Hoedebecke v. The City of Springfield

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

CORY HOEDEBECKE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 20-3057

)

THE CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS, )

and RHET SPENGEL )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:

Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 43)

filed by Defendants the City of Springfield (“the City”) and

Springfield Police Officer Rhet Spengel (collectively, “Defendants”).

The City has shown that it is entitled to summary judgment as to

Plaintiff’s Monell claim, while Plaintiff has shown genuine issues of

fact as to all other claims. Additionally, Plaintiff has shown that the

facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, amount to

a constitutional violation which was clearly established in July

2019. Accordingly, Officer Spengel is not entitled to qualified

immunity as to Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment § 1983 claims, and

Defendants’ Motion (d/e 43) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN

PART.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court draws the following facts from the parties’

statements of material facts, taking into account each party’s

objections thereto. The Court discusses material factual disputes, if

any, in its analysis. Any fact submitted by any party that was not

supported by a citation to evidence will not be considered by the

Court. See Civ. LR 7.1(D)(2)(b)(2). Any response to an allegedly

disputed fact unsupported by evidentiary documentation is deemed

admitted. Id.

The facts of this case surround a traffic stop in which

Defendant Officer Rhet Spengel arrested Plaintiff Cory Hoedebecke.

Plaintiff and a group of friends began bar-hopping in and around

Springfield, Illinois on the evening of July 6, 2019. Defs.’ Mot. (d/e

43) p. 3; Pl.’s Resp. (d/e 44) p. 15. Plaintiff and Officer Spengel had

been friends for nearly 15 years beginning in 2003, though the pair

had a falling out in the fall of 2018. Id. pp. 14–15. Officer Spengel

was on duty the night of July 6, 2019 and was assigned to Beat 400

in Springfield. Pl.’s Resp. p. 15. Beat 400 did not include any of

the bar-hop locations. Id.

Before starting his shift in Beat 400, Officer Spengel

communicated with Erika Carlove, a mutual friend of both him and

Plaintiff, to learn about Plaintiff’s involvement in the outing. Id. In

fact, Officer Spengel was kept apprised of Plaintiff’s whereabouts

the entire evening of July 6 and into the early morning of July 7

through a series of text messages with Carlove. See id. pp. 15–18.

The entire evening, Officer Spengel and Carlove exchanged text

messages from various points on the bar-hop route in which

Carlove informed Officer Spengel about Plaintiff’s movements,

including to both Weebles bar and the Butternut Hut in Springfield.

Id. pp. 16–18.

Carlove knew Plaintiff’s whereabouts because Plaintiff was

driving her in Plaintiff’s Jeep along the route that night. Id. p. 17.

Carlove told Officer Spengel at 7:34 p.m. that she and Plaintiff had

arrived at Weebles. Id. p. 16. When Officer Spengel learned about

Plaintiff going to Weebles, he left Beat 400 and parked in a parking

lot just south of Weebles. Id. p. 16. Officer Spengel stayed in that

parking lot for approximately 45 minutes, all the while texting

Carlove, including asking Carlove “How drunk is fat ass?” in

reference to Plaintiff. Id.

Plaintiff and Carlove then left Weebles to go to the Butternut

Hut, and Officer Spengel asked Carlove to let him know when “tons

of shit,” another reference to Plaintiff, was going to leave that bar.

Id. p. 17–18. In the meantime, Officer Spengel drove to and parked

his car north of the Butternut Hut and waited there for

approximately three hours. Id. To justify his time outside of his

assigned Beat, Officer Spengel changed his activity log to reflect

that he was performing a “premises check” and a “burglary detail.”

Id. at p. 18.

Plaintiff and Carlove left the Butternut Hut at around 12:40

a.m. in Plaintiff’s car. Id. at p. 19. At about 12:44 a.m., Officer

Spengel initiated a traffic stop of Plaintiff’s car. Id. Officer Spengel

was assisted by Patrol Officers Kyle Duvall and Taylor Sullivan. Id.

Spengel eventually arrested Plaintiff on charges of driving under the

influence of alcohol in violation of 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) and also

cited Plaintiff for disregarding a traffic control light and improper

traffic lane usage in violation of 625 ILCS 5/11-306 and 625 ILCS

5/11-709(a) respectively. Id. at pp. 19–21 (citing Ex. M). Plaintiff

was released from the Sangamon County Jail and retained an

attorney to represent him on the charges. Id. at p. 19. All the

charges against Plaintiff were dismissed by a judge of the Seventh

Judicial Circuit of Illinois, Sangamon County on motion of the

Sangamon County State’s Attorney on August 15, 2019. Id. at p.

21 (citing Ex. M). The order stated the reason for the dismissals

were due to “insufficient evidence.” Id. The mandatory suspension

of Plaintiff’s license which had been in place under 625 ILCS 5/11-

501.1 was rescinded in the same order. Id.

Before the charges were dismissed, Plaintiff’s attorney in the

criminal cases notified the Sangamon County State’s Attorney, the

Corporate Counsel for the City, and the Chief of Police of the

Springfield Police Department of the actions Officer Spengel took

prior to Plaintiff’s arrest. Id. An internal investigation was initiated

by Deputy Chief Ken Scarlette, which resulted in a formal complaint

against Officer Spengel filed by the Springfield Police Department

(“SPD”). Id. at pp. 19–20. Following the investigation, Lieutenant

Andrew Dodd issued a report that recommended six of seven official

charges of violations of the SPD Rules should be sustained. Id. at

pp. 20–21. Specifically, the charges to be sustained alleged

violations of Rule 11 – Neglect of Duty, Rule 14 – Arrests and Due

Process, Rule 20 – Abuse of Position, Rule 21 – Unbecoming

Conduct and Associations, Rule 27 – Internal Investigations, and

Rule 33 – Lying and Untruthfulness. Id. at p. 21 (citing Ex. Y).

Lieutenant Dodd then recommended that Officer Spengel be

terminated for his behavior. Id.

Springfield Police Department Deputy Chief Kenneth Scarlette

then issued a report in which he restated Lieutenant Dodd’s

findings on each charge and recommended Officer Spengel be

terminated. Id. at p. 22 (citing Ex. Z). Springfield Police

Department Chief Kenny Winslow agreed with that

recommendation. Id. (citing Ex. AA 53:19–20). However,

Springfield Mayor James Langfelder, who had final authority on

SPD disciplinary decisions, instead suspended Officer Spengel for

45 days without pay as discipline for Spengel’s actions surrounding

Plaintiff’s arrest. Id. at pp. 22–23 (citing Ex. AA 55:17–56:2 & Ex.

E).

Plaintiff then filed suit against Officer Spengel and the City on

February 25, 2020 alleging six violations of federal and Illinois state

law. Defendants now move for summary judgment on each count

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment under Rule 56 is appropriate “if the

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). On such a motion, the facts and all

reasonable inferences derived therefrom are viewed in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,

380 (2007); Blasius v. Angel Auto., Inc., 839 F.3d 639, 644 (7th Cir.

2016) (citing Cairel v. Alderden, 821 F.3d 823, 830 (7th Cir. 2016)).

A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if the evidence

is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-

moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Modrowski v. Pigatto,

712 F.3d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that Rule 56

“imposes an initial burden of production on the party moving for

summary judgment to inform the district court why a trial is not

necessary” (internal citation omitted)). After the moving party does

so, the non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings and

“set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (quotation and footnotes omitted).

Summary judgment is warranted when the moving party carries its

initial burden and the non-moving party cannot establish an

essential element of its case on which it will bear the burden of

proof at trial. Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 964 (7th Cir.

2012). “[S]ummary judgment is the ‘put up or shut up’ moment in

a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would

convince a trier of fact to accept its version of events.” Johnson v.

Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2003).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ actions amount to six

violations of federal and Illinois law. Plaintiff alleges in Counts I

and II that Officer Spengel’s actions violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

the Fourth Amendment by unreasonably seizing and falsely

arresting Plaintiff. Count III alleges that Mayor Langfelder’s

disciplinary decision amounted to a violation of Plaintiff’s

Constitutional rights under Monell v. Department of Social Services

of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In Counts IV and V,

Plaintiff alleges state law tort claims for false arrest and intentional

infliction of emotional distress against both the City and Officer

Spengel. Lastly, Plaintiff alleges state law indemnification in Count

VI and that the City is liable for any compensatory damages

awarded against Officer Spengel.

A. Officer Spengel is not entitled to qualified immunity on

Plaintiff’s § 1983 Fourth Amendment claims as stated in

Counts I and II.

Officer Spengel asserts the defense of qualified immunity as to

each of Plaintiff’s claims under § 1983. Generally, the doctrine of

qualified immunity is a shield police officers may use when faced

with a suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which a plaintiff

claims constitutional violations. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731,

735 (2011) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

Whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity “involves a two-

pronged inquiry: (1) whether the facts, read in favor of the non-

moving party, amount to a constitutional violation; and (2) whether

the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the

alleged violation.” Rainsberger v. Benner, 913 F.3d 640, 647 (7th

Cir. 2019). The two prongs of this question may be addressed in

either order depending on the claim. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.

223, 242 (2009).

The Court need not always address both questions in the

qualified immunity analysis. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,

236–42 (2009). “[I]f the law was not clearly established, there is no

need to tackle the (often harder) question whether the challenged

conduct violated the Constitution.” Rainsberger, 913 F.3d at 647.

But where the law was clearly established, both qualified immunity

questions must be addressed. Id.

i. Officer Spengel is not entitled to qualified immunity on

Plaintiff’s § 1983 unreasonable seizure claim in Count I.

The Court first considers Plaintiff’s claim that Officer Spengel

violated the Fourth Amendment by executing an unreasonable

seizure.

1. Plaintiff’s right to be free from a seizure not based

on a reasonable and articulable suspicion was clearly

established in July 2019.

“Undoubtedly the Fourth Amendment’s general proscription

against unreasonable seizures was clearly established at the time”

Officer Spengel stopped Plaintiff. Phelan v. Vill. of Lyons, 531 F.3d

484, 488 (2008). For qualified immunity purposes, though, the

application of this right to these particular set of circumstances

must have been “clear enough that a ‘reasonable officer would

understand that what he is doing violates that right.’” Id. (quoting

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)). The plaintiff need not

identify a case directly on point to show the law was clearly

established. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011).

Instead, the plaintiff must show that it was “sufficiently clear that

every reasonable official would have understood that what he [was]

doing violate[d]” the alleged right when he acted. Lovett v. Herbert,

907 F.3d 986, 992 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577

U.S. 7, 11 (2015)).

The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to

be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. Amend. IV.

Because “[a] traffic stop and accompanying detention constitute a

seizure under the Fourth Amendment,” a traffic stop will violate the

Fourth Amendment if it is unreasonable. Phelan v. Vill. of Lyons,

531 F.3d 484, 488 (7th Cir. 2008). A traffic stop is unreasonable if

the officer performing the stop does not have a “reasonable and

articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Huff v.

Reichert, 744 F.3d 999, 1004 (7th Cir. 2014). And while “[t]he

Fourth Amendment permits pretextual traffic stops,” i.e., traffic

stops based partially on the ulterior motives of the officer, stops are

only reasonable if they are otherwise independently “based on an

observed violation of traffic law.” Id. (quoting Whren v. United

States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996)). It, therefore, would have been

clear to any reasonable officer in Spengel’s position that some

reasonable and articulable suspicion was required to stop Plaintiff’s

car. However, as explained below, a question remains for trial as to

whether Officer Spengel’s stop of Plaintiff in the early hours of July

7, 2019 was reasonable.

2. Plaintiff has fulfilled his burden to establish a

genuine issue for trial as to whether Officer

Spengel’s stop of Plaintiff’s car was reasonable.

Plaintiff has raised questions of fact for trial regarding the

reasonableness of the traffic stop. Officer Spengel testified in his

deposition that he saw Plaintiff change lanes without signaling and

stopping past a stop line after seeing Plaintiff leave the Butternut

Hut. Ex. C at 65:7–12; 78:23–79:5. In his probable cause

statement submitted with the Sangamon County Sheriff’s Office,

Officer Spengel wrote that he saw Plaintiff “fail to make a complete

stop at [a] stop light” and “straddle[] a lane line for several seconds.”

Ex. I. However, Erika Carlove, who was in Plaintiff’s car with

Plaintiff at the time of the traffic stop, stated that she “as the

passenger in [Plaintiff’s] car, did not see any reason for [Plaintiff] to

be pulled over.” Ex. Q at p. 7. Carlove further stated that she

observed “no traffic violation that would’ve warranted an officer

pulling [Plaintiff] over that [she] noticed.” Id. Moreover, Carlove

never stated in any text message that she believed Plaintiff was

intoxicated, despite Officer Spengel questioning her regarding

Plaintiff’s intoxication. See Pl.’s Resp. (d/e 44) p. 18. While Carlove

is not a police officer, her statements dispute what Officer Spengel

says he observed prior to initiating the traffic stop.

Patrol Officer Sullivan also disputed other statements Officer

Spengel made in his probable cause statement, including Spengel’s

statements that Plaintiff showed signs of intoxication. Patrol Officer

Sullivan stated in her interview during the internal investigation

that Plaintiff seemed coherent, spoke coherently, and was not

slurring his speech or swaying. Ex. N. at p. 3.

Plaintiff has presented ample evidence to raise a question for

the fact finder regarding Officer Spengel’s veracity and the accuracy

of his probable cause statement. When the facts are viewed in the

light most favorable to Plaintiff, as they must be at this stage, the

Court finds that a genuine issue of fact exists regarding the

reasonableness of the traffic stop. Accordingly, Officer Spengel is

not entitled to qualified immunity as to Count I.

ii. Officer Spengel is also not entitled to qualified

immunity on Plaintiff’s § 1983 false arrest claim as

stated in Count II.

The Court next considers Plaintiff’s claim that Officer Spengel

violated the Fourth Amendment by executing an arrest without

probable cause.

1. Plaintiff’s right to be free from arrest without

probable cause was clearly established in July 2019.

The “clearly established” prong of the qualified immunity

inquiry is easily met for Plaintiff’s § 1983 false arrest claim. “There

is no question that [Plaintiff’s] constitutional right to be free from

arrest without probable cause was clearly established at the time of

[his arrest].” Fleming v. Livingston Cty., Ill., 674 F.3d 874, 879 (7th

Cir. 2012). This case presents a Fourth Amendment claim of false

arrest, so the question may also be understood as whether Officer

Spengel had “arguable probable cause” to arrest Plaintiff for driving

under the influence because arguable probable cause to arrest “is

‘an absolute defense’ to a wrongful arrest claim under § 1983.”

Huff, 744 F.3d at 1005 (quoting Rooni v. Biser, 742 F.3d 737, 740

(2014)). This standard has been repeatedly stated and employed by

the Seventh Circuit, clearly establishing that an officer must have

at least arguable probable cause to arrest an individual. See Burrit

v. Ditlefsen, 807 F.3d 239 (7th Cir. 2015) and Fleming, 674 F.3d

874. The ‘clearly established’ prong of the qualified immunity

inquiry is met, and the only question that remains is “whether the

facts, read in favor of the of the non-moving party, amount to a

constitutional violation.” Rainsberger, 913 F.3d at 647.

2. Plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of material fact

regarding the existence of arguable probable cause

when Officer Spengel arrested Plaintiff.

“A police officer has probable cause to arrest when, at the

moment the decision [to arrest] is made, the facts and

circumstances within [the officer’s] knowledge and of which [the

officer] has reasonably trustworthy information would warrant a

prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed or was

committing an offense.” Fleming, 674 F.3d at 878–79 (quoting Qian

v. Kautz, 168 F.3d 949, 953 (7th Cir. 1999)). But in the context of a

claim of qualified immunity, the reasonableness of the officer’s

actions is evaluated under the standard that has been called

“arguable probable cause.” Burrit, 807 F.3d at 250.

The presence at the time of arrest of arguable probable cause

entitles defendant officers to qualified immunity for § 1983 claims

arising under the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 249–250; Fleming,

674 F.3d at 880. “Although closely related, a determination of

actual probable cause is separate and distinct from a determination

of what is sometimes referred to as ‘arguable probable cause’ for

qualified immunity purposes.” Burritt, 807 F.3d at 250 (citing

Fleming, 674 F.3d at 880). “Arguable probable cause is established

‘when a reasonable police officer in the same circumstances and

with the same knowledge and possessing the same knowledge as

the officer in question could have reasonably believed that probable

cause existed in light of well-established law.’” Fleming, 674 F.3d

at 880 (quoting Humphrey v. Staszak, 148 F.3d 719, 725 (2012))

(additional citation and internal quotation omitted) (emphasis in

original). Furthermore, “[t]he fact that criminal charges are

eventually dropped . . . has no consideration in the determination of

arguable probable cause at the time of arrest.” Fleming, 674 F.3d

at 249. Neither does an officer’s subjective motives. Nieves v.

Bartlett, 139 S.Ct. 1715, 1725 (2019) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at

736 (“[W]hen reviewing an arrest, [the Court] ask[s] ‘whether the

circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the challenged] action,’

and if so, conclude[s] ‘that action was reasonable whatever the

subjective intent motivating the relevant officials.’”) The precise

question before the Court, then, is whether, at the time of Plaintiff’s

arrest when presented with the facts then-known, a reasonable

officer could have mistakenly believed that probable cause existed

to arrest Plaintiff for driving under the influence. Burritt, 807 F.3d

at 250. This question is a question of fact for a jury to decide “if

there is room for a difference of opinion concerning the facts or the

reasonable inferences to be drawn from them.” Maxwell v. City of

Indianapolis, 998 F.2d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 1993).

Plaintiff has presented evidence to create a genuine issue for

trial on whether Officer Spengel had arguable probable cause to

arrest Plaintiff. As stated, the only evidence Officer Spengel puts

forth to support his probable cause finding is his own testimony

and his probable cause statement. Plaintiff has presented Erika

Carlove’s statements who was the passenger in Plaintiff’s vehicle at

the time of the stop, and those of Patrol Officer Sullivan, who

assisted Officer Spengel that night, to dispute the facts asserted in

Officer Spengel’s statements. Carlove stated plainly that Plaintiff

was not intoxicated, and Patrol Officer Sullivan stated she did not

believe Plaintiff seemed intoxicated when she arrived on the scene.

Ex. N. And while Officer Spengel did know of previous DUI charges

against Plaintiff from 2005 and 1994, “a suspect’s criminal history

is a legitimate factor in a probable cause determination” only if such

history is supported by other corroborating information. Hardiman

v. Ford, 41 F.3d 1510, 1994 WL 585409, *3 (7th Cir. 1994) (Table).

Indeed, “[a] prior arrest . . . shows very little, if anything, about the

likelihood that a person committed a crime a decade later.” Huff,

744 F.3d at 1007. The corroborating information Officer Spengel

offers is clearly disputed, and the disputes create “a room for a

difference of opinion concerning” the reasonableness of Officer

Spengel’s actions, especially in light of Spengel’s behavior in

tracking Plaintiff throughout the night and disparaging Plaintiff

while doing so. Maxwell, 998 F.2d at 434.

Officer Spengel’s arguments to the contrary do not correctly

state the law. First, Officer Spengel concedes that “there are

genuine disputes over some of [Officer Spengel’s] statements” in his

statements of probable cause. Defs.’ Mot. (d/e 43) at p. 7. Officer

Spengel then argues that Plaintiff cannot show Officer Spengel

violated clearly established law for either the traffic stop or the DUI

arrest because Officer Spengel has been “unable to identify a case

which clearly establishes the lack of probable cause for a DUI stop

and arrest where the officer knew of the driver’s history of 3 DUI

arrests, the driver had spent hours on a bar-hopping expedition

(during which he admitted to consuming 9 beers, and the driver

refused both a field sobriety test and a breathalyzer test.” Id. at p.

9. But providing a case on point to that level of specificity is not

required. Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741. Moreover, a plaintiff need not

identify an analogous case “where the constitutional violation is

patently obvious.” Reed v. Palmer, 906 F.3d 540, 547 (7th Cir.

2018)

Plaintiff here has raised disputes in the form of Carlove’s and

Officer Sullivan’s statements regarding Officer Spengel’s finding of

probable cause and on the question of whether Officer Spengel had

arguable probable cause. It would have been plainly obvious to a

reasonable officer that arresting an individual without even

arguable probable cause after following the individual for hours to

perform a traffic stop on said individual would offend the

Constitution. Reed, 906 F.3d at 548 (quoting Safford Unified Sch.

Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 377 (2009)). (“Outrageous

conduct ‘obviously will be unconstitutional.’”) When viewed in the

light most favorable to Plaintiff, the undisputed facts how that

Officer Spengel followed Plaintiff throughout the night and left his

own Beat assignment to do so. They also establish that Officer

Spengel asked Carlove repeatedly about Plaintiff’s intoxication,

though Carlove never stated Plaintiff was intoxicated. And as stated

above, Plaintiff has presented evidence to raise a dispute as to

Officer Spengel’s police reports. Accordingly, Officer Spengel’s

request for qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s false arrest claim

must be denied.

B. Plaintiff has not carried his burden to offer evidence from

which a reasonable jury could find in his favor as to the

Monell claim stated in Count III.

Plaintiff also brings a claim under Monell v. Department of

Social Services oof City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Under

Monell, “[a] local governing body may be liable for monetary

damages under § 1983 if the unconstitutional act complained of is

caused by: (1) an official policy adopted and promulgated by its

officers; (2) a governmental practice or custom that, although not

officially authorized, is widespread and well settled; or (3) an official

with final policy-making authority.” Thomas v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s

Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010). “Liability under Monell is

difficult to establish, requiring a § 1983 plaintiff to prove that a

municipality, either through an express policy or an implied policy

of inaction, took ‘deliberate’ action that was the ‘moving force’

behind a constitutional injury.” Taylor v. Hughes, 26 F.4th 419,

435 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v.

Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–07 (1997)). The municipal action which

forms the basis of a Monell claim “can take the form of an express

policy (embodied, for example, in a policy statement, regulation, or

decision officially adopted by municipal decisionmakers), an

informal but established municipal custom, or even the action of a

policymaker authorized to act for the municipality.” J.K.J. v. Polk

Cty., 960 F.3d 367, 377 (7th Cir. 2020) (en banc). But in any case,

the plaintiff must show that the “municipal policy or custom caused

the constitutional injury.” Id.

Plaintiff here argues that the City is responsible for Officer

Spengel’s actions because Mayor Langfelder “ratified” Spengel’s

actions when Mayor Langfelder, pursuant to his authority as the

final authority on disciplinary decisions of SPD officers, suspended

Spengel for 45 days rather than terminating Spengel’s employment.

Pl.’s Resp. (d/e 44) p. 40–41. In support of that argument, Plaintiff

cites M.A. v. County of San Bernardino, 2021 WL 4706716, at *13

(C.D. Cal. June 25, 2021) (slip copy). The court there noted that a

local government may expose itself to Monell liability when “an

official with final policy-making authority ratifie[s] a subordinate’s

unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” Id.

(quoting Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 (9th Cir.

1992)). However, the court also noted that “[t]he mere failure to

discipline [individual officers] does not amount to ratification of

their allegedly unconstitutional actions.” Id. (quoting Sheehan v.

City & Cty. of S.F., 743 F.3d 1211, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014), reversed in

part on other grounds, 575 U.S. 600, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 191 L.Ed.2d

856 (2015)).

Notwithstanding the fact that a case from the Central District

of California is not binding on this Court, M.A. v. County of San

Bernardino plainly does not support Plaintiff’s argument. Like the

plaintiffs there, Plaintiff here only objects to the degree to which

Officer Spengel was disciplined. Plaintiff does not argue that the

City engaged in a widespread practice of inadequate disciplinary

actions by the City as an institution, which can amount to a Monell

claim if such widespread failure to discipline rises to such a level

that it “permeates a critical mass of an institutional body.” Rossi v.

City of Chicago, 790 F.3d 729, 737 (7th Cir. 2015). Instead,

Plaintiff only argues that, because Mayor Langfelder did not

discipline Officer Spengel to the degree to which the City’s policies

would allow, see Ex. F p. 13, Mayor Langfelder ratified and

condoned, after the fact, Officer Spengel’s actions.

But “a Monell claim requires more than” showing a final

policymaker did not discipline within his full authority. Rossi, 790

F.3d at 737. A Monell claim requires a showing of “a widespread

practice that permeates a critical mass of an institutional body” and

“for this reason, misbehavior by one or a group of officials is only

relevant where it can be tied to the policy, customs, or practices of

the institution as a whole.” Id. Plaintiff does not allege such a

widespread practice here, or present any evidence to show as much,

and so his Monell claim falls short. Indeed, the injury of which

Plaintiff complains is the unreasonable stop and arrest at the hands

of Officer Spengel. Without facts showing that Officer Spengel was

either inadequately trained or that the City engaged in a

demonstrable pattern of widespread inadequate disciplinary

procedure, Plaintiff cannot show Mayor Langfelder’s disciplinary

decision was the “moving force” behind either Officer Spengel’s

deliberate actions or Plaintiff’s injury. Taylor, 26 F.4th at 435; see

J.K.J., 960 F.3d at 377. Because Plaintiff has not offered any

evidence to prove the causation element at the center of a Monell

claim, the City is entitled to summary judgment on Count III.

Brown, 520 U.S. at 404–405.

C. Plaintiff has raised genuine issues for trial as to the Illinois

state law claims stated in Counts IV and V.

In Counts IV and V, Plaintiff alleges Illinois state tort claims

against Officer Spengel and the City for false arrest and intentional

infliction of emotional distress. Defendants argue only that each

state law claim falls because, in their view, Officer Spengel’s actions

constituted legal police action and so Plaintiff cannot show at least

one essential element for either false arrest or intentional infliction

of emotional distress. The Court disagrees.

i. A reasonable jury could conclude that Officer Spengel

committed the Illinois tort of false arrest as stated in

Count IV.

To establish a claim of false arrest under Illinois state law, a

plaintiff must prove “that the plaintiff was restrained or arrested by

the defendant, and that the defendant acted without having

reasonable grounds to believe that an offense was committed by the

plaintiff.” Meebrey v. Marshall Field & Co., Inc., 139 Ill.2d 455, 474

(1990). Defendants correctly state that a plaintiff in a false arrest

case will not be able to prove his claim if the traffic stop and arrest

were supported by probable cause. Defs.’ Mot. (d/e 43) p. 11 (citing

Stokes v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 599 F.3d 617, 626

(7th Cir. 2010). But as stated above, there exist issues of fact for a

jury on the question of whether Officer Spengel had either a

reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop and arrest Plaintiff.

Such issues also raise questions of fact for a jury as to whether

Officer Spengel “acted without having reasonable grounds to believe

that an offense was committed by” Plaintiff. Meebrey, 139 Ill.2d at

474. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion (d/e 43) must be denied as to

Count IV.

ii. A reasonable jury could also conclude that Officer

Spengel committed the Illinois tort of intentional

infliction of emotional distress as stated in Count V.

Under Illinois law, to survive summary judgment on his claim

for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Plaintiff “must

present evidence showing that (1) the defendant's conduct was truly

extreme and outrageous, (2) the defendant either intended to inflict

emotional distress or knew there was at least a high probability that

he would cause severe emotional distress, and (3) the conduct in

fact caused severe emotional distress.” Stokes, 599 F.3d at 626.

Officer Spengel’s conduct throughout the night on July 6, 2019

clearly raises issue of fact from which a reasonable jury could find

in favor of Plaintiff. Officer Spengel left his Beat assignment,

continued to communicate with Carlove in ways which disparaged

Plaintiff, and executed a traffic stop and arrest on Plaintiff for

reasons that are disputed.

Defendants argue that Officer Spengel’s actions cannot be said

to be “beyond all possible bounds of decency” as required under

Illinois law because, again in their view, both the traffic stop and

arrest were legal. Defs.’ Mot. (d/e 43) p. 12 (citing Stokes, 599 F.3d

at 626). But questions exist as to the legality of Officer Spengel’s

actions as to the degree to which Spengel’s actions went beyond the

bounds of decency. When viewed in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff, the facts plainly establish that Officer Spengel followed

Plaintiff all night, left his duty station, and stopped and arrested

Plaintiff for disputed reasons. A reasonable jury could find that

such actions by a public official are beyond the pale. Therefore,

Defendant’s Motion (d/e 43) must be denied as to Count V.

D. If a jury finds in favor of Plaintiff and against Officer Spengel

as to the state law claims in Counts IV and V, the City may

be required to indemnify Officer Spengel.

The final Count alleged by Plaintiff is that of indemnification.

Title 745 Section 10/9-102 of Illinois’ Compiled Statutes states,

A local public entity is empowered and directed

to pay any tort judgment or settlement for

compensatory damages (and may pay any

associated attorney's fees and costs) for which

it or an employee while acting within the scope

of his employment is liable in the manner

provided in this Article.

Defendants only argue that Plaintiff’s indemnification claim under

745 ILCS § 10/9-102 is void because, as Defendants argued, each

state law claim fails. However, as just stated, each of Plaintiff’s

state law claims survives summary judgment. If Defendants are

found liable as to any of those claims, the City may be required to

indemnify Officer Spengel for any judgment against him. Therefore,

summary judgment must also be denied as to Plaintiff’s

indemnification Count.

IV. CONCLUSION

When the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find that Officer Spengel’s actions

were not reasonable and were without probable cause in stopping

and arresting Plaintiff on the night of July 6, 2019. Officer Spengel

is not entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment claims. Plaintiff has also shown genuine issues for

trial as to each of Plaintiff’s Illinois state law claims. However,

because Plaintiff has not fulfilled his burden to show evidence from

which a reasonable juror could conclude that Mayor Langfelder

disciplinary decision caused Plaintiff’s alleged constitutional injury,

Defendant’s are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s

Monell claim. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (d/e 43) is GRANTED as to Count III and DENIED as to

all other Counts.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: September 1, 2022.

FOR THE COURT

/s/ Sue E. Myerscough____________

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE