were undermined elsewhere in the ALJ’s Decision.

2

John next argues that the ALJ did not accept any of the medical opinions

stating a cane was medically necessary, instead substituting her own medical

opinion for that of Dr. Nwumeh. John’s argument in this regard, as with his

challenge to the ALJ’s consideration of Dr. Nwumeh’s opinions, faults the ALJ for

“only citing to evidence supporting the need for a cane and dismissing it because

it is based on subjective complaints.” Plf’s MSJ (Doc. 10-1 at pg. 13). The

Commissioner counters the ALJ’s finding that John’s cane was not medically

necessary was reasonable and supported because the ALJ cited several exams and

imaging that showed that the record largely lacked medical documentation

establishing the need for a cane.

SSR 96-9p states in relevant part:

To find that a hand-held assistive device is medically required, there

must be medical documentation establishing the need for a hand-held

assistive device to aid in walking or standing, and describing the

circumstances for which it is needed (i.e., whether all the time,

periodically, or only in certain situations; distance and terrain; and

any other relevant information).

SSR 96-9p at *7. This shows John is incorrect in arguing that testimony alone is

enough to establish the need for a cane. Also, given the striking similarities

between the parties’ arguments regarding Dr. Nwumeh’s opinions and the

medical necessity (or not) of John’s cane, the Court’s analysis as to the former

similarly applies to defeat John’s challenge to the ALJ’s findings as to the latter. In

other words, the ALJ built a logical bridge from the evidence to her conclusion that

John’s cane or walker were not medically necessary, and the ALJ relied on

substantial evidence in so concluding.

To briefly illustrate, the ALJ conceded that treatment notes between mid-

2016 and 2019 consistently indicated John ambulated with a cane or walker

(“presence of either cane or walker throughout much of the record is patently

clear”), John did have a prescription for both the cane and the walker, John refused

to walk without his cane at his June 2018 consultative physical examination, and

Dr. Nwumeh opined in January 2021 that John needed to have a cane or assistive

device when standing. AR 33. But the ALJ contrasted that ever-present observed

use of a cane or walker with evidence that John displayed only mild difficulty

getting on and off the exam table, that instances of positive testing results which

“tangibly demonstrated symptoms” were “merely sporadic considering the record

as a whole,” and only a few instances where the need for [use of a cane or a walker]

was “objectively demonstrated” but “not enough to support an ongoing

limitation.” AR 34. Earlier, the ALJ highlighted MRI imaging results used terms

such as mild, minor, and only mild to moderate. The ALJ noted most of the reports

of John’s cane use were based upon John’s subjective statements. Because the ALJ

made no error in considering Dr. Nwumeh’s opinions, as discussed supra, the ALJ

made no error in considering such evidence for purposes of deciding whether

John’s cane was medically necessary. In his Reply, John cites to all the foregoing

evidence and insists the logical conclusion is not that a cane is not medically

necessary. The Court finds otherwise; the ALJ reached a logical conclusion from

her consideration of the evidence. In the end, an ALJ’s decision must be affirmed

as long as the ALJ identifies supporting evidence and builds a logical bridge from

the evidence to the conclusion, and that is true “even if reasonable minds could

differ about the ultimate disability finding.” Schloesser v. Berryhill, 870 F.3d 712,

717 (7th Cir. 2017).

3

With regard to his subjective complaints, John argues that instead of

following the Social Security Administration’s requirements, the ALJ created a list

of her own requirements that the claimant allegedly failed to meet. He also argues

that the ALJ cited to evidence throughout the Decision that supported his

statements regarding his impairments and their limiting effects, but the ALJ

improperly concluded the opposite. The Commissioner argues the ALJ

sufficiently articulated why she found that John was limited, but not disabled.

SSR 16-3p provides that all the evidence, including objective medical

evidence, is to be considered in evaluating the intensity, persistence, and limiting

effects of an individual’s symptoms and also the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. §

404.1529(c)(3) are to be considered including: the claimant’s daily activities; the

location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms;

precipitating and aggravating factors; medications and their side effects; non-

medication treatments; any other measures used to relieve pain or other

symptoms; and any other factors concerning the claimant’s functional limitations

and restrictions due to pain and other symptoms. SSR 16-3p, at *7-8.

As an initial matter, the Court will not fault the ALJ for her errant statement

that “the record is not consistent with the complete inability to work.” AR 32. It

is apparent in light of the extensive discussion of the evidence that the ALJ

included in her Decision, recited herein, that the ALJ applied the correct standards.

Next, as detailed above, the ALJ considered the objective medical evidence, John’s

continued statements and reports of chronic neck and back pain, John’s statements

that he lost concentration and focus due to pain, the treatment John received, and

his activities of daily living. In particular, the ALJ considered John’s

representations that he could not sit, stand, and/or walk for longer than 10

minutes at a time, that his legs would go numb, that his left leg tended to buckle

when he walked, and that he could not tolerate repetitive lifting or carrying. While

John underwent one spinal fusion surgery in 2003 and he took several medications

including medical marijuana for pain, the ALJ observed John did not take the

strong codeine or morphine-based analgesics usually prescribed for severe and

unremitting pain, had not undergone continuing treatment beyond office visits

and prescriptions for pain medication such as physical therapy or the use of a

TENS unit, and signs of abnormal weight loss or muscle atrophy were not

indicated in the record. The ALJ considered the instances between 2016 and 2019

of John’s diminished sensation and reflexes, upper and lower extremity deficits,

intermittent right arm paresthesia, slightly decreased grip strength on the right,

and lower extremity weakness revealed during neurological examination.

Connecting the dots, the ALJ went on to state there was a “substantial discrepancy

between the claimant’s physical findings and his complaint” where John was

“always” neurologically stable at examinations by Dr. Nwumeh who most

regularly examined John and where objectively positive findings were rare and

only mild in intensity. The Court does not see where the ALJ created a list of her

own requirements; it is clear she applied the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. §

404.1529(c).

In doing so, the ALJ ensured her subjective symptom assessment was

reasoned and supported. The ALJ’s supported rejection of Dr. Nwumeh’s

opinions as a whole, one of which being that John could not engage in handling

and fingering activities, means the ALJ’s rejection of John’s statements that he was

limited in that way was supported. Same with the ALJ’s rejection of John’s

statements that he could not sit. The ALJ obviously credited John’s statements of

limitation in standing and/or walking due to his impairments where the ALJ

restricted him to sedentary work in the RFC. John says the ALJ failed to properly

consider his allegations of pain, weakness, and instability which were supported

by the evidence. Crucially, here, the ALJ in fact considered that evidence but

explained why the evidence as a whole did not support the extent of intensity,

persistence, or limitation in pain, weakness, and instability John alleged. While

the ALJ should have provided a more accurate picture of the manner in which

John performed his daily activities, the Decision reveals the ALJ did not place an

undue emphasis on those activities in her subjective symptom evaluation. See

Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 680 (7th Cir. 2008) (explaining an ALJ “can

appropriately consider a claimant’s daily activities when assessing his alleged

symptoms” but must not “plac[e] undue weight on the claimant’s household

activities in assessing the claimant’s ability to hold a job outside the home”);

Schreiber v. Colvin, 519 F. App’x 951, 961 (7th Cir. 2013) (unpublished opinion)

(explaining the ALJ’s adverse credibility finding was not patently wrong where

the ALJ did not place “undue weight” on the claimant’s activities of daily living

and “specified several reasons for finding [the claimant] not credible”). The Court

is thus satisfied the ALJ’s subjective symptom analysis is not patently wrong. See

Wilder v. Kijakazi, 22 F.4th 644, 653 (7th Cir. 2022) (reiterating that the Seventh

Circuit court of appeals “will uphold an ALJ’s credibility determination unless

that determination is patently wrong’”); and Murphy v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 811, 815-16

(7th Cir. 2014) (explaining “patently wrong” means “the decision lacks any

explanation or support”).

4

John lastly, and summarily, argues that the ALJ failed to consider both the

medical and non-medical evidence and failed to consider the aggregate effects of

his impairments when assessing the RFC. He says that specifically, the ALJ failed

to incorporate restrictions for using an assistive device, being off-task due to pain,

missing work more than two days per month, and limitations in standing and

walking. The Court agrees with the Commissioner that the ALJ’s narrative was in

accordance with SSR 96-8p.

SSR 96-8p provides in relevant part, “The RFC assessment must include a

narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing

specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g.,

daily activities, observations).” SSR 96-8p at *7. Here, as the Commissioner

succinctly puts it, the ALJ’s Decision as a whole reflects that she discussed

substantial evidence, including John’s subjective allegations as to symptom

severity, medical source opinion evidence, examination results and imaging,

John’s treatment history, and his activities of daily living before making her RFC

finding for sedentary work with several other restrictions. The ALJ’s

consideration of the evidence for purposes of deciding the persuasiveness of Dr.

Nwumeh’s opinions, of deciding whether the use of a cane/walker was medically

necessary, and of assessing John’s subjective statements as to his symptoms, see

supra, shows a narrative discussion that met the minimal articulation standard. See

Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 870 (7th Cir. 2000) (“We have repeatedly stated [ ]

that an ALJ must minimally articulate his reasons for crediting or rejecting

evidence of disability”). The Court will not remand this case.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. 10) is DENIED and the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Affirmance (Doc.

13) is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment as follows: “IT

IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the decision of the Defendant, Kilolo

Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, denying benefits to the Plaintiff,

John C., is AFFIRMED.” This matter is now terminated.

It is so ordered.

Entered on March 10, 2023.

s/Jonathan E. Hawley

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE