Jenkins v. Jeffries

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

BRADLEY JENKINS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 21-cv-3172

)

ROB JEFFREYS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss

filed by Defendants Rob Jeffreys, Glen Austin, Katie Fitzpatrick,

and Janel Forde. See d/e 9. Because Plaintiff Bradley Jenkins’

Complaint fails to state a claim for relief under the Equal

Protection Clause, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable

to Mr. Jenkins, accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true and

taking all reasonable inferences in his favor. Alicea-Hernandez v.

Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 2003).

Mr. Jenkins is a former employee of the Illinois Department of

Corrections (IDOC). He joined IDOC in 2010 as a correctional

officer. By 2016, Mr. Jenkins had risen to the rank of lieutenant.

Mr. Jenkins was, by all appearances, a model officer. So too was

Mr. Jenkins’ wife, Allissa Martin, who worked alongside her

husband at IDOC’s Logan Correctional Center.

Mr. Jenkins and Ms. Martin were married in the spring of

2019. On June 2, 2019, Ms. Martin fell to her death from an

upper floor of a St. Louis parking garage. St. Louis police arrested

Mr. Jenkins shortly thereafter. From June 2 to June 7, Mr.

Jenkins was held in the St. Louis City Jail. The criminal-assault

charges against him eventually were dropped.

Mr. Jenkins never returned to work after his release from jail.

Nor did he advise anyone at Logan of his absence. That task fell to

Mr. Jenkins’ father, who relayed to “officials at the Center” that Mr.

Jenkins “was not able to report to work because of the death of his

wife” and his subsequent detention. See Compl., d/e 1, at ¶ 14.

At some point, Logan officials told the elder Jenkins that he “need

not continue to report . . . about Jenkins’ situation.” Id.

That was because, Mr. Jenkins alleges, Logan had made up

its collective mind. In the aftermath of Ms. Martin’s fatal fall,

“many [Logan employees] expressed in various ways . . . their belief

that Jenkins’ conduct led to her death.” Id. ¶ 15. It was “a

practice” among Logan staff “to contact [an employee] who neither

1) reported to work . . . nor 2) gave previous notice to the Center

that he would not be at work.” Id. ¶ 17. Yet “no effort was made

to contact Jenkins as had been the practice with other employees.”

Id. ¶ 18.

On June 13, 2019, Defendant Katie Fitzpatrick—then a

human-resource officer at Logan—initiated disciplinary

proceedings against Mr. Jenkins. A little more than a month later,

Defendant Janel Forde—then Director of the Illinois Department of

Central Management Services—terminated Mr. Jenkins’

employment “at the request of the Defendants.” Id. ¶ 19. Ms.

Fitzpatrick’s complaint concerned Mr. Jenkins’ failure to report,

not his alleged role in Ms. Martin’s death. Mr. Jenkins alleges

that, had he “not been arrested and [detained] because of the

death of his wife,” he “would not have been terminated.” Id. ¶ 20.

Mr. Jenkins brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He

alleges that Defendants fired him because he belonged to “a

distinct and clearly identifiable class of individuals, to wit: public

employees who were charged, but not convicted, of serious

misconduct.” See id. ¶ 22. Mr. Jenkins argues that this denied

him the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth

Amendment.

In Count I, Mr. Jenkins alleges that Defendant Rob Jeffreys,

then IDOC’s Acting Director, “approved the Department’s

termination of Jenkins because of” Mr. Jenkins’ class membership.

Id. at 5. In Count II, Mr. Jenkins alleges that Defendant Glen

Austin, then Logan’s Warden, “sought approval for Jenkins’

termination” for the same reason. Id. at 6. Mr. Jenkins further

alleges that Ms. Fitzpatrick began disciplinary proceedings against

him (Count III) and Ms. Forde effected his termination (Count IV)

on the same discriminatory basis. See id. at 6–8.

Mr. Jenkins claims that Defendants’ actions cost him his

“employment with the Department,” the attendant “salary and

benefits,” and mental and emotional distress. See id. at 6. Mr.

Jenkins seeks both money damages and equitable relief—including

his reinstatement to IDOC—on each of Counts I through IV. He

sues the Defendants in their individual and official capacities.

Defendants now move to dismiss Mr. Jenkins’ complaint

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Defs.’ Mot. to

Dismiss, d/e 9. Defendants argue that Mr. Jenkins’ allegations do

not implicate a recognized Fourteenth Amendment right and,

therefore, fail to state a claim for relief. See Defs.’ Mem., d/e 10, at

4–5. In the alternative, Defendants argue that they are entitled to

qualified immunity on all four counts. See id. at 5–7.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Mr. Jenkins brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, this Court has federal-question

jurisdiction over his claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district

courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising

under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).

Venue is proper because a substantial part of the events or

omissions giving rise to Mr. Jenkins’ claims occurred within this

District. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the

complaint. Christensen v. Cty. of Boone, Ill., 483 F.3d 454, 458

(7th Cir. 2007). To state a claim for relief, a plaintiff need only

provide a short and plain statement of the claim showing he is

entitled to relief and giving the defendant fair notice of the claims.

Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008).

In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), this

Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true and

construing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor. Id. But

the complaint still must set forth facts that plausibly demonstrate

a claim for relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

547 (2007). A plausible claim is one that alleges factual content

from which the Court can reasonably infer that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009). Reciting the elements of a cause of action or

supporting claims with conclusory statements are insufficient to

state a cause of action. Id.

IV. ANALYSIS

Mr. Jenkins claims that Defendants violated the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when they

terminated his employment with IDOC. Specifically, in each of

Counts I through IV, Mr. Jenkins alleges that Defendants

personally sought and sanctioned his dismissal by reason of his

status as a “public employee[] that [was] charged, but not

convicted, of serious criminal misconduct.” See d/e 1 at 6.

A. Mr. Jenkins Fails to State a Claim for Relief.

Defendants first argue that Mr. Jenkins’ claims should be

dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). To

survive, Mr. Jenkins must have stated a claim for relief that is

plausible on its face. Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581

F.3d 599, 602–603 (7th Cir. 2009).

Mr. Jenkins’ four-count complaint centers on a novel theory.

He alleges that Defendants fired him by reason of his membership

in a class of “public employees that were charged, but not

convicted, of serious criminal misconduct.” See d/e 1 at 6.

Defendants do not challenge these claims as unsupported. Rather,

Defendants argue that Mr. Jenkins’ claims must be dismissed

because he cannot prove “that his ‘class’ . . . is a protected class”

under the Equal Protection Clause. See d/e 10 at 4.

The Equal Protection Clause “protects individuals against

intentional, arbitrary discrimination by government officials.”

Lauderdale v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., 876 F.3d 904, 909–10

(7th Cir. 2017). To state a prima facie claim under the Equal

Protection Clause, Mr. Jenkins must show that he (1) is a member

of a protected class; (2) is otherwise similarly situated to members

of an unprotected class; (3) was treated differently by Defendants

than were members of the unprotected class; and that (4)

Defendants acted with discriminatory intent. See Word v. City of

Chicago, 226 F.3d 558, 564 (7th Cir. 2000).

The Court finds that the law does not recognize Mr. Jenkins’

claimed membership in a protected class. Public employees

accused of serious criminal misconduct do not belong to a “suspect

class.” See, e.g., Vukadinovich v. Bd. of Sch. Trs. of Michigan City

Area Schs., 978 F.2d 403, 414 (7th Cir. 1992) (distinguishing

arrest history from “forbidden characteristic[s]” like “race, religion,

or gender”). Mr. Jenkins argues that the Equal Protection Clause

still extends to Defendants’ actions because Illinois law forbids the

use of an arrest record as a basis for termination. But this

theory—first raised in Mr. Jenkins’ response briefing, see d/e 14 at

5—still does not state an Equal Protection claim. A violation of

state law, even one that protects disfavored classes, “is not a

ground for a federal civil rights suit.” Guajardo-Palma v.

Martinson, 622 F.3d 801, 806 (7th Cir. 2010). While Mr. Jenkins

may have a viable state-law claim against Defendants, he does not

state a cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause.

Even still, discrimination by virtue of a non-suspect

classification can violate the Equal Protection Clause, which bars

government officials from “arbitrarily and irrationally singl[ing] out

one person for poor treatment.” Brunson v. Murray, 843 F.3d 698,

705 (7th Cir. 2016). Such “class-of-one” discrimination “is

illustrated when a public official, with no conceivable basis for his

action other than spite or some other improper motive . . . comes

down hard on a hapless private citizen.” Swanson v. City of

Chetek, 719 F.3d 780, 784 (7th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up). To survive

a motion to dismiss, Mr. Jenkins must allege that Defendants (1)

intentionally treated him differently from others similarly situated

and (2) did so without any rational basis. Vill. of Willowbrook v.

Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam).

Mr. Jenkins cannot state a claim for relief under this theory.

The first reason is that public employees cannot challenge

personnel actions on class-of-one grounds. See Engquist v.

Oregon Dep’t of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 598 (2008). Mr. Jenkins “has

presented no reasoned basis to distinguish that authority.”

O’Gorman v. City of Chicago, 777 F.3d 885, 892 (7th Cir. 2008).

And even if it were necessary to conduct a full class-of-one

analysis, Mr. Jenkins’ claims still would not state a cause of action

under the Equal Protection Clause.

The first element of a class-of-one claim—disparate

treatment—is not at issue here. Mr. Jenkins need not identify a

similarly situated comparator to survive a motion to dismiss. See

FKFJ, Inc. v. Vill. of Worth, 11 F.4th 574, 590 (7th Cir. 2021); see

also Miller v. City of Monona, 784 F.3d 1113, 1120 (7th Cir. 2015)

(collecting cases).

But Mr. Jenkins has not met his burden on the second

prong. He alleges that Defendants terminated his employment

with animus. However, “a given action can have a rational basis

and be a perfectly logical action for a government entity to take

even if there are facts casting it” in a nefarious light. See Flying J

Inc. v. City of New Haven, 549 F.3d 538, 547 (7th Cir. 2008). “All

it takes to defeat [a class-of-one] claim,” therefore, “is a conceivable

rational basis for the difference in treatment.” D.B. ex rel. Kurtis

B. v. Kopp, 725 F.3d 681, 686 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 571

U.S. 1200 (2014). The Court identifies two. Mr. Jenkins’

complaint, therefore, fails to state a viable claim for relief. See id.

First, Defendants contend that Mr. Jenkins was fired for

missing ten days of work without explanation. Absence without

leave is a sound reason for termination in any context.1 Second, a

correctional environment cannot abide employees accused of

criminal conduct—never mind those who commit it. So even if

Defendants acted with some degree of animus toward Mr. Jenkins,

his arrest still provided a rational basis for firing him. See Dean v.

Illinois Dep't of Corr., 2022 WL 826924, at *5 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 18,

2022) (“Here, it is entirely possible to imagine rational and sound

1 As an IDOC employee, Mr. Jenkins presumably enjoyed the

benefits of a collective-bargaining agreement, including any limits

on IDOC’s right of termination. But whether his firing complied

with that agreement is not properly before the Court.

reasons for Illinois to fire a correctional officer who had been

arrested twice in as many months.”); see generally 20 Ill. Adm.

Code 120.30 (2021) (requiring IDOC staff to “conduct themselves

in a manner that will not reflect unfavorably on the Department”).

B. Defendants Are Entitled to Qualified Immunity.

Defendants also invoke the affirmative defense of qualified

immunity on Mr. Jenkins’ claims for money damages. Having

found that Mr. Jenkins’ claims do not implicate a recognized

constitutional right, the Court turns briefly to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity insulates public officials from liability for

money damages if “their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.” Van den Bosch v. Raemisch, 658 F.3d

778, 786 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,

231 (2009)). In evaluating a qualified immunity claim, this Court

asks two questions: whether “the facts that a plaintiff has alleged

make out a violation of a constitutional right,” and, if so, “whether

the right at issue was clearly established at the time of defendant's

alleged misconduct.” See id. (cleaned up).

Mr. Jenkins alleges that all four Defendants discriminated

against him by reason of his membership in a protected class. As

discussed above, see supra Section IV.A, the law does not

recognize public employees accused of serious criminal misconduct

as comprising a suspect class. See Vukadinovich, 978 F.2d at

414. Because Mr. Jenkins alleges only that he was fired for having

been arrested, and because that status does not rise to the level of

a suspect class, the allegations here do not “make out a violation of

a constitutional right.” See Van den Bosch, 658 F.3d at 786. This

means that Defendants are immune from Mr. Jenkins’ claims.

V. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (d/e 9) is

GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Complaint (d/e 1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE. Mr. Jenkins may file an amended complaint on or

before August 2, 2022. Defendants shall answer any amended

complaint by no later than August 16, 2022.

ENTERED: JULY 19, 2022

FOR THE COURT:

s/Sue E. Myerscough

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE