Lugg v. Sutton

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ELIZABETH TIMMERMAN LUGG, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 18-cv-1412-JES-JEH

)

LENFORD SUTTON, individually, and in )

his capacity as Chair, Department of )

Education Administration and Foundations )

at Illinois State University, BOARD OF )

TRUSTEES OF ILLINOIS STATE )

UNIVERSITY, an Agency of the )

State of Illinois, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER AND OPINION

This matter is now before the Court on Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 32) for Summary

Judgment. Plaintiff has filed a Response (Doc. 35) and Defendants filed a Reply (Doc. 36).

Plaintiff Elizabeth Timmerman Lugg is an Associate Professor in the department of

Educational Administration and Foundations (“EAF”) who began working at Illinois State

University (“ISU”) in 1996 then became tenured in 2001. Eighteen years after Lugg became a

professor at ISU, Defendant Lenford Sutton was hired as the new Chair of the EAF Department

in 2014. Sutton immediately began making changes to policies, procedures, and structure to

better suit budgetary and student needs. Many faculty members appreciated those changes; Lugg

was not among them. Within months of his arrival, Lugg began making internal complaints

against Sutton including accusations that he, as a black male, discriminated against her and her

student, as white females. Those complaints were investigated by ISU and ultimately declared

unfounded. Similarly here, the Court finds Lugg’s complaints devoid of any merit. While

Professor Lugg may, by her own words, be “entitled,”1 it is Defendants who are entitled to

summary judgment. Thus, for the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff will need to again take her

complaints elsewhere because those alleged here are not actionable in federal court.

BACKGROUND

As indicated above, Plaintiff Lugg is an Associate Professor at ISU in the EAF

Department and Defendant Sutton is the Chair of that Department. Doc. 32, at SOF ¶¶ 9, 12. The

ISU Board of Trustees is also named as a Defendant in this case. Each individual member of the

Board in their official capacity as a member of the Board of Trustees of ISU were previously

named as Defendants.2 In Count I of her Complaint, Lugg alleges Sutton retaliated against her in

violation of the Illinois Ethics Act (“Ethics Act”), 5 ILCS 430/15-10, after she complained of age

and gender discrimination and assisted with a Title IX claim. Doc. 1-1, at 12-15. In Count II,

Lugg alleges the Board also retaliated against her in violation of the Ethics Act. In Counts III and

IV, she alleges the Board and the Board members discriminated and retaliated against her

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 18-24.

On December 31, 2018, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, which the Court granted

in part and denied in part. See Docs. 5, 8. The Court held Lugg may proceed on Count I against

Sutton in his individual and official capacities, on Count II against the Board, and on Counts III

and IV against the Board only. Doc. 8, at 12. The Court dismissed Counts III and IV against the

individuals Board members because “Plaintiff fail[ed] to allege that the Board members were

involved in the alleged discrimination or retaliation or that they were even aware of it.” Id. at 10.

1 See Plaintiff’s Response, Doc. 35, at 12.

2 Defendants Robert Churney, Robert Dobski, Rocco Donahue, Julie Annette Jones, Mary Ann Louderback, John

Rauschenberger, Sharon Rossmark, and Sarah Aguilar were dismissed on February 20, 2019. Doc. 8, at 12.

Before discussing the undisputed facts, the Court makes the following admonition to

Plaintiff. Simply put, the response section to Defendants’ proposed material facts is no place for

argument or pointing out other facts to explain away the proposed fact. That is the purpose of the

argument section or additional material facts section. For example, see Plaintiff’s four-page

response to SOF ¶ 23 that includes pure argument and facts completely divorced from the

proposed fact that Sutton, in his role as Chair, reviewed budgets and financial documents when

he began working at ISU. Doc. 35, at 14-18. The first line of Plaintiff’s Response represents that

she has complied with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Local Rule 7, then later dedicates

an entire section to reminding the Court of the federal rules and local rules (from another

district). See id. at 3, 8-9. Yet, the Court finds numerous deficiencies in Plaintiff’s Response.

As the Court has informed parties in previous cases,

While strict, the requirements imposed on the parties by Rule 56 and Local Rule

7.1(D) are not meant to be punitive. “Rather, they are intended to alert the court to

precisely what factual questions are in dispute and point the court to the specific

evidence in the record that supports a party’s position on each of these questions.

They are, in short, roadmaps, and without them the court should not have to proceed

further, regardless of how readily it might be able to distill the relevant information

from the record on its own.” Waldridge, 24 F.3d at 923. Thus, strict compliance with

these rules is necessitated because of the very efficiency concerns Plaintiff identifies

in the argument section of [her] brief.

McMahon v. Dunlap Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 323, 274 F. Supp. 3d 836, 842–43 (C.D. Ill. 2017).

Local Rule 7.1(D)(2)(a) states a response to a motion for summary judgment must

include an introduction that briefly summarizes the legal and factual basis for opposition to the

motion without citations. Instead, Plaintiff spends six pages marshalling through her argument of

the facts by way of lengthy block quotes and citations to her Complaint, deposition testimony,

and exhibits. While the Court may generally overlook an introduction that is a bit lengthy,

Plaintiff’s disregard for the local rules continues. Local Rule 7.1(D)(2)(b) provides that a

response to the motion must also state, in separate subsections: undisputed material facts,

disputed material facts, disputed immaterial facts, undisputed immaterial facts, and additional

material facts. As indicated in the voluminous footnotes below, Plaintiff often failed to

distinguish between disputed material facts and undisputed immaterial facts through

unresponsive and argumentative responses that do not actually dispute the proposed fact. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e)(2) provides that when a party fails to properly address another party’s assertion of

fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may, inter alia, “consider the fact undisputed for the

purposes of the motion.” Likewise, Local Rule 7.1(D)(2)(b)(6) cautions, “[a] failure to respond

to any numbered fact will be deemed an admission of the fact.” Id. Argumentative responses that

simultaneously deny the veracity of a defendant’s proposed material fact and present separate,

additional facts risk the possibility that the Court will consider defendant’s proposed fact as

undisputed. See e.g., Ciomber v. Coop. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 643–44 (7th Cir. 2008).

Plaintiff’s blatant disregard for summary judgment rules is not well-taken. Her failure to

follow these requirements resulted in her response to material facts and additional facts sections

spanning nearly 80 pages. To the extent Plaintiff responded to Defendants’ proposed material

facts with additional facts that were unresponsive to the proposed facts, the Court disregarded

those additional facts, unless Plaintiff added them to her “Additional Material Facts” section for

Defendants to respond. But Plaintiff generally has not done so. Plaintiff also committed other

errors she accuses Defendants of, such as, “[i]t is inappropriate to make legal arguments in a

Rule 56.1 statement of facts[,]” and “a party’s statement of material facts submitted pursuant to

Local Rule 56.1 is improper where it fails to cite to the record and is ‘filled with irrelevant

information, legal arguments, and conjecture.’” Doc. 35, at 9 (citing Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d

1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 2006); Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini–Hohberger Dhimantec, 529

F.3d 371, 382 n. 2 (7th Cir. 2008)). Plaintiff further points out, “[a]n affidavit or declaration used

to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be

admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the

matters stated.” Id. at 8. Yet, her Response is replete with facts attested to in affidavits that are

clearly not within the knowledge of the affiant, such as some of her own statements and quotes

from Professor Diane Dean and students, which the Court later discusses.

1. Sutton’s Arrival and Changes to the EAF

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed. ISU’s College of Education is

comprised of several departments including the EAF, which focuses on preparing people of

diverse backgrounds for leadership roles in education. Doc. 32, SOF ¶¶ 4-5.3 In the EAF

Department, Lugg is a member of the Pre-kindergarten through Grade 12 Education (“P-12”)

tenure line. SOF ¶¶ 10-11.4 EAF programs are offered to undergraduate, masters, and doctorate

level students. SOF ¶¶ 5, 10. ISU, like many universities, hires adjuncts to teach courses. SOF ¶

132.5 Sutton was hired as the Chair of EAF in July 2014. SOF ¶ 12. Based on statements made

during his 2014 interview for the Chair position and based on what he learned immediately upon

starting as Chair, Sutton understood that prior to his hire, there were issues in the EAF related to

leadership, lack of structure, and interpersonal/conflict issues among faculty, and students were

sometimes aware of or even participants in conflict between faculty members. SOF ¶¶ 20-21.6

3 Unless otherwise indicated, the Court takes the undisputed facts from Defendants’ Motion at Doc. 32, cited as SOF

¶ ___.

4 Plaintiff disputes SOF ¶ 10 but based on her Response and deposition, she does not dispute her status as a P-12

member.

5 Plaintiff does not dispute that ISU and other universities regularly engage in this practice, but disputes SOF ¶ 132

on the basis that “adjuncts were hired disproportionately to replace plaintiff.” As discussed later, Plaintiff fails to

offer evidence of this disproportion.

6 Plaintiff denies on grounds of hearsay. However, the specific statements are not being offered but rather a

generalization of Sutton’s perception of the Department at the time of his arrival. They are not offered for their truth

to prove these issues occurred but rather their effect on Sutton and how they factored into his decision-making,

which is directly at issue. Thus, SOF ¶¶ 20-21 are undisputed.

In September 2014, Sutton began working on and reviewing various aspects of the EAF

Department. He started working with EAF faculty members to update the independent study

policies and procedures to ensure that they were only used to supplement existing course

offerings or to assist with transitioning EAF to a cohort model (ultimately implemented in Fall

2015). SOF ¶ 68.7 In 2014, Sutton started working with EAF faculty to develop corporate

governance rules as well. SOF ¶ 32. He also asked Lugg on December 30, 2014, to review

“vitas” from potential adjunct professors (non-tenured track “NTT”) who would teach some EAF

courses. SOF ¶ 134. Lugg responded with a few comments on the vitas and asked why there was

a call out for adjuncts to teach law. SOF ¶ 135 (citing Ex. 24). Sutton answered that there was not

an official call out yet and the two agreed to meet further about the topic. Doc. 32-3, at 18. Lugg

had, with some frequency, taught law related EAF courses. SOF ¶ 10.8

As Chair, Sutton has full discretion, based on student and Department needs, to assign

classes to faculty members. SOF ¶ 13. Summer courses are offered and assigned by the EAF

Chair based on student needs. SOF ¶ 17.9 Teaching a “full load” generally means the faculty

member taught two courses in the fall semester and two courses in the spring semester. SOF ¶

14.10 If a faculty member teaches more than two courses during a fall or spring semester or

teaches a course in the summer, the each extra courses are considered an “overload” for which

7 Plaintiff only disputes that the independent studies policy was not changed until July 2016, therefore, SOF ¶ 68 is

undisputed.

8 Plaintiff disputes the characterization that she “often teaches law-related class” on the basis that “she is the only

professor who was hired to teach law class.” Doc. 35, at 12. She does not provide a frequency with which she taught

these law courses or even allege that she is the only professor who has ever taught these courses. Additionally, since

she does not allege that she makes hiring decisions, it is unclear how it would be within her personal knowledge that

no other professor has ever been hired to teach law classes. Regardless, the above statement is undisputed.

9 Plaintiff disputes this fact solely on the basis that “[t]here is no way to know why the chair assigns summer

teaching.” Doc. 35, at 13. However, because Sutton is the Chair, this would be within his knowledge and Plaintiff

already agreed based on her response to SOF ¶ 13 that the Chair has full discretion to do this “based on student and

department needs.” Thus, SOF ¶ 17 is considered undisputed.

10 Plaintiff disputes SOF ¶ 14 only to the extent she asserts professors are required to teach 3 courses per semester

and one is waived for work on dissertations. She then proceeds to provide a lengthy quote about “entitlement” which

has no bearing on this disputed fact. She does not dispute the definition of a “full load.”

they receive additional compensation. SOF ¶¶ 15, 18. Except for when she was on sabbatical,

Lugg has never taught fewer than two courses during any fall or spring semester. SOF ¶ 19.

In Fall 2014, Sutton also placed a moratorium on independent studies so that he could

study the policy and procedures before making any changes. SOF ¶ 34. EAF faculty members do

not receive monetary compensation for independent studies. SOF ¶ 73. However, during her

deposition, Lugg claimed that previous department chairs allowed the combination of

independent studies to form a single, compensable class. SOF ¶ 67. But Sutton has not allowed

any faculty member to receive compensation by combining independent study students to make a

single, compensable course. SOF ¶ 71. Therefore, he denied Lugg’s request to do so. SOF ¶ 70.

After a majority vote by EAF faculty, Sutton later transitioned all or a portion of the EAF

to a cohort model for student enrollment. SOF ¶ 35.11 The cohort model requires that EAF

students be admitted and cycled through their predetermined courses as a group and at the same

pace, as opposed to choosing and taking classes individually and at their own pace. Id. Under the

model, Sutton did not want independent studies offered on the same subjects the cohort was

being taught in the traditional classroom setting. SOF ¶¶ 37, 68.12 Initially, the change to a cohort

model resulted in a decrease in course offerings. SOF ¶ 38; Doc. 35, at 24. Additionally, a new

doctoral degree for “Leadership for Equity and Inquiry” was added. SOF ¶ 39; Doc. 35, at 25.13

Additionally, Sutton reviewed the Department’s budget and financial documents upon his

arrival at ISU in 2014 and learned that Lugg had been receiving compensation for editing the

11 Plaintiff disputes this fact on the basis that “EAF moved to a cohort only model but it was just for higher

education, not P12 and not for master’s classes in both higher education and P12.” Doc. 35, at 22. Therefore, the

Court uses the phrase “all or some.”

12 Plaintiff only disputes SOF ¶ 37 on the basis that “Sutton approved independent studies for some and not others

with no explanation.” Doc. 35, at 23. She does not dispute his reasoning as it relates to independent studies and the

cohort model, therefore, the above is undisputed.

13 Plaintiff does not contest that this new degree was added, rather, she disputes how it was added and whether it

required increasing the number of foundation courses that were taught. Plaintiff also takes issue with the fact that

Sutton “scheduled Foundations classes in the summer when plaintiff used to teach.” Doc. 35, at 25.

Illinois State Education Law and Policy Journal. SOF ¶ 184.14 However, there is no written

evidence of Lugg being entitled to compensation for the journal or having a ten-month contract.

SOF ¶ 183.15 Sutton also learned that no other faculty member was receiving monetary

compensation for editorial service; rather, they were given course releases, meaning they are

required to teach one fewer course in exchange for work on a publication. SOF ¶ 185.16 During

his deposition, Sutton testified that in 2014, he told Lugg that he was going to revisit the

compensation levels of the journal because she was the only faculty member receiving monetary

compensation for a journal. SOF ¶ 186.17

2. Spring 2015

On February 24, 2015, Sutton told Lugg that he was reducing the budget for the journal

because: “[b]udget decisions are based on the investment of resources that will have the greatest

return for the academic unit. For that reason, a number of longstanding items in EAF will be

adjusted away from antiquated rationale for spending.” SOF ¶ 187. In his deposition, Sutton

testified that he made this decision so that his decisions relating to faculty pay were fair for all

14 Plaintiff disputes this but fails to offer any evidence negating Sutton’s knowledge other than her statement that she

“has insufficient knowledge to confirm or deny.” However, “the nonmovant in a summary judgment action may not

rest on general denials or lack of knowledge in his pleadings to contest the movant’s evidence.” Bank Leumi Le-

Israel, B.M. v. Lee, 928 F.2d 232, 237 (7th Cir. 1991). Further, Plaintiff concedes and vehemently argues that she

was receiving compensation for her work on this journal. Thus, SOF ¶ 184 is undisputed.

15 SOF ¶ 183 is undisputed to the extent Plaintiff concedes there was no written agreement. Instead, she claims she

was paid every year on these terms but does not provide additional evidence of her pay.

16 Again, Plaintiff disputes this but fails to offer any evidence negating Sutton’s knowledge other than her statement

that she “has no knowledge how others are compensated.” See Bank Leumi Le-Israel, B.M., 928 F.2d at 237. For

example, Plaintiff could have pointed to even just one other person that received compensation in an effort to

potentially rebut this fact, but she did not. Additionally, Plaintiff later concedes in response to SOF ¶ 197 that she

recalled “Sutton telling her the others received a course release.” Doc. 35, at 65. Thus, SOF ¶ 185 is undisputed.

17 Here, Plaintiff disputes this statement but does not even cite to her own affidavit, or anything, for support that he

did not say this. “[F]lat denials, without reference to supporting materials, have no standing under the local rule.”

Kibler v. United States, 46 F. Supp. 3d 844, 849 (C.D. Ill. 2014). Thus, this fact is undisputed. Instead, Plaintiff

makes a non-responsive remark regurgitating the timing of Sutton’s email regarding the journal a year later, which is

another basis for deeming this fact undisputed. See also Doc. 36, at 23 (highlighting Plaintiff’s improper “disputes”).

faculty. SOF ¶ 188.18 On June 11, 2015, Sutton sent another e-mail to Plaintiff informing her that

there would be “no expenditures for the policy and law online journal for next year. All full time

faculty are returning to EAF next, therefore there will be little or no variance money to support

this effort.” Doc. 35, Plaintiff’s SOF ¶ 15 (citing Ex. 4).19 Sutton later testified that the journal

was being funded with variance money, which is money remaining with the Department because

faculty are on leave from the university. Doc. 32, SOF ¶ 190.20 He also testified that the Dean of

the College of Education directed him to spend all variance money exclusively on instruction and

to be cautious about costs. SOF ¶¶ 192-93.21 A few months later, Sutton paid Lugg $6,000 to co-

author a report relating to the redesign of the superintendent endorsement. SOF ¶ 194.

As of Spring 2015, multiple faculty members including Lugg, Beth Hatt, and Otto

(according to Lugg) had been teaching different iterations of the EAF 512 course number. SOF

¶¶ 52-53.22 It was a “catch-all general methodology course.” Doc. 35, at 26 (citing Lugg. Dep.

141:11-141:15). Around that same time, Sutton was trying to decide which iteration of EAF 512

to move forward with in the EAF program. SOF ¶ 54.23 To assist, he began asking faculty

18 Plaintiff marks SOF ¶ 188 as disputed but does not dispute that Sutton made this testimony, rather, she argues it is

up to the trier of fact to decide what his actual motivations were and how “fair” he was being. Argument is meant for

the argument section. Plaintiff could have addressed this in the burden-shifting framework where she can rebut

Defendants’ evidence, not here, where the purpose is to streamline the disputes of fact. Thus, SOF ¶ 188 is

undisputed to the extent that this was his testimony.

19 The Court has added the second sentence in the email for completeness based on Plaintiff’s citation to this page.

20 Here, Plaintiff disputes this statement but does not even cite to her own affidavit, or anything, for support. “[F]lat

denials, without reference to supporting materials, have no standing under the local rule.” Kibler, 46 F. Supp. 3d at

849. Thus, this fact is undisputed. Instead, Plaintiff makes a non-responsive remark regurgitating the timing on

Sutton’s email regarding the journal a year later, which is another basis for deeming this fact undisputed.

21 Undisputed based on the same as noted in the above footnote. Plaintiff makes another unresponsive remark that

Sutton could pay $35,000 for new positions he had created, such as program coordinators, but does not support that

notion with evidence and it is unclear how this would be within her personal knowledge. She also failed to include

this fact in her additional material facts section.

22 Plaintiff disputes the exact number of faculty that were teaching iterations, however, the word “multiple”

encompasses both Parties’ description of this fact.

23 Plaintiff does not dispute that Sutton was trying to decide which iteration of EAF 512 to use, but she disputes that

a change to EAF 512 was needed.

members in February 2015 to send him their EAF 512 syllabi for review. SOF ¶ 55.24 Lugg was

among the faculty members who was offering an iteration of EAF 512. SOF ¶ 57.

On April 21, 2015, Sutton again emailed Lugg asking her to forward him a copy of her

current syllabus and textbook for EAF 512. SOF ¶ 58 (citing Ex. 12).25 Lugg responded that she

was not using a textbook because “[l]egal research is [her] brain.” She also stated, “[a]s I was

taught, the teacher is in charge of the instruction and uses a textbook ONLY if necessary, to

enhance that instruction. Teachers who rely on or march through textbooks are not teaching.”

SOF ¶ 59. Sutton responded that he disagreed with Lugg’s description of teachers who depend

on textbooks. SOF ¶ 60. Lugg retorted, “[t]ake it up with the professors at the University of Iowa

College of Education, one of the top colleges of education in the U.S. Just telling you what I was

taught and what has rung true in my personal experience,” to which Sutton responded, “[t]hose

rankings are a joke!” SOF ¶¶ 61-62. During that spring, Sutton also stated to faculty members: “I

strongly urge research faculty to begin developing a new version of this offering using all

resources available to EAF.” SOF ¶ 56 (citing Ex. 11). Ultimately, after reviewing the syllabi and

course outlines, Sutton and a committee decided that the iteration of 512 offered by Erika Hunt

and Lisa Hood was best for the program. Id.26; see Doc. 32-2, at 11-37 (collecting syllabi).

24 Based on other evidence submitted, it appears Sutton began asking for syllabi at least as early as February 2015.

Doc. 36-1, at 2. Lugg denies SOF ¶ 55 because “Dr. Sutton specifically asked Hunt and Hood to submit a proposed

syllabus even though they were not teaching EAF 512 in any iteration.” Doc. 35, at 27. Thus, Lugg does not deny

that she and other professors teaching the course were asked to submit syllabi, but rather adds that other professors

who did not teach the iteration were asked to submit as well. Therefore, ¶ 55 is undisputed. Lugg should have added

that additional fact to her section of material facts rather than inappropriately characterizing ¶ 55 as disputed.

25 For context, by the Court’s review of these cited pages, the email chain began on April 15, 2015, when Lugg

emailed because “Len wanted to set up a meeting next week.”

26 Plaintiff disputes SOF ¶ 63, but it appears to only be on the basis that she believes she was best qualified to teach

EAF 512. It is unclear what the content of the course ultimately became considering there were different iterations

of it and if so, how Hunt and Hood were not qualified to teach it. Qualifications for Plaintiff’s specific iteration of

the course do not speak to whether Sutton and the committee believed a different course iteration was “best for the

program.” Thus, the above portion of this fact is appropriately considered undisputed. Plaintiff then provides a long

soliloquy from her deposition about how her reputation was hurt (without factual support) that is unresponsive to the

fact proposed. Therefore, that unresponsive portion is disregarded.

On April 17, 2015, B.G., an EAF doctoral student, met with Michael Shane McCreery,

ISU’s former Director of the Office of Equal Opportunity, Ethics, and Access (“OEOEA”), Title

IX Coordinator, ADA Coordinator, and Ethics Officer regarding her complaint that Sutton was

discriminating against B.G. based on her gender and race, as a white female. SOF ¶ 42; Doc. 32,

Ex. 10. Lugg, who was B.G.’s academic advisor, attended that meeting and served as a witness in

support of B.G.’s complaint. SOF ¶¶ 42-43. Three days later, B.G. filed her formal complaint

with the OEOEA alleging that Sutton discriminated against her based on her sex and color by

denying her requests for certain course and tuition waivers and by denying her independent study

proposal for the Spring of 2015. SOF ¶ 45. In April 2015, Sutton became aware of the Title IX

discrimination complaint against him and believed that Lugg was serving as a witness to the

complaint. Doc. 35, Plaintiff’s SOF ¶¶ 3-4.

On June 11, 2015, McCreery sent a formal “Notice to Respondent” letter to Sutton

regarding B.G.’s complaint. Doc. 32, at SOF ¶ 46. The notice informed Sutton that ISU’s Anti-

Harassment and Non-Discrimination policy prohibits retaliation against a complainant or those

who are asked to cooperate in an ongoing OEOEA investigation. SOF ¶ 47. The OEOEA

ultimately found there was insufficient evidence, based on the preponderance of the evidence

standard, to conclude that Sutton violated ISU’s Anti-Harassment and Non-Discrimination policy

by discriminating against B.G. on the basis of her sex/gender or race/color. SOF ¶ 48. On June

25, 2015, Plaintiff also filed requests for a Title IX investigation of gender discrimination and

retaliation. Doc. 35, Plaintiff’s SOF ¶ 17.27

27 Defendants dispute Plaintiff’s additional material SOF ¶ 17 on the basis that “[t]he party opposing summary

judgment may not rely on the allegations contained in the pleading” and Plaintiff merely cites her Complaint as

evidence that she filed formal complaints. Doc. 36, at 19. While the Court agrees a party cannot merely rely on her

Complaint as evidence, Defendants later concede that Plaintiff’s “internal informal and formal sex discrimination

complaint beginning around June 2015” was a protected activity for the purposes of this Motion. Therefore, this fact

is undisputed. At the same time, the Court can also consider the lack of evidence offered regarding those internal

complaints.

3. Summer 2015

The EAF Chair’s Advisory Council (“CAC”) is comprised of faculty members, elected to

three-year terms, from areas of concentration within the EAF, including Foundations, Higher

Education, P-12, and Research. Doc. 32, SOF ¶ 81. The CAC’s work is facilitated by the

Department Chair. SOF ¶ 82. Its duties include the following: reviewing and updating the EAF

governance document; reviewing, critiquing, updating, and revising the Department’s course

content and programs regularly; reviewing curriculum course numbers, rotations, academic

content, learning outcomes, assessment, course design and redesign, and university catalogs; and

reviewing teaching schedules, course rotations, teaching assignments, and approving

independent study requests. SOF ¶ 83. In 2015, a decision was made to have Hatt, who was also

an EAF faculty member, co-teach EAF 436 (Leadership for Diverse Learning Needs) with Lugg.

SOF ¶ 84.28 During the Summer of 2015, Lugg and Hatt did co-teach EAF 436. SOF ¶ 88.29

Lugg’s compensation was not affected by the fact that she co-taught EAF 436 with Hatt because

Sutton exercised his discretion to provide Lugg her full pay, rather than half. SOF ¶¶ 85, 87.

On July 9, 2015, the Director of ISU’s Center for Teaching, Learning, and Technology,

Dr. Claire Lamonica, conducted a small group instructional diagnosis with students in the EAF

Principal Preparation Program Cohort 2. SOF ¶ 90 (citing Ex. 16). At the time, the students in

this cohort were taking the co-taught EAF 436 course. Id. In the diagnosis, the students identified

28 Plaintiff disputes whether it was Sutton or CAC who made the decision that the course be co-taught but does not

dispute that a decision was made. Doc. 35, at 34.

29 SOF ¶ 88 is another example of an unnecessary objection by Plaintiff. Plaintiff objects to use of the term “co-

teach,” because she claims, “Plaintiff tried to teach her course in the half the time in the mornings and Hatt taught

her class in the afternoon.” Doc. 35, at 35. However, this objection contradicts Plaintiff’s repeated admission in

other SOFs that the two “co-taught” EAF 436. See e.g. id. (“Plaintiff denies that she was angered that she had to co-

teach as she has co-taught many courses before”). Plaintiff also failed to dispute other SOFs that used the term “co-

teach.” See SOF ¶¶ 85, 90. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s Response undercuts her argument that being assigned to co-teach

was an adverse action where she admits she has co-taught before. Likewise, it appears EAF 512 was ultimately co-

taught as well. See Doc. 32-2, at 26; SOF ¶ 63.

several aspects of the course that hindered their efforts to succeed, including divisiveness among

faculty; inconsistent practices and expectations from Lugg and Hatt, which was exacerbated by

their divisiveness; and a lack of instructors with practical experience as members of K-12

administrative teams. SOF ¶ 91.30 After reviewing the findings from this diagnosis, and

consulting with the CAC, Sutton decided not to assign this course to Lugg or Hatt going forward.

SOF ¶¶ 92, 141.31

4. Fall 2015

The cohort model was implemented in Fall 2015. SOF ¶ 95.32 Lugg was on sabbatical

during Fall 2015, and she claims33 she was retaliated against because less qualified and

underqualified individuals were hired to teach her classes “even though past precedent for other

faculty was to rearrange schedules so that courses could be taught by tenure line faculty.” SOF ¶

94. Under the cohort model, the EAF has never revised any course schedules to accommodate

any faculty member’s sabbatical, and non-tenured track faculty or adjunct faculty have been

retained to teach courses normally taught by faculty who are on sabbatical. SOF ¶¶ 96-97.34

30 Plaintiff disputes SOF ¶ 91. In reviewing her dispute, she does not dispute Exhibit 16 which is summarized in

SOF ¶ 91, rather, she disputes the reasoning behind the students’ frustration. Plaintiff further states that her course

reviews for the course were excellent but fails to provide any of them as exhibits. Even if her evaluations were

stellar, that does not change the fact that students clearly took issue with how Sutton and Hatt worked together to

“co-teach.” In sum, SOF ¶ 91 is properly characterized as undisputed—Exhibit 16 speaks for itself and portions of it

appear to be accurately summarized in SOF ¶ 91.

31 Plaintiff does not dispute this portion of SOF ¶ 92. Therefore, this fact is considered undisputed.

32 Plaintiff lists SOF ¶ 95 as a disputed material fact but proceeds to simply argue the cohort model is immaterial for

scheduling specific classes. She does not dispute the implementation date of the cohort model, which is the only fact

listed in SOF ¶ 95. This fact should have been categorized as “undisputed and immaterial” for the reasons stated in

Plaintiff’s Response. Because Plaintiff does not dispute that the cohort model was in fact implemented in Fall 2015,

the Court considers this fact undisputed.

33 Plaintiff appears to have dropped this theory of discrimination related to how ISU scheduled courses while she

was on sabbatical as she does not discuss it in the argument section of her Response.

34 Plaintiff disputes these SOFs and indicates these were done a year or two years prior, for other another unnamed

faculty member. However, this response fails to account for the fact that these facts were prefaced with the time

frame “under the cohort model,” which was undisputedly implemented in Fall 2015. Thus, Plaintiff’s response is

unresponsive and disregarded as she would need to address Fall 2015 onward. Moreover, based on Plaintiff’s

response, she may be referring to a time before Sutton was even hired at ISU and the focus of this lawsuit is on his

actions and alleged retaliation, so the Court fails to see the relevance of how things were previously run unless

Plaintiff is alleging that she was singled out in a policy change. She fails to do that.

Lugg’s compensation was not affected by the identities or qualifications of those hired to teach

EAF courses while she was on sabbatical. SOF ¶ 98.

While Lugg was on sabbatical, she filed an ethics complaint on November 30, 2015 with

McCreery about an EAF faculty member, Zeng Lin, who was allegedly working at both ISU and

another university in China in violation of the state ethics law. SOF ¶ 99 (citing Ex. 17). Lugg

believed Sutton was involved in Lin’s violation because Sutton assigned him classes even though

he knew that Lin would be in China. SOF ¶ 100. Sutton disclaims any knowledge as to whether

or not Lin was employed by the university in China. SOF ¶ 101.35 Upon her return from

sabbatical, Lugg taught both EAF 548 and EAF 466 during Spring 2016. SOF ¶ 103.36

5. Spring and Summer 2016

In late 2015, copies of a document were circulated37 around ISU’s campus relating to a

disciplinary issue that Sutton was involved in 15 years prior to him working at ISU. SOF ¶ 105.

On January 6, 2016, Sutton sent an e-mail addressed to the EAF Department stating:

Colleagues I need to hold an emergency meeting tomorrow morning @ 11 am

concerning the budget, summer school courses, and pending personnel changes in

EAF. Given the personnel information, call-ins will not be allowed. I know this is

short notice colleagues, but it’s extremely important that I speak to you all together

ASAP. Please let me know if you are able to attend.

Doc. 35, Plaintiff’s SOF ¶ 18. The Parties differ in their accounts of the exact words stated in this

meeting and the overall purpose for the meeting but agree that the meeting did occur, the

35 Plaintiff disputes this fact then admits that she cannot respond to what was within Sutton’s knowledge, then

proceeds to add additional facts to make an inferential leap that he knew. These facts should have been included in

her additional facts section but were not. Therefore, the Court disregards them and considers SOF ¶ 101 undisputed.

36 Plaintiff disputes this fact then points the Court to her response to SOF ¶ 102, which then points the Court to her

response to SOF ¶ 76, which includes a chart Plaintiff prepared. However, that chart states exactly what Defendants

stated—Lugg taught EAF 466 and 548. Thus, it is Plaintiff who is confused, and this fact is undisputed by Plaintiff’s

own admission. See Doc. 35, at 38 (citing Id. at 30, 38). Moreover, Plaintiff does not list any courses that she

“should have taught as an overload” in Spring 2016 or include the chart in her additional facts section.

37 Plaintiff disputes the use of the word “circulated” then contradicts her own dispute by pointing to deposition

testimony discussing multiple outlets where the copies were shared. Thus, this fact is undisputed.

circulation of the document was a topic of discussion, and Sutton was upset.38 One week later,

EAF faculty and staff members sent a letter to ISU President Larry Dietz regarding the

circulation. Doc. 32, at SOF ¶ 109 (citing Ex. 19). In part, the letter to Dietz stated, “[f]inally, we

emphatically state our support of Dr. Sutton, who has consistently acted with the highest level of

integrity and whose talented and unflagging leadership has improved the Department

dramatically, benefiting students, faculty members, and the campus community.” SOF ¶ 110. The

only EAF faculty members who did not sign the letter were Lugg, Dean, and Lin, who was out of

the country at the time. SOF ¶ 111. Following the circulation, Sutton sent a formal complaint to

the Vice-Chair on March 31, 2016, asserting claims against Lugg and Dean for their alleged

involvement in the incident in violation of the ethics code. Doc. 35, Plaintiff’s SOF ¶¶ 28-30.

That same spring, Dietz requested that Pamela Heatlie conduct a climate assessment in

the EAF about how the Department was operating, including an overall understanding of what

was working well, what areas may need improvement, and whether there were overarching

discrimination or harassment concerns. Doc. 32, SOF ¶ 112.39 The climate assessment was

completed on May 13, 2016 and included the following remarks:

Most faculty and staff indicated that prior to Dr. Sutton’s arrival, department chairs

seemed to make private arrangements with individual faculty members that

operated to that individual faculty member’s benefit (e.g., course releases, summer

course assignments, other paid assignments, etc.)

* * *

Many faculty indicated that it was their opinion that [Lugg] “bullied” the

department chairs and, as a result, benefitted from special arrangements or

opportunities that other faculty weren’t even aware existed. As a result, the same

advantages reportedly were believed to have gone to the same faculty member year

over year.

38 The Court further discusses the contents of this meeting in the discussion section of this Opinion and why the

actual words are not material.

39 Plaintiff disputes the reason for hiring Pamela Heatlie (including whether it was because of the letter that

circulated) and what her title was, but she does not dispute that the climate assessment occurred or its purpose.

Therefore, this portion of SOF ¶ 112 is undisputed. Notably, the assessment specifically stated that it was requested

by Dietz in February 2016 because of the January 2016 letter from faculty raising concerns of racial hostility in the

EAF department and the anonymous distribution of the document related to Sutton.

* * *

Dr. Sutton is credited with a new level of transparency and information sharing so

that all department faculty are aware of available opportunities. He also uses faculty

committees to provide advice on course assignments and other department matters,

although he retains final decision-making authority.

* * *

Dr. Sutton is also widely credited with creating an environment in which all faculty

are treated with equal respect, including foundations which was previously seen or

made to feel as though they had or offered less value to the department.

* * *

As much as most faculty admire the positive change Dr. Sutton has brought to EAF,

they indicated that they are aggravated by behaviors of their colleague Professor

Betsy Lugg. Professor Lugg is not necessarily disliked on a personal level, but her

colleagues are frustrated at her unwillingness to accept change, to accept and

implement decisions that they make as a faculty (including curriculum), and what

in their opinion is a willingness to act intentionally (either directly or through

others, such as students) to cause personal or professional harm to her colleagues

in order to influence events or otherwise obtain her goals.

* * *

Faculty and staff indicate their belief that Professor Lugg’s behavior has been a

long-standing problem, with many describing it as “toxic” or “bullying.”

* * *

[Lugg] is reportedly so difficult to work with or faculty are so worried about falling

into disfavor with her because she will “go after” them, that they either avoid her

or find indirect ways of conducting work so that she will no know of their

involvement.

SOF ¶¶ 113-121 (citing Ex. 21).40

During Summer 2016, Lugg taught EAF 586 (Administration of HR). SOF ¶ 125. The

only class that she was not assigned to teach that she had taught in the past was EAF 436, which

Sutton did not assign her due to the co-teaching experience in Summer 2015. SOF ¶ 126.

6. 2017 Performance Issues and the DFSC

The Department Faculty Status Committee (“DFSC”) is an EAF committee that evaluates

faculty members’ performances. SOF ¶ 154. It is comprised of a Chair and faculty members who

40 Plaintiff lists SOF ¶¶ 113-121 as “undisputed immaterial facts” but also lists them as disputed material facts. In

her disputed facts section, Plaintiff, without argument, objects on grounds of hearsay within hearsay. Regardless of

whether Plaintiff disputes these paragraphs or not, Exhibit 21 and the statements in it are being offered to show Lugg

was not performing as expected and support a non-retaliatory reason for some of Defendants’ actions such as policy

changes and the basis for concerns regarding Lugg’s performance. Doc. 32, at 50. Therefore, Plaintiff objection is

overruled. However, the Court does not find SOF ¶ 114 to fit this purpose, therefore it is disregarded.

are elected by EAF faculty members to two-year terms. Id. Sutton is the Chair of the DFSC. Id.

On January 31, 2017, the DFSC sent Lugg her annual performance review for 2016, which was

prepared by DFSC members Sutton, Eckrich, Evans-Winters, Renn, and Nur-Awaleh. SOF ¶ 175

(citing Ex. 32). The DFSC stated,

[T]he DFSC believes it is vital that students not be immersed within department

politics, conflicts, or disagreements. More specifically, making or sharing

negative comments about one another with students or using students in an

effort to promote personal and competitive agenda’s [sic] regarding other

faculty is a clear violation . . . As a way to ensure that our community maintains

its values, members of the academic community are expected to behave responsibly

and to treat colleagues fairly, with respect, civility, and decency. In so doing, they

should refrain from making rash statements in criticism of coworkers, from

ascribing unworthy motives to them, and from spreading malicious gossip. Faculty

and staff should refrain at all times from making derogatory comments about their

colleagues when students are present.

SOF ¶ 176-177 (citing Illinois State University Policy & Procedures, 1.17a: Professional

Relationships) (emphasis in original). The DFSC also reminded Lugg that further violations of

this policy could result in disciplinary action. SOF ¶ 178.

On March 31, 2017, Phyllis McCluskey-Titus sent an email to Sutton stating in part,

Given the unworkable situation in our department and the Higher Education

program with two faculty members, Betsy Lugg and Diane Dean, it is impossible

to have any positive effect on the important work we need to do around curriculum

development, or dissertation and doctoral exam work. Their continual lack of

cooperation and disruption of meetings, disregard for established processes, talking

negatively about other faculty in the department to students, bullying faculty,

students, and administrators to get what they want, and making exceptions for some

students to the detriment of the program has brought tension and stress within the

department . . . for self-preservation, I will not attend or participate in Higher

Education doctoral program meetings.

SOF ¶¶ 157-158.41 Around this time, several other faculty members sent Sutton emails stating

that they were not willing to work with Lugg on dissertation committees that she chairs. SOF ¶

41 Plaintiff does not dispute that this email was sent but rather argues it was sent a few days after she had an

altercation with another faculty member. Because this “dispute” is non-responsive to the fact proposed, SOF ¶¶ 157-

58 are undisputed.

156 (citing Ex. 27).42 For context, after a student passes a comprehensive exam measuring the

student’s competency, then the student moves into the dissertation phase of the degree. SOF ¶ 7.

While in the dissertation phase, the student works with a committee of EAF faculty members.

SOF ¶ 8. EAF faculty are generally expected to serve on dissertation committees. SOF ¶ 173.43

The committee’s duties include assessing the student’s dissertation proposal, determining

whether the proposed work is sufficient for a dissertation, and evaluating the final dissertation

defense in determining whether to grant the student their PhD. SOF ¶ 8. Although the Parties

dispute his reasoning, at some point, Sutton told a student that he would be better served using a

different chair (other than Lugg), for his dissertation committee. SOF ¶ 170; Doc. 35, at 52-53.

On May 3, 2017, Sutton sent an email with the subject line “Confidential DFSC

Communication” to Lugg stating:

Multiple EAF faculty have reported to the Department Chair they do not wish to

work on any dissertation committees you chair. The supervision, advising and

mentoring of student research are criteria for the evaluation of teaching for

university faculty (ASPT, p. 61, 2017). For that reason, the DFSC would like to

invite you to a meeting to learn how we might assist you in creating a more

welcoming environment for colleagues who serve on committees with you . . . This

is an attempt to offer support for your teaching, something you have the right to

refuse.

Doc. 32, SOF ¶ 155 (citing Ex. 26).44 A few weeks after the DFSC communication, Lugg filed

charges of discrimination against Sutton and ISU on May 22, 2017 with the Illinois Department

42 Plaintiff, without argument, objects on grounds on hearsay within hearsay. However, these documents speak to

Sutton’s state of mind with respect to his May 3, 2017 email, which Plaintiff alleges to be a form of retaliation

threatening discipline. The senders are generally speaking about their personal experiences. The Court does not

consider these emails for the purpose that Plaintiff did in fact do the things described in the emails. These emails are

also relevant to whether Defendants can show a legitimate business reason for some of their actions. Further,

Plaintiff does not object to SOF ¶ 164, which reiterates the content of these emails, “DFSC has learned that eight

colleagues, mostly research faculty, have identified the following reasons for not wanting to serve on doctoral exam

or dissertation committees with you, or at least not committees you chair.” SOF ¶ 164 (citing Ex. 30).

43 Plaintiff disputes SOF ¶ 173 but not the above portion of it.

44 Plaintiff does not dispute that she received this email. She only disputes the reason for the email being sent.

Therefore, the Court considers this fact undisputed to the extent Lugg received this email and this is what it stated.

of Human Rights (“IDHR”). SOF ¶ 137. Lugg alleged that Sutton threatened her on May 3, 2017

by stating he would call a meeting regarding her performance. SOF ¶ 153.

On June 16, 2017, the DFSC sent Lugg a letter to follow-up on her annual performance

evaluation for 2016. SOF ¶ 162 (citing Ex. 30). The letter stated, “[i]t is intended to highlight

continuing areas of concerns about your performance, to suggest actions you might take to

improve that performance, and to reiterate a standing invitation to work with the DFSC to assist

in your work responsibilities.” SOF ¶ 163. The letter further stated, “it is vital that students not

be immersed in department politics, conflicts, or disagreements. Inimical communication with

students about fellow colleagues in face-to-face or electronic communication should be avoided

at all costs[,]” and “making or sharing negative comments about faculty or department affairs

with students or using students to promote personal and competitive agendas regarding other

faculty is a clear violation of University Policy 1.17a: Professional Relationships.” Id.

Additionally, the letter stated the DFSC learned of eight colleagues including mostly

research faculty, that did not want to serve on doctoral exam or dissertation committees with

Lugg, or at least not committees she chaired for the following reasons:

• They think you do not respect their suggestions or constructive criticism

intended to strengthen the student’s work.

• They feel bullied into playing the role you want them to, and into being or

staying on committees or being removed against their will.

• They question the integrity and quality of student work being produced on

committees you chair. Your goal seems to move the student on and out even

when the methodology is inadequate or quality of the written work low.

• Some faculty feel threatened for or unnecessarily supervised by you in their

work with students of color.

• Colleagues believe in the past you have undermined the department’s

programs by offering independent studies for courses already offered by

colleagues. While procedures are in place to curtail this practice, its residual

effects are still felt.

SOF ¶ 164. Around the same time, the DFSC also sent follow-up performance evaluation letters

to two other EAF faculty members, one who identifies as male and the other as female. SOF ¶

166 (citing Ex. 31).45 Lugg filed her Second Amended Charges of Discrimination with the IDHR

against Sutton and ISU on December 7, 2017. SOF ¶ 168.

7. 2017 and 2018 Courses

Plaintiff urges the Court to not focus on the specific courses she alleges demonstrated

retaliation, so the Court briefly summarizes the facts as it relates to those presented. Doc. 35, at

83-44. In Spring 2017, Lugg taught a full course load, including EAF 548 (Legal Bases of

Higher Education), and EAF 466 (College Students and the Law). Doc. 32, SOF ¶¶ 128-29. The

only other courses offered that semester that Lugg was qualified to teach were EAF 431 (School

Leadership and the Law) and a second section of EAF 548. SOF ¶ 130. Sutton assigned adjunct

professors David Braun to teach EAF 431 and Tiffany Puckett to teach EAF 548. SOF ¶ 131.

Lugg made a request to teach in the summer of 2017 but was not assigned to teach any

courses. Doc. 35, SOF ¶¶ 39-40. Only one section of EAF 586 was offered during Summer 2017.

Doc. 32, at SOF ¶ 142. EAF 586 is an Administration in Human Resources course. SOF ¶ 144;

Doc. 35, at 38. Sutton chose an adjunct instructor who was an associate superintendent of human

resources to teach it that summer. SOF ¶¶ 143-144 (citing Ex. 25, which includes the resume of

that individual).46 EAF 436 was also offered that summer but Sutton chose not to assign Lugg or

Hatt to teach it due to the co-teaching experience of Summer 2015. SOF ¶ 141. In sum, in the fall

and spring semesters of 2017 and 2018, Lugg taught full course loads each semester. SOF ¶ 150.

45 Plaintiff disputes SOF ¶ 166, however, her response states “see responses above,” yet the responses above are still

unresponsive to the proposed fact. Therefore, SOF ¶ 166 is undisputed. Further, Plaintiff fails to cite any evidence

refuting that the DFSC did indeed send these follow-up letters to performance reviews, which is unsurprising

considering Defendants provided evidence of the letters.

46 Plaintiff disputes Sutton’s reasoning for hiring this adjunct to the teach the course but does not dispute that the

chosen adjunct was an associate superintendent of human resources. Thus, the above is undisputed.

She was the only faculty member who taught EAF 596 (Negotiated Agreement Administration

and Development) during Fall 2017. SOF ¶ 152. Lugg did not receive overloads those semesters

because those courses were assigned to adjuncts. SOF ¶ 151.47 The Parties dispute the

characterization of the EAF Department’s “Section 5.0 Staffing Requirements” (Doc. 32, Ex. 22)

and whether it is a considered an “agreement to assign adjuncts.” Lugg does not dispute or object

to the document itself, rather she simply claims Sutton unliterally chose to hire adjuncts. Doc.

35, at 48. Exhibit 22 states, “Adjunct Faculty shall teach no more than 80% of the coursework in

the principal preparation program.” Sutton based various decisions to assign courses to adjuncts

on this document as well as other qualifications he discusses.

8. ISU Internal Investigations

Although Plaintiff claims that retaliation ensued for “6 years!” this is where the facts end,

except to the extent ISU issued a final report on February 15, 2019 regarding Lugg’s internal

discrimination and retaliation claims against Sutton. SOF ¶¶ 205-206 (citing Ex. 39). Plaintiff

disputes Exhibit 39 on the basis that it was issued two years after Plaintiff brought her initial

charge of discrimination, four months after this lawsuit was filed, and it is self-serving. Doc. 35,

at 65. The Court would agree that this report should not be considered based on it having been

finalized over a year after Plaintiff’s last protected activity and four months after the initiation of

this lawsuit, thereby diminishing its relevance. At the same time, Lugg claims she made multiple

complaints to ISU regarding Sutton and alleges continuing violations through 2020. Therefore, it

becomes relevant to Lugg’s allegation that ISU failed to stop the discrimination and Lugg could

have attempted to use it as such in her Response to Defendants’ Motion. See Doc. 32, at 49. The

report focuses on ISU’s investigation efforts throughout 2017 and only discusses evidence

47 Again, Plaintiff does not dispute that this occurred but disputes the reasoning for hiring adjuncts stating, “there is

not an agreement; Dr. Sutton unilaterally chose to hire an adjunct.” Doc. 35, at 48.

considered from 2015-2018, which supports it relevance. The report indicates, “[b]oth parties

(Lugg and Sutton) were given an opportunity to review a preliminary draft of the report and all

of the evidence gathered to date,” then provides a discussion of each party’s response, which

suggests this report originated much earlier than the finalization date. Doc. 32-6, at 57. Based on

these considerations, the Court considers Exhibit 39 for the limited purpose that ISU ultimately

determined Lugg failed to provide sufficient evidence to support her claims against Sutton.

9. Plaintiff’s Remaining Additional Material Facts

There are numerous statements listed in Plaintiff’s additional material facts section that

Defendants do not dispute in their Reply but generally assert that they are immaterial because

they are conclusory allegations, unsupported speculations, and mere opinions. See e.g., Doc. 35,

Plaintiff’s SOF ¶¶ 11-12, 27, 43-44, 46-48, 50-55, 57-58. The Court generally agrees with

Defendants and addresses these facts in the discussion section where Lugg offers them as

evidence of retaliation. To the extent the Court has not discussed or addressed other facts listed in

Plaintiff’s Response, they were either found to be redundant of previously undisputed facts or

irrelevant, such as Lugg’s long-winded remarks from her deposition that do not address material

issues or demonstrate a material factual dispute exists.48

48 See e.g., Doc. 35, at 77, Plaintiff’s Additional Material Fact 56:

Plaintiff testified “This will be my answer for every time you ask if I felt entitled: I believe as a

faculty member who was hired to teach certain classes or classes in certain areas, when classes in

those areas become available that I should be assigned to teach them, including summer and

including overload. That has been the past practice for two decades and if you want to call that an

entitlement, then yes, I am entitled . . . .” (Ex. 2, Lugg Dep. 197:13-25).

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where the movant shows, through “materials in the

record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or

declarations, stipulations … admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” that “there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. When presented with a motion for summary judgment, the Court must

construe the record “in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and avoid[] the temptation to

decide which party’s version of the facts is more likely true.” Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770

(7th Cir. 2003). In resolving the motion, “[t]he court has one task and one task only: to decide,

based on the evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of fact that requires a

trial.” Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994).

In order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant must “set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 250 (1986). If the evidence, however, is “merely colorable, or is not significantly

probative or merely raises ‘some metaphysical doubt as the material facts,’ summary judgment

may be granted.” Id. at 249-50. Thus, in order to overcome the undisputed facts set forth in a

defendant’s motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff cannot rest on the allegations in his

complaint but must point to affidavits, depositions, or other evidence of an admissible sort that a

genuine dispute of material fact exists between parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); Behrens v.

Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 309 (1996). “[I]f the non-movant does not come forward with evidence

that would reasonably permit the finder of fact to find in her favor on a material question, then

the court must enter summary judgment.” Waldridge, 24 F.3d at 920.

DISCUSSION

Things appear very heated in the EAF Department at ISU. One might have thought at the

inception of this lawsuit that Sutton could be the driving force, however, at summary judgment

the evidence revealed a different account than that of Plaintiff’s Complaint. It seems Lugg had an

issue with Sutton before he was even hired. See Doc. 35, at 13-14 (“Several of us were shocked

with his behavior [during his interview in 2014]; concluded he must have been told he was going

to be hired and so was just going through the motions.”). Although this differs from her

statement to an OEOEA investigator: “[Lugg] stated that, at first, she thought [Sutton] was the

best candidate for the Chair position and added that she had ‘high hopes’ with his arrival.” Doc.

32-6, at 47. She also had an issue with the way Sutton spoke at times: “[H]e told us he was an

‘Old Gangsta’ and broke into a hip-hop lingo that only the black faculty (not the Africans, but the

American Blacks) seemed to understand.” Doc. 32-2, at 58. Lugg’s issues with Sutton

culminated in various internal complaints and this lawsuit. Based on Defendants’ Motion and

Lugg’s Response which fails to show a material dispute of fact exists that requires a trial,

Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 32) is GRANTED for the reasons discussed below.

In their summary judgment briefing, the Parties consolidate their discussion of the

retaliation claims alleged in Counts I, II, and IV pursuant to the Ethics Act and Title VII. Then,

the Parties briefly address Lugg’s Title VII gender discrimination claim in Count III. See Doc.

35, at 100. The Court will the address these issues in the same order here.

A. Retaliation pursuant to the Ethics Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

The Parties agree that the framework for prevailing on an Ethics Act or Title VII

retaliation claim is essentially the same. Both statutes prohibit retaliating against an employee

who has exposed or participated in the investigation of an unlawful employment practice. 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). For her Title VII claim, Lugg must prove that (1) she engaged in a

statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a

causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action. Doc. 32, at 34; Doc. 35, at 81

(citing Lewis v. Wilkie, 909 F.3d 858, 866 (7th Cir. 2018)). Similarly, for her Ethics Act

retaliation claims, Lugg must prove that (1) she disclosed to a public body regarding an activity,

policy, or practice of any other state employee that she reasonably believed to be a violation of

law, rule, or regulation, and (2) that conduct was a contributing factor in the retaliatory act she

alleges. Id. (citing Hosick v. Chi. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 924 F. Supp. 2d 956, 974 (N.D. Ill.

2013)). The Parties then focus on the element of causation citing only federal cases addressing

Title VII. The Court will follow the Parties’ issue presentation.

In her Response, Lugg agrees with applying the direct method of establishing a prima

facie case for retaliation, then faults Defendants for not discussing the burden-shifting

framework under the indirect method.49 To be clear, these two methods are “just means to

consider whether one fact ... caused another ... and therefore are not elements of any claim.”

Lewis, 909 F.3d at 866 (quoting Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, 834 F.3d 760, 763 (7th Cir. 2016)

(internal quotation marks omitted)). While indirect or direct evidence are still appropriate

considerations, the legal standard is “is simply whether the evidence would permit a reasonable

factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff’s race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed factor

caused the discharge or other adverse employment action.” Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765. Contrary to

Lugg’s interpretation, Ortiz cautioned against bucketing indirect versus direct evidence

categories, but it did not preclude a defendant from responding to each piece of evidence the

plaintiff offers. Rather, Ortiz instructs courts to take a holistic approach in viewing the evidence.

49 But see Doc. 32, at 49 where Defendants discuss the McDonnell Douglas framework.

See id. at 766. The Court can, and does, take a holistic approach to viewing the evidence even

though Defendants succinctly parsed out the alleged instances of retaliation or inferences of

retaliatory motives into sub-sections, a method which Lugg attempts to mirror in her Response.50

Plaintiff then makes it a point to explain that she gets the opportunity to argue pretext, but

it becomes unclear where she intended to do that. The Court will assume that her “corroborating

evidence section” and footnote 2 of page 101 are meant for that. To the extent Plaintiff argues

pretext, in evaluating pretext, the Court does not determine whether the employer’s explanation

was reasonable or valid, it assesses the honesty of the explanation. Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d

965, 968 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing O’Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 636-37 (7th Cir.

2011); Montgomery v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 626 F.3d 382, 396–97 (7th Cir. 2010); Naik v.

Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 627 F.3d 596, 601 (7th Cir. 2010)). Indeed, as often

reiterated in Title VII cases, “courts do not sit as super personnel departments to second guess an

employer’s facially legitimate business decisions.” Wells v. Unisource Worldwide, Inc., 289 F.3d

1001, 1007 (7th Cir. 2002).

1. Statutorily Protected Activities

Lugg claims she engaged in the following statutorily protected activities: (1) she

participated in a student, B.G.’s, discrimination complaint against Sutton in April 2015, (2) she

made internal informal and formal sex discrimination complaints beginning around June 2015,

(3) she filed an internal ethics complaint against Professor Lin in November 2015, and (4) she

filed discrimination charges with the Illinois Department of Human Rights on May 22, 2017 and

December 7, 2017. Doc. 35, at 80-81. For the purposes of summary judgment, Defendants

concede that these actions were protected activities. Doc. 32, at 33. Lugg generally claims that

50 Lugg did not respond to each argument by Defendants.

Sutton implemented changes in the EAF in an effort to retaliate against her for engaging in

protected activity. Meanwhile, Defendants argue that Lugg cannot show her conduct contributed

to any of the alleged retaliatory conduct, Defendants articulated legitimate, non-retaliatory

reasons for their actions, Sutton would have implemented those changes regardless of Lugg’s

activities, some of that implementation pre-dates Lugg’s protected activities, and many of Lugg’s

allegations are not supported by the record. Doc. 35, at 2, 53.

2. Adverse Employment Actions

In her Response, Lugg reduces51 her list of purported adverse employment actions to the

following: (1) the law review journal she worked on was cancelled and she lost $6,000 per year

of income, (2) she was denied summer teaching and lost income/compensation, and (3) she was

denied overloads resulting in a loss of additional income. Doc. 35, at 82. According to Lugg’s

expert, these losses amount to economic damages just shy of $1,000,000. Id. Therefore, the

Court focuses on those instances in this Opinion. Affording a liberal construction to the term

“adverse action,” the above could be considered adverse actions.52 Likewise, Defendants do not

dispute that the above three actions as materially adverse. Thus, the Court focuses of causation.

51 As Defendants noted in their Reply, Doc. 36, at 20:

[Plaintiff made] no response to the argument that the following allegations were not adverse

employment actions: referring to her academic training (actually to law school rankings) as a joke;

assigning Beth Hatt to co-teach EAF 436 (while still compensating Plaintiff the full amount); hiring

adjunct professors to teach her classes while she was on sabbatical and unavailable to teach them

anyway; implying that Plaintiff distributed inflammatory information about a reprimand received

during Sutton’s prior job; sending her the May 3rd letter regarding her performance; recommending

that a student select another professor for his committees; participating in negative performance

reviews; or participating in the DFSC follow up letter in 2017.

However, the Court considers these actions to the extent Plaintiff offered them as “corroborating evidence.”

52 The Ethics Act defines “retaliatory action” as “the reprimand, discharge, suspension, demotion, denial of

promotion or transfer, or change in the terms or conditions of employment of any State employee, that is taken in

retaliation for a State employee’s involvement in protected activity, as set forth in Section 15–10.” 5 ILCS 430/15–5.

“For Title VII retaliation purposes, a materially adverse action ‘need not be one that affects the terms and conditions

of employment, but it ‘must be one that a reasonable employee would find to be materially adverse such that the

employee would be dissuaded from engaging in the protected activity.’” Lewis, 909 F.3d at 867. But the provision

only protects an individual from “retaliation that produces an injury or harm.” Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.

White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006).

3. Causation

A. Suspicious Timing

Lugg’s first argument to show causation, as articulated on pages 85-88 of her Response

and repeated throughout her response to proposed material facts section,53 is that Lugg has “rare

evidence of timing proximal and suspicious enough to show causation.” Doc. 35, at 85. While a

few hours or days can certainly constitute temporal proximity, depending on the circumstances,

the Court disagrees that Lugg has this “rare” evidence.

The Court recognizes the well-establish precedent quoted by Lugg that suspicious timing

can establish an inference of retaliation “[w]hen an adverse employment action follows on the

close heels of protected expression and the plaintiff can show the person who decided to impose

the adverse action knew of the protected conduct.” Lord v. High Voltage Software, Inc., 839 F.3d

556, 564 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Culver v. Gorman & Co., 416 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir. 2005)).

However, close temporal proximity alone is rarely sufficient to show causation in a retaliation

claim. Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 860–61 (7th Cir. 2012); see also McCann v. Badger

Mining Corp., 965 F.3d 578, 592 (7th Cir. 2020) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that suspicious

timing alone was enough to survive summary judgment). Illinois courts agree. See Flick v. S.

Illinois Healthcare, 21 N.E.3d 82, 88 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (“[C]lose timing is usually not enough

to establish a causal connection standing alone”). But proximity alongside other corroborating

evidence may support an inference of retaliatory motive and permit a plaintiff to survive

summary judgment. Coleman, 667 F.3d at 860–61. Where an inference of causation would be

reasonable in a particular case, “[a] jury, not a judge, should decide whether the inference is

appropriate.” Loudermilk v. Best Pallet Co., LLC, 636 F.3d 312, 315 (7th Cir. 2011). However, a

53 See e.g., Plaintiff’s responses to SOF ¶¶ 23, 27. Doc. 35, at 14-17, 20.

submission to the jury on this issue depends on the unique facts of the case – it is not automatic.

McCann, 965 F.3d at 593 n.72.

As to the rare evidence of proximity, Lugg first asserts that Sutton asked for her syllabus

for a class (EAF 51254) within days of Lugg providing corroborating evidence on April 17, 2015

for B.G.’s complaint. For that argument to begin to work, asking for a class syllabus would need

to be an adverse action. Even affording the most liberal construction to the term “adverse

action,” asking for a syllabus does not suffice and Lugg makes no argument for it. But Lugg also

states that the particular class was taken away within a week and cites to her deposition

testimony for support. Doc. 35, at 86 (citing Lugg Dep., 227:22 – 228:10, 257:16 – 258:3, 413:5-

10). If one ignores the fact that none of these citations actually specify that the class was taken

away within a week and Lugg fails to provide the transcript pages 257-258 in her exhibit; ignores

the fact that Fall 2017 is the first time Lugg alleges she should have taught EAF 512 but did not

(see Doc. 35, at 32); and ignores any context surrounding the syllabus request, then the two

events taken together, the request and class removal, could be an adverse action on the heels of a

protected activity. However, Defendants rebutted Lugg’s conclusory proposition with Exhibit 41,

which demonstrates the discussion regarding the future of EAF 512 was still ongoing in

December 2015. Doc. 36-2, at 2-3.

Even if the Court accepted Lugg’s version that Sutton asked for a syllabus and took the

class way within one week of the protected activity, despite her failure to cite evidence, the

undisputed facts demonstrate the first syllabus request occurred well before April 17, 2015. Doc.

36, at 24. Sutton had asked multiple professors for their current EAF 512 syllabus, beginning at

least as early as February 2015. Doc. 36-1, at 2. It would appear the April email was a follow-up

54 Plaintiff fails to state which class she is referring to, the Court infers she means EAF 512 based on the undisputed

facts.

to that request. Additionally, Sutton gave a legitimate business reason for changing EAF 512—

there were multiple iterations because it was previously treated as a “catch-all general

methodology course” and he wanted to choose which iteration to move forward with. It is also

undisputed that multiple professors were teaching the course, including at least Lugg, Hatt, and

Otto. Doc. 35, at 26. Sutton ultimately chose Hunt/Hood to teach EAF 512. The consequence of

that decision means Lugg is not the only professor who was no longer teaching EAF 512. Doc.

36, at 24. Thus, her argument for proximity based on the syllabus request fails.

Lugg’s next proffered proximity of an adverse action on June 11, 2015, likewise fails.

She asserts that Sutton took an adverse action by taking away the budgeting for the law review

journal two hours after he received an email notification that the OEOEA received B.G.’s

complaint. Doc. 35, at 86-88. It is undisputed that within two hours of receiving that email,

Sutton informed Lugg there would be “no expenditures for the policy and law online journal for

next year. All full time faculty are returning to EAF next, therefore there will be little or no

variance money to support this effort.” Id. at 68. However, as Defendants repeatedly emphasize,

details matter in proximity arguments. See Doc. 36, at 23 (citing Bagwe v. Sedgwick Claims

Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 811 F.3d 866, 890 (7th Cir. 2016) (rejecting the plaintiff’s temporal

proximity argument after viewing the events in chronological order)). Here, the undisputed facts

show the law journal reduction, like the syllabus-change, was already in the review process

before the June email. Id. It is undisputed that Sutton learned in 2014 that Lugg was the only

faculty member receiving compensation for editing the journal while all other faculty members

were given course releases in exchange for work on a publication. See supra fns. 14, 16. Lugg

has not provided evidence supporting her entitlement to this special benefit of an additional

$6,000 per year. See supra fn. 15.

The Parties agree that on February 24, 2015, Sutton told Lugg that he was reducing the

budget for the journal because: “[b]udget decisions are based on the investment of resources that

will have the greatest return for the academic unit. For that reason, a number of longstanding

items in EAF will be adjusted away from antiquated rationale for spending.” SOF ¶ 187. On that

same page of emails, Lugg retorts to Sutton, “[s]ince in essence you are cutting my pay, my

suggestion would be to drop it altogether.” Id. It would appear based on his ultimate decision

regarding the journal, Sutton took Lugg up on that suggestion. Yet, Plaintiff omits any discussion

regarding the February email except to mark it as undisputed.

Ignoring all of the above context, Lugg attempts to divert attention by focusing on the

June 2015 email. Even considering just the timing of the email, it is also undisputed that Sutton

already believed Lugg was serving as a witness in B.G.’s complaint as early as April 2015,55 two

months before the email regarding the journal. Thus, the Court is hard-pressed to accept Lugg’s

couching of the facts to fit her argument for proximity where she has already admitted that

Sutton knew much earlier about the protected activity. Lugg is correct in her assertion that the

Court cannot make credibility determinations at summary judgment, however, no credibility

determination is necessary for the Court’s finding that the undisputed facts simply do not support

Lugg’s argument. Even if the chronological order of events supported her argument, Defendants

offered two reasons for not paying Lugg $6000/year for work on the law journal for the 2015-

2016 school year: she was the only one receiving this special benefit and there was no variance

money available. Doc. 32, at 47. Lugg has not rebutted that reason with evidence of pretext.

55 Lugg repeatedly reiterates that it is undisputed Sutton knew about her protected activity in April 2015 throughout

her brief but overlooks that in her attempt to show suspicious timing here. See Doc. 35, at 4-5, 16-17, 66, 86, 90. She

also uses that timeline of April 2015 to benefit her other arguments. Id. at 4 (“Specifically, within days of providing

corroborating evidence [April 17, 2015], Dr. Sutton asked for the syllabus for one of Dr. Lugg’s courses, and within

approximately one week had taken away that class.”).

Rather, Lugg does not dispute Sutton’s testimony that EAF lacked funding for the journal

because it would not have the variance money as faculty were returning from university leave

and that the Dean of the College of Education told Sutton to spend all variance money

exclusively on instruction. See supra fns. 20-21. She also does not dispute that Sutton informed

her in 2014 that he was going to revisit compensation levels of the journal because she was the

only faculty member receiving monetary compensation rather than a course release. See supra

fn. 17. Thus, even when construing the facts in a light most favorable to Lugg, no reasonable

juror could find causation based on temporal proximity.

B. Corroborating Evidence

Alternatively, Lugg argues corroborating evidence supports an inference of a causal link.

Doc. 35, at 88. Like the rest of Lugg’s Response, Lugg offers six pieces of evidence in a series of

block quotes and brief arguments, which the Court will discuss in turn.

First, Lugg points to a January 2016 faculty meeting where Sutton said, “if you mess

with me you’re going to get it back – you’re going to feel it[.]” Id. at 89-90. According to Dean,

Sutton looked at her and Lugg when he made this remark. Id. Lugg claims this remark from

Sutton reveals his “personality trait” of lashing out in anger and retaliation against anyone that

questions him. Id. at 90. In her additional material facts section, Lugg also cites Sutton’s own

words regarding this incident, “I told the faculty that they did not want to mess with me …”. Id.

at 69 (citing Ex. 14, Doc. 35-4, at 5). However, as Defendants point out, Lugg omits the entire

sentence which reads, “I told the faculty that they did not want to mess with me because my faith

is grounded in scripture and I am free.” Doc. 35-4, at 5.

Even accepting Dean’s version of Sutton’s words and the direction of his eyes, contrary

to Lugg’s submission, a dispute of fact does not exist simply because a defendant made an

ambiguous remark to a crowd of colleagues. An employer’s “unfulfilled threat of discipline for

protected activity” generally does not qualify as an adverse action but it may qualify as

“evidence of retaliatory intent behind a more concrete adverse action.” See Poullard v.

McDonald, 829 F.3d 844, 856 (7th Cir. 2016). An inference of discrimination can be made

regarding a remark “when they are ‘(1) made by the decision-maker, (2) around the time of the

decision, and (3) in reference to the adverse employment action.’” Bagwe, 811 F.3d at 885

(quoting Egonmwan v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 602 F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 2010)). In making

this determination of whether a remark is discriminatory, the Court must also consider the

context in which the remark was made. Id.; Doc. 36, at 24 (citing Bagwe, 811 F.3d at 885).

Beginning with the context of the statement, Sutton made this “threat” after it was

discovered that someone printed numerous copies of a document regarding a disciplinary issue

involving Sutton from nearly twenty years prior and left the copies on campus. The Parties agree

Sutton’s remark referred to the fliers. Doc. 36, at 24; Doc. 35, at 89. Even if Lugg was involved

in the fliers, this was not a protected activity, nor does Lugg argue it as such.

In reviewing the actual remark, no disciplinary employment action was articulated, and it

was an isolated remark rather than repeated ambiguous threats. As to timing, this remark

occurred well after the law journal decisions were made so Lugg would need to connect the

remark to her no longer receiving overloads. She does not pinpoint when those decisions were

made or even attempt to connect the remark to those decisions. Likewise, Lugg has not

connected this threat to a later materially adverse action in an effort to counter Defendants’ non-

discriminatory reason for disciplining Lugg or not assigning her overloads.56 Thus, even when

56 See Poullard, 829 F.3d at 857 (quoting Dunn v. Washington County Hospital, 429 F.3d 689, 692–93 (7th Cir.

2005); Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 69).

Dunn, 429 F.3d at 692 (“Talk is cheap; unless Dunn knew that Coy had sabotaged the career of other

nurses, his statements would not have dissuaded reasonable persons from protecting their own rights

resolving ambiguities in favor of Lugg, an inference of retaliatory or discriminatory intent is not

appropriate, and this statement does not support her causation theory.

Second, Lugg merely states that Sutton filed a claim against her on March 31, 2016,

which refers to B.G., the student who filed a complaint against Sutton in April 2015, as Lugg’s

“surrogate” or “minion.” However, Lugg does nothing to develop an argument on this piece of

evidence. “[P]erfunctory and undeveloped arguments are deemed waived[.]” See Perez v. Illinois,

488 F.3d 773, 776–77 (7th Cir. 2007).

Third, Lugg asserts that Lugg and Dean were the only professors to “feel it,” then

meanders through various statements from Dean’s deposition. Doc. 35, at 91. These statements

are unhelpful for various reasons: most examples are vague, such as he “invented his own ways –

his own use of policy . . . making it very difficult for students,” “people get widely different

amounts of resources,” and “allowing faculty to treat me disrespectfully and hostilely.” Id.

“[C]onclusory statements not grounded in specific facts are not enough to stave off summary

judgment.” King v. Ford Motor Company, 872 F.3d 833, 840 (7th Cir. 2017). More importantly,

the first block quote does not mention anything specific to the Plaintiff in this case, which is

Lugg, not Dean. Where Dean does mention Lugg, her statements are a regurgitation of the same

retaliatory acts Lugg alleges in her affidavit but in the form of “concerns” that Lugg shared with

Dean. Id. Thus, they do not provide additional support to Lugg’s claim of causal connection.

Neither Lugg nor Dean point to evidence that faculty with lesser qualifications were

teaching “their courses” aside from their own conclusory opinions. It is unclear how other

under the statute and thus cannot violate Title VII.”). We think this is simply a reflection of the

Supreme Court’s instruction that “the significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend

upon the particular circumstances. Context matters.” Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 69, 126 S.Ct.

2405. Here, Poullard does not explain why the unfulfilled threats of discipline he received were

significant enough in context to rise to the level of a materially adverse action, and we see no basis

for that conclusion in the record.

faculty’s qualifications would be within their knowledge, particularly where they do not offer

specific facts describing those qualifications. See also infra section B (discussing comparator

evidence). Even if they provided evidence of lesser qualifications, Dean’s testimony supports the

notion that other teachers had “their courses”57 reassigned to adjunct faculty with lesser

qualifications and Dean admitted that there is a nationwide trend of hiring adjuncts as well. Id. at

92. Regardless of a trend, Lugg fails to show more adjuncts were assigned to her classes than

other classes of similarly situated individuals. Doc. 36, at 21. “The similarly-situated inquiry is a

flexible one, but we frequently consider whether the employees in question had the same job

description, were subject to the same standards, had the same supervisor, and had comparable

experience, education, and other qualifications.” Poullard, 829 F.3d at 855 (citing Boumehdi v.

Plastag Holdings, LLC, 489 F.3d 781, 791 (7th Cir. 2007)). Yet, Plaintiff does not even offer a

potential comparator. Another issue with Lugg’s argument is that she simply supplies lengthy

quotes without explanation, even where the significance is not obvious. It is not the Court’s job

to make Plaintiff’s case or parse through lengthy quotes to unearth the significance of them.

Fourth, Lugg asserts causality is shown because Sutton took away classes from Dean

and Lugg (the only professors to bring claims against Sutton), then gave them to adjuncts and

took away summer sessions where Lugg was sometimes the only professor not offered summer

courses. Doc. 35, at 92. Meanwhile, Lugg claims others were assigned full loads in the summer

or overloads in the fall. However, “saying so doesn’t make it so; summary judgment may only be

defeated by pointing to admissible evidence in the summary judgment record that creates a

genuine issue of material fact.” United States v. 5443 Suffield Terrace, Skokie, Ill., 607 F.3d 504,

510 (7th Cir. 2010). As discussed below, Lugg fails to offer specific facts to support her

57 No evidence has been presented that any professor had an exclusive agreement to teach a particular course,

thereby deeming it “their course,” which could not be assigned to another professor.

assertions. Ortiz did not wash away the requirements of Rule 56 or allow a plaintiff to survive

summary judgment by making conclusory statements without specific facts under the guise that

the “holistic approach” support her theories. See Igasaki v. Illinois Dep’t of Fin. & Pro. Regul.,

988 F.3d 948, 958 (7th Cir. 2021) (‘Mere conclusory allegations do not constitute evidence.’)

(quoting Montgomery v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 626 F.3d 382, 389 (7th Cir. 2010)).

At the outset, Plaintiff has not identified admissible evidence to show that no other

professors filed “claims,” therefore, the Court disregards this conclusory statement. More

importantly, as Defendants emphasize, Lugg repeatedly remarks that “others” receive these

things, yet she fails to identify a single professor. Doc. 36, at 21. As to adjuncts, it is undisputed

that Lugg knew as early as December 2014, well before she engaged in any protected activity,

that Sutton intended to potentially hire adjuncts to teach EAF law courses. SOF ¶ 134. It appears

Lugg simply had an issue with ISU hiring adjuncts, but tenured professors are not a protected

class under Title VII. For example, Plaintiff was aggrieved that ISU had adjunct professors teach

her courses while she was on sabbatical rather than re-arranging courses to better accommodate

her. Doc. 35, at 37. Notably, in many of the disputes she raises in response to Sutton’s decisions,

she takes issue with Sutton choosing to hire adjuncts as a general matter. For example, Sutton

stated he decided to assign adjuncts to teach courses in 2017 and 2018 “in accordance with

EAF’s agreement to assign more adjuncts to teach its P-12 principal preparation courses so that

students had a chance to network and learn from instructors with practical experience.” SOF ¶

151. Lugg simply remarks, “[d]enies. There is not an agreement; Dr. Sutton unilaterally chose to

hire an adjunct.” Doc. 35, at 48. While he does not have discretion to discriminate or retaliate, it

is disputed that Sutton, as Chair, has full discretion to assign courses. SOF ¶ 13. Lugg fails to

connect Sutton’s decisions to hire adjuncts to a plan to disproportionately assign adjuncts to

courses she taught. She also fails to offer specific facts to rebut Defendants’ reason for hiring

adjuncts to teach particular courses. See e.g., Doc. 32 at 42-43; Doc. 32, at 92.

As to the overloads, Lugg does not allege that there were courses she was completely

shut out from or assert that she asked for overloads each semester. In fact, she generally prefers

not to discuss specific course names. The undisputed facts shows that sometimes she taught

certain courses and sometimes she did not, but still had a full load. She does not allege that she

had an agreement to be the only professor who taught certain courses.

For summer courses, Lugg does not cite evidence from her own affidavit or deposition,

which specifically states that she taught summer courses before 2015 or that every time she

requested summer teaching before 2015, she was granted it. Even if she did, that does not mean

the administration was obligated to continue that practice. Summer 2017 is the only specific

summer that she claims to have asked to teach and was denied. Id. at 73. That summer Sutton

chose an adjunct instructor who was an associate superintendent of human resources to teach

EAF 586, the Administration in Human Resources course. SOF ¶ 144. EAF 436 was also offered

that summer but Sutton chose not to assign Lugg or Hatt to teach it due to the co-teaching

experience of Summer 2015. SOF ¶ 141. Lugg offered no evidence of pretext for Sutton’s

decision regarding EAF 586 and she does not address his hiring reason for EAF 436 at all.

Fifth, Lugg reiterates that these “adverse actions” only happened to her and Dean, and

Lugg testified that similarly situated individuals received different treatment. Doc. 35, at 93. But

that was the extent of her testimony—regurgitating the term “similar situated”—without

identifying a single professor who is similarly situated and received better treatment with

overload scheduling. Id. “Rule 56 demands something more specific than the bald assertion of

the general truth of a particular matter, rather it requires affidavits that cite specific concrete facts

establishing the existence of the truth of the matter asserted.” King, 872 F.3d at 840 (citing Lucas

v. Chi. Transit Auth., 367 F.3d 714, 726 (7th Cir. 2004); Drake v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 134

F.3d 878, 887 (7th Cir. 1998)). Therefore, her proposed evidence is conclusory and disregarded.

Sixth, Lugg contends there is voluminous testimony from students that experienced an

extended version of Sutton’s harassment to Lugg. However, even viewing the statements as a

whole, the statements do not provide corroborating evidence.

In this section, Lugg again supplies lengthy quotes where the significance is not obvious.

It is not the Court’s job to make Plaintiff’s case or parse through lengthy quotes to unearth the

significance of them. Lugg first points to a vague and conclusory statements from Dean for

support: “I have observed that things have been made unusually difficult for Dr. Lugg’s students

and for some of mine, that Dr. Sutton has made things unusually difficult for them in the

dissertation process.” Doc. 35, at 93 (citing Dean Dep. 158:20-159:3) (emphasis added). Again,

“conclusory statements not grounded in specific facts are not enough to stave off summary

judgment.” King, 872 F.3d at 840. Therefore, Dean’s testimony about “things” is unavailing.

Next, Lugg offers testimony from a student that “thinks” Sutton “suggested” an unnamed

professor to be on a committee to fail the student and take students away from Lugg. Doc. 35, at

94. To the extent the student testified regarding theories of Sutton’s motivations, that testimony

is vague and speculative, therefore it is disregarded. See Overly v. KeyBank Nat'l Ass’n, 662 F.3d

856, 864 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[R]eliance on speculation is not enough to get the case to a jury.”). As

to the committee action itself, it is simply too remote, and the argument is underdeveloped. Lugg

did not name the professor or offer evidence to show the professor did something inappropriate

in failing the student other the student’s speculation. Similarly, the student’s comments on what

Lugg’s thoughts were regarding Sutton’s reasoning for taking courses away from her are hearsay

and speculative, therefore they are disregarded. See Doc. 35, at 94. Lugg also provides testimony

from a student that shows Sutton “demeaned and disregarded” her qualifications to the student.

Id. at 95. Yet, all of student’s answers are, “I’m not sure” and “I don’t recall specifically,” then a

disjointed rant that Lugg was the only advisor the student wanted, which fails to answer the

posed question: “what did professor Sutton say during the meeting that you had with him that

you consider demeaning and disregarding Dr. Lugg’s qualifications?” Id.

To the extent Lugg continues to provide statements about Sutton affecting a student’s

graduation timeline, the Court emphasizes that the Plaintiff in this case is Elizabeth Lugg. See id.

at 97. This case is about alleged discrimination and retaliation against Lugg, it is not a forum to

air every grievance someone has had against Sutton, such as the swiftness or brevity of his

emails. Id. at 97-98. While the experiences of students may be relevant to this lawsuit, repeated

block quotes from individuals not party to this lawsuit regarding unrelated grievances do little to

help Lugg survive summary judgment. Likewise, Lugg spends pages quoting a student’s “gut

feelings.” The Court does not see how a student’s “gut feeling [] that [Sutton] is not a good boss,

that he should not be the chair of our program” shows evidence of causality. Id. at 98. Again, the

student’s testimony regarding the interworking of course scheduling is speculative and

disregarded. Id. at 99. A regurgitation of Lugg’s testimony in the form of student testimony

regarding these topics to which the student has no first-hand knowledge does little to strengthen

Lugg’s case. Rather, it only reinforces the notion that Lugg has parroted her grievances to

students, or at least one student.

On the next topic that Sutton urged a student to consider another professor for the

student’s dissertation chair, Lugg has not provided evidence that there was a nefarious reason for

Sutton’s statement outside of the interest of the student. See id. at 95-96; Doc. 32, at 47. Even the

student admits as much,

Q: Did Professor Sutton ever tell you that you would have an easier time

graduating if you choose a different dissertation chair?

A: He didn’t come right out and say that, but it was very clear in our meeting that

graduating with my current structure was not – was not in my best interest, it was

not going to happen.

. . .

Q: Do you have any other basis for that belief, anything else to support it?

A: I mean, no. I just got the pure sense that there was no justification for it . . . .

Id. at 96. Even so, Lugg does not allege that she was removed from sitting on dissertation

committees, or that she was no longer allowed to chair them.

As to Lugg’s allegations that her performance reviews were retaliatory, Defendants

provided evidence in their Motion to show that Lugg was not meeting ISU’s legitimate

performance expectations. See Docs. 32, at 43-46. The following are excerpts from six different

faculty members that expressed concerns about serving on a dissertation committee with Lugg

and Lugg’s communication with them and others:

As is often the case with this pair of faculty [Drs. Lugg and Dean], and those of us

in EAF have long known, they raise these kinds of unwarranted complaints and

grievances as a smokescreen in which to veil their own acts of racism and hate

speech, falsehoods, pot-stirring, unauthorized promises made to students, and

failures to follow through or serve students well, and as cover for their very own

diploma-yielding “university of two.”

* * *

Our department, including students and faculty, have suffered from [Betsy Lugg’s

and Diane Dean’s] relentless unethical, lying, and manipulative behavior. Their

behavior has escalated as a result of you being chair because they cannot stand a

Black person having authority over them. Numerous people in our department have

shared with Shane McCreary and the outside consultant about their unethical,

unprofessional, and racist behavior.

* * *

1. Issues of qualification for supervising PhD students. . .

2. Discriminate against minorities. She likes to “find problems” from minorities. It

seems to her, minority needs to be supervised by her. She often use the title from

law school to threaten people in EAF. She is the “Laws” of EAF.

3. Abuse power . . . Last year I was hijacked by her. She took every possibility-

from Chair, dean to graduate director, to take away my right on academic freedom.

* * *

Betsy Lugg has consistently spoken ill about my coursework and curriculum for no

apparent reason except to make my work life a living hell, because I am a Black

woman committed to and hired to teach on social justice and equity in education .

. . The most egregious of acts that leaves me sick to the pit of my stomach is when

Lugg spent an entire semester galvanizing students who were currently enrolled in

my course and convinced them to go to the Chair and Provost to speak against my

course implementation, curriculum and teaching.

* * *

[Dr. Lugg] routinely rejects feedback on doctoral exams from colleagues. She has

stated publicly that she will do what she wants to do and sees no need to attend to

the concerns of colleagues . . . I am aware of a case where Lugg claims a student

passed the exam despite the fact that there is no record of an exam going out for

approval, being sent to the student, or having been returned. Carol has no record of

it, and Dr. Lugg cannot produce a completed exam or even the original questions.

Given the timing of this exam, only two committee members were required. The

second reader was Dr. Dean who declined to confirm that there was an exam. I

believe there was no exam. This is a clear breach of faculty ethics and demonstrates

Lugg’s lack of respect for colleagues.

* * *

Given the unworkable situation in our department and the Higher Education

program with two faculty members, Betsy Lugg and Diane Dean, it is impossible

to have any positive effect on the important work we need to do around curriculum

development, or dissertation and doctoral exam work. Their continual lack of

cooperation and disruption of meetings, disregard for established processes, talking

negatively about other faculty in the department to students, bullying faculty,

students, and administrators to get what they want, and making exceptions for some

students to the detriment of the program has brought tension and stress within the

department so much that I cannot be effective in this role, or even in my faculty

role in general.

Doc. 32-6 (citing Ex. 27). It is undisputed that the DFSC sent three communications to Lugg

identifying its concerns that colleagues refused to serve on dissertation committees with her and

its belief that she was violating ISU’s “Policy & Procedures, 1.17a: Professional Relationships”

regarding communication about co-workers and to them, and further violations of this policy

could result in disciplinary action. See Defendants’ Exs. 26, 30, 32. In the argument section of

her Response, Lugg does not attempt to show pretext behind these reviews and generally does

not discuss them aside from citing vague testimony from Dean. Doc. 35, at 91.

Overall, the biggest deficiency in Lugg’s Response is that “saying so doesn’t make it so.”

See 5443 Suffield Terrace, Skokie, Ill., 607 F.3d at 510. The Court agrees with Defendants’

characterization that Lugg’s Response largely relies on conclusory allegations, speculation, and

opinions lacking foundation. Doc. 36, at 22. As to her substantive arguments, Lugg generally

supplies a block quote of deposition testimony then a block quote of caselaw, which is

sometimes unrelated, then tells the Court that a jury should decide this case. Lugg has not shown

suspicious timing or provided corroborating evidence such that a reasonable jury could find an

inference of causation here. Therefore, it is appropriate for the Court determine the inference as a

matter of law. In doing so, the Court finds Lugg failed to meet her burden to establish a causal

link and she failed to rebut Defendants’ evidence to show a retaliatory intent can be inferred.

Even when viewing the record in a light most favorable to Lugg and viewing the evidence as a

whole, no material dispute of fact exists that requires a trial. Thus, the Court must grant summary

judgment as no reasonable juror could find in her favor on her retaliation claims under the Ethics

Act or Title VII. To the extent Lugg relies on the McDonnell Douglas framework, as similarly

discussed below regarding her discrimination claim, she fails to present evidence of a similarly

situated individual who did not engage in protected activity but was treated more favorably.

B. Title VII Gender Discrimination Claim

No reasonable juror could find that Lugg’s sex caused any of the alleged adverse

employment actions. “The singular question that matters in a discrimination case is: Whether the

evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff’s race, ethnicity, sex,

religion, or other proscribed factor caused the discharge or other adverse employment action.”

See McDaniel v. Progress Rail Locomotive, Inc., 940 F.3d 360, 367 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding the

plaintiff’s discrimination and retaliation claims failed under the Ortiz holistic approach and

McDonnell Douglas framework) (quoting Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765) (internal quotation marks). It is

well-settled that a plaintiff may still utilize the McDonnell Douglas “burden-shifting” framework

to meet the holistic standard described in Ortiz. Here, like in McDaniel, Lugg’s claim fails under

both Ortiz and McDonnell Douglas. Lugg seems to invoke the McDonnell Douglas framework,

so the Court will discuss both in turn.

1. The McDonnell Douglas Framework

As Lugg partially quotes from Peirick v. Indiana Univ.-Purdue Univ. Indianapolis

Athletics Dep’t, 510 F.3d 681, 687–88 (7th Cir. 2007), under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff

must first make out a prima facie case by showing: “(1) she is a member of the protected class,

(2) she met her employer’s legitimate expectations, (3) she suffered an adverse employment

action, and (4) her employer treated similarly situated male employees more favorably.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Once that has been shown, “the employer must

offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, which the

employee may rebut by showing that the reason is a mere pretext for discrimination.” Id.

However, Lugg is mistaken that Peirick holds that prongs two and four merge together if the

employee claims the employer is lying about the business expectations. Doc. 35, at 101. Rather,

Peirick holds the “second prong and the pretext question seemingly merge because the issue is

the same—whether the employer is lying.” Id. In fact, the Seventh Circuit recently held in

McDaniel that the court need not address the other elements of the McDonnell Douglas

framework, including legitimate business expectations, where the plaintiff failed to satisfy the

fourth element by not providing sufficient evidence regarding a similarly situated individual.

McDaniel, 940 F.3d at 368. Thus, the Court begins with prong four.

Unfortunately for Plaintiff, saying the term “similarly situated” thirteen times does not

make it so. In support of her discrimination claim, Lugg asserts that an unnamed male faculty

member was not admonished for “failing to communicate.” Doc. 35, at 100. While self-serving

deposition testimony or affidavits are admissible evidence at summary judgment, if Lugg is

attempting to provide a comparator then she needs to at least identify that person. See Hill, 724

F.3d at 967 (emphasizing the district court should have considered as evidence the plaintiff’s

deposition testimony that was based on his personal knowledge and set forth specific facts).

Ample exhibits were included in the summary judgment briefing that spanned hundreds of pages,

yet Lugg chose to cite her testimony vaguely discussing a male that was not criticized for

“failing to communicate,” but she, as a white female, was “criticized.”

Lugg bears the burden of showing she is similarly situated to the individuals she

identifies. Skiba v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708, 723 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding a list of the

names, ages, and positions of 37 employees was insufficient comparator evidence because it

gave the court “no amplifying detail of the employees’ qualifications or employment history that

would allow this Court to comfortably conclude their hiring was the result of discriminatory

motive rather than some other explanatory variable.”). Though the test should not be rigidly

applied, typically, a plaintiff must at least show a comparator “dealt with the same supervisor,

[was] subject to the same standards, and had engaged in similar conduct without such

differentiating or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s

treatment of them.” Gates v. Caterpillar, Inc., 513 F.3d 680, 690 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Snipes

v. Illinois Dept. of Corr., 291 F.3d 460, 463 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Here, Lugg has failed to do that because she does not even provide the name for the male

comparator, let alone the other relevant factors. This mirrors the plaintiff in McDaniel.

McDaniel provides even less detail than the plaintiff in Skiba. He argues that the

eight other Material Handlers under Howard’s supervision qualify as similarly

situated employees. McDaniel, however, does not provide any information that

would allow a finder of fact to determine that these individuals are indeed similarly

situated: he did not submit the employees’ names, work history, performance

reviews, or—most importantly—their ages. In fact, he provided no information at

all about the eight individual employees who he alleges are similarly situated . . .

The district court correctly found that McDaniel’s conclusory assertion that there is

“evidence that he was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees who

did not contest Howard’s failure to comply with Progress Rail’s policies” was

insufficient to raise an issue of fact and survive summary judgment. As McDaniel

has not identified any similarly situated employees to allow a factfinder to conduct

a “meaningful comparison,” his prima facie case for discrimination fails. See

Barricks v. Eli Lilly and Co., 481 F.3d 556, 560 (7th Cir. 2007). Using the Ortiz

holistic approach, McDaniel’s claim fares no better.

McDaniel, 940 F.3d at 369. Likewise, Lugg only states the comparator is a male and a “faculty

member.” She does not state his name, whether he is a tenured professor, his work history and

performance, whether it was Sutton that failed to admonish him, or whether Lugg is even the

“white female” that she refers to in her testimony. She also does not assert that the unnamed male

was not admonished for the same conduct she committed and then given overloads, which is her

main example of an adverse action. Thus, because Lugg did not provide sufficient information

about a similarly situated employee outside of her class that was treated more favorably, her

discrimination claim fails under the McDonnell Douglas framework.

2. Ortiz and Other Evidence of Discrimination

In an effort to further adhere to the holistic Ortiz approach, the Court considers the other

evidence Lugg offers in support of her gender discrimination claim. Lugg, without citation to any

evidence, makes a blanket statement in footnote 2 of her Response that she “had universally

stellar performance reviews prior to Dr. Sutton.” Doc. 35, at 101. Assuming she had “stellar”

reviews, it does not change the legitimate business objective Sutton gave for the DFSC issuing

Lugg negative reviews in 2017, which is that the reviews were an attempt to correct long-

standing performance issues including her history of inappropriate communications,

interpersonal conflict with faculty members, and violations of ISU’s policy for professional

relationships. Doc. 32, at 44-46. On January 31, 2017, the DFSC’s letter informed Lugg that

“making or sharing negative comments about one another with students or using students in an

effort to promote personal and competitive agenda’s [sic] regarding other faculty is a clear

violation” of ISU Policy & Procedures, 1.17a: Professional Relationships and further violations

of this policy could result in disciplinary action. SOF ¶¶ 176-178. On May 3, 2017, Sutton sent

an email to Lugg with the subject line “Confidential DFSC Communication” stating:

Multiple EAF faculty have reported to the Department Chair they do not wish to

work on any dissertation committees you chair. The supervision, advising and

mentoring of student research are criteria for the evaluation of teaching for

university faculty (ASPT, p. 61, 2017). For that reason, the DFSC would like to

invite you to a meeting to learn how we might assist you in creating a more

welcoming environment for colleagues who serve on committees with you . . . This

is an attempt to offer support for your teaching, something you have the right to

refuse.

SOF ¶ 155. Notably, these negative reviews or communications occurred well after Lugg’s

protected activities in 2015 and before her next protected activity on May 22, 2017. Nor does

Lugg make a proximity argument related to the negative reviews.

As to the DFSC’s follow-up letter in June 2017, Defendants provided support that formed

part of the basis for sending the letter, including statements from faculty members that were

unwilling to serve on dissertation committees with Lugg and/or had issues with how Lugg

communicated with them, which again speaks to ISU’s cited policy regarding professional

relationships. Defendants also offered evidence of similar letters sent to other faculty with the

same title, “Performance Issues,” that were likewise sent by Sutton as Chair and the Department

Faculty Status Committee. Notably, according to the dates of the letters, those other letters were

sent ten days prior to the letter sent to Lugg. Additionally, Lugg does not connect the

performance letters from DFSC to any adverse actions or allege anything inappropriate occurring

within the make-up of the panel.

Next, Lugg highlights more vague assertions from her deposition such as, “Bottom line,

if you are black and especially if you are a black male, you are above reproach from the Chair. If

you are a female, and especially a white female who does not fit the female stereotype, you are

always at fault even if the facts say otherwise.” Doc. 35, at 100. Then, Lugg oddly cites her

testimony regarding an excerpt of a story Sutton shared from his childhood in a staff meeting.

Whether Sutton’s brothers brought home dates that attempted to impress his mother by helping

prepare meals has no bearing on whether Sutton discriminated against Lugg. “Even supposing

this evidence were enough to establish that [Sutton or ISU] held biases against women, [Lugg]

has failed to link those alleged biases to the decision to [not assign Lugg overloads].” Harper v.

Fulton Cty., Ill., 748 F.3d 761, 766 (7th Cir. 2014). As to a gender bias, Defendants also point out

it is undisputed that Sutton selected at least two female faculty members, Hunt and Hood,58 to

teach courses that Lugg alleges she should have taught. Doc. 36, at 24. Finally, as to Lugg’s

allegation that ISU has failed to investigate continuing gender discrimination, Defendants have

submitted a report detailing ISU’s investigations and ultimate finding that Lugg’s claims were

unsubstantiated. Doc. 32, at 48; SOF ¶¶ 205-206 (citing Ex. 39). Lugg has not rebutted this

evidence in her Response or even addressed it at all. For all of the reasons discussed above, Lugg

has failed to show that her gender caused an adverse employment action, and her claim likewise

fails when viewing the evidence as a whole under Ortiz.

In sum, “not everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action.

Otherwise, minor and even trivial employment actions that ‘an irritable, chip-on-the-shoulder

58 The Court disagrees with the Defendants that it is undisputed Sutton chose Hatt for a course that Plaintiff alleges

she should have taught. The record only reflects that Hatt was chosen to co-teach with Plaintiff.

employee did not like would form the basis of a discrimination suit.’” Smart v. Ball State Univ.,

89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Williams v. Bristol–Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270,

274 (7th Cir. 1996)). It is no secret that Lugg and Sutton strongly disagreed with one another on

various issues. But that does not mean Sutton or ISU discriminated or retaliated against Lugg. In

this case, a new chair within the education department arrived and started making changes to

purportedly fit budgetary and student needs. Lugg did not like those changes, such as those

which altered her “entitlement.” While Plaintiff may have received special treatment in the past

simply because she said so,59 it does not mean Sutton was obliged to continue those at her whim,

particularly where he implemented changes that applied to everyone, not just Lugg. Based on the

undisputed facts, no reasonable juror could find a discriminatory or retaliatory intent behind

these changes based on the Ortiz approach or McDonnell Douglas framework.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 32) for Summary Judgment is

GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to terminate this case.

Signed on this 18th day of August, 2021.

s/James E. Shadid

James E. Shadid

United States District Judge

59 See e.g, Doc. 35, at 61 (Another incentive Plaintiff received “to get her to leave the top ranked program at Penn

State” was “that the $2000 normally allowed for moving expenses was increased to $6000 as Plaintiff said the lower

amount was insufficient.”).