Chatman v. Jeffreys

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION

PAUL CHATMAN,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:22-1314-MMM

v.

ROB L. JEFFREYS, Director of the Illinois

Department of Corrections, et al.

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Paul Chatman’s Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis.

ECF No. 2. Plaintiff brought suit against Defendants Rob L. Jeffreys, the Director of the Illinois

Department of Corrections, Brendan E. Kelly as the Director of the Illinois State Police, and Craig

Findley, Chairman of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s

Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis is DENIED and his Complaint is DISMISSED.

BACKGROUND

In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that he was convicted of First-Degree Murder in 1983

and that he was 17 years old when he committed the offense. ECF No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff states that

he was released from state custody on June 24, 2020.

While he was incarcerated, a law that Plaintiff refers to as the “Murder and Violent

Offender Against Youth Registration Act” was passed. Id. (citing 730 ILCS 154/1). Plaintiff

asserts that despite him being 17-years old at the time of the offense, and the victim being an adult,

he is now required to register with the Illinois State Police and provide photographs, his address,

and employment information for the purposes of registering. Id. at 4. He argues that he will be

closely monitored during his 10-year registration period and may be arrested if he happens to

inadvertently fall short of the reporting requirements. Id.

Plaintiff already brought suit against the State of Illinois on largely the same issues

presented here. Plaintiff named only the State of Illinois but served the notice of lawsuit on the

same three Defendants named here. He brought the case in the Circuit Court of Cook County for

a temporary restraining order exempting him from registering under the Registration Act. Chatman

v. People, 2022 WL 6126027 (Ill. App. Ct. 2022). The lower court held an oral argument where

the state officials were given the opportunity to present their arguments on the motion to dismiss.

Id. at 2. The lower court dismissed the case on the basis of sovereign immunity finding that

Plaintiff technically only named the State of Illinois in the Complaint, despite serving the lawsuit

on the three Defendants named here. Id. The lower court also otherwise observed that the

Registration Act was not an unconstitutional ex post facto law. Id. The lower court denied Plaintiff

the opportunity to replead because Plaintiff would be unable to plead facts that would entitle him

to relief. Id. The Illinois Court of Appeals found that it was appropriate to reach the merits because

Plaintiff could have just amended to name the state officials. Id. at 4. The Appellate Court therefore

addressed the merits of Plaintiff’s claims. Id. The Court found that the law did not violate the ex

post facto clause of the Constitution and did not violate the single subject Rule of the Illinois

Constitution. The Illinois Supreme Court denied his petition for appeal. Chatman v. People, 193

N.E.3d 8 (Ill. 2022).

Plaintiff has now brought suit in federal court arguing that the registration law violates the

ex post facto clause of the Constitution, the Eighth Amendment, the due process rights of the Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendment, and the single subject rule found in the Illinois Constitution. Plaintiff

does not seek any money damages but instead seeks an injunction to stop Defendants from

enforcing the registration requirements.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal courts may authorize a litigant to proceed in an action without prepaying fees if

two conditions are met: (1) the litigant is unable to pay the costs of commencing the action; and

(2) the action is not frivolous nor malicious, does not fail to state a claim on which relief may be

granted, and does not seek monetary relief against a defendant that is immune from such relief. 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(a) and (e)(2). Regardless of plaintiffs’ ability to pay, they must assert a claim upon

which relief may be granted.

To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the complaint need contain only enough

factual matter, accepted as true, to allow the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the alleged conduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Plausibility means alleging

factual content that allows a court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged

misconduct. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). A plaintiff’s claim must

“give enough details about the subject matter of the case to present a story that holds together,” to

be plausible. Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010). A court must draw all

inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Bontkowski v. First Nat’l Bank of Cicero, 998 F.2d

459, 461 (7th Cir. 1993).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s claims center on the Murder Registration Act, effective January 1, 2012, which

sets forth registration requirements for individuals convicted of first-degree murder of an adult, as

follows:

A person who is convicted or adjudicated delinquent of first degree

murder of an adult shall be required to register for a period of ten

years after conviction or adjudication if not confined to a penal

institution, hospital, or any other institution or facility, and if

confined, for a period of ten years after parole, discharge, or release

from any such facility.

730 ILCS 154/5(c-6). For the purposes of 154/5, first degree murder of an adult “means first degree

murder under Section 9-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 when the

victim was a person 18 years of age or older at the time of the commission of the offense.” 730

ILCS 154/5(b-5) .

In his complaint, Plaintiff states that he was convicted of first-degree murder of an

individual who was an adult. Plaintiff argues that he should be exempt from the act based upon

paperwork that he received when he was released, and he alleges the language of the statute

otherwise does not apply to him. He further argues that as applied to him, the law violates the ex

post facto clause of the Constitution, the Eighth Amendment, and his Due Process Rights under

the Constitution. The Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit have repeatedly denied similar

challenges to similar registration laws. Accordingly, as explained below, it is clear that Plaintiff

has not stated a basis for relief.

1. The registration requirements do not violate the ex post facto clause of the

Constitution.

Plaintiff argues that since the law requiring registration was passed over twenty years after

he committed his crime, the law violates the ex post facto clause of the Constitution. The ex post

facto clause prohibits the enactment of a “law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater

punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.” U.S. v. Lopez, 222 F.3d 428,

440 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798)); see also U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 9, cl. 3. “For a law to violate this protection, it must be retroactive and punitive.” Koch v.

Hartland, 43 F.4th 747, 750 (7th Cir. 2022). A civil sanction implicates the ex post facto clause of

the Constitution “only if it can be fairly characterized as punishment.” Bae v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 489,

492 (7th Cir. 1995). A civil regulatory scheme that is not punitive in nature does not raise ex post

facto concerns. See Vasquez v. Foxx, 895 F.3d 515, 520 (7th Cir. 2018) (abrogated on other

grounds in Koch v. Hartland, 42 F.4th 747 (7th Cir. 2022)). A significant factor in determining

whether a statute is punitive is the legislation’s purpose. Gilbert v. Peters, 55 F.3d 237, 238 (7th

Cir. 1995) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958)). If the purpose was to impose punishment

“that ends the inquiry.” United State v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2001)(quoting Smith v. Doe,

538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003)). If the purpose is “civil and nonpunitive” the court must examine whether

the “statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention

to deem it civil.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 92).

Both the Seventh Circuit and Supreme Court have upheld various laws requiring that

certain types of offenders register despite challenges under the ex post facto clause of the

Constitution. The Seventh Circuit and Supreme Court have determined that registering on a list is

a “nonpunitive civil regulation” that did not raise any ex post facto concerns. Vasquez, 895 F.3d at

520 (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 105–106; see also United States v. Leach, 639 F.3d 769, 773 (7th

Cir. 2011)). 1 The Supreme Court explained that “our criminal law tradition insists on public

indictment, public trial, and public imposition of a sentence” and that the criminal system “does

not treat dissemination of truthful information in furtherance of a legitimate governmental

1 Vasquez and Leach were overruled in part my Koch v. Hartland, 42 F.4th 747 (7th Cir. 2022).

Vasquez and Leach both stated that creating new prospective legal obligations based on the person’s prior

criminal history meant that the law was not retroactive. The Seventh Circuit recently held that the “Leach-

Vasquez rule for analyzing retro-activity can no longer stand.” Koch v. Hartland, 43 F.4th 747, 755 (7th

Cir. 2022). The Seventh Circuit stated that Leach and Vasquez failed to account for the fact that the “sex

offender registration laws imposed obligations beyond those prescribed at the time of the offense.” Id.

However, the Seventh Circuit reiterated that this was only part of the two-part inquiry into whether a law

was both punitive and retroactive. Id. The Seventh Circuit did not disturb Vasquez and Leach’s holdings

and analysis regarding whether a law qualified as punitive.

objective as punishment.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 99. The Supreme Court further reasoned that

registering does not impose “physical restraints” and is “less harsh than the sanctions of

occupational debarment, which we have held to be nonpunitive.” Id. Finally, the Court reasoned

that landlords and employers could conduct background checks on the criminal records of

prospective tenants or employees, undermining an argument that the registry will make registrants

unemployable or less able to access housing. Id. The Supreme Court summarized that any negative

consequences “flow not from the Act’s registration and dissemination provisions, but from the fact

of conviction, already a matter of public record.” Id. at 101. While the Supreme Court was

evaluating the constitutionality of Alaska’s sex offender registry, the same reasoning applies to

Illinois violent offender registry. Accordingly, the Court finds that the law does not violate the ex

post facto clause of the Constitution because registering is not punishment.

2. The registration requirements do not violate the Eighth Amendment.

Plaintiff’s argument that this violates the Eighth Amendment because he finds it is

defamatory and embarrassing also fails. “The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments which

involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, are grossly disproportionate to the severity

of the crime for which an inmate was imprisoned, or are totally without penological justification.”

Whitman v. Nesic, 368 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2004). As explained above, the Seventh Circuit and

Supreme Court have determined that these types of registries are not punishments at all and

therefore, it could not be a cruel or unusual punishment. The Supreme Court has also addressed

the issue of whether a sex offender registry could qualify as a violation of the Eighth Amendment.

The Supreme Court stated that the “purpose and the principal effect” are to “inform the public for

its own safety, not to humiliate the offender.” Smith, 538 at 99. That the information is subject to

more widespread access on the internet does “not render Internet notification punitive.” Id.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court has confirmed that the registries are not punitive.

Accordingly, even if this could be fairly characterized as punishment, it is not “grossly

disproportionate” to the crime or involve “wanton infliction of pain.” See United States v. Hook,

471 F.3d 766, 775 (7th Cir. 2006) (concluding that since DNA blood draws are routine and incurs

minimal pain and discomfort, they do not violate the Eighth Amendment). Accordingly, the Act

does not violate the Eighth Amendment.

3. The Registration Act does not violate the due process clause of the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendment.

Plaintiff claims that this scheme violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because he

“was denied due process where, upon his release, he was not admonished by the Judge of such

registry before he was placed under its ramifications.” ECF No. 1 at 9. Plaintiff appears to suggest

that he should have appeared before a judge before being included on the registry. In Conn. Dep’t

of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003), the Supreme Court overturned the Second Circuit’s ruling

that due process entitled class members to a hearing to determine whether they were likely to be

dangerous “before being labeled as such by their inclusion on the registry.” Id. at 6. The Supreme

Court explained that a “mere injury to reputation, even if defamatory, does not constitute the

deprivation of a liberty interest.” Id. The Court explained that “the law’s requirements turn on an

offender’s conviction alone—a fact that a convicted offender has already had a procedurally

safeguarded opportunity to contest.” Id. at 7. Here, as well, Plaintiff has already been found guilty

in a court of law and the registry is merely reporting that fact. Accordingly, there is no due process

violation.2

2Plaintiff does not appear to be making a substantive due process claim. In Vasquez, the Seventh

Circuit rejected the parties’ substantive due process claim, explaining that the law only triggers rational

basis review. The Seventh Circuit upheld the more onerous requirements of the sex offender registry

4. Federal courts must follow state interpretation of state laws.

Plaintiff argues that the Registration Act violates Illinois’s single subject rule because the

“title of the Act is confined to the subject of youth and children” and the “entire Act relates to

violence against youth, children and persons under the age of 18.” ECF No. 1 at 12 (citing 730

ILCS 154/1). The Illinois Constitution states that “Bills, except bills for appropriations and for the

codification, revision or rearrangement of laws, shall be confined to one subject.” Ill. Const. 1970,

art. IV, §8(d). The Illinois Supreme Court has explained that the clause “operates to prevent the

passage of legislation that, standing alone, may not muster the votes necessary for enactment.”

People v. Cervantes, 723 N.E.2d 265, 266 (Ill. 1999) (citing People v. Reedy, 708 N.E. 2d 1114

(1999); Johnson v. Edgar, 680 N.E. 2d 1372 (1997)). An act “violates the single subject rule when

the General Assembly ‘includes within one bill unrelated provisions that by no fair interpretation

have any legitimate relation to one another.’” Id. (quoting Reedy, 708 N.E. 2d at 1117). However,

“an enactment satisfies the single subject requirement so long as the matters included within it

have a natural and logical connection.” Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 352, 718 N.E.2d 191 (1999).

Plaintiff attempts to frame this issue as a violation of the Federal Constitution but does not

fully explain that argument. Instead, it appears that Plaintiff is trying to enforce a provision that

exists only in the state constitution, and there are many obstacles to bringing such a claim in federal

courts due to the immunity afforded the state under the Eleventh Amendment, among other

jurisdictional issues. See e.g. McDonough Assocs. v. Grunloh, 722 F.3d 1043, 1050 (7th Cir. 2013)

(explaining that the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment bar on suing states in

banning registrants from living too close to day cares. Vasquez, 895 F.3d at 525 (7th Cir. 2018) (abrogated

on other grounds in Koch v. Hartland, 42 F.4th 747 (7th Cir. 2022)). The same reasoning would apply here

that there is a rational basis in that there is a legitimate government interest in protecting the public from

violent offenders and the Court would not second-guess policy judgment by attempting to weigh the

likelihood of recidivism against the harm to the registrant. Id.

federal court allows lower federal courts to enforce federal law against the state officials in certain

circumstances); Grable & Sons Metal Prod. Inc. v. Darue Engr. & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005)

(establishing that in deciding whether a federal forum is appropriate to resolve a state law claim

that implicates a federal issue “the question is, does a state-law claim necessarily raise a stated

federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without

disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities”).

Moreover, federal courts must defer to state court interpretation of their own laws. RAR, Inc. v.

Turner Diesel, Ltd., 107 F.3d 1272, 1276 (7th Cir. 1997) (“state court precedent is binding upon

[federal courts] regarding issues of state law”). Here, the Illinois Appellate Court has already

explained that the Registration Act requires offenders to register if they are convicted of certain

offenses against youth or adults and that those matter “have a natural and logical connection.”

Chatman v. People, 2022 WL 6126027 (Ill. App. Ct. 2022). Accordingly, the court found requiring

registration for adult offenders accused of first-degree murder in an act that also relates to violence

against children did not violate the single subject rule. Id. Thus, this Court cannot disturb that

decision, and Plaintiff’s argument on this issue fails.

CONCLUSION

Both the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit have upheld various criminal registries,

and Plaintiff repeats arguments that have been rejected many times. Accordingly, that Plaintiff did

not adequately plead a claim for relief, and it is not appropriate to allow him to proceed in forma

pauperis. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis [2] and his Motion for

Service of Summons [3] are DENIED. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice.

ENTERED this 14th day of February, 2023.

/s/ Michael M. Mihm

Michael M. Mihm

United States District Judge