stating that an appellant should be allowed to submit a statement of her grounds for appealing so that the district judge “can make a reasonable assessment of the issue of good faith”
How later courts described this case
- stating that an appellant should be allowed to submit a statement of her grounds for appealing so that the district judge “can make a reasonable assessment of the issue of good faith”
- providing that a good- faith appeal is an appeal that “a reasonable person could suppose . . . has some merit” from a legal perspective
- holding that “a state and its agencies are not suable ‘persons’ within the meaning of section 1983”
- holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars a damages suit against a State but advising Courts to dismiss on the ground that § 1983 does not authorize such lawsuits before addressing a constitutional defense
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
JOSEPH GENTRY REDMAN, )
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 3:22-cv-03221-SEM
)
STATE OF ILLINOIS et al., )
Defendants. )
MERIT REVIEW ORDER
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, United States District Judge:
Before the Court for screening is a complaint [1] filed under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 by Plaintiff pro se Joseph Gentry Redman, who is
incarcerated at Graham Correctional Center. Plaintiff’s pleading
alleges constitutional violations against the State of Illinois (“State”)
and the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) Parole Review
Board (“Board”) in connection with his mandatory supervised
release. The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s case, concluding that
Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for relief.
I. SCREENING STANDARD
The court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint and dismiss any
legally insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing the complaint, the court
accepts the factual allegations as accurate, liberally construing
them in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649
(7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are
insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721
F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
II. COMPLAINT
A. Facts
Plaintiff asserts that he lost his residence to fire.
Consequently, the scheduled date Plaintiff began serving his
mandatory supervised release (“MSR”) term, commonly called
parole, was delayed until Plaintiff established suitable housing.
Plaintiff believes this delay establishes a constitutional violation.
B. Analysis
Plaintiff cannot sue the State because “[t]he Illinois sovereign
immunity statute protects the State against being ‘made a
defendant or party in any court.’” Murphy v. Smith, 844 F.3d 653,
658 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting 745 ILCS 5/1); see also Thomas v.
Illinois, 697 F.3d 612, 613 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment bars a damages suit against a State but advising
Courts to dismiss on the ground that § 1983 does not authorize
such lawsuits before addressing a constitutional defense).
Plaintiff also does not state a claim against the Board. Section
1983 provides a claim against a person acting under the color of
law who deprives another of a federal right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See
Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 462–63 (7th Cir. 2009)
(concluding that since a § 1983 cause of action is against a ‘person,’
in order ‘[t]o recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must
establish that a defendant was personally responsible for the
deprivation of a constitutional right.’”) (quoting Johnson v. Snyder,
444 F.3d 579, 583 (7th Cir. 2006)); see also Thomas, 697 F.3d at
613 (holding that “a state and its agencies are not suable ‘persons’
within the meaning of section 1983”) (citing Will v. Michigan Dep’t of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66-70 (1989)).
Furthermore, “Illinois law requires [IDOC] to ensure that
inmates have proper and approved residences before releasing them
on parole.” Smith v. Anderson, 874 F.3d 966, 968 (7th Cir. 2017)
(citing 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 1610.110). Illinois law “also authorizes
[IDOC] to hold inmates until it has approved their living
arrangements.” Id. See Neville v. Walker, 878 N.E.2d 831, 835 (Ill.
App. 4 Dist. 2007) (“[A]n inmate is entitled to MSR only so long as
that inmate complies with the conditions imposed by the [Parole
Review] Board.”) (citing 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7 (West 1998); 730 ILCS
5/3-3-7 (West 2006)).
The Supreme Court has clarified that “parolees have a more
limited liberty interest than ordinary citizens.” Knox v. Smith, 342
F.3d 651, 657 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 480 (1972) (“Revocation [of parole] deprives an individual, not
of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only of
the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special
parole restrictions.”)). Additionally, officers responsible for an
inmate’s continued detention until residential housing can be
established are entitled to qualified immunity. Smith, 874 F.3d at
968.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s allegations fail
to state a § 1983 claim. Although the Court has the discretion to
permit Plaintiff to file an amended complaint, it is unnecessary
when, as here, the Court finds that any amendment to the claim
raised in Plaintiff’s pleading would be futile. Luevano v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1025 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Gonzalez-
Koeneke v. West, 791 F.3d 801, 807 (7th Cir. 2015) (“District
courts, nevertheless, ‘have broad discretion to deny leave to amend
where there is undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated
failure to cure deficiencies, undue prejudice to the defendants, or
where the amendment would be futile.’”) (quoting Arreola v.
Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir. 2008)).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) The Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint [1] under 28
U.S.C. 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a federal claim on
which relief may be granted. Because any amendment to
the complaint would be futile, the Court DIRECTS the
Clerk of the Court to enter a judgment under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 58. Plaintiff remains responsible for any unpaid balance
of the $350 filing fee.
2) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a
notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the
entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A motion for
leave to appeal in forma pauperis MUST identify the issues
Plaintiff will present on appeal to assist the Court in
determining whether the appeal is taken in good faith. See
Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c); see also Celske v Edwards, 164
F.3d 396, 398 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that an appellant
should be allowed to submit a statement of her grounds for
appealing so that the district judge “can make a reasonable
assessment of the issue of good faith”); Walker v O’Brien,
216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2000) (providing that a good-
faith appeal is an appeal that “a reasonable person could
suppose . . . has some merit” from a legal perspective). If
Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the
$505.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of
the appeal.
ENTERED March 3, 2023.
s/ Sue E. Myerscough
_______________________________________
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE