Rushville plaintiff “is not similarly situated to an IDOC inmate.”
How later courts described this case
- Rushville plaintiff “is not similarly situated to an IDOC inmate.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MICHAEL W. SMITH, )
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 20-CV-4271
)
ERID KUNKEL, )
Defendant. )
)
CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER
JAMES E. SHADID, U.S. District Judge:
The pro se Plaintiff is detained in the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center
and seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The “privilege to proceed without posting
security for costs and fees is reserved to the many truly impoverished litigants who,
within the District Court's sound discretion, would remain without legal remedy if such
privilege were not afforded to them.” Brewster v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 461 F.2d 649,
651 (7th Cir. 1972). Additionally, a court must dismiss cases proceeding in forma
pauperis “at any time” if the action is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim, even if
part of the filing fee is paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)(2). Accordingly, this Court grants leave
to proceed in forma pauperis only if the allegations state a federal claim for relief.
In reviewing the Complaint, the Court accepts the factual allegations as true,
liberally construing them in Plaintiff's favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th
Cir. 2103). However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts
must be provided to "'state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'" Alexander v.
U.S., 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013)(citation omitted).
Plaintiff has identified one Defendant, Facility Director Eric Kunkel. Plaintiff
claims Defendant Kunkel has created and implemented a policy which prohibits all
residents “from buying or possessing a computer or any internet capable device and
from possessing an e-mail account or social media account.” (Comp., p. 2). Plaintiff
wishes to purchase a laptop for work related to his treatment and legal work and to
communicate with friends and family.
Prisons may implement restrictions if the limitation is “reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). In addition,
“persons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate
treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of
confinement are designed to punish.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321–22 (1982).
However, the Seventh Circuit has previously considered Rushville’s ban on
internet-capable devices and found the restriction was “in furtherance of legitimate
security interests.” Swanson v. Scott, 2020 WL 2494741, at *1 (C.D.Ill. May 14, 2020), citing
Brown v. Phillips, 801 F.3d 849, 855 (7th Cir. 2015). “The Appellate Court found that
absent such a prohibition, civilly committed sex offenders would be able to ‘contact
victims of their crimes’ and to ‘download, manipulate, share, and store illegal
pornography...” Swanson,, 2020 WL 2494741, at *1, quoting Brown, 801 F.3d at 855
(emphasis in original).
The Seventh Circuit further determined in Brown, that even if an
internet-capable device was purchased without Wi-Fi hardware,
the consoles still could wirelessly connect to the internet by plugging
into the console's Ethernet or USB port a device that would convert
the cable-only device to a wireless device. A resident could then
connect to the internet in several ways, including simply
asking outsiders to emit a wireless signal from a cell phone
in the parking lot. Swanson,, 2020 WL 2494741, at *2 (internal
citation omitted).
Therefore, even if Plaintiff maintains he intends to use a laptop for other
purposes, “[t]he prevailing caselaw in this Circuit squarely supports the Rushville
policy restricting detainees' access to internet-capable devices.” Swanson, 2020 WL
2494741(dismissing Rushville complaint alleging denial of internet access was a
violation of his First Amendment right to free association). Since the Appellate Court
has previously considered the policy and found it was constitutionally sound, Plaintiff’s
First Amendment claim is dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff next claims the policy violates his Equal Protection rights because
Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) inmates can purchase tablets. Even if
Plaintiff could prove such a policy existed, Plaintiff has failed to articulate an equal
protection claim since he is not similarly situation to an IDOC inmate. See Rapier v.
Harris, 172 F.3d 999, 1004 (7th Cir.1999) (pre-trial detainees are not similarly situated to
convicted prisoners); Smego v. Meza, 2015 WL 5636459, at *2 (C.D.Ill. June 27, 2015)
(Rushville plaintiff “is not similarly situated to an IDOC inmate.”).
IT IS ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff’s petition to proceed in forma pauperis is denied. [3]. Plaintiff’s
complaint is dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. The clerk is directed
to enter judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. The case is closed.
2. If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, he must file a notice of appeal
with this court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). A
motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis MUST set forth the issues Plaintiff plans to
present on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(C).
Entered this 22nd day of March, 2021.
s/James E. Shadid
_________________________________________
JAMES E. SHADID
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE