The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
DARIN WHITTEN, LISA C. KAISER, )
WILLIAM D. KAISER, DOROTHY )
TAFT, and JARED KERWIN, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Case No. 21-3023
)
ROCHESTER TOWNSHIP REPUBLICAN )
CENTRAL COMMITTEE; Rochester )
Township Republican Central )
Committeepersons THOMAS K. )
MUNROE, MARK C. WHITE, ANTHONY )
SAPUTO, MATTHEW BUTCHER, and )
DAVID ARMSTRONG, in their official )
Capacities as Committeepersons for the )
Rochester Township Republican Central )
Committee; LYNN CHARD, in her official )
Capacity as Clerk of Rochester Township; )
DON GRAY, in his official capacity as )
Clerk of Sangamon County; and DARRELL )
MAXHEIMER, )
)
Defendants. )
OPINION
RICHARD MILLS, United States District Judge:
This is an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, wherein Plaintiffs alleged their
constitutional rights were violated under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution.
The Plaintiffs also allege violations of the Illinois Constitution and Illinois
law.
Pending is Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order,
Preliminary or Permanent Injunction.
On January 28, 2021, the Court heard videoconference oral arguments on the
Plaintiffs’ motion.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
(A)
The Plaintiffs filed a Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and
Injunctive Relief against Defendants. The allegations center on the conduct of a
Caucus of the Rochester Township Republican Central Committee to nominate
candidates on behalf of the party for the April 6, 2021 consolidated election.
Plaintiff Darin Whitten was a registered voter and attendee at the Rochester
Township Republican Caucus on December 1, 2020, and was nominated at the
Caucus to be the Republican candidate for Rochester Township Highway
Commissioner.
Plaintiffs Lisa C. Kaiser, William D. Kaiser, Dorothy Taft and Jared Kerwin
were registered voters in Rochester Township, were qualified participants attending
the Caucus on December 1, 2020, and voted in said Caucus.
Pursuant to the Illinois Township Code, 60 ILCS 1/45-15, Defendant
Rochester Township Republican Central Committee makes nominations for
township candidates for the Republican Party.
Defendant Thomas K. Munroe, Mark C. White, Anthony Saputo, Matthew
Butcher and David Armstrong were at all relevant times the Rochester Township
Republican Precinct Committeepersons and constitute the Republican Township
Republican Central Committee (“Committee”). Munroe served as the Caucus
Chairman or Presiding Officer for the December 1, 2020 Caucus.
Defendant Lynn Chard was at all relevant times the Rochester Township
Clerk. Her duties included accepting the Committee’s nomination papers, which
stated who was nominated by the Caucus for each Township office to be elected at
the April 6, 2021 Consolidated Election. Chard also served as the Secretary of the
Caucus.
Defendant Don Gray is the Clerk of Sangamon County, Illinois. His duties
include accepting from the Rochester Township Clerk not less than 68 days before
the township election (by January 28, 2021) the Township Clerk’s certification of
the candidates nominated at the Caucus.
Defendant Darrell Maxheimer is the duly elected Road Commissioner of
Rochester Township. He is the purported winner of the Caucus vote for the
Republican nomination of Road Commissioner. Maxheimer’s name was certified
to the Township Clerk by Munroe, as the person nominated to be the Republican
Party Candidate for Road Commissioner at the Consolidated Election to be held on
April 6, 2021.
The Plaintiffs allege that members of the Committee failed to promulgate
rules of procedure as required for the Caucus. Ballots were printed before any
candidate was nominated. Ballots listed the name of each township office up for
election on April 6, 2021, and below each office was the name of only the incumbent
officeholder. Darrell Maxheimer was listed on the ballot as Road Commissioner.
The Plaintiffs allege the ballot instructed voters to “CIRCLE A NAME OR
WRITE IN CANDIDATE” and included a blank line below the incumbent
officeholder’s name. There were 115 persons who signed affidavits stating they
attended the Caucus. Twenty-two of those individuals, or 19.1%, did not attend the
Caucus inside. Those individuals drove in motor vehicles to the parking lot and were
asked by purported Caucus Judges if they wanted a ballot. All of the individuals
who voted outside cast their votes prior to the start of the Caucus at 7:15 p.m. The
ballots cast outside were brought inside when the Caucus started and placed in an
orange bucket on a table in the front of the room.
The Plaintiffs claim voting before candidates are nominated is contrary to due
process and all rules of parliamentary procedure, in addition to being contrary to
rules included in the Township Caucus Guide for 2021 issued by the Illinois State
Board of Elections. Moreover, the Caucus failed to approve or amend rules of
procedure for conducting a township caucus, in violation of Section 45-50 of the
Township Code.
The only candidates nominated for Township Road Commissioner at the
Caucus were Plaintiff Darin Whitten and Defendant Darrell Maxheimer. Only
Maxheimer’s name appeared on the ballot.
The Plaintiffs allege that a count of the 115 votes cast shows that in the race
for the nomination for Road Commissioner, Maxheimer had 1,2 or 3 more votes than
Whitten, depending on how a ballot is counted on which the voter wrote in Whitten’s
name and circled Maxheimer’s name. It is unclear whether the ballot counted for
Whitten, Maxheimer or was not counted.
Defendant Munroe certified Maxheimer as the Republican candidate for Road
Commissioner.
(B)
On December 23, 2020 in the Sangamon County Circuit Court, Case Number
2020-CH-201, the Plaintiffs filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief and an emergency motion for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction. The Parties are identical to the parties in this case and the
prayer for relief is almost exactly the same.
On January 5, 2021, Sangamon County Circuit Judge Gail Noll dismissed the
Plaintiffs’ claims on the basis that Plaintiffs had not first raised objections before the
appropriate election board as is required under the Illinois Election Code. Judge
Noll concluded the court lacked jurisdiction because Plaintiffs’ claims were not
brought pursuant to judicial review of an election board’s decision.
On January 7, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal and that appeal is
pending before the Appellate Court of Illinois. The Plaintiffs also moved to expedite
the appeal. At oral argument, Plaintiffs’ counsel said the motion to expedite was
denied.
The Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in this case on January 15, 2021. In Count
I, Plaintiffs seek Declaratory and Injunctive Relief under 10 ILCS 5/29-1, asking the
Court to declare the December 1, 2020 Rochester Republican Caucus invalid and
void because it violated the Illinois Township Code along with the Illinois and U.S.
Constitutions, seeking injunctive relief enjoining the certification of Defendant
Darrell Maxheimer as the Republican Candidate for Rochester Township Road
Commissioner or printing his name on the ballot for the April 6 election, and also
ordering Defendant Rochester Township Republican Central Committee to hold a
second Republican Caucus or a revote for the Republican nomination for Road
Commissioner.
In Count II, the Plaintiffs seek similar relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
alleged First and Fourteenth Amendment violations.
The Plaintiffs sought the same relief in the Sangamon County case.
On January 19, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed their emergency motion seeking
injunctive relief in this Court.
II. DISCUSSION
(A)
In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, a movant must establish (1) a
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) no adequate remedy at law exists; and (3)
irreparable harm will result if the injunction is not granted. See Foodcomm Intern.
v. Barry, 328 F.3d 300, 303 (7th Cir. 2003). The Court must also weigh the balance
of harm to the parties if the injunction is granted or denied and evaluate the effect of
an injunction on the public interest. See Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 665 (7th
Cir. 2013). “This equitable balancing proceeds on a sliding-scale analysis; the
greater the likelihood of success on the merits, the less heavily the balance of harms
must tip in the moving party’s favor.” Id.
The Defendants claim the Plaintiffs have no likelihood of success because the
claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462 (1983). “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies when the state court’s
judgment is the source of the injury of which plaintiffs complain in federal court.”
Richardson v. Koch Law Firm, P.C., 768 F.3d 732, 733 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293 (2005)). “A state
litigant seeking review of a state court judgment must follow the appellate process
through the state court system and then directly to the United States Supreme Court.”
Kelley v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 548 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 2008).
In Kelley, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit observed
that the Supreme Court had limited the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in Exxon Mobil.
See id. The doctrine is narrow and is confined to “cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district
court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of
those judgments.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006) (quoting Exxon Mobil,
544 U.S. at 284.
“Claims that directly seek to set aside a state court judgment are de facto
appeals which trigger the doctrine.” Sykes v. Cook County Circuit Court Probate
Division, 837 F,3d 736, 742 (7th Cir. 2016). Federal claims not raised in state court,
or those that do not appear to require review of a state court’s decision may still be
barred under Rooker-Feldman if there is “no way for the injury complained of by a
plaintiff to be separated from a state court judgment.” Id.
(B)
As the Court noted, Judge Noll determined that the Circuit Court of Sangamon
County lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the case under 735 ILCS 5/2-619. Prior to
that determination, Judge Noll found that “[t]he Illinois Election Code, 10 ILCS
5/10-8, and 5/10-9, provides Plaintiffs with a process to challenge procedures used
during a caucus election.” [d/e 7-2]. The Order further states, “Pursuant to the
Election Code, Plaintiffs are first required to raise any objections before the
appropriate election board. Thereafter, Plaintiffs may seek judicial review of the
Board’s decision.” Id.
The Plaintiffs claim they are not challenging that finding or seeking to
overturn the Sangamon County Circuit Court Order. Because the Plaintiffs are not
asking this Court to determine whether Illinois courts have subject matter
jurisdiction, they contend the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar the action.
Obviously, the Plaintiffs are challenging Judge Noll’s Order. In order for this
Court to grant the relief sought by the Plaintiffs, the Court necessarily would have
to find that Plaintiffs are not required under the Election Code to raise any objection
to the election board before seeking judicial review. That was Judge Noll’s
conclusion. The Plaintiffs are asking the Court to hold otherwise and allow the
dismissed state court claims to proceed in federal court. Federal courts do not exist
to provide disappointed state court litigants with “a second bite at the apple.” Matter
of Lisse, 921 F.3d 629, 641 (7th Cir. 2019).
In this case, both the Circuit Court of Sangamon County and the United States
District Court would have had subject matter jurisdiction. The Plaintiffs chose the
forum in which to pursue their claims. The Plaintiffs believe the Sangamon County
Circuit Court was in error in concluding they had a remedy under the Election Code.
Because the Plaintiffs decided to pursue their claims in state court, however, that is
an issue for the Appellate Court of Illinois, not a federal district court.
The Plaintiffs cite Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981 (8th Cir.
1995) as very similar to this case. The state court had dismissed the plaintiff’s suit
for lack of jurisdiction because the plaintiff did not follow the proper procedures for
a terminated public employee to obtain review of her termination in a Minnesota
state court. See id. at 983. The Eighth Circuit found that although Rooker-Feldman
precluded plaintiff’s state law claims in federal court because she had not first
obtained a writ of certiorari, her § 1983 claims were not barred. See id. at 984.
A crucial distinction between this case and Charchenko is that Plaintiffs here
sought the same relief on both counts in state court and federal court—specifically
enjoining certification of the purported Republican candidate for Rochester
Township Road Commissioner and ordering a second Republican Caucus for
nominating a Road Commissioner. This Court would have to determine that the
Sangamon County Circuit Court erred in determining that Plaintiffs had a remedy
under the Election Code. “[T]o determine whether Rooker-Feldman bars
Charchenko’s federal suit requires determining exactly what the state court held and
whether the relief requested by Charchenko in his federal action requires
determining the state court decision is wrong or would void its ruling.” Charchenko,
47 F.3d at 983. Because this Court would have to determine that the state court’s
decision was wrong in order to enjoin certification of the purported candidate and
order a second Republican Caucus or a revote for Road Commissioner, the Court
concludes that all of the Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by Rooker-Feldman.
If the Plaintiffs’ allegations are true, it appears there were major issues with
the December 1, 2020 Rochester Township Republican Caucus. Because the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes the claims in the Plaintiffs’ Complaint,
however, the Court must conclude that Plaintiffs have no likelihood of success on
the merits. When the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies, the suit should be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction. See Frederickson v. City of Lockport, 384 F.3d 437, 439
(7th Cir. 2004). The Court will terminate the Plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief
and dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Ergo, this case is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Clerk will terminate any pending motions [d/e 2].
ENTER: February 1, 2021
FOR THE COURT:
/s/ Richard Mills
Richard Mills
United States District Judge