The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, URBANA DIVISION
EVET Y. TAYLOR, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 21-cv-2053
)
LIBERTY VILLAGE MANOR )
COURT, )
)
Defendant. )
OPINION
TOM SCHANZLE-HASKINS, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE:
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Liberty Village
Manor Court’s (Liberty Village) Motion to Dismiss (d/e 19) (Motion). The
parties have consented to proceed before this Court. Consent to the
Exercise of Jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate Judge and
Reference Order entered July 7, 2021 (d/e 28). Pro se Plaintiff Evet Taylor
alleges claims for racial harassment, discriminatory discharge, and
retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Complaint for Employment Discrimination
(d/e 1) (Complaint). Taylor also alleges a claim for disability discrimination
in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act. 29 U.S.C. §12101 et
seq. Liberty Village moves to dismiss the racial harassment and disability
discrimination claims but not the discriminatory discharge and retaliation
claims. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is ALLOWED.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For purposes of the Motion, the Court assumes that all of Taylor’s
factual allegations in her Complaint are true, and the Court draws all
inferences from those allegations in favor of Taylor. See Access Living of
Metropolitan Chicago, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 372 F.Supp.3d 663, 667
(N.D. Ill. 2019). Taylor attached to her Complaint the Charge of
Discrimination (Charge) that she filed with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The Charge is part of the Complaint for
all purposes. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c).
Taylor is an African American and referred to herself as Black. Taylor
worked at a Certified Nurse’s Assistant (CNA)/Shower Aide at Liberty
Village. From November 2009 until her termination on March 9, 2010, she
alleges that she was racially harassed by her supervisor, PJ Brown. Brown
harassed Taylor by making Taylor work weekends and through her lunch
break. Brown did not make a non-Black employee work weekends and
through her lunch break. Complaint, at 4, and attached Charge, at 1.
On February 1, 2010, Taylor opposed Brown’s discrimination to
Liberty Village’s Corporate Office. Taylor also complained to A.D.O.N.
Christal Thomas. The Complaint does not define the term A.D.O.N. The
Court presumes the term means Assistant or Associate Director of Nursing.
On March 18, 2010, Taylor was discharged. Taylor alleges that the timing
raises an inference of retaliatory motivation. She also alleges that other
non-Black employees were not treated similarly. After Taylor’s discharge,
Liberty Village repeatedly gave bad references to Taylor’s prospective
employers with whom Taylor had applied for employment. Taylor alleges
the bad references were given in retaliation of her opposition to
discrimination. See Complaint, attached Charge, at 1-3.
Taylor also checked the appropriate box on her Complaint form
asking the Court to order Liberty Village to reasonably accommodate her
disabilities. Complaint, at 3.
Taylor filed her Charge with the EEOC on August 3, 2010.
Approximately ten years later, the EEOC issued Taylor a Right to Sue
Letter on December 18, 2020. Complaint, attached Right to Sue Letter.
Taylor filed her Complaint on March 14, 2021.
Liberty Village moves to dismiss the racial harassment claim and the
disability discrimination claim. Taylor opposes the Motion.
ANALYSIS
A plaintiff’s complaint must allege “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and allegations must be
“simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) & (d)(1). The plaintiff
must allege sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is
plausible if the plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is plausible
on its face if it provides the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 608 (7th
Cir. 2007). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate when “the factual
detail in a complaint [is] so sketchy that the complaint does not provide the
type of notice of the claim to which the defendant is entitled under Rule 8.”
Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT & T Mobility, LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 667
(7th Cir. 2007).
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination because of the
employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42. U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a)(1). Racial harassment violates Title VII if the harassment
creates a hostile work environment. To allege a hostile work environment,
Taylor must allege: (1) the work environment was objectively and
subjectively offensive; (2) the harassment was based on membership in a
protected class, here race; (3) the conduct was severe and pervasive; (4)
and a basis for employer liability. Nichols v. Michigan City Plant Planning
Dept., 755 F.3d 594, 600-01 (7th Cir. 2014). To be severe and pervasive,
the defendant’s must engage in harassing and abusive conduct that is
“sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s
employment and create an abusive work environment.” Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc., 510 U.S.17, 21 (1993).
Here, Taylor alleges that her supervisor made her work weekends
and through lunch. She does not allege racially abusive conduct or
actions. Requiring an employee to work weekends and through lunch is
not sufficient to show an objectively racially abusive work environment that
was severe and pervasive. See Smith v. Rosebud Farmstand, 909
F.Supp.2d 1001, 1005 (N.D. Ill. 2012). Taylor fails to state a claim for racial
harassment or a racially hostile work environment.
Taylor, however, alleges that her employer treated her differently than
non-Black employees. Disparate treatment may also violate Title VII. The
Court recognizes that Taylor does not mention the theory of disparate
treatment discrimination in connection with being required to work
weekends and through lunch. A party is not required to allege a legal
theory and specifying the wrong legal theory is not fatal to a plaintiff’s claim.
Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 649 n.3 (7th Cir. 2008). The allegations
that her supervisor made her work weekends and through lunch, however,
would not state a claim for disparate treatment employment discrimination.
To allege a claim for disparate treatment discrimination, a plaintiff
must allege that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she was
subjected to an adverse employment action, and (3) her employer
subjected her to the adverse employment action because of her
membership in the protected class. See Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d
340, 344 (7th Cir.1994).1 Taylor alleges that her supervisor made her work
weekends and through lunch but did not make non-Black employees do so.
The question is whether making an employee work through lunch and on
weekends is an adverse employment action.
An adverse employment action is a significant adverse change in the
conditions of employment:
Although we define adverse employment action broadly, not
everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable
adverse action. For an employment action to be actionable, it
must be a significant change in employment status, such as
hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
1 In mixed motive cases, the party may be able to state a claim if she alleges that her membership in the
protected class was a motivating factor in the employer’s actions. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
different responsibility, or a decision causing a significant
change in benefits. We have noted that a materially adverse
employment action can be categorized into three groups: (1)
the employee's current wealth such as compensation, fringe
benefits, and financial terms of employment including
termination; (2) the employee's career prospects thus impacting
the employee's future wealth; and (3) changes to the
employee's work conditions including subjecting her to
humiliating, degrading, unsafe, unhealthy, or otherwise
significant negative alteration in [her] work place environment.
Lewis v. City of Chicago, 496 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2007)
(internal citations and quotations omitted). Taylor fails to allege that
making her work weekends and through lunch harmed her financially,
harmed her career prospects, or subjected her to a “humiliating, degrading,
unsafe, unhealthy, or otherwise significant negative” workplace
environment. She therefore fails to allege that she suffered an adverse
employment action by being required to work through lunch and on
weekends. She does not state a claim for disparate treatment employment
discrimination.
Taylor also fails to state a claim for disability discrimination. To allege
a claim for disparate treatment disability discrimination, a plaintiff must
allege that (1) she has a disability, (2) she was qualified to perform the
essential functions of her job with or without a reasonable accommodation;
(3) she was subjected to an adverse employment action, and (4) her
employer subjected her to the adverse employment action because she
was disabled. See Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 256 F.3d 568, 572-73.
Taylor did not allege any facts in her Complaint on any of these elements.
She only checked a box asking the Court to order Liberty Village to
reasonably accommodate her disabilities. Taylor does not state a claim.
Taylor, further, did not allege disability discrimination in her Charge.
She, therefore, cannot raise the claim in this case. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a);
Hale v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University School of
Medicine, 219 F.Supp.3d 860, 865 (C.D. Ill. 2016). Taylor cannot proceed
with her disability discrimination claim.
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Liberty Village Manor
Court’s Motion to Dismiss (d/e 19) is ALLOWED. Plaintiff Evet Taylor’s
racial harassment claims, or alternatively disparate treatment claims, and
her disability discrimination claims are DISMISSED. Plaintiff may proceed
with her Title VII claims that Defendant discriminated against her because
of her race when Defendant fired her and her claims that Defendant
retaliated against her for opposing discrimination. Defendant is directed to
answer Plaintiff’s remaining claims by August 27, 2021.
ENTER: August 12, 2021
s/ Tom Schanzle-Haskins
TOM SCHANZLE-HASKINS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE