Opinion

Brown v. The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois

Court
District Court, C.D. Illinois
Filed
Dec 9, 2022
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 20.7%

holding common questions exist where “the same evidence will suffice for each member to make a prima facie showing [or] the issue is susceptible to generalized, class-wide proof.” (citation omitted)

How later courts described this case

  • holding common questions exist where “the same evidence will suffice for each member to make a prima facie showing [or] the issue is susceptible to generalized, class-wide proof.” (citation omitted)
  • contemplating whether common questions pertaining to an affirmative defense predominated

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION

DERICK BROWN, ATIBA FLEMONS, & )

JEFFREY TAYLOR, on behalf of )

themselves and others similarly situated, )

)

Plaintiffs, ) Case No. 2:19-cv-02020

)

v. )

)

THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF )

THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER & OPINION

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify Class (doc. 58).

The Motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for review. For the following reasons,

the Motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Derick Brown, Atiba Flemons, and Jeffrey Taylor are three Black

employees who currently work at Defendant’s Urbana-Champaign campus (UIUC or

the University). They charge Defendant with discrimination against Black employees

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and

have filed this putative class action lawsuit on behalf of themselves and their

colleagues to seek redress.

According to Plaintiffs, the University’s Nondiscrimination Policy (NDP) is

discriminatory and the University’s Office of Access and Equity (OAE)—the unit

tasked with investigating alleged violations of the NDP—has engaged in a pattern

and practice of discrimination by systematically failing to promptly evaluate and

ameliorate NDP complaints arising from alleged race-based misconduct. Regarding

the former claim, Plaintiffs allege the NDP creates a more demanding standard of

proof than is appropriate under Title VII in addressing complaints of race-based

misconduct without the protections and benefits afforded to litigants formally

pursuing a Title VII claim in court. And regarding the latter, Plaintiffs allege the

“OAE’s standard operating procedure is to guarantee a finding that a violation of the

NDP has not occurred, thus perpetuating racial hostility.” (Doc. 59 at 9).1 To maintain

this “inexorable zero,” Plaintiffs claim OAE staff members “refer draft investigatory

findings for Legal Review only where there is a preliminary recommendation that a

violation of the NDP is indicated, ensuring that UIUC’s legal department will

override the preliminary determination.” (Doc. 59 at 10). Plaintiffs further claim the

“OAE maintains a practice of nonenforcement by purposefully disregarding

provisions of the NDP aimed at preventing harassment, and by taking no measures

to mete out discipline, mandate reporting of racial harassment, or mandate training

on the NDP for all employees.”2 (Doc. 59 at 10). To remedy these claims, Plaintiffs

seek injunctive relief directing Defendant to overhaul the NDP and its complaint

procedure. (See doc. 59 at 72).

1 The Court’s pinpoint citations are to the page numbers generated by the Court’s

CMECF system.

2 Defendants refute this claim, pointing to evidence that the OAE does not have

authority to discipline. (Doc. 59-43 at 7–10). Rather, disciplinary actions are carried

out by the University’s various human resources departments. (Doc. 59-43 at 7–10).

Plaintiffs now seek certification of a class comprising

[a]ll individuals identifying as Black and/or African American who are

currently employed at UIUC, or who have been employed by UIUC at

any point since January 1, 2014, and who have not held a supervisory

position within System Human Resources, Illinois Human Resources,

campus unit offices for human resources, or the Office of Access and

Equity at any point since January 1, 2014.

(Doc. 59 at 49).

LEGAL STANDARD

“The party seeking class certification bears the burden of showing by a

preponderance of the evidence that certification is proper.” Orr v. Shicker, 953 F.3d

490, 497 (7th Cir. 2020). Firstly, the proposed class must be “sufficiently definite that

its members are ascertainable.” Lacy v. Cook Cty., Illinois, 897 F.3d 847, 864 (7th Cir.

2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Secondly, the movant(s) must comply with

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which requires satisfaction of “all four

requirements of Rule 23(a)—numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of

representation—and any one of the general categories of Rule 23(b).” Orr, 953 F.3d

at 497.

DISCUSSION

The parties devote many pages to arguing over the theory under which

Plaintiffs intend to proceed in this putative class action lawsuit and the merits

thereof. Early on, Plaintiffs indicated they intended to proceed based on theories of

retaliation and hostile work environment. (Text Order dated Aug. 8, 2019). Now,

Plaintiffs have seemingly abandoned the hostile-work-environment theory and are

instead pursuing a theory that Defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of

discrimination in its promulgation of the NDP and evaluation of complaints

thereunder.

Defendant claims waiver, asserting this shift circumvents Judge Bruce’s Text

Order on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, which noted: “Plaintiffs, in their Response

18 at page 1, confirmed that they are not pursuing any disparate treatment claims,

and are pursuing only hostile work environment and retaliation claims under Title

VII.” (Text Order dated Aug. 8, 2019). The Court disagrees with Defendant’s

contention and accepts Plaintiffs’ explanation: Plaintiffs waived their specific,

individual claims of disparate treatment asserted in Counts V and VI of the Amended

Complaint, not the overarching claim related to the NDP and its complaint procedure,

couched in Count I.3 Indeed, both Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint and Response to

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss discuss at length their theory that Defendant engaged

in a pattern or practice of discrimination in promulgating the NDP and evaluating

complaints thereunder. Defendant nevertheless did not challenge that theory at the

dismissal stage or elsewhere in this litigation. Thus, the Court will proceed herein on

the understanding that Plaintiffs’ class claim is limited to their challenge of

Defendant’s NDP and its complaint procedure.

3 While Count I is labeled a hostile-work-environment claim, the Court is not “bound

by names and labels placed on a complaint by” Plaintiffs. Bastien v. AT&T Wireless

Servs., Inc., 205 F.3d 983, 987 (7th Cir. 2000). In addition to explicitly alleging a

hostile work environment, Count I also challenges the validity of Defendant’s

“policies, practices, and/or procedures.” (Doc. 4 at 82).

I. Plaintiffs Cannot Satisfy the Rule 23(a) Prerequisites

Of the Rule 23(a) requirements, Defendant only challenges commonality and

typicality. The Court accepts this implicit concession that Plaintiffs’ proposal meets

the requirements of numerosity and fair and adequate representation by the named

parties and finds Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in support of their Motion for Class

Certification demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that these elements

are satisfied. The same cannot be said for the requirements of commonality and

typicality.

A. Plaintiffs Have Not Satisfied the Commonality Requirement

Commonality requires a plaintiff to show that “there are questions of law or

fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). “[S]uperficial common questions—

like whether each class member shares a characteristic or ‘suffered a violation of the

same provision of law’—are not enough.” Van v. Ford Motor Co., 332 F.R.D. 249, 273

(N.D. Ill. 2019) (quoting Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 668 F.3d 481, 497 (7th Cir.

2012). Instead, to satisfy this requirement, a plaintiff “must assert a common injury

that is ‘capable of class[-]wide resolution—which means that determination of its

truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the

claims in one stroke.’ ” Lacy v. Cook Cty., Illinois, 897 F.3d 847, 865 (7th Cir. 2018)

(quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011)).

In a case such as this, where Plaintiffs seek to “bring otherwise highly

individualized claims as a class, the class must establish systemic violations or an

illegal policy.” Van, 332 F.R.D. at 273 (citing Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 497). “ ‘If, to make

a prima facie showing on a given question, the members of a proposed class will need

to present evidence that varies from member to member, then it is an individual

question. If the same evidence will suffice for each member to make a prima facie

showing, then it becomes a common question.’ ” Id. (quoting Messner v. Northshore

Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 815 (7th Cir. 2012)); see also Tyson Foods, Inc. v.

Bouaphakeo, 577 U.S. 442, 453 (2016) (holding common questions exist where “the

same evidence will suffice for each member to make a prima facie showing [or] the

issue is susceptible to generalized, class-wide proof.” (citation omitted)).

The operative question is thus whether Plaintiffs have submitted sufficient

evidence to conclude at this stage Defendant has engaged in systemic Title VII

violations or enforced an illegal policy. Plaintiffs, of course, answer in the affirmative

and assert the following five questions pertinent to their claim meet the commonality

requirement.

One: Whether OAE has a policy or practice of never issuing a finding of

a violation of the NDP;

Two: Whether OAE has a policy or practice of referring to UIUC’s Legal

Department for review and reversal only those draft preliminary

investigation reports that indicate a violation of the NDP;

Three: Whether the provisions of the NDP itself are more demanding

than those of Title VII that they effectively prohibit any finding that

alleged racial harassment will be found to have violated the NDP;

Four: Whether OAE’s definition of “harassment” as applied to

complaints of racial harassment demands more proof than the definition

OAE applies to complaints of sexual harassment, further evidence that

UIUC is discriminating “because of” race; and

Five: Whether OAE has a practice of nonenforcement of the NDP with

respect to reporting racial harassment, training employees on what

constitutes racial harassment, and meting out discipline that, in effect,

OAE tolerates racial harassment.

(Doc. 59 at 53–54).

As these questions suggest, Plaintiffs’ theory is that Defendant’s NDP violates

Title VII and its complaint procedure, as carried out by the OAE, constitutes a pattern

or practice of intentional discrimination in violation of Title VII. Pattern-or-practice

claims most often arise in the context of hiring practices. See E.E.O.C. v. Int’l Profit

Assocs., Inc., 2007 WL 3120069, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2007). “For example, ‘[i]f an

employer has an established policy of making employment decisions with racial

animus in violation of Title VII, it is likely that any specific employment decision also

violates Title VII, and if a particular decision was not discriminatory, the employer

is in the best position to show why.” Van, 332 F.R.D. at 274 (quoting Int’l Profit

Assocs., Inc., 2007 WL 3120069, at *2). Such claims thus “require a ‘showing that an

employer regularly and purposefully discriminates against a protected group.’ ”

Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709, 716-17 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Council 31, Am.

Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., AFL-CIO v. Ward, 978 F.2d 373, 378 (7th Cir.

1992)). To prevail under this theory, “Plaintiffs must prove that discrimination ‘was

the company’s standard operating procedure—the regular rather than the unusual

practice.’ ” Id. (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, (1977)).

However, as Judge Dow observed in Van, “it is not clear to the Court that such

a claim can be brought in the context of this case.” 332 F.R.D. at 274. The Van

plaintiffs’ claim is remarkably similar to that asserted here:

Plaintiffs claim that Defendant has maintained a policy of failing to take

prompt remedial action in response to credible allegations of

harassment. . . . Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant as a rule

has allowed known harassers to remain in the workplace, failed to

discipline harassers despite the harassment being witnessed by

supervisors, threatened female complainants with termination or

otherwise reprimanded female complainants, assigned less desirable

tasks to women who did not submit to sexual advances, among other

conduct.

Id. In finding a lack of commonality as to this pattern-or-practice claim, Judge Dow

reasoned:

Even assuming these facts to be true, however, a finding that an

employer had a pattern or practice of tolerating . . . harassment in

violation of Title VII does not necessarily establish that an individual

claimant was exposed to harassment or that the harassment an

individual claimant suffered violates Title VII. The Teamsters pattern-

or-practice framework can assist a court’s analysis of whether a

defendant has engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination

prohibited under Title VII, but it is Title VII itself that defines the scope

of prohibited discrimination and sets the substantive boundaries within

which the method of proof must operate. In other words, adopting the

Teamsters method of proof to adjudicate plaintiffs’ claims does not

obviate the need to consider the * * * statutory elements of the specific

cause of action pled.

Id. at 274–75 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Similarly, even if Plaintiffs are correct in their assertion the NDP and its

complaint procedure are problematic, such a finding has no bearing on whether

anyone suffered a Title VII violation. Plaintiffs have put the cart before the horse.

Title VII regulates conduct;4 it does not regulate or even mandate organizational

policies prohibiting conduct prohibited by Title VII, Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,

524 U.S. 742, 745 (1998) (“[P]roof that an employer had promulgated an

4 Title VII prohibits discrimination “against any individual with respect to his

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such

individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

antiharassment policy with [a] complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance

as a matter of law, [but] the need for a stated policy suitable to the employment

circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any case when litigating the first

element of the defense.”). By challenging the NDP and its complaint procedure,

Plaintiffs are effectively challenging the first element of Defendant’s affirmative

defense5—not asserting a claim cognizable under Title VII. Indeed, the policy itself is

race-neutral (see doc. 59-1), and Plaintiffs’ more sinister claim—that the OAE had an

unwritten policy to never find a violation of the NDP—is likewise race-neutral.6 This

is simply unlike cases where there was a policy, written or by practice, to never hire

or promote people of color, which are clearly race-based policies, see, e.g., Teamsters,

431 U.S. at 324.

Because neither the NDP nor its complaint procedure constitute a patent

violation of Title VII, Plaintiffs’ putative common questions have no bearing on their

and the putative class members’ prima facie claims under Title VII and thus cannot

serve as common questions in that regard. This, however, raises an additional

concern that permeates the Rule 23 analysis: Plaintiffs disclaim “harassment

common to the class as a whole that has resulted in an overall hostile environment.”

5 Under Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), an employer

“is entitled to an affirmative defense against liability if it can show (1) that it

exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing

behavior, and (2) that the claimant failed to take advantage of any preventive or

corrective opportunities provided by the University to otherwise avoid harm.” Hardy

v. Univ. of Illinois at Chicago, 328 F.3d 361, 364 (7th Cir. 2003).

6 The Court recognizes the possibility that a disparate impact claim could potentially

arise from such a policy, but Plaintiffs have not pursued a disparate impact claim

herein.

(Doc. 69-1 at 5). Because the failure to have an adequate antiharassment policy and

complaint procedure is not itself a violation of Title VII, it appears highly unlikely

that each and every member of the putative class suffered a Title VII violation in

light of Plaintiffs’ disclaimer. The proposed class definition, therefore, seems to be

overbroad in that it includes individuals with no colorable Title VII claim.

That said, the putative common questions do touch on Defendant’s affirmative

defense to claims of Title VII violations. But even assuming commonality may arise

from questions solely pertaining to an affirmative defense rather than a plaintiff’s

prima facie case, see Gorss Motels, Inc. v. Brigadoon Fitness, Inc., 29 F.4th 839, 845

(7th Cir. 2022) (contemplating whether common questions pertaining to an

affirmative defense predominated), the Court remains skeptical of the notion that the

answers to Plaintiffs’ putative common questions “will resolve an issue that is central

to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke,” Lacy, 897 F.3d at 865.

Recall that Plaintiffs seek to certify a class comprising

[a]ll individuals identifying as Black and/or African American who are

currently employed at UIUC, or who have been employed by UIUC at

any point since January 1, 2014, and who have not held a supervisory

position within System Human Resources, Illinois Human Resources,

campus unit offices for human resources, or the Office of Access and

Equity at any point since January 1, 2014.

(Doc. 59 at 49). Plaintiffs claim the number of University employees identifying as

black or African American was nearly 900 in 2015; consistent with Plaintiffs’

assertion “that number is consistent with the range of employees identifying as Black

in the years after 2015” (doc. 59 at 50), the Court will presume for the purpose of this

Order the putative class numbers approximately 900 individuals. Yet, Plaintiffs also

allege the OAE evaluated only 757 or so NDP complaints during the class period, of

which approximately 80% (approximately 60) were made by employees who identified

as Black or African American. (Doc. 59 at 12, 55, 58–59).

This comparatively minute number of putative class members interacting with

the OAE’s NDP complaint procedure raises alarm bells. Plaintiff has not established

the OAE’s NDP complaint procedure is the only way by which a Title VII claimant

may “exhaust” her claim so as to avoid the consequences of the Ellerth/Faragher

defense. Defendant points to evidence demonstrating the OAE is not the only unit

that may evaluate allegations of race-based misconduct; in fact, it is the University’s

various human resources departments that are authorized to take corrective action

for such claims—the OAE has no such authority. (Doc. 68-1 at 13–14 (citing doc. 59-

43 at 7–10); see also doc. 63-7). Given participation in the OAE’s NDP complaint

procedure is purportedly voluntary (see doc. 68-1 at 14), it stands to reason that an

aggrieved employee may overcome the Ellerth/Faragher defense by going straight to

the unit holding the power to remedy misconduct: the applicable human resources

department. To be clear, this is not a decision on the merits of any aspect of

Defendant’s potential Ellerth/Faragher defense; it is merely an observation that

Plaintiffs have not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that aggrieved

employees must go through the OAE to seek internal redress for alleged race-based

7 The Court is aware that Defendant disputes this, arguing “only a relatively small

number of [NDP] complaints proceed through the investigative process to a final

report” and the OAE evaluated more than 75 complaints but many of them were

withdrawn or resolved through informal mediation. (Doc. 68-1 at 13).

misconduct. If employees are not required to go through the OAE and may instead

seek redress from other units within the University, then questions pertaining to the

OAE’s NDP and its complaint procedure are not common in the context of Defendant’s

affirmative defense even among the putative class members with colorable Title VII

claims.

In sum, the more the Court digs into Plaintiff’s theory of the case, the more

Plaintiffs’ foundation crumbles. Ellerth holds Defendant was under no legal

obligation pursuant to Title VII to promulgate antiharassment policies and complaint

procedures, which calls into serious question the propriety of the very broad proposed

class definition. Plaintiffs’ claim instead attacks the first element of Defendant’s

Ellerth/Faragher defense. But this theory suffers a fatal flaw: Plaintiffs have not

demonstrated the OAE’s NDP complaint procedure is the only avenue to avoid the

application of that defense. If, as the Court suspects, employees can and do report

race-based misconduct directly to University officials or units other than the OAE,

the propriety and efficacy of the NDP and its complaint procedure do not present

issues common to such individuals. For these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiffs have

failed to meet their burden to prove commonality such that the answers to their

putative common questions “will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each

one of the claims in one stroke,” Lacy, 897 F.3d at 865.

B. Plaintiffs Have Not Proven Their Claims are Typical of the Class

The “commonality and typicality requirements . . . tend to merge.” Wal-Mart,

564 U.S. at 349 n.4 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13

(1982)). However, the two differ in that “the commonality inquiry focuses on what

characteristics are shared among the whole class while the typicality inquiry focuses

on the desired attributes of the class representative.” Howard v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s

Off., 989 F.3d 587, 606 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Newberg on Class Actions § 3:31).

“Typicality is meant to ensure that the named representative’s claims have the same

essential characteristics as the claims of the class at large.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). Specifically, “[a] plaintiff’s claim is typical if it arises from the same

event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class

members and [is] based on the same legal theory.” Lacy, 897 F.3d at 866 (internal

quotation marks omitted and alteration in original). “The logic behind the typicality

requirement ‘is that a class representative will adequately pursue her own claims,

and if those claims are “typical” of those of the rest of the class, then her pursuit of

her own interest will necessarily benefit the class as well.’ ” Howard, 989 F.3d at 605

(quoting Newberg on Class Actions § 3:28).

Plaintiffs’ claims are not typical of the putative class members’ claims. The

named Plaintiffs and the two class exemplars represent five of the approximately 60

NDP complaints asserting race-based misconduct evaluated by the OAE during the

class period. As stated above, the number of NDP complaints filed in the relevant

time period represents an infinitesimal fraction of the putative class, meaning the

vast majority of the putative class members were not subject to the same practice or

conduct that comprises the gravamen of Plaintiffs’ and the class exemplars’ claims:

the OAE’s NDP and complaint procedure. In the Court’s estimation, the experiences

of the Plaintiffs and putative class members range from (1) those who experienced no

racial discrimination or harassment to (2) those who experienced racial

discrimination or harassment but did not report it to (3) those who experienced racial

discrimination or harassment but reported it to a University official or unit other

than the OAE to (4) those who experienced racial discrimination or harassment and

reported it to the OAE. As these experiences vary wildly it cannot be said that

Plaintiffs’ experience is typical of the entire class; rather, it appears Plaintiffs’ and

the exemplars’ experiences are an extreme minority. For these reasons and those

discussed above in the commonality analysis, Plaintiffs have failed to adequately

prove typicality.

II. The Court does not Consider the Arguments Relating to Rule 23(b), (c)

Because Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to prove commonality and

typicality, the Court does not consider the parties’ arguments relating to Rule 23(b)(2)

or (c)(4).

CONCLUSION

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification

(doc. 58) is DENIED. This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Long for a case

management hearing to establish the procedures moving forward.

SO ORDERED.

Entered this 9th day of December 2022.

s/ Joe B. McDade

JOE BILLY McDADE

United States Senior District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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