Allen v. Macoupin County Public Health Department

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

NIKA ALLEN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 20-3137

)

MACOUPIN COUNTY PUBLIC )

HEALTH DEPARTMENT, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:

Before the Court is Defendant Macoupin County Public Health

Department’s (the “Department”) Motion for Summary Judgment

(d/e 26) and Motion to Strike (d/e 39) and Plaintiff Nika Allen’s

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (d/e 28). Because genuine

disputes of material fact exist as to essential elements of Plaintiff’s

claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 26) and Plaintiff’s Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment (d/e 28) are each DENIED. Further,

because the Court reaches this conclusion without considering the

affidavit the Department seeks to strike, the Motion to Strike (d/e

39) is DENIED AS MOOT.

I. FACTS

The Court draws the following facts from the parties’

statements of material facts, taking into account each party’s

objections thereto. The Court discusses material factual disputes

in its analysis. Any fact submitted by any party that was not

supported by a citation to evidence will not be considered by the

Court. See Civ. LR 7.1(D)(2)(b)(2). Any response to an allegedly

disputed fact unsupported by evidentiary documentation is deemed

admitted. Id.

Plaintiff Nika Allen began working for the Macoupin County

Public Health Department at the Maple Street Clinic (the “Clinic”) in

early 2017. Def.’s Mem. (d/e 27) p. 7. Plaintiff reported directly to

Kimberly Stinnett, who was employed by the Department as a lead

office assistant with immediate supervisory authority over Plaintiff.

Pl.’s Mem. p. 6; Def.’s Mem. p. 7. Angela Weidner, the director of

nursing and chief operating officer for the Department, also had

supervisory authority over Plaintiff, though Weidner was not

Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor. Pl.’s Mem. (d/e 30) p. 5; Def.’s

Mem. p. 7. Weidner also had supervisory authority over Christy

Blank, clinical director at the Department, and Donna Rassmussen,

a physician assistant and assistant director of behavioral health at

the Department, though Weidner’s supervision of Rassmussen was

administrative only. Pl.’s Mem. p. 5, 6; Def.’s Mem. p. 4, 8. Kent

Tarro was the director of the Department and was the person to

whom Weidner reported. Pl.’s Mem. p. 5; Def.’s Mem. p. 7.

Plaintiff began her employment with the Department and

Clinic as a “faxer,” but eventually assumed the role of a “Medical

Office Assistant.” Pl.’s Mem. p. 7; Def.’s Mem. p. 7. Plaintiff’s

responsibilities as Medical Office Assistant included scheduling

appointments for patients of the medical clinic and the behavioral

health and recovery center. Pl.’s Mem. p. 7; Def.’s Mem. p. 9.

Plaintiff’s performance in her role was mixed. At Plaintiff’s six-

month evaluation in September 2017, Stinnett evaluated Plaintiff as

being “very proficient” and “do[ing] what [was] asked of her.” J.A.

1599. Stinnett also noted that Plaintiff “would benefit from avoiding

conversations with other certain coworkers and focus on her duties”

but that Plaintiff was “capable of being a top performer” and was

“always polite and willing to do extra tasks asked of her.” J.A.

1600.

However, Plaintiff was also a part of an “Informal Counselling

Session” on February 9, 2018. Def.’s Mem. p. 12; J.A. 0748. She

was reportedly cited for not getting along with coworkers and failing

to perform some of her job duties. Id. According to Stinnett, the

other office assistants also complained that Plaintiff’s behavior had

changed during her time at the Clinic. Def.’s Mem p. 13. Weidner

testified at her deposition that, in February or March of 2018, she

thought the other office assistants at the Clinic were “being mean

and picking on Plaintiff” which resulted in Plaintiff and the other

assistants “constantly fighting.” J.A. 1712. The informal

counseling session was, itself, the listed discipline for Plaintiff’s

alleged behavioral issues. J.A. 0748.

Plaintiff also suffered from anxiety and depression while

employed at the Clinic. Pl.’s Mem. p. 8; Def.’s Mem. p. 11. Plaintiff

received treatment for these mental health conditions from

Rassmussen at the Clinic beginning in October 2017. Id. Plaintiff

was treated with Xanax, a sedative. Id. Plaintiff discussed her

conditions and her treatment with Weidner around the same time

she began treatment, though Plaintiff did not tell Weidner about the

specific medication she was taking. Pl.’s Mem. p. 8; Def.’s Mem. p.

11.

Plaintiff was then hospitalized on March 1, 2018. Pl.’s Mem.

p. 8; Def.’s Mem. p. 11. Hospital records from Alton Memorial

Hospital showed that, after a 9-1-1 call was made to Alton Hospital

EMS, Plaintiff was found on the floor of her home and that her

family reported Plaintiff experiencing seizures. J.A. 0200. Plaintiff

was eventually transferred to Passavant Hospital in Jacksonville,

Illinois, where she remained hospitalized for three days. Pl.’s Mem.

p. 10; Def.’s Mem. p. 14. Toxicology reports from Passavant showed

Plaintiff’s blood tested positive for Xanax, alcohol, and cocaine. J.A.

2148. Plaintiff was also diagnosed with bipolar and borderline

personality disorder when admitted to Passavant. Def. Mem. p. 18.

At some point while Plaintiff was hospitalized, Weidner and

Blank spoke about the situation. Pl.’s Mem. p. 10; Def.’s Mem. p.

15. Weidner testified in a deposition that Blank told Weidner about

Plaintiff’s hospitalization. Id. Weidner stated that Blank said,

“[Allen is] fucking crazy and she’s in the hospital.” J.A. 1662.

Plaintiff was then discharged from Passavant on March 5,

2018. Pl.’s Mem. p. 12. The same day, Dr. Kamna Handa at

Passavant sent a letter to Stinnett stating that Plaintiff had been

hospitalized, should be excused from work, and would be “able to

return to work on 03/09/18 with no restrictions.” Pl.’s Mem. p. 12.

Plaintiff did so on March 12, 2018. Pl.’s Mem. p. 13; Def.’s Mem. p.

19. The same day, Plaintiff had an appointment with Dr. Yae Rim

Lee, a psychiatrist at the Clinic, for evaluation of Plaintiff’s mental

health matters after Rassmussen referred Plaintiff to Dr. Lee. Pl.’s

Mem. p. 8–9; Def.’s Mem. p. 19. Dr. Lee noted that Plaintiff stated

she was referred because “I [Plaintiff] overdosed and I [Plaintiff]

almost died.” J.A. 0441. Dr. Lee also noted Plaintiff saying that

she had been using illegal substances on a weekly basis for about a

year. J.A. 0441–0442. Plaintiff immediately returned to work

following her appointment with Dr. Lee. Pl.’s Mem. p. 9.

The next day on March 13, 2018, Plaintiff was called into a

meeting with Stinnett, Weidner, and Blank. Pl.’s Mem. p. 14; Def.’s

Mem. p. 20; Def.’s Resp (d/e 33) p. 24. According to Plaintiff,

Weidner stated that both she and Blank believed Plaintiff was

mentally unstable and should take a leave of absence. Pl.’s Mem. p.

14–15; J.A. 0137–0138. Both Weidner and Blank deny commenting

on Plaintiff’s mental health. Def.’s Resp. p. 25–26. The parties

dispute most of what transpired at the meeting, including what was

said, who said it, and whether Plaintiff was forced to take

involuntary FMLA leave or whether the leave was “offered” to

Plaintiff. Pl.’s Mem. p. 14–16; Def.’s Mem. p. 20–23; Def.’s Resp. p.

25–28; Pl.’s Resp. (d/e 34) p. 13–19. Undisputed, though, is the

fact that Plaintiff was placed on leave under the Family and Medical

Leave Act effective March 13, 2018 despite Plaintiff not believing

she needed to take any leave. Def.’s Mem. p. 23; Pl.’s Resp. p. 19.

Also undisputed is an email Blank sent to Tarro, Weidner,

and Stinnett on March 13, 2018 recommending Plaintiff’s

employment be immediately terminated. Pl.’s mem p. 13; Def.’s

Resp. p. 22. Blank’s recommendation was, in part, due to her

concern that the Clinic “[had] someone first line with patients” who

was “very unstable but yet” the Clinic was “asking her to represent”

the Clinic. J.A. 2137. Blank’s concern stemmed from “the amount

of patients [the Clinic] deal[t] with . . . on a daily basis” who were

“not stable.” Id. While Plaintiff’s employment was not terminated

in accordance with Blank’s recommendation, Plaintiff’s employment

with the Department eventually ended when Plaintiff contacted

Tarro sometime mid-June 2018 to say that Plaintiff quit. Def.’s

Mem. p. 31; Pl.’s Resp. p. 34.

Plaintiff then filed suit against Defendant the Macoupin

County Public Health Department on June 4, 2020 alleging the

Department’s employees’ actions in placing Plaintiff on leave

violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)

(hereinafter “ADA”). See Compl. (d/e 1). Both Plaintiff and the

Department have now moved for summary judgment pursuant to

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper under Rule 56 if there is no

genuine dispute of material fact and the movant shows she is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The

movant bears the initial responsibility of informing the Court of the

basis for the motion and identifying the evidence the movant

believes demonstrates the absence of any genuine dispute of

material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

The non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings and “set

forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

Summary judgment is not warranted if there are factual disputes as

to an essential element of the case which would determine whether

a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 964 (7th Cir. 2012). In

short, “summary judgment is the ‘put up or shut up’ moment in a

lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would

convince a trier of fact to accept its version of events.” Johnson v.

Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2003). On that

evidence, the Court must determine whether a genuine dispute of

material facts exists.

A genuine dispute of material fact exists if a reasonable trier of

fact could find in favor of the nonmoving party. Carroll v. Lynch,

698 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2012). When ruling on a motion for

summary judgment, the Court must construe facts in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable

inferences in the nonmoving party's favor. Woodruff v. Mason, 542

F.3d 545, 550 (7th Cir. 2008). These standards for summary

judgment remain when considering cross-motions for summary

judgment: the Court must “construe all inferences in favor of the

party against whom the motion under consideration is made.”

Oneida Nation v. Vill. of Hobart, Wis., 371 F. Supp. 3d 500, 508

(E.D. Wis. 2019) (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 297 F.3d

558, 561–62 (7th Cir. 2002)).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff alleges that the Department’s actions in placing

Plaintiff on FMLA leave amount to a violation of the Americans with

Disabilities Act’s prohibition on workplace discrimination. See 42

U.S.C. § 12112(a). An employer violates the ADA when it

“discriminate[s] against a qualified individual on the basis of

disability.” Id. To succeed on a claim that an employer violated the

ADA, a qualified individual must establish that (1) she was

disabled, (2) she was otherwise qualified to perform the essential

functions of her job with or without reasonable accommodation,

and (3) her disability was the basis for the adverse employment

action. Richardson v. Chicago Transit Auth., 926 F.3d 881, 886

(7th Cir. 2019). The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff was

otherwise able to perform the essential functions of her job, instead

focusing their arguments on the first and third prongs of Plaintiff’s

claim as well as whether Plaintiff was a “qualified individual” under

the ADA.

The Department argues that Plaintiff cannot succeed on her

claim under the ADA because Plaintiff cannot show she was a

“qualified individual” under the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A

“qualified individual” is someone “who, with or without reasonable

accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the

employment position” the individual holds. Id. at § 12111(8). The

ADA’s implementing regulations further state that an individual is

“qualified” if “the individual satisfies the requisite skill, experience,

education and other job-related requirements of the employment

position” she holds and “can perform the essential functions of

such position” with or without reasonable accommodation. 29

C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). The regulations explicitly exempt from the

definition of “qualified individual” individuals “currently engaging in

the illegal use of drugs, when the covered entity acts on the basis of

such use.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(a).

Disputes of fact on this issue preclude summary judgment.

While the Department is correct that Plaintiff would not be a

“qualified individual” if the Department acted on the basis of

Plaintiff’s admitted use of illegal drugs, see Pl.’s Resp. p. 37, the

extent to which the Department relied on Plaintiff’s drug use is

disputed. First, the Department has not presented any evidence to

show that Plaintiff’s superiors knew about Plaintiff’s drug use before

placing her on leave. The Department has only shown that Blank

and Weidner knew Plaintiff had been hospitalized because, in

Blank’s words, she was “fucking crazy.” That does not put beyond

dispute either Blank’s, Weidner’s, or Stinnett’s knowledge of

Plaintiff’s use of drugs. If anything, as explained supra, that

statement raises an inference from which, when viewed in the light

most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable jury could conclude that

the Department regarded Plaintiff as being disabled.

Moreover, even if Plaintiff’s supervisors did know about the

drug use, the Department has not shown that it acted “on the

basis” of such use. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(a). Issues of fact exist as to

the purported bases for placing Plaintiff on leave, such as what

Weidner, Stinnett, and Blank knew about Plaintiff’s use of illegal

drugs, when they knew it, and to what extent they relied on such

information when placing Plaintiff on leave. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

ability to show that the Department did not know Plaintiff was

using drugs at the time she was placed on leave, and therefore a

“qualified individual” within the meaning of the ADA, hinges on a

question of fact for a reasonable jury to decide. The Department’s

request for summary judgment on the basis of Plaintiff’s use of

illegal drugs must, therefore, be denied.

Further, questions of fact exist as to whether Plaintiff can

show a disability under the ADA. To prove a disability under the

ADA, a plaintiff must show “(A) a physical or mental impairment

that substantially limit[ed] one or more major life activities . . . (B) a

record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such

an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(1). Plaintiff here relies on the

“regarded as” prong. An individual meets the definition of having a

disability under that prong “if the individual establishes that he or

she has been subjected to an action . . . because of an actual or

perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the

impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.” Id.

at § 12102(3)(A). Under the ADA’s implementing regulations, the

term “mental impairment” means “[a]ny mental or psychological

disorder, such as an intellectual disability (formerly termed ‘mental

retardation’), organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness,

and specific learning disabilit[y].” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2).

Plaintiff has presented evidence to support her claim that she

was “regarded as” having an impairment. Plaintiff has presented

evidence showing she suffered from depression and anxiety, was

diagnosed with bipolar and borderline personality disorder, and

received treatment regularly from Rassmussen at the Clinic for her

depression and anxiety. Plaintiff has also shown that her

supervisors knew about these maladies and presented evidence that

Blank referred to Plaintiff as “unstable” and “fucking crazy.” Such

diagnoses clearly fit the definition of a “mental impairment.”

Blank’s descriptions of Plaintiff also raise a question as to whether

the Department regarded Plaintiff as having a mental impairment.

However, when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to

each party as they must be on cross-motions for summary

judgment, the Court determines that the issue of whether Plaintiff

was “subjected to an action,” in this case, placing Plaintiff on FMLA

leave, “because of” the perceived impairment is a question of fact for

a jury to decide.

Lastly, the Department challenges Plaintiff’s ability to prove

she suffered an adverse employment action on the basis of her

disability. Richardson, 926 F.3d at 886. The Department argues

Plaintiff cannot establish this final element because Plaintiff was

not subjected to discipline on March 12 or 13, 2018 and because,

in the Department’s view, the FMLA leave on which Plaintiff was

placed was not a disciplinary measure. However, under the ADA’s

implementing regulations, “[p]rohibited actions include but are not

limited to refusal to hire, demotion, placement on involuntary leave,

termination, exclusion for failure to meet a qualification standard,

harassment, or denial of any other term, condition, or privilege of

employment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1) (emphasis added). The

prohibition against being placed on involuntary leave is not limited

to when such leave is disciplinary. The regulation simply states

that placing an employee who is regarded as disabled on

involuntary leave because of the disability is prohibited. Placing

Plaintiff on involuntary FMLA leave on March 13, 2018 because of a

disability would plainly fall into this category.

However, questions of fact remain regarding causation.

Plaintiff’s argument only goes so far as to point out the above-cited

regulation. Pl.’s Mem. p. 25. The Department, on the other hand,

disputes that Plaintiff was placed on leave solely because of a

perceived disability. The Department’s argument is bolstered by

evidence that Plaintiff had used illegal drugs. But as already

explained, questions abound regarding the extent to which

Plaintiff’s employment superiors at the Department were aware of

her drug use and whether they acted on that basis. Such questions

and the weighing of evidence are question for the jury. See Payne v.

Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003) (“On summary judgment

a court may not make credibility determinations, weigh the

evidence, or decide which inferences to draw from the facts; these

are jobs for a factfinder.”) Accordingly, summary judgment is

precluded on the causal element Plaintiff’s ADA claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

Each party has presented evidence from which a reasonable

jury could find in its favor regarding the essential elements of

Plaintiff’s claim under the ADA. As such, both Motions for

Summary Judgment (d/e 26 & 28) must be denied. Furthermore,

because the Court does not consider the Affidavit of Nika Allen in

this ruling, the Department’s Motion to Strike the same (d/e 39) is

denied as moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: September 22, 2022.

FOR THE COURT

/s/ Sue E. Myerscough____________

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE