Santana v. McDonough County

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

ORLANDO SANTANA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 20-cv-04094

)

McDONOUGH COUNTY, )

McDONOUGH COUNTY SHERIFF’S )

DEPARTMENT, PETER MURFIN, )

and PEGGY MAPPIN, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.

This cause is before the Court on the parties’ cross-motions for

summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s

Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 17) is DENIED and

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 18) is GRANTED

IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. FACTS

Plaintiff Orlando Santana was arrested for underage drinking

in the early morning hours of February 29, 2020 and placed in a

holding cell in the McDonough County Jail (“Jail”) in Macomb,

Illinois. Santana was twenty years old at the time. The holding

cells of the Jail are subject to audio and video recording, and

several audio/video recordings of Santana’s cell from the morning of

February 29, 2020 have been submitted into evidence. See d/e 17,

exh. B1–13, C.

The video footage of Santana’s cell shows that, after 7:30 a.m.,

Santana began knocking on the steel door of his cell and saying,

“Excuse me.” After receiving no response from correctional officers,

Santana began banging on the steel door of his cell and shouting.

After correctional officers still did not respond, Santana shouted,

“I’m going to fucking kill myself, fuck this shit bro” and “I’m going to

hang myself.” D/e 18, p.3. Santana walked towards the toilet in

his cell, stepped onto the toilet, and removed his shirt. Defendant

Peter Murfin, a correctional officer on duty at the Jail, heard

Santana shout that he was going to kill himself and observed

Santana climb onto the toilet via a monitor displaying a video feed

of Santana’s cell. Murfin instructed Defendant Peggy Mappin, the

other correctional officer on duty, to get a suicide prevention smock

and follow him to Santana’s cell.

Murfin then drew his taser, walked to Santana’s cell, and

opened the door. Murfin leveled his taser at Santana’s chest and

ordered Santana to remove all of Santana’s clothing. As Murfin

ordered Santana to undress, Mappin arrived outside the door and

stood behind Murfin. Santana responded, “I will, I will,” and “okay,

here,” and allowed Murfin to retrieve the shirt that Santana was

holding in his hand and toss it out of the cell. However, Santana

did not immediately remove the rest of his clothes. Instead,

Santana argued with Murfin in a raised voice while Murfin

repeatedly ordered him to remove his clothes. Due to the audio

quality of the submitted recording, not all of Santana’s words are

clearly discernible, but at one point he can be heard responding to

Murfin’s order to undress by asking, “First, can I call my mom?”

D/e 17, exh. C, at 2:30–2:31. After roughly forty seconds of

argument, during which time Santana unbuttoned his pants and

lowered them slightly but then pulled them back up, Santana took

a step towards Murfin, at which point Murfin used one hand to

push Santana back into the cell. Murfin then stepped into the cell,

still with his taser pointed at Santana’s chest, and continued to

order Santana to remove his clothes.

Santana re-buttoned his pants and continued to argue with

Murfin. Murfin then pushed Santana into one corner of the cell

and warned Santana that Murfin would use the taser if Santana

continued to refuse to comply. While the two men argued, Mappin

entered Santana’s cell behind Murfin and unholstered her own

taser. When Santana continued to refuse to remove his clothes,

Murfin stated, “I’m gonna tase you” and caused his taser to emit a

spark. Santana raised his hands in front of his chest but continued

to argue with Murfin. Murfin then stated, “I’m gonna tase you” two

additional times and began slowly counting to three, stopping at

“Two and a half.” Santana continued to argue with Murfin and

made no move to comply. Murfin then fired his taser into Santana’s

chest. The taser’s two barbed probes punctured Santana’s skin and

released an electrical shock into Santana’s body, at which point

Santana fell to the ground.

As Santana lay on the ground, Murfin removed all of

Santana’s clothing and then removed the probes from Santana’s

skin. After the probes were removed, Santana bled a small amount

from the places where the probes had struck his skin. Murfin and

Mappin exited the cell, leaving the suicide smock inside with

Santana.

Santana was released on bond at approximately 9:50 a.m.,

eight hours and twenty minutes after arriving at the Jail and a little

over two hours after being tased. Later that day, Santana visited

the McDonough hospital, where he was examined and determined

not to be in need of any treatment. Santana eventually pled guilty

to one count of consumption of alcohol by a minor in connection

with the offense for which he had been arrested. He was sentenced

to six months of court supervision and was required to take a drug

and alcohol class and to participate in twenty hours of community

service.

On April 16, 2020, Santana filed a four-count Complaint

(d/e 1) against Murfin, Mappin, McDonough County, and the

McDonough County Sheriff’s Department. Count I, brought under

42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleges that Murfin violated Santana’s Fourth

Amendment rights by using excessive force against him, that

Mappin violated Santana’s Fourth Amendment rights by failing to

prevent Murfin from using excessive force, and that both Murfin

and Mappin violated the Fourth Amendment by failing to provide

medical assistance to Santana. Count II alleges a state-law claim

for willful and wanton conduct against the McDonough County

Sheriff’s Department (the “Department”). Count III alleges a state-

law claim for battery against Murfin and the Department. Count IV

alleges that McDonough County is required to indemnify the other

Defendants for any judgment entered against them.

Santana filed his Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 17) on

November 18, 2021. Santana’s Motion requests summary

judgment in favor of Santana and against Murfin and Mappin on

Count I and against the Department on Counts II and III. All four

Defendants jointly filed their cross-motion for summary judgment

(d/e 18) on November 19, 2021. Defendants argue that Murfin’s

use of a taser on Santana was reasonable under the circumstances,

and in the alternative that Murfin is entitled to qualified immunity

on Santana’s excessive force claim. Defendants also argue that

they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s other claims if

Murfin’s use of force was reasonable. Each of the parties filed a

Response (d/e 22, 23) to the opposing party’s summary judgment

motion on February 28, 2022 and a Reply (d/e 24, 25) in support of

their own summary judgment motion on March 14, 2022.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that no

genuine dispute exists as to any material fact and that the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

The movant bears the initial responsibility of informing the Court of

the basis for the motion and identifying the evidence the movant

believes demonstrates the absence of any genuine dispute of

material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A

genuine dispute of material fact exists if a reasonable trier of fact

could find in favor of the nonmoving party. Marnocha v. St. Vincent

Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 986 F.3d 711, 718 (7th Cir. 2021).

When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must

construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. King

v. Hendricks Cty. Commissioners, 954 F.3d 981, 984 (7th Cir.

2020).

The moving party bears the burden of establishing that there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S.

at 323. After the moving party does so, the non-moving party must

then go beyond the pleadings and “set forth specific facts showing

that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. at 255 (cleaned up). Summary judgment is

warranted when the moving party carries its initial burden, and the

non-moving party cannot establish an essential element of its case

on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Kidwell v.

Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 964 (7th Cir. 2012).

Defendants have argued that Murfin is entitled to qualified

immunity on Santana’s excessive force claim. Courts apply a two-

part inquiry to determine whether a defendant is entitled to

qualified immunity. First, the court examines whether the plaintiff

has presented evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, that would allow a reasonable fact finder to determine that

the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right. Sallenger v.

Oakes, 473 F.3d 731, 739 (7th Cir. 2007). Second, the court

examines whether the particular constitutional right was clearly

established at the time of the alleged violation. Id. A court may, in

its discretion, address the second prong of the test first. Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 (2009).

The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the existence of

a clearly established constitutional right. Rice v. Burks, 999 F.2d

1172, 1174 (7th Cir. 1993). A plaintiff may do this by either

pointing to a closely analogous case or showing that the conduct

was so egregious that no reasonable officer would have thought he

was acting lawfully. Chelios v. Heavener, 520 F.3d 678, 691 (7th

Cir. 2008); Abbott v. Sangamon Cnty., Ill., 705 F.3d 706, 723-24

(7th Cir. 2013). “Importantly, the right must be clearly established

in a particularized sense, rather than in an abstract or general

sense.” Abbott, 705 F.3d at 731. In excessive force cases, “the

result depends very much on the facts of each case,” so officials are

entitled to qualified immunity unless precedent ‘‘squarely governs”

the case against them. Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 13 (2015)

(quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004)). While a

case directly on point is not required, “existing precedent must have

placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Id.

at 12 (quoting Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Murfin Is Entitled to Qualified Immunity on Santana’s

Excessive Force Claim.

The central allegation in Santana’s Complaint is that Murfin’s

use of a taser on Santana violated Santana’s Fourth Amendment

right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.

Normally, § 1983 claims against correctional officers for the use of

excessive force against pre-trial detainees are brought under the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, but here the parties

agree that Santana has properly alleged a violation of his Fourth

Amendment rights because “the Fourth Amendment governs the

period of confinement between arrest without a warrant and the

[probable cause determination].” Currie v. Chhabra, 728 F.3d 626,

629 (7th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original); but see Forrest v. Prine,

620 F.3d 739, 743 (7th Cir. 2010) (discussing temporal limitations

on Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches

and seizures and holding that Fourteenth Amendment applied to

claim that correctional officer used excessive force during the strip

search of a pretrial detainee prior to probable cause determination).

Regardless of whether Santana’s claims should have been brought

under the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment, however, the same

standard applies. “Whatever the source of law, in analyzing an

excessive force claim, a court must determine whether the force was

objectively unreasonable in light of the ‘facts and circumstances of

each particular case.’” Lombardo v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, 141

S. Ct. 2239, 2241 n.2 (2021) (quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576

U.S. 389, 397 (2015)).

Because Defendants have invoked qualified immunity,

Santana must show, not only that the force used by Murfin was

objectively unreasonable, but that its unreasonableness was clearly

established as of February 29, 2020. Santana argues that this was

the case because he was only “passively resisting” by refusing to

comply with Murfin’s orders, d/e 17, p. 14, and the use of a taser

on a passively resisting individual has usually been found to violate

clearly established law. See Abbott, 705 F.3d at 732.

Santana argues that “passive resistance includes failing to

comply with a verbal command.” D/e 17, p. 11. However, the

Seventh Circuit cases Santana cites to support this proposition all

involve plaintiffs who merely failed to comply with a command. In

Abbott v. Sangamon County, Illinois, 705 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 2013),

police officers used a taser on the plaintiff twice, once while the

plaintiff was running towards the officers and then again while the

plaintiff was lying face-up on the ground and not responding to law

enforcement demands to turn over. The Seventh Circuit found that

the second shock violated clearly established law because the

plaintiff was lying immobile when it was delivered. Id. at 730. In

Phillips v. Community Insurance Corp., 678 F.3d 513 (7th Cir.

2012), police ordered plaintiff to leave her parked car, but the

plaintiff, who was intoxicated, refused to comply and instead lit a

cigarette and lay down in the front seat. Id. at 525. Police shot the

plaintiff four times in the legs with beanbag projectiles, seriously

injuring her. The Seventh Circuit found that it was a “close

question” whether officers acted reasonably by firing the first shot,

but that it was clearly unlawful for police to shoot plaintiff three

additional times after she proved too drunk to react to the first shot

other than by yelling in pain. Id. at 526. In Becker v. Elfreich, 821

F.3d 920 (7th Cir. 2016), the plaintiff was attempting to surrender

to police with his hands above his head when the defendant set a

police dog on the plaintiff. While plaintiff was subdued and fully

compliant, the defendant allowed his dog to cause serious injury to

the plaintiff by continuing to bite while the defendant finished

handcuffing the plaintiff.

Unlike the plaintiffs in Abbott, Phillips, and Becker, Santana

was not lying immobile and unresponsive when the allegedly

unreasonable force was employed. Instead, Santana was upright

and in motion and was shouting and raising his hands to ward off

the taser impact that Murfin had repeatedly warned was coming.

Moreover, Murfin deployed his taser only once, whereas the

defendant in Abbott deployed a second shock to his target’s

unresponsive body and the defendants in Phillips and Becker

seriously injured their targets. See Abbott, 705 F.3d at 726 (finding

that use of a taser is more than a de minimis application of force,

but “generally does not constitute as much force as so-called impact

weapons, such as baton launchers and beanbag projectiles”).

Additionally, Murfin used his taser only after Santana threatened to

commit suicide and took actions consistent with an intent to

commit suicide.

A more similar Fourth Amendment excessive force case is

Brooks v. City of Aurora, Illinois, 653 F.3d 478 (7th Cir. 2011). In

that case, police officers informed the plaintiff that he was under

arrest, and the plaintiff then backpedaled away, evaded the officer’s

attempt to grab his wrist, and “threw out his arms in what could be

construed as a resisting or defensive posture.” Id. at 484. The

police officer pepper sprayed the plaintiff twice and then arrested

him. The Seventh Circuit, noting that “[p]rior cases have charted

only clearer waters,” found that the officer was entitled to qualified

immunity because the illegality of “applying pepper spray to an

arrestee who has ceased active, physical resistance for a couple of

seconds but has not submitted to the officer's authority, has not

been taken into custody and still arguably could pose a threat of

flight or further resistance” was not clearly established. Id. at 487.

Santana has not shown that the waters have cleared since

Brooks was decided. Granted, the plaintiff in Brooks actively

evaded attempts by the police to physically restrain him and

retreated towards his house, whereas Murfin never attempted to

physically seize Santana and Santana was trapped in a small cell.

On the other hand, however, Murfin gave Santana a number of

chances to comply, argued with Santana for several minutes in an

attempt to make him comply without resorting to the use of force,

and repeatedly warned Santana that Murfin was about to deploy

the taser if Santana did not comply. The officer in Brooks gave no

such warning and sprayed the plaintiff shortly after first informing

him that he was under arrest. Additionally, the officer in Brooks

sprayed the plaintiff a second time after the plaintiff had already

“ceased active, physical resistance for a couple of seconds.” Id.

Murfin, by contrast, shocked Santana only once. See Abbott, 705

F.3d at 726 (finding that the use of a taser is a similar application

of force to the use of pepper spray, as both fall “somewhere in the

middle of the nonlethal-force spectrum”).

Factually similar excessive force cases from the Fourteenth

Amendment context confirm that Murfin’s use of the taser did not

violate clearly established law. In Forrest v. Prine, 620 F.3d 739

(7th Cir. 2010), a correctional officer instructed an intoxicated and

belligerent pretrial detainee to comply with the procedures for a

strip search, and, when the detainee refused to comply, employed a

taser on the detainee. As in this case, the detainee was pacing in

his cell and arguing with officers in a raised voice prior to the officer

employing his taser. And as in this case, the officer “warned [the

detainee] several times that noncompliance would result in tasing.”

Id. at 745. The Seventh Circuit found, not only that the officer’s

use of force was constitutionally reasonable, but that the officer

acted “in a professional manner to accomplish a difficult task in a

dangerous situation.” Id. at 746.

In Forrest, the detainee was a violent felon who “shout[ed]

obscenities,” clenched his fists, and was approximately the same

size as the officer who employed the taser. Id. at 741–42. Santana,

by contrast, was physically smaller than Murfin at 5’10” and 150

pounds to Murfin’s 6’0” and 290 pounds. While neither detainee

explicitly threatened violence, Santana’s speech consisted mainly of

requests for a phone call so that he could contact his mother, while

the plaintiff in Forrest aggressively screamed obscenities at

correctional officers. Interpreting the facts in the light most

favorable to Santana, it might be reasonable to distinguish Forrest

because the correctional officer in Forrest, unlike Murfin, could

reasonably have feared that his own safety would be in danger if he

attempted to restrain the detainee without the use of a taser. But

in order to overcome qualified immunity, Santana must show that

existing Seventh Circuit precedent placed the question of whether a

law had been violated beyond debate. In light of Brooks and

Forrest, Santana cannot show that it was clearly established on

February 29, 2020 that using a taser one time, after several

warnings, on a possibly suicidal pretrial detainee who was moving

around his cell, arguing in a raised voice, and raising his hands

defensively violated clearly established law. Accordingly, Murfin is

entitled to qualified immunity on Santana’s excessive force claim.

B. Defendants Are Entitled to Summary Judgment on

Santana’s Failure to Intervene and Failure to Provide

Medical Care Claims.

The Court’s finding that Murfin’s use of force did not violate

clearly established law means that Mappin is entitled to qualified

immunity on Santana’s failure to intervene claim. See Lewis v.

Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 472 (7th Cir. 2009) (explaining that liability

for failure to intervene under § 1983 requires that the non-

intervening officer “had reason to know that a fellow officer was

using excessive force or committing a constitutional violation”).

Santana argues that Murfin and Mappin’s failure to provide

him with medical care after Murfin employed the taser was

objectively unreasonable and violated Santana’s Fourth Amendment

Rights. The Seventh Circuit has set forth four factors governing the

determination of whether an officer’s response to medical needs was

objectively unreasonable: “(1) whether the officer has notice of the

detainee's medical needs; (2) the seriousness of the medical need;

(3) the scope of the requested treatment; and (4) police interests,

including administrative, penological, or investigatory concerns.”

Ortiz v. City of Chicago, 656 F.3d 523, 530 (7th Cir. 2011). “The

severity of the medical condition under this standard need not, on

its own, rise to the level of objective seriousness required under the

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Instead, the Fourth

Amendment's reasonableness analysis operates on a sliding scale,

balancing the seriousness of the medical need with the third

factor—the scope of the requested treatment.” Williams v.

Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392, 403 (7th Cir. 2007).

The only injuries Santana suffered were two minor puncture

wounds where the taser’s barbed probes struck his chest. These

wounds produced only “minimal” bleeding, and when Santana went

to the hospital on the 29th he was told that his injuries did not

require any treatment. From this, the Court concludes that the

injuries sustained by Santana were not objectively serious. See id.

at 401 (“A medical condition is deemed to be objectively serious if it

is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating

treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would

easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.”) (cleaned up).

Furthermore, Santana did not request medical attention at any

point while he was detained in the Jail. Having taken the four

factors laid out by the Seventh Circuit into account, the Court finds

that Murfin and Mappin did not act in an objectively unreasonable

manner by not providing medical care to Santana.

C. The Court Declines to Exercise Jurisdiction Over

Santana’s Remaining State Law Claims

“Although the decision is discretionary, ‘[w]hen all federal

claims in a suit in federal court are dismissed before trial, the

presumption is that the court will relinquish federal jurisdiction

over any supplemental state-law claims.’” RWJ Mgmt. Co. v. BP

Prod. N. Am., Inc., 672 F.3d 476, 479 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Al's

Serv. Ctr. v. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 599 F.3d 720, 727 (7th Cir.

2010) (alteration in original). Here, Santana’s state-law claims for

battery, willful and wanton conduct, and indemnification have not

been thoroughly briefed and have been treated by both parties as

an afterthought to Santana’s § 1983 claims. Accordingly, the Court

finds that the relevant factors to be considered, namely “judicial

economy, convenience, fairness and comity,” Lalowski v. City of Des

Plaines, 789 F.3d 784, 794 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Wright v.

Associated Ins. Cos. Inc., 29 F.3d 1244, 1251 (7th Cir. 1994)), do

not militate strongly in favor of a federal decision of Santana’s state-

law claims on the merits. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3),

therefore, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over Santana’s remaining state law claims.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (d/e 17) is DENIED. Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment (d/e 18) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Summary judgment is granted against Plaintiff and in favor of

Defendants Murfin and Mappin as to Count I of Plaintiff’s

Complaint (d/e 1). Counts II, III, and IV of Plaintiff’s Complaint are

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter final judgment in

favor of Defendants Murfin and Mappin and against Plaintiff

Orlando Santana. Any pending motions are DENIED as MOOT, any

pending deadlines are TERMINATED, and any scheduled settings

are VACATED. This case is CLOSED.

ENTERED: September 8, 2022

FOR THE COURT:

/s/Sue E. Myerscough

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE