Opinion

Cruz v. Pritzker

Court
District Court, C.D. Illinois
Filed
Oct 6, 2021
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 20.7%

holding that a public official’s residence for venue purposes is the place where he or she performs the official duties of his or her office, regardless of secondary offices in other districts

How later courts described this case

  • holding that a public official’s residence for venue purposes is the place where he or she performs the official duties of his or her office, regardless of secondary offices in other districts

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

ROBERT CRUZ, on behalf of his )

minor child L.C., and SCOT )

JONES, on behalf of his minor )

child D.J., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. )

) Case No. 21-cv-03199

JAY R. PRITZKER, in his official )

capacity as Governor, and )

DR. CARMEN I. AYALA, in her )

Official capacity as Director of the)

Illinois State Board of Education, )

And OAK LAWN COMMUNITY )

HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT 229 )

SCHOOL BOARD, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:

Before the Court is Defendant Oak Lawn Community High

School District 229 School Board’s (“School Board”) Motion to

Transfer Venue to the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1404. (d/e 6). Defendant School Board has proven that

factors of convenience and the interest of justice favor transfer.

Therefore, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Robert Cruz and Scot Jones (“Plaintiffs”) are both

residents of Cook County, Illinois, which is located in the Northern

District of Illinois. Plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of their minor

children on September 2, 2021 against Defendants Governor JB

Pritzker, Director of the Illinois State Board of Education Dr.

Carmen Ayala (collectively, the “State Defendants”), and the School

Board. See Notice of Removal (d/e 1) Ex. 1. The School Board is

also located in Cook County, Illinois and the Northern District. In

their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege the State Defendants as well as the

School Board violated their substantive due process rights under

the Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in dissemination of certain

public health guidelines for schools. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege

that Defendant Governor Pritzker exceeded his authority under the

Illinois Emergency Management Agency Act, 20 ILCS 3305 et seq.,

in issuing Executive Order 2021-18 (“EO 2021-18”).1 EO 2021-18

mandates all public and nonpublic K-12 schools require “the indoor

1 While Plaintiffs have attached an Executive Order to their Complaint, the Court notes that it

does not appear to be the correct Executive Order. Executive Order 2021-18, to which

Plaintiffs cite, is available at https://www.illinois.gov/government/executive-orders/executive-

order.executive-order-number-18.2021.html.

use of face coverings by students, staff, and visitors who are over

age two.” Plaintiffs allege that mandate violated their “fundamental

right to make health-related decisions for their minor children” and

that Dr. Ayala took part in the violation by complying with EO

2021-18. Notice of Removal, Ex. 1 at pp. 2–3. Plaintiffs further

allege that the School Board also took part in the violation of

Plaintiffs’ rights when the School Board passed Resolution 2122-01,

which states that the School Board will comply with all mandates

from the Governor of Illinois. Id. at 37–38.

On September 10, 2021, the State Defendants removed the

suit to this Court. Notice of Removal (d/e 1). The same day, the

School Board filed the present Motion to Change Venue. (d/e 6).

The School Board states that the State Defendants do not object to

the School Board’s motion. Id. at 5. Plaintiffs filed their

Memorandum in Opposition to transfer on September 24, 2021.

(d/e 10).

II. ANALYSIS

Venue in a federal civil suit is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Under § 1391(b), venue is proper in “a judicial district in which any

defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in

which the district is located,” or “a judicial district in which a

substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim

occurred.” Where a defendant is a corporation in a State with

multiple districts, as here, that corporation’s residency is “any

district in that State within which its contacts would be sufficient to

subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate

State, and, if there is no such district, the corporation shall be

deemed to reside in the district within which it has the most

significant contacts.” Id.

The transfer of venue in a case from one federal court to

another is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Under § 1404, a court

may "transfer any civil action to any other district or division where

it might have been brought.” Id. A court may do so “[f]or the

convenience of parties and witnesses” and “in the interest of

justice.” Id. Section 1404 “allow[s] a district court to transfer an

action filed in a proper, though not necessarily convenient, venue to

a more convenient district.” Research Automation, Inc. v.

Schrader-Bridgeport Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 973, 977 (7th Cir. 2010).

Whether to grant a motion to transfer under § 1404 is within the

“substantial degree of deference” of the Court. Id. at 977–78.

There are three essential elements of a valid transfer: (1) venue

is proper in the transferor court, (2) venue is proper in the

transferee court, and (3) the transfer is for the convenience of the

parties and witnesses, and in the interest of justice. Great West

Casualty Co. v. Ross Wilson Trucking, 2017 WL 707484, at *4 (C.D.

Ill. Feb. 22, 2017). The first two elements are met here because

neither party disputes that the Central District and the Northern

District are each a proper venue. As a result, whether to transfer

from the Central District to the Northern District turns on the

convenience of the parties and witnesses and the interest of justice.

a. The convenience of the parties and witnesses favors transfer.

When deciding convenience between parties, the Court

considers the following five factors: “(1) the plaintiff's choice of

[venue]; (2) the situs of material events; (3) the relative ease of

access to evidence; (4) the convenience of the parties; and (5) the

convenience of the witnesses.” Id. The moving party, here the

School Board, bears the burden of proving the proposed transferee

district is more convenient. Great West Casualty, 2017 WL 707484,

at *4.

The Plaintiffs’ choice of venue does not weigh against transfer.

While ordinarily afforded substantial weight, the plaintiff’s choice of

venue is entitled to less deference where the plaintiff’s chosen venue

is not the plaintiff’s home venue. Id. The Central District is neither

Plaintiffs’ home venue. Each Plaintiff resides in Cook County,

Illinois, making each of their home venues the Northern District.

Furthermore, each Plaintiff’s minor child attends school in Oak

Lawn, Illinois, also within Cook County and the Northern District.

Finally, Plaintiff Cruz initially filed a similar suit in Cook

County against the State Defendants. See Def.’s Resp. (d/e 12) at

Ex. 1. The State Defendants moved to transfer the case to

Sangamon County, arguing that transfer would be convenient to

consolidate Plaintiff Cruz’s case with other cases raising claims

related to the State Defendants’ authority over public health

guidance in schools. Id. at Ex. 3. Plaintiff Cruz then voluntarily

withdrew the Cook County suit and refiled it as the present case in

Sangamon County, this time with Plaintiff Jones as a co-plaintiff

and the School Board as a third defendant. Notice of Removal (d/e

1) at Ex. 1. Plaintiffs’ first choice of venue, then, was Cook County

in the Northern District, and this case was filed in Sangamon

County in the Central District only after the State Defendants

raised the transfer argument for the convenience of consolidating

cases with similar claims. This factor is, therefore, neutral as to

transfer because the Central District is neither the Plaintiffs’ home

venue nor their first choice of venue.

The material events factor, in turn, weighs in favor of transfer.

While one of the challenged mandates—EO 2021-18—was signed in

Springfield, Illinois in the Central District, the other mandate—

Resolution 2122-01—was issued by the School Board in the

Northern District. Additionally, as stated, both Plaintiffs reside in

the Northern District and the schools their minor children attend

are also in the Northern District. So, any alleged harm done to

Plaintiffs or their children would have occurred in the Northern

District. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of transfer.

The relative ease of access to evidence also favors transfer.

The School Board argues that “virtually all relevant evidence is

located in the Northern District,” an assertion supported by the fact

that the site of the material events is also in the Northern District.

In response, Plaintiffs argue that “[t]he relevant documentary

evidence has already been filed” either in Plaintiffs’ Complaint or in

Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. Pl.’s Opposition at p.

7. However, at this stage in the proceedings, with little discovery

done, Plaintiffs’ claim that all the relevant evidence has already

been filed is unsupported by the facts and is speculative. Instead,

as the School Board argues, more evidence will likely be in the

Northern District because the site of the material events is in the

Northern District. The ease of access to evidence, then, favors

transfer.

The convenience of the parties is neutral. As Plaintiffs point

out and the State Defendants concede, the State Defendants reside

in the Central District. See Pl.’s Mem. in Opposition (d/e 10) at p.

8; Def.’s Resp. (d/e 13) at p. 7; see also Protess v. Howell, 1995 WL

270219, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 1995) (citing Braggs v. Lane, 717

F.Supp. 609, 611 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that a public official’s

residence for venue purposes is the place where he or she performs

the official duties of his or her office, regardless of secondary offices

in other districts). In contrast, Plaintiffs and the School Board

reside in the Northern District. Transfer to the Northern District,

then, would only change which parties would be litigating outside

their home venue: without transfer, the School Board and Plaintiffs;

with transfer, the State Defendants. However, the Court notes that

the State Defendants do not object to the transfer. Pl.’s Mot. to

Change Venue (d/e 6) at p. 5. Therefore, this factor is neutral.

The convenience of the witnesses favors transfer. The School

Board argues that this factor favors transfer because the Plaintiffs

and the School Board reside in the Northern District, so if they are

called to testify then venue in the Northern District would be more

convenient. Plaintiffs, in response, argue that, in their view, “it is

unlikely any non-party will be required to testify in the action,”

rendering the inconvenience of potential witnesses minimal. Id. at

p. 8. However, Plaintiffs’ argument assumes that only the parties

would be called, while the School Board’s argument assumes that,

at a minimum, the parties would be called. If more witnesses are

called, such as other Oak Lawn High School Board members, those

witnesses will be in the Northern District because the location of

the material events is also in the Northern District. The Court finds

that additional witnesses who may be called would be

inconvenienced if transfer is not granted. Therefore, the Court finds

that the convenience of the parties and the witnesses favors

transfer to the Northern District.

b. The interest of justice favor transfer.

Next, the interest of justice favors transfer. Whether transfer

would serve the interest of justice requires the Court to consider the

following factors: (1) the “docket congestion and likely speed to trial”

in each venue; (2) “each court's relative familiarity with the relevant

law;” (3) “the respective desirability of resolving controversies in

each locale;” and (4) “the relationship of each community to the

controversy.” Research Automation, 626 F.3d at 978.

The docket congestion and likely speed of trial factor is

neutral. According to the U.S. District Courts Federal Management

Statistics for the 12-month period ending March 31, 2021, the

Central District had a total of 473 civil and criminal cases per

judgeship and a median time from filing to disposition of 9.8

months in civil cases. See U.S. District Courts—Federal Court

Management Statistics–Comparison Within Circuit—During the 12-

Month Period Ending March 31, 2021, at *7,

https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fcms_na

_distcomparison0331.2021.pdf. In comparison, the Northern

District had fewer filings per judgeship at 413, but a longer median

time to disposition of 16.3 months for the same time period. Id.

Therefore, the docket congestion and likely speed to trial factor is

neutral.

The applicable law factor is also neutral. While the School

Board argues that the Northern District is more familiar with the

applicable law because that District has resolved prior cases

involving similar claims, both the Central District and the Northern

District are capable of interpreting Illinois state law, which would

apply in either venue.

The final factors—the respective desirability of resolving

controversies in each locale and the relationship of each community

to the controversy—strongly favor transfer. The claims against the

School Board affect a narrow community: Oak Lawn, Illinois.

Plaintiffs’ claims against the School Board involve individuals who

live in Oak Lawn and their children who attend Oak Lawn schools.

The outcome of those claims will directly impact other Oak Lawn

parents and students in addition to the Oak Lawn School Board

and its members. The more interested venue for Plaintiffs’ claims

against the School Board is the Northern District, and, while the

Central District has an interest in the claims against the State

Defendants, the Northern District has an equal interest in the

claims against the State Defendants and is capable of deciding

them alongside the claims against the School Board. The final

factors, therefore, strongly favor transferring the controversy to the

Northern District.

III. CONCLUSION

Considering all the factors relevant to the convenience of the

parties and the interests of justice, the Court finds that the School

Board has proven transfer is warranted. The School Board’s Motion

to Change Venue is GRANTED. This case is transferred to the

Northern District of Illinois.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: October 5, 2021

/s/ Sue E. Myerscough

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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