Ealy v. Watson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

COURTNEY EALY, )

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 20-3027

)

CAMERON WATSON, et. al., )

Defendants. )

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER

JAMES E. SHADID, U.S. District Judge:

This cause is before the Court for consideration of Defendants Cameron Watson,

David Frank, and Angela McKittrick’s Motion for Summary Judgment. [58]. For the

following reasons, the motion is GRANTED. [58].

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a pro se prisoner, has one claim alleging Defendants Warden Cameron

Watson, Adjustment Committee Chairman David Frank, and Committee Member

Angela McKittrick violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights during a

September 12, 2019, disciplinary hearing at Western Illinois Correctional Center. See

November 10, 2020 Case Management Order; May 4, 2021 Text Order; June 23, 2021

Minute Entry. Plaintiff claims he was placed in disciplinary segregation for five months

where he experienced unsanitary living conditions.

II. FACTS

Plaintiff was incarcerated at Western Illinois Correctional Center (Western) when

he received a disciplinary ticket on September 4, 2019. (Plain. Resp., [61], Ex. Q). The

Offender Disciplinary Report claimed multiple offenders located on one wing in the

facility had tested positive “for the use of THC.” (Plain. Resp., [61], Ex. Q). The

reporting officer stated he had conducted interviews with three confidential sources

(CS) who claimed Plaintiff had marijuana and provided it to inmates on the wing

including one CS. The CS witnesses also said Plaintiff was getting the marijuana from a

female visitor, T.B., who hid it “inside her vagina” and provided it to Plaintiff during

visiting hours. (Plain. Resp., [61], Ex. Q).

The report further claimed officers monitored a phone call in which Plaintiff

used another inmate’s PIN number to call T. B. (Plain. Resp., [61], Ex. Q). During the

call, Plaintiff told T.B. to “[m]ake sure you got that shit” when she came to visit. (Plain.

Resp., [61], Ex. Q).

The reporting officer stated records demonstrated T.B. visited on multiple

occasions, but officers specifically reviewed visiting room footage from an August 11,

2019 visit. (Plain. Resp., [61], Ex. Q). The officer claimed T. B. could be seen retrieving

an item from her crotch and placing it on the table underneath a napkin and candy.

(Plain. Resp., [61], Ex. Q). The officer further claimed Plaintiff was then seen putting the

item in his mouth. (Plain. Resp., [61], Ex. Q).

The reporting officer stated Plaintiff was uncooperative during an interview and

denied any involvement. (Plain. Resp., [61], Ex. Q).

Plaintiff was accused of violating three department rules including Drugs and

Drug Paraphernalia for bringing marijuana into the facility, Possession or Solicitation of

Unauthorized Personal Information for using another inmate’s phone PIN, and Abuse

of Privileges based on conduct during a visit or phone call. (Plain. Resp., [61], Ex. A, Q).

The Offender Disciplinary Report states Plaintiff was accused of a major infraction, he

would be placed in “temporary confinement” due to the “seriousness of the offense,”

and a hearing was required. (Plain. Resp., [61], Ex. Q).

An officer indicated he had delivered a copy of the Offender Disciplinary Report

to the Plaintiff on September 4, 2019, but Plaintiff refused to sign it. (Plain. Resp., [61],

Ex. Q). Plaintiff admits he did receive a copy of the report. (Def. Mot., [58], Ex. 1; Plain.

Depo., p. 9).

The bottom portion of this document states: “Detach and Return to the

Adjustment Committee or Program Unit Prior to the Hearing.” The form has spaces

designated for the inmate’s potential witnesses as well as what information each

witness could provide. (Plain. Resp., [61], Ex. Q).

Plaintiff admits he did not submit this form. (Def. Mot., [58], Plain. Depo., p. 10).

I may not have submitted the slip at the bottom, but I might also have wrote

it on a piece of paper, like ripped off a piece of paper, wrote my name and ID

number on it and wrote a request to the Adjustment Committee and dropped

it....well, I was actually in segregation, so I couldn’t drop it in a box. I would

have to put it in the door and the CO would have to come get it. (Def. Mot.,

[58], Plain. Depo, p. 10).

Plaintiff does not remember when he would have submitted this paper. (Def.

Mot., [58], p. 10).

Plaintiff did file a grievance which was received on September 5, 2019. (Plain.

Resp., [61], Ex. N). Plaintiff disputes the statements of each CS noting there is no video

of their claims, no specific time frames provided, and no other “physical evidence” to

support their statements. (Plain. Resp., [61], Ex. N, p. 2). Plaintiff concludes his

grievance stating he “wished that the board look into this and throw out the ticket.”

(Plain. Resp., [61], Ex. N, p. 2).

The grievance officer did not review the document until January 29, 2020, and

ultimately denied Plaintiff’s grievance. (Plain. Resp., [61], Ex. N). The Warden’s Office

also approved the denial on the same day. (Plain. Resp., [61], Ex. N).

An Adjustment Committee Hearing was held on September 12, 2019. (Def.

Mot.,[58], IDOC # 89); (Plain. Resp., [61], Ex. A). Defendants Frank and McKittrick

served on the committee and signed the Adjustment Committee Final Report. (Def.

Mot.,[58], IDOC # 90); (Plain. Resp., [61], Ex. A).

The report states Plaintiff admitted to using another inmate’s personal PIN

number and abuse of privileges, but he denied the Drugs and Drug Paraphernalia

violation. (Def. Mot.,[58], IDOC # 89). Plaintiff stated his phone call with T.B. was

about a debit card, not drugs, and he did not bring drugs into the facility. (Def. Mot.,

[58], IDOC # 89).

The Adjustment Committee Report then reviewed the evidence including

multiple offenders on Plaintiff’s wing testing positive for THC, the statements of each

CS, the phone call with T.B., and the visiting room footage. (Def. Mot.,[58], IDOC # 89).

Defendant Frank says prior to the hearing, the Adjustment Committee watched the

video recording and spoke with the Internal Affairs Officer who conducted the

investigation and wrote the disciplinary report. (Def. Mot., [58], Frank Aff., p. 1). The

officer reviewed the CS statements and stated he believed they were “reliable due to

corroborating statements made during separate interviews.” (Def. Mot., [58], Frank Aff.,

p. 2).

The Final Adjustment Committee Report provided the basis for the final decision

noting the CS statements, the video recording, and the other information provided in

the investigator’s reports. (Def. Mot., [58], IDOC #89). Plaintiff was found guilty of

bringing marijuana into Western Illinois Correctional Center. (Def. Mot.,[58], IDOC #

89). The committee also noted it would not release the identities of the three CS

witnesses for safety and security reasons. (Def. Mot.,[58], IDOC # 89).

Plaintiff says he was given an opportunity to speak during the disciplinary

hearing. (Def. Mot., [58], Ex. 1; Plain. Depo., p. 11-12). Plaintiff says he asked for his

drug test results and he asked for a continuance to view the video recording. (Def. Mot.,

[58], Ex. 1; Plain. Depo., p. 14). Plaintiff also told the Adjustment Committee he had

“sent a grievance asking for them to look into the confidential sources’ statements don’t

corroborate each other.” (Def. Mot., [58], Ex. 1; Plain. Depo., p. 14).

The hearing proceeded and Plaintiff was found guilty of all three rule violations

and Defendants Frank and McKittrick recommended six months of C grade status, five

months of segregation, a disciplinary transfer, and a six-month restriction on contact

visits. (Plain. Resp., [61], Ex. A). Defendant Warden Watson concurred with the

decision and discipline on September 16, 2019. (Plain. Resp., [61], Ex. A).

An officer signed the bottom of the Adjustment Committee Final Report

indicating he provided a copy of it to the Plaintiff on September 24, 2019, at 2:30 p.m.

(Plain. Resp., [61], Ex. A). Plaintiff admits he received the report. (Def. Mot., [58], Ex. 1;

Plain. Depo., p. 15).

Defendant Frank does not remember Plaintiff asking for witnesses during the

hearing, and there is no record of Plaintiff requesting witnesses either before or during

the hearing. (Def. Mot., [58], Frank Aff., p. 2). “If Plaintiff had requested witnesses, the

witnesses who could provide relevant testimony could have been called and

interviewed by the hearing investigator, and it would be documented in the

Adjustment Committee Report.” (Def. Mot., [58], Frank Aff., p. 2).

Defendant Frank also does not remember Plaintiff asking for his drug test results

during the hearing and the record does not verify Plaintiff’s request. (Def. Mot.,[58],

Frank Aff., p. 2). “However, a drug test would have little bearing on this case, as

Plaintiff was found guilty of introducing contraband into the facility and not of using

that contraband.” (Def. Mot., [58], Frank Aff., p. 2).

Defendants’ maintain Plaintiff’s first month in segregation was in “investigative

segregation” prior to any finding of guilt. (Def. Mot., [58], p. 2). It appears from the

housing document provided that Plaintiff was placed in investigative segregation on

August 26, 2019. (Def. Mot., [58], Ex 1).

Plaintiff says he was moved to crisis watch at some point after the disciplinary

hearing on September 12, 2019, and before his transfer to Lawrence Correctional Center

on October 23, 2019. (Def. Mot., [58], Ex. 1; Plain. Depo., p. 20). Plaintiff does not recall

how long he remained on crisis watch. (Def. Mot., [58], Plain. Depo., p. 20).

While still at Western, Plaintiff says all segregation cells were very cold. (Def.

Mot., [58], Plain. Depo., p. 19). Once particular cell was filthy and had bad plumbing

and spider webs. (Def. Mot., [58], Plain. Depo., p. 19). Plaintiff says there was feces

from other cells coming into his toilet. (Def. Mot., [58], Plain. Depo., p. 19).

Plaintiff was transferred to Lawrence Correctional Center (Lawrence) on October

23, 2019 where he remained in segregation until the end of January, 2020. (Def. Mot.,

[58], Ex. 1; Plain. Depo., p. 21). Plaintiff was then moved to general population at

Lawrence. (Def. Mot., [58], Ex. 1; Plain. Depo., p. 21).

Plaintiff says the only difference in the segregation cells and general population

cells at Lawrence is the segregation cells are “filthier because it’s like nobody really

comes to like clean them out.” (Def. Mot., [58], Ex. 1; Plain. Depo., p. 22). Plaintiff also

claims there were bird feces and feathers outside of his cell window. (Def. Mot., [58],

Plain. Depo. p. 23), (Plain. Resp., [61], p. 2) Plaintiff admits he was able to clean the

inside of his cell and open his window. (Def. Mot., [58], Ex. 1; Plain. Depo., p. 22-23).

Plaintiff says in segregation, he also had limited phone calls and limitations on

commissary purchases. (Def. Mot., [58], Ex. 1; Plain. Depo., p. 24),

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A movant may demonstrate the absence of a

material dispute through specific cites to admissible evidence, or by showing that the

nonmovant “cannot produce admissible evidence to support the [material] fact.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). If the movant clears this hurdle, the nonmovant may not simply

rest on his or her allegations in the complaint, but instead must point to admissible

evidence in the record to show that a genuine dispute exists. Id.; Harvey v. Town of

Merrillville, 649 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 2011). “In a §1983 case, the plaintiff bears the

burden of proof on the constitutional deprivation that underlies the claim, and thus

must come forward with sufficient evidence to create genuine issues of material fact to

avoid summary judgment.” McAllister v. Price, 615 F.3d 877, 881 (7th Cir. 2010).

At the summary judgment stage, evidence is viewed in the light most favorable

to the nonmovant, with material factual disputes resolved in the nonmovant's favor.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine dispute of material

fact exists when a reasonable juror could find for the nonmovant. Id.

IV. ANALYSIS

Defendants argue Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a violation of his constitutional

rights. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects persons against

deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural

protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake.” Wilkerson v Austin, 545

U.S. 209, 221 (2005). Therefore, before considering whether Plaintiff was given notice

and a hearing prior to his placement in segregation, the Court must first consider

whether Plaintiff had a liberty interest at stake.

The Seventh Circuit has noted “an inmate’s liberty interest in avoiding

segregation is limited.” Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 734 F.3d 740, 743 (7th Cir. 2013), citing

Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir.2009). A convicted prisoner must

be able to show his confinement imposed an “atypical and significant hardship on the

inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,

484 (1995).

To determine whether Plaintiff’s time in segregation rises to the level of a

constitutional violation, the Court must consider “the combined import of the duration

of the segregative confinement and the conditions endured.” Marion, 559 F.3d at 697

(emphasis in original). Unless an inmate is housed in “exceptionally harsh conditions,”

relatively short terms of segregation will not violate a prisoner’s due process rights.

Hardaway, 734 F.3d at 743; Marion, 559 F.3d at 697–98.

Defendants maintain five months in segregation, standing alone is not enough to

implicate a liberty interest. See Hardaway, 734 F.3d at 744 (finding total of six months in

segregation “alone is insufficient to rise to the level of a Fourteenth Amendment

violation.”); Marion, 559 F.3d at 698 (“six months of segregation is not such an extreme

term and, standing alone, would not trigger due process rights.”).

The Court agrees the amount of time Plaintiff spent in segregation does not, by

itself, indicate a potential due process violation. Therefore, the Court musts consider

whether the conditions of Plaintiff’s confinement were severe enough to implicate a

liberty interest. See Kervin v. Barnes, 787 F.3d 833, 836–37 (7th Cir. 2015) (a period of

segregation shorter than six months may establish a violation “depending on the

conditions of confinement.”).

The Supreme Court has noted it is difficult to articulate an appropriate baseline

to measure what is atypical and significant in any particular prison. Wilkerson, 545 U.S.

at 223. “[M]ere exposure to unsavory conditions worse than those experienced in

general population housing” generally will not suffice. Stallings v. Best, 2018 WL

4300488, at *6 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 10, 2018) citing Hardaway, 734 F.3d at 744; Townsend v. Fuchs,

522 F.3d 765, 771 (7th Cir. 2008). However, the Supreme Court held inmates “deprived

of almost any environmental or sensory stimuli and of almost all human contact” for

“an indefinite period” meets “any plausible baseline.” Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 214, 223.

When asked about the segregation conditions at Western, Plaintiff said all cells

were cold, and one particular cell was dirty, had bad plumbing, bugs, and the smell of

feces from the toilet. Plaintiff does not provide any additional information. For

instance, Plaintiff does not state how long he was in the unclean cell, nor has he given

any description of other cells beyond a vague statement that the were cold. In addition,

Plaintiff transferred to another facility just one month after he was found guilty of the

disciplinary ticket.

In his deposition, Plaintiff stated segregation cells at Lawrence were not as clean

as general population cells. However, Plaintiff admits he could clean his cell. Plaintiff’s

allegation that his cell window was not clean does not demonstrate a significant

hardship.

In response to the dispositive motion, Plaintiff now says due to the limitations on

light at Lawrence Correctional Center, he “now has to wear prescription glasses with

shade on them” (Plain. Resp., [61], p. 6; [68], p. 2; [69], p. 3). Plaintiff made no mention

of any eye problems in his deposition. More important, Plaintiff has not presented any

medical records or other evidence to substantiate this claim. The Court cannot rely on

Plaintiff’s speculation concerning the cause of any claimed eye problems. See Harper v.

C.R. England, Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 306 (7th Cir. 2012) (“our favor toward the nonmoving

party does not extend to drawing inferences that are supported by only speculation or

conjecture.”)(internal citation omitted); Hall-Bey v Hanks, 93 Fed.Appx 977, 980 (7th Cir.

2004)(“conclusory statements cannot sustain a non-movant’s burden on summary

judgment.”).

Plaintiff’s response also includes a general statement that the segregation cells

made him “sick,” and he the “loss of gym time, loss of yard, loss of phone, loss of

grade,” and loss of visitation had an impact on his mental health. (Plain. Resp., [68], p.

2).

Again, Plaintiff does not provide any specific information concerning his living

conditions or how whether he had any opportunity to exercise. Plaintiff has also failed

to provide any medical records or even a general description of how and when he

became sick.

Finally, the Seventh Circuit has “already ruled that deprivations upon demotion

to ‘C’ grade status do not implicate a liberty interest.” Miller v. Maue, 759 Fed.Appx. 515,

516 (7th Cir. 2019), citing Hoskins v. Lenear, 395 F.3d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 2005); Thomas v.

Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 762 n.8 (7th Cir. 1997) (collecting cases).

Based on the record before the Court, Plaintiff cannot establish his five-month

stay in segregation constituted an “atypical and significant hardship,” and therefore he

cannot establish a protected liberty interest was at stake. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484; see i.e.

Stallings v. Best, 2018 WL 4300488, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2018), aff'd, 777 F. App'x 831

(7th Cir. 2019) (finding no liberty interest in six-month segregation stay despite “six-

legged pests that invaded [plaintiff's] food trays and body and four-legged pests that

skittered over him in the dark”); Coleman v. Baldwin, 2016 WL 537970, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb.

11, 2016)(stating that no constitutional concern arose when an inmate was held for six

months in “the presence of insects, mice, and broken windows as well as a restriction on

showers and the deprivation of his wheelchair and walking cane”); Williams v. Sanders,

2010 WL 4687840, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2010) (“[t]ransferring a prisoner from the

general population to segregation unit” with “noisy, unsanitary cells” did “not present

the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a

liberty interest.”); Sanchez v. Walker, 2010 WL 5313815, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 2010)(six

month segregation stay did not did not implicate a liberty interest despite the fact that

the inmate had no access to cleaning supplies, trash was not removed, toilets were dirty

and only periodically flushed, “little black bugs” were found around the toilet, and

inmates were subjected to roaches, spiders, and mice.).

Even if Plaintiff had demonstrated a liberty interest was at stake, he cannot

demonstrate his due process rights were violated during the September 12, 2019,

Adjustment Committee hearing. “Due process requires that prisoners in disciplinary

proceedings be given: ‘(1) advance (at least 24 hours before hearing) written notice of

the claimed violation; (2) the opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision

maker; (3) the opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence (when

consistent with institutional safety); and (4) a written statement by the factfinder of the

evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.’” Scruggs v. Jordan, 485

F.3d 934, 939 (7th Cir. 2007), quoting Rasheed–Bey v. Duckworth, 969 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir.

1992).

“Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are governed by the ‘some

evidence’ standard.” Boyd v. Warden, 2023 WL 130534, at *2 (S.D.Ind.Jan. 9, 2023),

quoting Ellison v. Zatecky, 820 F.3d 271, 274 (7th Cir. 2016). In other words, “a hearing

officer's decision need only rest on ‘some evidence’ logically supporting it and

demonstrating that the result is not arbitrary.” Ellison, 820 F.3d at 274 (7th Cir. 2016); see

Eichwedel v. Chandler, 696 F.3d 660, 675 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[t]he some evidence standard ...

is satisfied if there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion

reached by the disciplinary board.”).

In addition, “[w]hen confidential information is the basis for a prison

disciplinary decision, there must be some indication of the reliability of the confidential

sources.” Gutierrez v. Baldwin, 2022 WL 18027527, at *6 (S.D.Ill. Dec, 30, 2022), citing

Mendoza v. Miller, 779 F.2d 1287, 1293 (7th Cir. 1985).

The reliability of confidential informants may be established by: (1)

the oath of the investigating officer as to the truth of his report containing

confidential information and his appearance before the disciplinary

committee, McCollum, 695 F.2d at 1049; (2) corroborating testimony, (3) a

statement on the record by the chairman of the disciplinary committee that,

he had firsthand knowledge of the sources of information and considered

them reliable on the basis of ‘their past record of reliability, or (4) in camera

review of material documenting the investigator's assessment of the

credibility of the confidential informant.Mendoza, 779 F.2d at 1293 (internal

citation and quotations omitted).

Defendants argue Plaintiff received his due process protections during the

disciplinary hearing. He was given advance written notice of the violation when he was

provided with a copy of the Offender Disciplinary Report on September 4, 2019, eight

days before the hearing. Plaintiff was given an opportunity to be heard before an

impartial decision maker when he appeared before the adjustment committee and was

given the opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence. The committee spoke

with the investigating officer concerning the reliability of each CS statement. The

committee found the information provided by the CS witnesses was reliable since the

statements were obtained independently and corroborated each other. In addition, the

drug test results of other inmates on Plaintiff’s wing, Plaintiff’s telephone call with T.B.

using another inmate’s PIN, and the video recording of his meeting with T.B. provided

further support of the CS statements. Finally, the Adjustment Committee Report

provided an overview of all the evidence considered and the basis for its decision.

Plaintiff argues the Adjustment Committee members failed to consider his

grievance. However, considering grievances is the job of the grievance counselor and

grievance officer, not the Adjustment Committee. Plaintiff believes he may have

submitted a piece of paper questing the CS statements, but he does not remember

when. Plaintiff further admits he was given the proper form to request witness, but he

did not use it, nor has he mentioned any witness he wished to call or could have

provided relevant information.

Even if the Adjustment Committee had considered Plaintiff’s grievance, it does

not provide any specific evidence. Instead, Plaintiff simply says he does not believe the

CS statements are detailed enough and he does not believe they corroborate each other.

Plaintiff’s disagreement with the Adjustment Committee’s findings is not evidence of a

due process violation. See Singh v. Gegare, 651 Fed.Appx. 551, 555-56 (7th Cir. 2016)

(disagreement with outcome of disciplinary hearing is not a due process violation);

Palafox v. Spiller, 2018 WL 3037398, at *4 (S.D.Ill. June 19, 2018)(plaintiff believes

Adjustment Committee “gave more weight to results of investigation…and to

confidential informants than it did to Plaintiff’s version of events. But mere

disagreement with the outcome of a disciplinary hearing does not amount to a due

process violation.”).

Plaintiff also admits he was given the opportunity to speak and provide evidence

during the hearing. However, Plaintiff says the committee denied his request for a

continuance. Plaintiff wanted to review the video, prepare questions for the CS

witnesses, and see the results of his own drug test.

The Defendants correctly note the results of Plaintiff’s own drug test are

irrelevant. Plaintiff was not accused of using marijuana, but instead of bringing

marijuana into the facility and providing it to other inmates. In addition, Plaintiff was

given a complete review of the evidence against him eight days before the hearing

including a description of the video recording.

More important, “[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not criminal proceedings,

and do not require the same protections to the accused as criminal proceedings do.”

Lehn v. Bryant, 2006 WL 2095787, at *8 (C.D.Ill. July 27, 2006), citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556.

In other words, “there is no right to ‘confrontation and cross-examination.’” Hamilton v.

Scott, 762 F.Supp. 794, 802 (N.D.Ill. March 29,1991), quoting Wolff, 418 U.S. at 567; see also

Ferguson v. McCaughtry, 1993 WL 3076, at *1 (7th Cir. 1993)(“no right to confront or

cross-examine his accuser”); Jones v. Messina, 2008 WL 192329, at *5 (C.D.Ill. Jan. 23,

2008)(“confrontation and cross-examination and counsel are not constitutionally

required.”).

Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a protected liberty interest in his five- month

segregation stay. In addition, the record establishes Plaintiff received advance written

notice of the claimed rule violations, the opportunity to be heard by impartial decision

makers, the opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence, and he was provided a

written statement of the basis of the decision to impose disciplinary measures.

Furthermore, various evidence corroborated the reliability of the statements from the

confidential sources. The Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. [58].

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) Defendants Cameron Watson, David Frank, and Angela McKittrick’s Motion

for Summary Judgment is GRANTED pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

56 [58]. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of

Defendants and against Plaintiff. This case is terminated.

2) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a notice of appeal with

this Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A

motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis MUST identify the issues the

Plaintiff will present on appeal to assist the court in determining whether the

appeal is taken in good faith. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c); See also Celske v

Edwards, 164 F.3d 396, 398 (7th Cir. 1999)(an appellant should be given an

opportunity to submit a statement of his grounds for appealing so that the district

judge “can make a reasonable assessment of the issue of good faith.”); Walker v

O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2000)(providing that a good faith appeal is an

appeal that “a reasonable person could suppose…has some merit” from a legal

perspective). If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $505.00

appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of the appeal.

Entered this 30th day of January, 2023.

s/ James E. Shadid

_________________________________________

JAMES E. SHADID

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE