holding that a public official’s residence for venue purposes is the place where he or she performs the official duties of his or her office, regardless of secondary offices in other districts
How later courts described this case
- holding that a public official’s residence for venue purposes is the place where he or she performs the official duties of his or her office, regardless of secondary offices in other districts
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
ROBERT CRUZ, on behalf of his )
minor child L.C., and SCOT )
JONES, on behalf of his minor )
child D.J., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. )
) Case No. 21-cv-03199
JAY R. PRITZKER, in his official )
capacity as Governor, and )
DR. CARMEN I. AYALA, in her )
Official capacity as Director of the)
Illinois State Board of Education, )
And OAK LAWN COMMUNITY )
HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT 229 )
SCHOOL BOARD, )
)
Defendants. )
OPINION AND ORDER
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Before the Court is Defendant Oak Lawn Community High
School District 229 School Board’s (“School Board”) Motion to
Transfer Venue to the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1404. (d/e 6). Defendant School Board has proven that
factors of convenience and the interest of justice favor transfer.
Therefore, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Robert Cruz and Scot Jones (“Plaintiffs”) are both
residents of Cook County, Illinois, which is located in the Northern
District of Illinois. Plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of their minor
children on September 2, 2021 against Defendants Governor JB
Pritzker, Director of the Illinois State Board of Education Dr.
Carmen Ayala (collectively, the “State Defendants”), and the School
Board. See Notice of Removal (d/e 1) Ex. 1. The School Board is
also located in Cook County, Illinois and the Northern District. In
their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege the State Defendants as well as the
School Board violated their substantive due process rights under
the Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in dissemination of certain
public health guidelines for schools. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege
that Defendant Governor Pritzker exceeded his authority under the
Illinois Emergency Management Agency Act, 20 ILCS 3305 et seq.,
in issuing Executive Order 2021-18 (“EO 2021-18”).1 EO 2021-18
mandates all public and nonpublic K-12 schools require “the indoor
1 While Plaintiffs have attached an Executive Order to their Complaint, the Court notes that it
does not appear to be the correct Executive Order. Executive Order 2021-18, to which
Plaintiffs cite, is available at https://www.illinois.gov/government/executive-orders/executive-
order.executive-order-number-18.2021.html.
use of face coverings by students, staff, and visitors who are over
age two.” Plaintiffs allege that mandate violated their “fundamental
right to make health-related decisions for their minor children” and
that Dr. Ayala took part in the violation by complying with EO
2021-18. Notice of Removal, Ex. 1 at pp. 2–3. Plaintiffs further
allege that the School Board also took part in the violation of
Plaintiffs’ rights when the School Board passed Resolution 2122-01,
which states that the School Board will comply with all mandates
from the Governor of Illinois. Id. at 37–38.
On September 10, 2021, the State Defendants removed the
suit to this Court. Notice of Removal (d/e 1). The same day, the
School Board filed the present Motion to Change Venue. (d/e 6).
The School Board states that the State Defendants do not object to
the School Board’s motion. Id. at 5. Plaintiffs filed their
Memorandum in Opposition to transfer on September 24, 2021.
(d/e 10).
II. ANALYSIS
Venue in a federal civil suit is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
Under § 1391(b), venue is proper in “a judicial district in which any
defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in
which the district is located,” or “a judicial district in which a
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim
occurred.” Where a defendant is a corporation in a State with
multiple districts, as here, that corporation’s residency is “any
district in that State within which its contacts would be sufficient to
subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate
State, and, if there is no such district, the corporation shall be
deemed to reside in the district within which it has the most
significant contacts.” Id.
The transfer of venue in a case from one federal court to
another is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Under § 1404, a court
may "transfer any civil action to any other district or division where
it might have been brought.” Id. A court may do so “[f]or the
convenience of parties and witnesses” and “in the interest of
justice.” Id. Section 1404 “allow[s] a district court to transfer an
action filed in a proper, though not necessarily convenient, venue to
a more convenient district.” Research Automation, Inc. v.
Schrader-Bridgeport Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 973, 977 (7th Cir. 2010).
Whether to grant a motion to transfer under § 1404 is within the
“substantial degree of deference” of the Court. Id. at 977–78.
There are three essential elements of a valid transfer: (1) venue
is proper in the transferor court, (2) venue is proper in the
transferee court, and (3) the transfer is for the convenience of the
parties and witnesses, and in the interest of justice. Great West
Casualty Co. v. Ross Wilson Trucking, 2017 WL 707484, at *4 (C.D.
Ill. Feb. 22, 2017). The first two elements are met here because
neither party disputes that the Central District and the Northern
District are each a proper venue. As a result, whether to transfer
from the Central District to the Northern District turns on the
convenience of the parties and witnesses and the interest of justice.
a. The convenience of the parties and witnesses favors transfer.
When deciding convenience between parties, the Court
considers the following five factors: “(1) the plaintiff's choice of
[venue]; (2) the situs of material events; (3) the relative ease of
access to evidence; (4) the convenience of the parties; and (5) the
convenience of the witnesses.” Id. The moving party, here the
School Board, bears the burden of proving the proposed transferee
district is more convenient. Great West Casualty, 2017 WL 707484,
at *4.
The Plaintiffs’ choice of venue does not weigh against transfer.
While ordinarily afforded substantial weight, the plaintiff’s choice of
venue is entitled to less deference where the plaintiff’s chosen venue
is not the plaintiff’s home venue. Id. The Central District is neither
Plaintiffs’ home venue. Each Plaintiff resides in Cook County,
Illinois, making each of their home venues the Northern District.
Furthermore, each Plaintiff’s minor child attends school in Oak
Lawn, Illinois, also within Cook County and the Northern District.
Finally, Plaintiff Cruz initially filed a similar suit in Cook
County against the State Defendants. See Def.’s Resp. (d/e 12) at
Ex. 1. The State Defendants moved to transfer the case to
Sangamon County, arguing that transfer would be convenient to
consolidate Plaintiff Cruz’s case with other cases raising claims
related to the State Defendants’ authority over public health
guidance in schools. Id. at Ex. 3. Plaintiff Cruz then voluntarily
withdrew the Cook County suit and refiled it as the present case in
Sangamon County, this time with Plaintiff Jones as a co-plaintiff
and the School Board as a third defendant. Notice of Removal (d/e
1) at Ex. 1. Plaintiffs’ first choice of venue, then, was Cook County
in the Northern District, and this case was filed in Sangamon
County in the Central District only after the State Defendants
raised the transfer argument for the convenience of consolidating
cases with similar claims. This factor is, therefore, neutral as to
transfer because the Central District is neither the Plaintiffs’ home
venue nor their first choice of venue.
The material events factor, in turn, weighs in favor of transfer.
While one of the challenged mandates—EO 2021-18—was signed in
Springfield, Illinois in the Central District, the other mandate—
Resolution 2122-01—was issued by the School Board in the
Northern District. Additionally, as stated, both Plaintiffs reside in
the Northern District and the schools their minor children attend
are also in the Northern District. So, any alleged harm done to
Plaintiffs or their children would have occurred in the Northern
District. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of transfer.
The relative ease of access to evidence also favors transfer.
The School Board argues that “virtually all relevant evidence is
located in the Northern District,” an assertion supported by the fact
that the site of the material events is also in the Northern District.
In response, Plaintiffs argue that “[t]he relevant documentary
evidence has already been filed” either in Plaintiffs’ Complaint or in
Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. Pl.’s Opposition at p.
7. However, at this stage in the proceedings, with little discovery
done, Plaintiffs’ claim that all the relevant evidence has already
been filed is unsupported by the facts and is speculative. Instead,
as the School Board argues, more evidence will likely be in the
Northern District because the site of the material events is in the
Northern District. The ease of access to evidence, then, favors
transfer.
The convenience of the parties is neutral. As Plaintiffs point
out and the State Defendants concede, the State Defendants reside
in the Central District. See Pl.’s Mem. in Opposition (d/e 10) at p.
8; Def.’s Resp. (d/e 13) at p. 7; see also Protess v. Howell, 1995 WL
270219, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 1995) (citing Braggs v. Lane, 717
F.Supp. 609, 611 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that a public official’s
residence for venue purposes is the place where he or she performs
the official duties of his or her office, regardless of secondary offices
in other districts). In contrast, Plaintiffs and the School Board
reside in the Northern District. Transfer to the Northern District,
then, would only change which parties would be litigating outside
their home venue: without transfer, the School Board and Plaintiffs;
with transfer, the State Defendants. However, the Court notes that
the State Defendants do not object to the transfer. Pl.’s Mot. to
Change Venue (d/e 6) at p. 5. Therefore, this factor is neutral.
The convenience of the witnesses favors transfer. The School
Board argues that this factor favors transfer because the Plaintiffs
and the School Board reside in the Northern District, so if they are
called to testify then venue in the Northern District would be more
convenient. Plaintiffs, in response, argue that, in their view, “it is
unlikely any non-party will be required to testify in the action,”
rendering the inconvenience of potential witnesses minimal. Id. at
p. 8. However, Plaintiffs’ argument assumes that only the parties
would be called, while the School Board’s argument assumes that,
at a minimum, the parties would be called. If more witnesses are
called, such as other Oak Lawn High School Board members, those
witnesses will be in the Northern District because the location of
the material events is also in the Northern District. The Court finds
that additional witnesses who may be called would be
inconvenienced if transfer is not granted. Therefore, the Court finds
that the convenience of the parties and the witnesses favors
transfer to the Northern District.
b. The interest of justice favor transfer.
Next, the interest of justice favors transfer. Whether transfer
would serve the interest of justice requires the Court to consider the
following factors: (1) the “docket congestion and likely speed to trial”
in each venue; (2) “each court's relative familiarity with the relevant
law;” (3) “the respective desirability of resolving controversies in
each locale;” and (4) “the relationship of each community to the
controversy.” Research Automation, 626 F.3d at 978.
The docket congestion and likely speed of trial factor is
neutral. According to the U.S. District Courts Federal Management
Statistics for the 12-month period ending March 31, 2021, the
Central District had a total of 473 civil and criminal cases per
judgeship and a median time from filing to disposition of 9.8
months in civil cases. See U.S. District Courts—Federal Court
Management Statistics–Comparison Within Circuit—During the 12-
Month Period Ending March 31, 2021, at *7,
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fcms_na
_distcomparison0331.2021.pdf. In comparison, the Northern
District had fewer filings per judgeship at 413, but a longer median
time to disposition of 16.3 months for the same time period. Id.
Therefore, the docket congestion and likely speed to trial factor is
neutral.
The applicable law factor is also neutral. While the School
Board argues that the Northern District is more familiar with the
applicable law because that District has resolved prior cases
involving similar claims, both the Central District and the Northern
District are capable of interpreting Illinois state law, which would
apply in either venue.
The final factors—the respective desirability of resolving
controversies in each locale and the relationship of each community
to the controversy—strongly favor transfer. The claims against the
School Board affect a narrow community: Oak Lawn, Illinois.
Plaintiffs’ claims against the School Board involve individuals who
live in Oak Lawn and their children who attend Oak Lawn schools.
The outcome of those claims will directly impact other Oak Lawn
parents and students in addition to the Oak Lawn School Board
and its members. The more interested venue for Plaintiffs’ claims
against the School Board is the Northern District, and, while the
Central District has an interest in the claims against the State
Defendants, the Northern District has an equal interest in the
claims against the State Defendants and is capable of deciding
them alongside the claims against the School Board. The final
factors, therefore, strongly favor transferring the controversy to the
Northern District.
III. CONCLUSION
Considering all the factors relevant to the convenience of the
parties and the interests of justice, the Court finds that the School
Board has proven transfer is warranted. The School Board’s Motion
to Change Venue is GRANTED. This case is transferred to the
Northern District of Illinois.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: October 5, 2021
/s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE