Yeager v. Owsley

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

AMANDA YEAGER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 20-3246

)

SHANE OWSLEY, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, United States District Judge:

Before the Court is Defendant Shane Owsley’s Motion for

Summary Judgment [Doc. 13]. Plaintiff Amanda Yeager, who is

proceeding pro se, did not file a response to the motion.

In her Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Ms. Yeager alleges

Mr. Owsley violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by

operating a social media account for official purposes and excluding

individuals, including Ms. Yeager, from an otherwise open dialogue

because those individuals expressed views with which the public

official disagrees. See Doc. 1, at 2. Mr. Owsley moves for summary

judgment on the basis that his conduct was not under color of law

and, further, he is entitled to qualified immunity.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

Defendant Shane Owsley is employed as the Superintendent for

Gillespie Community Unit School District 7 (“District 7”). See Doc.

13, at 1. District 7 is operated and controlled by the Board of

Education of Gillespie Community Unit School District 7 (“Board of

Education”), which consists of seven publicly elected members and

which operates and controls the public schools within the

jurisdictional boundaries of District 7 for students in Pre-K through

12th grade. Id. at 1-2. Mr. Owsley was hired by the Board of

Education as the Superintendent of District 7 effective July 1, 2020.

Id. at 2. As the Superintendent, Mr. Owsley was directed in his work

by the Board of Education through its direction and through its duly

adopted policies. Id.

After being hired as Superintendent, Mr. Owsley created a

personal account on the social media platform Twitter under the

1 The Defendant’s Undisputed Material Facts are properly supported by citations to the record.

Because the Plaintiff did not respond to the Defendant’s factual allegations, the Court

considers the facts to be undisputed for purposes of the motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2);

see also CDIL-LR 7.1(D)(2)(b)(6).

screen name “@CUSD7_Sup” (“the Twitter Account”). Id. Neither the

Board of Education nor the District own or control the social media

platform Twitter. Id. The Twitter Account was used to discuss

educational policy, events, and information about District 7, in

addition to information about remote learning generally for schools.

Id. Mr. Owsley created the Twitter Account on his personal time. Id.

The Twitter Account was not part of Mr. Owsley’s official

responsibilities as an employee of District 7 either under Board Policy

or his contractual agreement with the Board of Education. Id. Mr.

Owsley was not directed or asked by the Board of Education to create

the Twitter Account. Id. The Board of Education did not authorize

Mr. Owsley’s creation of the Twitter Account and it was not an official

account of the District or the Board of Education. Id. The Board of

Education was not aware that the Twitter Account existed, and the

Board did not control the content or operation of the account. Id.

The Board of Education has approved a page on the social

media platform Facebook which is located at

https://www.facebook.com/cusd7 (“District Facebook Account”), in

order to provide constituents with information about the District. Id.

at 3. Under Board Policy 5:25, individual employees are permitted to

create and utilize social media accounts but the Board of Education

expressly acknowledges that it does not monitor or control these

accounts. Id. Under Board Policy 2:110, the President of the Board

of Education serves as the official spokesperson of the Board of

Education. Id.

At the beginning of the 2020-2021 school year, the Board of

Education decided to provide educational services to students in a

remote setting. Id. Some community members, including Plaintiff

Amanda Yeager, disagreed with this decision and wanted students to

receive educational services in person. Id. Ms. Yeager went to Board

of Education meetings and expressed her opinion that education

should be provided in person. Id. The Plaintiff also posted her

opinion about in-person learning in online forums such as the

Twitter Account. Id. Mr. Owsley did not censor or remove comments

by Ms. Yeager from the Twitter Account which were in favor of

providing in-person education. Id.

On or about September 21, 2020, Ms. Yeager posted a public

message on the Twitter Account which discussed the minor children

of Mr. Owsley and discussed where the children went to school. Id.

Mr. Owsley never used the Twitter Account and did not want

information about his children or their educational placement

discussed publicly on the Internet. Id. at 4. Because of the

discussion regarding his minor children and the disclosure of their

educational placement, Mr. Owsley temporarily blocked Ms. Yeager

from viewing or interacting with the Twitter Account. Id.

Ms. Yeager then posted another message about Mr. Owsley’s minor

children and discussed where they went to school on the Twitter

Account. Id.

Due to the discussion regarding his minor children and the

disclosure of the school they attended, Mr. Owsley disabled and

deleted the Twitter Account and another personal Twitter account he

maintained. Id. Mr. Owsley did not seek the consent or authorization

of the Board of Education in order to disable and delete the Twitter

Account. Id. Because it was a personal account, Mr. Owsley did not

need the consent or authorization of the Board of Education to

disable and/or delete the Twitter Account. Id. Mr. Owsley has not

reactivated the Twitter Account or any other account on the social

media platform Twitter and has no intention of doing so.

DISCUSSION

Mr. Owsley moves for summary judgment on the basis that Ms.

Yeager cannot establish that Mr. Owsley acted under color of law and,

alternatively, he is entitled to qualified immunity. Doc. 13, at 1. As

the Court noted, Ms. Yeager did not file a response to Mr. Owsley’s

motion. The docket report shows that a Rule 56 Notice was sent to

Ms. Yeager advising her that she had 21 days to respond to the

motion. Doc. 14, at 1. The Rule 56 Notice further provides that the

motion, if appropriate, would be granted and the case terminated if

she failed to respond. Id.

Summary judgment standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if the motion is properly

supported, and “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court views the evidence and construes all

reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. See Driveline

Systems, LLC v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 936 F.3d 576, 579 (7th Cir. 2019).

To create a genuine factual dispute, however, any such inference

must be based on something more than “speculation or conjecture.”

See Harper v. C.R. England, Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 306 (7th Cir. 2012)

(citation omitted). “The court does not assess the credibility of

witnesses, choose between competing reasonable inferences, or

balance the relative weight of conflicting evidence.” Driveline

Systems, 36 F.3d at 579 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Ultimately, there must be enough evidence in favor of the non-

movant to permit a jury to return a verdict in its favor. See Springer

v. Durflinger, 518 F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 2008).

Section 1983 standards

“Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, codified as 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, ‘authorizes suits to enforce individual rights under federal

statutes as well as the Constitution’ against state and local

government officials.” Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 611 (7th Cir.

2012) (quoting City of Rancho Palos Verdes, Cal. v. Abrams, 544 U.S.

113, 119 (2005)). Section 1983 does not create substantive rights,

but serves to vindicate federal rights that are conferred elsewhere.

See Padula v. Leimbach, 656 F.3d 595, 600 (7th Cir. 2011). In order

to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) she was

deprived of a federal right; (2) by an individual acting under color of

state law. See Ovadal v. City of Madison, 416 F.3d 531, 535 (7th Cir.

2005).

Defendant’s actions and Color of Law Requirement

“Not every action by a state official or employee occurs under

color of state law.” Barnes v. City of Centralia, 943 F.3d 826, 831

(7th Cir. 2019). State action involves the exercise of power

“possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the

wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.” Walker v.

Taylorville Correctional Center, 129 F.3d 410, 413 (7th Cir. 1997)

(quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988)). The action must be

“related in some way to the performance of the duties of the state

office.” Honaker v. Smith, 256 F.3d 477, 485 (7th Cir. 2001). Any

acts of officers involving their personal pursuits are plainly excluded.

See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945).

“Section 1983 does not cover disputes between private citizens,

even if one happens to be an officer.” Barnes, 943 F.3d at 831. A

plaintiff must do more than assert that the individual is a state officer

in order to establish action under color of state law. See Gibson v.

City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1516 (7th Cir. 1990). The critical

inquiry involves whether the individual’s actions related in some way

to the performance of his or her official duties. See id.

In Luce v. Town of Campbell, Wisc., 872 F.3d 512 (7th Cir.

2017), the Seventh Circuit determined that when a local police chief

defamed local citizens for expressing political views, that conduct was

not under color of law because defamation was not one of the police

chief’s duties. See id. at 514-15. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit

affirmed the district court’s conclusion that a mayor and fire chief’s

act of burning down the home of a disgruntled resident did not

constitute state action because that act was not related to any official

duty or activity of the mayor and fire chief. See Honaker, 256 F.3d

at 485. “Arson is not among a fire chief’s duties, just as defamation

is not among a police chief’s.” Luce, 872 F.3d at 515.

Here, Twitter is a social media platform that is owned and

operated by a private entity. The operation of the Twitter Account

did not derive from state law. Mr. Owsley’s creation and operation of

the Twitter Account did not result from any state action.

Mr. Owsley further claims that the Illinois School Code does not

grant him the authority to create a social media account on behalf of

the District. As an employee, Mr. Owsley works under the direction

of the Board of Education and is subject to its policies. 105 ILCS

5/10-16.7; 105 ILCS 5/10-21.4. Mr. Owsley’s powers under state

law do not involve creating social media accounts or communicating

with the public in general.

Additionally, the policies of the Board of Education do not

support the notion that Mr. Owsley was independently vested with

the authority by virtue of his position to create and operate the

Twitter Account. In fact, the Board of Education’s policy on social

media accounts specifies that that social media accounts maintained

by an employee are not those of the Board of Education. Board Policy

5:125 provides, (1) “The Board expressly disclaims any responsibility

for imposing content filters, blocking lists, or monitoring of its

employees’ personal technology and social media;” and (2) an

employee may “use personal technology and social media for personal

purposes only during non-work times or hours.” Doc. 13-1.

It is undisputed that Mr. Owsley created the Twitter Account on

his own time and operated it based on his own personal discretion.

The Board of Education did not direct Mr. Owsley’s work in this

regard and was not aware that the Twitter Account existed. The fact

that Mr. Owsley was a public employee does not transform his

creation of the Twitter Account on a platform not owned, controlled,

or operated by the Board of Education into official state action due

to the nature of his employment. The undisputed material facts

establish that that the creation and operation of the social media

account was a purely personal endeavor of Mr. Owsley. Mr. Owsley’s

actions were entirely outside the control of the Board of Education

and not part of the duties and responsibilities of the Superintendent

under State law or his employment with the Board. Accordingly, Mr.

Owsley did not need to obtain the permission or consent of the Board

of Education to delete his Twitter Account.

There is no dispute that a private citizen such as Mr. Owsley

has the ability to decide who will or will not have access to his social

media accounts without running afoul of the First Amendment. As

previously noted, a First Amendment violation requires governmental

action.

Because it is undisputed that Mr. Owsley was not acting under

color of law when he blocked Ms. Yeager from accessing the Twitter

Account, Ms. Yeager’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fail as a matter

of law. Mr. Owsley is entitled to summary judgment.

Qualified Immunity

Even if Mr. Owsley acted under color of law as a governmental

official and violated Ms. Yeager’s First Amendment rights, the Court

concludes he would be entitled to qualified immunity. “The doctrine

of qualified immunity balances dueling interests—allowing officials

to perform their duties reasonably without fear of liability on the one

hand and affording members of the public the ability to vindicate

constitutional violations by government officials who abuse their

offices on the other.” Lopez v. Sheriff of Cook County, 993 F.3d 981,

987 (7th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). In

determining whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity,

courts consider whether the officer’s “conduct violated a

constitutional right and, if so, whether that right was clearly

established at the time of the alleged violation.” Id.

Courts should look at past cases with specificity in determining

whether an officer violated clearly established law. See id. at 988.

“The Supreme Court has time and again instructed lower courts not

to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). While a case with identical

factual circumstances is not required, the right must be “so clearly

established that it is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official

would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Id.

The case law concerning whether or not the blocking of

individuals from a social media platform controlled by a

governmental official was not clearly established at the time Mr.

Owsley blocked Ms. Yeager. The Seventh Circuit had not considered

the issue. Other circuit courts of appeal are split on the issue. See

Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 675 (4th Cir. 2019) (finding a First

Amendment violation by elected President of County Board of

Supervisors for blocking plaintiff from a social media page); Campbell

v. Reisch, 986 F.3d 822, 826 (8th Cir. 2021) (finding that legislator

was not acting under color of law in blocking an individual from social

media page).

It is undisputed that Mr. Owsley blocked Ms. Yeager from the

Twitter Account and later disabled and deleted the Twitter Account

because Ms. Yeager posted a message about Mr. Owsley’s minor

children and where they attended school. Doc. 13, at 4. Moreover,

Mr. Owsley did not censor or remove comments of Ms. Yeager that

were in favor in-person education before she posted the information

about his minor children. Id. at 3. There is no clearly established

case law which provides that Mr. Owsley’s actions under those

circumstances constitute a First Amendment violation. Therefore,

the Court concludes that, even if Mr. Owsley were acting under color

of law and violated Ms. Yeager’s First Amendment rights, he would

be entitled to qualified immunity. Summary judgment is also

appropriate on that basis.

Therefore, Defendant Shane Owsley’s Motion for Summary

Judgment [d/e 13] is GRANTED.

The Clerk will enter Judgment in favor of the Defendant and

terminate this case.

ENTER: June 10, 2022

/s/ Sue E. Myerscough

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE