Waddle v. Brennan

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ROCK ISLAND DIVISION

MELISSA WADDLE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 4:20-cv-04022-SLD-JEH

)

LOUIS DEJOY,1 )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General for the United States

Postal Service’s (“USPS”), Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 16. Also before the Court

are Defendant’s motions to seal documents, ECF No.18, and correct its memorandum of law,

ECF No. 20, that were submitted in support of the summary judgment motion. For the reasons

that follow, the motions are GRANTED.

BACKGROUND2

Plaintiff Melissa Waddle is a supervisor for the USPS who has worked in customer

service and delivery operations. Her duties include assisting customers, overseeing daily

operations, running reports, correcting timekeeping errors, and managing employee resources.

1 Louis DeJoy is now Postmaster General for the United States Postal Service. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 25(d), when a public officer named in her official capacity ceases to hold office while the action is

pending, her “successor is automatically substituted as a party.” The Clerk is directed to terminate Megan J.

Brennan as a defendant on the docket and add Louis DeJoy.

2 At summary judgment, a court “constru[es] the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and avoid[s]

the temptation to decide which party’s version of the facts is more likely true.” Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770

(7th Cir. 2003). Unless otherwise noted, the facts related here are taken from the USPS’s statement of undisputed

material facts in its corrected memorandum of law, Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 6–16, ECF No. 20-1; Waddle’s

response to the USPS’s statement of undisputed material facts and additional facts, Mem. Supp. Resistance Mot.

Summ. J. 2–10, ECF No. 23-1; the USPS’s reply thereto, Reply 1–15, ECF No. 24; and exhibits to the filings, which

the Court identifies with descriptive titles for ease of reference.

At the beginning of 2018, Waddle worked at the Quad Cities Processing and Distribution

Facility (“QCP&DF”) in Milan, Illinois. In May 2018, she filed a complaint with the Equal

Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) office, alleging a hostile work environment and harassment

by two QCP&DF supervisors. On June 15, 2018, Waddle began taking leave to address mental

health issues stemming from the harassment. In July 2018, Waddle’s psychiatrist diagnosed her

with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and adjustment disorder.

On November 13, 2018, Waddle’s psychiatrist cleared her to return to work. Waddle

contacted Sarah Weller, a USPS occupational nurse. Waddle told Weller that she could go back

to work, but her psychiatrist did not believe she should return to the QCP&DF. Waddle told

Weller she wanted to transfer facilities, and Weller replied she would forward the request to

human resources.

On December 13, 2018, Waddle had a call with Human Resources Manager Anjeannette

Pettinger. The parties dispute what was said. Waddle alleges she told Pettinger that she suffered

from adjustment disorder and needed to be transferred to return to work. Waddle Aff. ¶ 7, Mem.

Supp. Resistance Mot. Summ. J. Ex. A, ECF No. 23-1 at 19–21. She also alleges she told

Pettinger about her prior EEO complaint. Id. According to Waddle, Pettinger then offered to

transfer her to an open supervisor position in Bettendorf, Iowa. Id. ¶ 8. Waddle accepted, and

Pettinger told her to contact Bettendorf postmaster Ellen Opperman to discuss a start date.3 Id.

Waddle further alleges that when she contacted Opperman, Opperman was unaware of the offer.

Mem. Supp. Resistance Mot. Summ. J. 5. Opperman said she would speak to Pettinger and

operations manager Thomas Allen before getting back to Waddle with more information. Id.

3 The parties spell the Bettendorf postmaster’s surname inconsistently. For consistency, the Court will default to

“Opperman,” the spelling used by the postmaster in her EEO investigative affidavit. See Opperman EEO

Investigative Aff., ECF No. 17-3 at 75–ECF No. 17-4 at 5.

The USPS maintains that Waddle never told Pettinger about her adjustment disorder or

offered her the Bettendorf job. Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 8. Instead, when Pettinger

mentioned Bettendorf, she “was simply asking [Waddle] if Bettendorf was an acceptable

accommodation.” Pettinger EEO Investigative Aff. 2, ECF No. 17-3 at 68–74. Pettinger further

explained that if Bettendorf became available, “there [was] a formal process” before Waddle

would receive an offer. Id. According to Pettinger, this was a “complex” process that would

require her to coordinate with management and the USPS legal department. Id. at 4.

The USPS also disputes Waddle’s account of her call with Opperman. According to the

USPS, Opperman told Waddle that she could not discuss the Bettendorf position with her

because she had not received any information about Waddle transferring to Bettendorf. Mem.

Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 11; see also Opperman EEO Investigative Aff. 6, ECF No. 17-3 at 75–ECF

No. 17-4 at 5.

On January 3, 2019, Waddle emailed Pettinger to “pinpoint a start date in Bettendorf . . .

under the Reasonable Accommodations clause of the Rehabilitation Act.” Jan. 3, 2019 12:17

P.M. Waddle E-Mail 1, ECF No. 17-4 at 29–30. Pettinger replied that she had just spoken with

“Tom [Allen]” and that she would “send[] [Waddle] the information we need to continue with

the reasonable accommodation process.” Jan. 3, 2019 12:43 P.M. Pettinger E-Mail, ECF No. 17-

4 at 29.

On January 7, 2019, Waddle emailed Pettinger about a supervisor in Moline, Illinois,

who she heard wanted to request a transfer to Bettendorf. Waddle wrote that “[i]f Ellen

[Opperman] would prefer to take him as a transfer, I am open to taking his place in Moline.”

Jan. 7, 2019 1:36 P.M. Waddle E-Mail 1–2, ECF No. 17-4 at 34–35.

On January 11, 2019, Waddle sent a follow-up email beginning “[a]ny word on [Moline]

or Bettendorf?” Jan. 11, 2019 11:32 A.M. Waddle E-Mail 2, ECF No. 17-4 at 33–34. She noted

that it had been a month since her call with Pettinger and two months “since [she] started trying

to get back to work.” Id. Pettinger replied that she was working through the approval process.

She explained she had not sent Waddle the reasonable accommodation information mentioned in

her January 3 email because it would be unnecessary if Waddle’s transfer was approved.

Pettinger also asked Waddle how she felt about “the possibility of [working at the facility in]

Aledo[, Illinois] if Bettendorf doesn’t work out.” Jan. 11, 2019 11:35 A.M. Pettinger E-Mail,

ECF No. 17-4 at 33. Waddle replied she would prefer not to work in Aledo because of the

commute.

On January 17, 2019, Pettinger emailed Waddle to tell her that the USPS would be

posting the Bettendorf position for applicants. She explained that because there had been some

requests for lateral transfers to Bettendorf, “we think it is in the best interest of the Postal Service

to post the job and everyone can compete.” Jan. 17, 2019 10:37 A.M. Pettinger E-Mail 1, ECF

No. 17-4 at 32–33. Pettinger wrote that she could offer Waddle the job in Aledo. Pettinger

could also coordinate a temporary transfer so that Waddle could begin work that week and

decide whether she wanted a permanent reassignment to Aledo from the QCP&DF. Id. Waddle

ultimately did not pursue an application for the Bettendorf position, and a postal service

employee named Vicky Ratcliff was hired.

Waddle replied reiterating her concern about the Aledo commute. She asked if she

would be paid for mileage, adding that “[t]he reason I am off, the reason I cannot go back to the

plant is not my own creation.” Jan. 17, 2019 2:09 P.M. Waddle E-Mail, ECF No. 17-4 at 32.

Pettinger responded that Waddle would be paid for mileage while in the temporary role.

Pettinger wrote that although she understood that Waddle believed she had a hostile work

environment at the QCP&DF, she could not make Waddle leave that facility and Waddle would

need to let Pettinger know what she wanted done with regard to Aledo. Waddle replied to

Pettinger, again expressing that she did not believe “the person who has been targeted should be

the one who is forced to commute.” Jan. 17, 2019 2:42 P.M. Waddle E-Mail, ECF No. 17-4 at

31. She further stated she did not consider Aledo “reasonable” because of the commute. Id. She

concluded that “[o]nce I have given this [offer] to my attorney for advice and on how [sic] to

proceed . . . , I anticipate that I will be ready to go back to work . . . Jan[uary] 26.” Id.

On January 24, 2019, Waddle’s attorney, Stephen Fieweger, emailed Pettinger, stating

that Waddle “should not be required to commute to Aledo, Illinois, in order to have her

reasonable accommodation request met.” Jan. 24, 2019 8:51 A.M. Fieweger E-Mail, Mem.

Supp. Resistance Mot. Summ. J. Ex. B, ECF No. 23-1 at 22. He asked Pettinger to advise by

close of business the next day “whether the postal service will reasonably accommodate

[Waddle] and place her in the open Bettendorf position.” Id.

On February 12, 2019, Waddle emailed Pettinger to follow up on Fieweger’s email.

Pettinger replied that Fieweger had already received a response and that Waddle needed to

decide if communication would come through her or her attorney. Waddle and Pettinger

exchanged additional emails, including a message in which Pettinger told Waddle she would

send her the reasonable accommodation materials. However, Pettinger never sent those

materials based on the legal department’s opinion that Waddle had not substantiated her right to

a reasonable accommodation.

Throughout February and March, Waddle emailed various USPS higher-ups, including

multiple messages to then-Postmaster General Megan Brennan, about her situation. The emails

summarized the events that led to her initial EEO complaint, her communications with Pettinger,

and her position that the commute to Aledo was not acceptable and that she should be transferred

to Bettendorf.

In a letter dated March 15, 2019, Pettinger notified Waddle that her messages had been

received by all parties. She wrote that Waddle could either return to the QCP&DF or transfer to

Aledo. The letter included a form for Waddle to indicate her choice of position along with an

envelope to return the form. She asked Waddle to respond within seven days.

Waddle submitted her response on April 3, 2019. See Reply 8, ECF No. 24. (Waddle

contends she received the letter on April 2, 2019. Mem. Supp. Resistance Mot. Summ. J. 6). On

April 15, 2019, Waddle requested a start date from Pettinger. She began working as a supervisor

at the Aledo facility on May 11, 2019.

On May 29, 2019, Waddle filed a complaint with the EEO office, alleging that Pettinger

engaged in disability discrimination and retaliation when she failed to transfer Waddle to

Bettendorf, delaying her return to work. Waddle received a final agency decision on December

5, 2019. She then filed this action with the Court on February 11, 2020. See Compl., ECF No. 1.

She brings two claims against the USPS: first, that Pettinger retaliated against Waddle for her

initial EEO activity, and second, that Pettinger discriminated against Waddle on the basis of

disability by failing to grant her the reasonable accommodation of the transfer.4 Id. at 4–6.

4 Waddle’s Complaint alleges only “disability discrimination” and does not cite to any statute. See Compl. 5–6.

The Court construes Waddle’s claim as having been brought under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which

provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability,

. . . be subjected to discrimination . . . under any program or activity conducted by . . . the United States Postal

Service.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).

The USPS now moves for summary judgment on both counts, arguing that Waddle is not

disabled under the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and cannot provide

evidence of retaliation.5 Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 3–4, ECF No. 20-1. The USPS also moves

to correct its memorandum of law submitted in support of summary judgment, see ECF No. 20,

and seal documents attached to its summary judgment motion, see ECF No. 18. The Court

grants the USPS’s unopposed motion to correct the citation inconsistencies in its memorandum

of law. Because the documents – Waddle’s medical records — should remain private, the Court

also grants the motion to seal.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). Summary judgment is also appropriate if the party opposing summary judgment fails to

establish a genuine issue of fact on an element essential to its case and on which that party bears

the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). Where one

party has properly moved for summary judgment, the non-moving party must respond “by

identifying specific, admissible evidence showing that there is a genuine dispute of material fact

for trial.” Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2017). The court’s function is

not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there

is a genuine issue for trial”—that is, whether “there is sufficient evidence favoring the non[-

5 Although the USPS frames its argument under the ADA, the ADA does not apply to federal workers, see Vargas v.

DeJoy, 980 F.3d 1184, 1188 n.4 (7th Cir. 2020); in this case, the Rehabilitation Act applies. See id. Because courts

look to “same standards and provisions that govern the [ADA]” when resolving Rehabilitation Act claims, see id.,

the Court will infer the USPS intends to argue under the Rehabilitation Act and thus apply its ADA arguments to

Waddle’s Rehabilitation Act claim.

]moving party for a jury to return a verdict” in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Patel v. Allstate Ins. Co., 105 F.3d 365, 370 (7th Cir. 1997). The court

must view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party[] and draw[] all

reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” McCann v. Iroquois Mem’l Hosp., 622 F.3d 745,

752 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). However, the non-movant “is not

entitled to the benefit of inferences that are supported by only speculation or conjecture.”

Nichols v. Mich. City Plant Plan. Dep’t, 755 F.3d 594, 599 (7th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks

omitted). “A genuine issue for trial exists only when a reasonable jury could find for the party

opposing the motion based on the record as a whole.” Pipitone v. United States, 180 F.3d 859,

861 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting Roger v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 21 F.3d 146, 149 (7th Cir.

1994)).

II. Analysis

a. Disability Discrimination6

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual

with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, . . . be subjected to

discrimination . . . under any program or activity conducted by . . . the United States Postal

Service.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Courts “resolve Rehabilitation Act claims by looking to the same

standards and provisions that govern the Americans with Disabilities Act.” Vargas v. DeJoy,

980 F.3d 1184, 1188 n.4 (7th Cir. 2020).7

6 To follow the order in which both parties have briefed the issues, the Court addresses Waddle’s second count of

disability discrimination before her first count of retaliation.

7 The Court also cites to cases involving other antidiscrimination laws, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17, because the statutes are similar. See Miranda v. Wis. Power & Light Co., 91

F.3d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[I]n analyzing claims under the ADA, it is appropriate to borrow from our

approach to the respective analog under Title VII.”).

Under both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, a failure to accommodate claim requires

the plaintiff to prove “(1) he was a qualified individual with a disability, (2) his employer was

aware of his disability, and (3) his employer failed to reasonably accommodate his disability.”

Id. at 1188. The USPS argues Waddle cannot meet any of these burdens. Mem. Supp. Mot.

Summ. J. 21–23. Thus, the Court begins by asking whether Waddle has met her initial burden of

showing that she is a qualified individual with a disability under the Rehabilitation Act.

“‘[Q]ualified individual with a disability’ [is a] term[] of art that must be understood

within [its] respective statutory context[].” Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir.

1997). This context includes a “fundamental statutory requirement that only impairments that

substantially limit the ability to perform a major life activity constitute disabilities.” Albertson’s,

Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 556 (1999); see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (“The term

‘disability’ means . . . a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more

major life activities of such individual.”). Major life activities “include, but are not limited to,

caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing,

lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating,

and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). When determining whether an individual’s disability

substantially limits a major life activity, the individual’s performance of that activity is compared

with that of the average person in the general population. See E.E.O.C. v. AutoZone, Inc., 630

F.3d 635, 642 (7th Cir. 2010).

Here, the parties do not disagree that Waddle suffers from PTSD and adjustment disorder

but dispute whether those diagnoses substantially limit any major life activity such that she is

entitled to a reasonable accommodation. See Reply 1–2. Waddle states that her mental health

conditions “affect [her] ability to think clearly and to be able to concentrate on [her] work,”

Waddle Aff. ¶ 3, which suggests that she is arguing that she is substantially limited in the major

life activities of working and thinking.

To show that the major life activity of working is substantially limited, “a plaintiff must

show that the impairment significantly restricts the ability to perform a class of jobs or a broad

range of jobs in various classes.” Winsley v. Cook County, 563 F.3d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 2009)

(quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Seventh Circuit has held consistently that in a situation

where “a plaintiff ‘can do the same job for another supervisor, she can do the job, and does not

qualify under the ADA.’” Makeda-Phillips v. Ill. Sec’y of State, 642 F. App’x 616, 618 (7th Cir.

2016) (quoting Schneiker v. Fortis Ins. Co., 200 F.3d 1055, 1062 (7th Cir. 2000)); Weiler v.

Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 524 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[A]n inability to perform a particular

job for a particular employer is not sufficient to establish a substantial limitation on the ability to

work; rather, the impairment must substantially limit employment generally.” (quotation marks

omitted)).

The medical records submitted to the Court do not provide evidence that Waddle was

unable to perform either her job or a broader class of jobs. Instead, Waddle admits in her

response that she was able to perform her required work-related duties and that there were no

duties associated with her position she was unable to perform. See Mem. Supp. Resistance Mot.

Summ. J. 3. This admission necessarily contradicts a showing that she is substantially limited in

the major life activity of working because she has admitted to no limitations, substantial or

otherwise, in either her current role or a broader class of jobs. See Weiler, 101 F.3d at 524.

Moreover, none of the medical information submitted to the Court substantiates that Waddle is

substantially limited in the major life activity of thinking—only that, when working at the

QCP&DF, she experienced anxiety that caused her to “second guess everything” and “feel[] that

[she] must execute all duties perfectly to keep from being targeted” by the two supervisors who

allegedly harassed her. Waddle EEO Investigative Aff. 2, ECF No. 17-2 at 47–56; compare

Nawrot v. CPC Int’l, 277 F.3d 896, 905 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that the major life activity of

thinking was substantially limited where the plaintiff’s hypoglycemic episodes caused him to

lose consciousness and make nonsensical statements) with Steffy v. Cole Vision Corp., Case No.

05-C-0204, 2008 WL 11463619, at *14–17 (March 17, 2008) (finding that the major activity of

thinking was not substantially limited where the plaintiff, who suffered from PTSD and

depression, had to “take things slower,” needed instructions repeated, and had memory issues).

Moreover, Waddle identified no limitations in her personal life as a result of her diagnoses,

including any limitations on her ability to think. See Waddle EEO Investigative Aff. 3.

Because she has not shown she is substantially limited in a major life activity, the Court

therefore finds that Waddle has failed to demonstrate she is a qualified individual with a

disability under the Rehabilitation Act. Because a plaintiff must first show that she is a qualified

individual with a disability to succeed on a failure to accommodate claim, the Court need not

continue its analysis to ask whether the USPS was aware of Waddle’s disability or whether her

disability was reasonably accommodated. See Vargas, 980 F.3d at 1188.

Nevertheless, the Court notes briefly that, regardless of any statutory entitlement to an

accommodation, Waddle was offered an accommodation: the transfer to Aledo. Waddle’s

contention is that she was entitled to the transfer to Bettendorf, citing Gile v. United Airlines,

Inc., 95 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 1996), to support her proposition that a transfer to an open, vacant

position is a reasonable accommodation. Mem. Supp. Resistance Mot. Summ. J. 11; see Gile, 95

F.3d at 498–99. But Gile does not support the proposition that the employee must then be

transferred to the open position of her choice, or that transfer must be the default

accommodation. Rather, the employer must “identify the full range of alternative positions . . .

[and] consider transferring the employee to any of these other jobs.” Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu

Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 678 (7th Cir. 1998).

Waddle does not appear to argue that Bettendorf was singularly able to accommodate her

needs. Indeed, she emailed Pettinger letting her know she would also be amenable to a transfer

to Moline. See Jan. 7, 2019 1:36 P.M. Waddle E-Mail 1–2. Her only apparent issue with Aledo

is the commute. But the fact that Waddle would have preferred Bettendorf “is of no

consequence” because an “employer is not obligated to provide an employee the accommodation

he requests or prefers,” only a reasonable accommodation. See Corder v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 162

F.3d 924, 927–28 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that the employer offered the plaintiff a reasonable

accommodation by arranging for a transfer to a different office, where the plaintiff objected to

that office because of a “significantly lengthier commute”).

Finally, Waddle argues that various other facts on the record create disputed issues of

material fact in her case: namely, that the USPS did not follow its reasonable accommodation

procedures and that she is more qualified than the employee who was hired to work in

Bettendorf, Vicky Ratcliff. Mem. Supp. Resistance Mot. Summ. J. 13–14.

To the extent that Waddle is claiming that the USPS is responsible for a breakdown of the

interactive process, “there is no independent cause of action for breakdown of the interactive

process under the [Rehabilitation Act]. . . . Liability arises from these types of allegations only

when the employer's failure to engage in an interactive process resulted in a failure to identify an

appropriate accommodation for the qualified individual.” Igasaki v. Ill. Dep’t of Fin. & Pro.

Regul., 988 F.3d 948, 961 (7th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, because Waddle is

not entitled to an accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act, this claim necessarily fails.

And to the extent that Waddle is alleging a claim of disparate treatment based on

Ratcliff’s hiring, this claim fails, too, for the same reason: Waddle has not shown that she is

disabled under the Rehabilitation Act. Moreover, “[i]f a plaintiff does not apply for a job

vacancy that is posted, he cannot make a prima facie case for unlawful discrimination . . . unless

the plaintiff demonstrates that the employer's discriminatory practices deterred plaintiff from

applying.” Hudson v. Chi. Transit Auth., 375 F.3d 552, 558 (7th Cir. 2004). Here, Waddle

states that Ratcliff, as a non-managerial employee, “did not have the right to be promoted over

[her],” Waddle Aff. ¶ 9, and that she believed it would be “ineffective” for her to apply to

Bettendorf. Mem. Supp. Resistance Mot. Summ. J. 4. These statements do not suggest that

Waddle was deterred from applying based on discriminatory practices at the USPS so much as a

belief that she was entitled to Bettendorf, apparently a coveted position, without application.

Because Waddle has not met her burden of showing she is a qualified individual with a

disability under the Rehabilitation Act, her claims under the Act fail. Therefore, the Court grants

the USPS summary judgment on Waddle’s disability discrimination claim.

b. Title VII Retaliation

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17, prohibits an

employer from “discriminat[ing] against any of his employees . . . because [the employee] has

made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,

or hearing” related to an unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). “To prevail on

a Title VII retaliation claim, the plaintiff must prove that (1) he engaged in an activity protected

by the statute; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal link

between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Lewis v. Wilkie, 909 F.3d 858, 866 (7th

Cir. 2018). At summary judgment, “the dispositive question [is] whether a reasonable jury could

find a but-for causal link between the protected activit[y] and adverse actions at issue.” Burton

v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 851 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Lord v. High

Voltage Software, Inc., 839 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2016) (“A retaliation claim requires proof

that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action because of his statutorily protected

activity[.]”).

With regard to the first element, Waddle clearly engaged in protected activity when she

filed her initial EEO complaint against the two QCP&DF supervisors.8 With regard to the

second, Waddle appears to proffer two adverse employment actions: “Anjeannette Pettinger[’s]

fail[ure] to place her in the open Supervisor Customer Service position in Bettendorf” and “the

delay in returning her to work.” Mem. Supp. Resistance Mot. Summ. J. 15–16.

As an initial matter, the Court is not persuaded that either of these grievances, particularly

the first, constitutes an adverse employment action under Title VII. See Stockett v. Muncie Ind.

Transit Sys., 221 F.3d 997, 1001 (7th Cir. 2000) (“An adverse employment action is a materially

adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment [that is] more disruptive than a mere

inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.” (alteration in original) (quotation marks

omitted)); Haywood v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 323 F.3d 524, 532 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he employee

must be able to show a quantitative or qualitative change in the terms or conditions of

employment.”), overruled on other grounds by Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th

Cir. 2016). There is no indication that the rescission of the Bettendorf offer, if it indeed was

rescinded, materially changed the terms or conditions of Waddle’s employment. See Dandy v.

United Parcel Serv., Inc., 388 F.3d 263, 275 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding an employer’s denial of a

request for a “lateral transfer offering parallel pay, benefits, and responsibilities” was not an

8 That Waddle engaged in protected activity is not in dispute. See Answer ¶ 15, ECF No. 8.

adverse employment action). But because the parties focus on whether Waddle can provide

evidence of a causal link between her initial EEO activity and USPS’s allegedly adverse

responses, the Court will follow their lead and focus on that question.

Circumstantial evidence, such as “(1) suspicious timing; (2) ambiguous statements or

behavior towards other employees in the protected group; (3) evidence, statistical or otherwise,

that similarly situated employees outside of the protected group systematically receive[d] better

treatment; and (4) evidence that the employer offered a pretextual reason for an adverse

employment action,” can support finding a causal link between a protected activity and an

adverse employment action. Rowlands v. United Parcel Serv. – Fort Wayne, 901 F.3d 792, 802

(7th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original). Here, Waddle argues that Pettinger retaliated against her

“[b]ased on [her] knowledge of the pending EEO claims” because Pettinger allegedly revoked

the offer sometime after learning about Waddle’s prior EEO activity. Mem. Supp. Resistance

Mot. Summ. J. 16. But this conclusory allegation is far from sufficient to support any inference

that Pettinger retaliated against Waddle. See Sanchez v. Henderson, 188 F.3d 740, 747 (7th Cir.

1999) (“[M]ere knowledge of the plaintiff's protected activity prior to an adverse employment

action does not establish a retaliatory motive.”).

Nor Waddle has provided evidence that the USPS’s proffered reasons for either adverse

action—the failed Bettendorf transfer or the delay—are pretextual. With regard to Bettendorf,

Pettinger told Waddle that the position would be opened to applications because other employees

had expressed interest in the job. See Jan. 17, 2019 10:37 A.M. Pettinger E-Mail 1. This

rationale should not have come as a surprise to Waddle, because it is consistent with her own

email to Pettinger about the Moline supervisor who wanted to transfer to Bettendorf. See Jan. 7,

2019 1:36 P.M. Waddle E-Mail 1–2. In fact, the desirability of and competition for the

Bettendorf role appears to be precisely why Waddle offered to transfer to Moline instead.

And with regard to the delay, the USPS maintains that was caused by the complex

administrative process needed to facilitate transfers between facilities, as well as inconsistent

communication from Waddle and her attorney. Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 26–27. Waddle

simply asserts that the process should not have taken as long as it did, and argues that she told

Pettinger she could begin work on January 26 in her January 17 email. Mem. Supp. Resistance

Mot. Summ. J. 16–17; see Jan. 17, 2019 2:42 P.M. Waddle E-Mail. But Waddle wrote in that

email not that she would accept the offer, but that she would run it by her attorney for advice on

how to proceed, see id.—and her attorney subsequently emailed Pettinger to reiterate that the

Aledo commute was unacceptable, see Jan. 24, 2019 8:51 A.M. Fieweger E-Mail. As Waddle

and her attorney continued to advocate for Bettendorf, it was understandable for Pettinger to

assume she was no longer interested in Aledo.

But even if Waddle has provided evidence of a delay that could be attributed to the

USPS, she provides no evidence that the delay was because of her prior EEO complaint. Her

allegations perhaps provide evidence of an administrative process that was, at times, rife with

miscommunication and misunderstanding, but nothing on the record even hints at retaliatory

animus. Thus, Waddle has failed to meet her burden on a necessary element. Accordingly, the

Court grants summary judgment for the USPS on Waddle’s retaliation claim.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 16, is GRANTED.

Defendant’s motions to seal documents, ECF No.18, and correct its memorandum of law, ECF

No. 20, are also GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to file the corrected memorandum of law on

the docket. The Clerk is further directed to enter judgment and close the case.

Entered this 29th day of September, 2021.

s/ Sara Darrow

SARA DARROW

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE