“Prison grievance procedures are not mandated by the First Amendment and do not by their very existence create interests protected by the Due Process Clause.”
How later courts described this case
- “Prison grievance procedures are not mandated by the First Amendment and do not by their very existence create interests protected by the Due Process Clause.”
- supervisors are not liable for the errors of their subordinates
- supervisor liability not permitted under § 1983
- holding that placement of inmate in non-disciplinary segregation for three months did not create liberty interest
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JUAN MENESES, )
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) No. 20-2233
)
JOHN BALDWIN, et. al., )
Defendants. )
MERIT REVIEW ORDER
JAMES E. SHADID, U.S. District Judge:
This cause is before the Court for merit review of the Plaintiff’s complaint. The
Court is required by 28 U.S.C. §1915A to “screen” the Plaintiff’s complaint, and through
such process to identify and dismiss any legally insufficient claim, or the entire action if
warranted. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §1915A.
Plaintiff, a pro se prisoner, claims his constitutional rights were violated by
Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) Director John Baldwin, Correctional Officer
G. Stuck, Administrative Review Board (ARB) Member Debbie Knauer, John or Jane
Doe investigators, and John or Jane Doe transfer coordinators.
On June 1, 2018, Plaintiff was taken to Internal Affairs at Danville Correctional
Center. Plaintiff was asked whether he knew anything about a romantic relationship
between his vocational teacher and another inmate. Plaintiff said he did not, and the
interview ended.
Plaintiff was called back three days later for additional questioning. Plaintiff
says he was placed in segregation “under Investigative Status.” (Comp, p. 5). On June 6,
2018, Plaintiff received a disciplinary ticket informing him he was under investigation.
Plaintiff says at some unspecified time, Defendant Officer Stuck told Plaintiff the
inmate involved in the relationship said Plaintiff was his “look-out.” (Comp., p. 6).
Defendant Stuck asked Plaintiff if he would agree to “voice stress analysis.” (Comp., p.
6). Plaintiff agreed, passed the test, but remained in segregation.
On June 27, 2018, Plaintiff was transferred to segregation at Big Muddy
Correctional Center. However, when he arrived, Plaintiff says he was released from
segregation, so it is unclear if he spent any additional time in a segregation cell.
On July 6, 2018, Plaintiff filed a grievance asking for “the good conduct credits
for his contract signed at Danville” and a transfer to another facility. (Comp., p. 7).
Defendants Baldwin and Knauer addressed Plaintiff’s grievance without a hearing and
awarded the good conduct credits. Plaintiff has attached the response to his grievance
noting his request for good conduct credits was “moot” since they had already been
awarded and he could speak to his counselor about a transfer if he was eligible. (Comp.,
p. 13).
Plaintiff says Defendant Stuck retaliated against him by placing him in
segregation without due process. Plaintiff also says he was denied due process before
he was transferred to segregation and transferred to another facility. Plaintiff further
claims this transfer was retaliatory.
Plaintiff has failed to clearly articulate a violation of his First Amendment rights.
To state a retaliation claim, Plaintiff must allege “(1) he engaged in activity protected by
the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation likely to deter such activity; and (3)
the First Amendment activity was at least a motivating factor in the decision to impose
the deprivation.” Hawkins v. Mitchell, 756 F.3d 983, 996 (7th Cir. 2014). Plaintiff has
failed to identify a protected activity. See i.e. Knox v. Wainscott, 2003 WL 21148973, at *8
(N.D.Ill. May 14, 2003)(investigation and refusal to answer questions is not a protected
activity).
It is also unclear from Plaintiff’s complaint if he was ever found guilty of any
offense. Plaintiff’s complaint states his due process rights were violated because he
remained in investigative or administrative segregation for approximately three weeks.
However, to articulate a constitutional violation, Plaintiff must be able to show the
resulting sanction deprived him of life, liberty, or property. See Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d
508, 524 (7th Cir. 2017). As a rule, a prisoner has no protected liberty interest in
remaining in the general population of a prison, except in rare cases where “segregation
conditions ... constitute an ‘atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to
the ordinary incidents of prison life.’” Thomas v Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 760 (7th Cir.
1997)(internal citation omitted); see also Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 771 (7th Cir.
2008)(holding that placement of inmate in non-disciplinary segregation for three
months did not create liberty interest).
In addition, Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to a hearing on his
grievance. See Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011)(“Prison grievance
procedures are not mandated by the First Amendment and do not by their very
existence create interests protected by the Due Process Clause.”).
Plaintiff is also advised he must only identify Defendants who were directly
involved in his allegations. In order to hold an individual liable under Section 1983,
Plaintiff must “show that the defendants were personally responsible for the
deprivation of their rights.” Wilson v. Warren Cty., Illinois, 2016 WL 3878215, at *3 (7th
Cir. 2016). “A defendant is personally responsible ‘if the conduct causing the
constitutional deprivation occurs at his direction or with his knowledge and consent.’”
Id. quoting Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995). It is doubtful the IDOC
Director had any direct involvement in Plaintiff’s claims.
Further, the mere fact that a defendant was a supervisor is insufficient to
establish liability because the doctrine of respondeat superior (supervisor liability) does
not apply to actions filed under 42 USC §1983. See Smith v. Gomez, 550 F.3d 613, 616 (7th
Cir. 2008)(supervisor liability not permitted under § 1983); Pacelli v. DeVito, 972 F.2d
871, 877 (7th Cir. 1992)( supervisors are not liable for the errors of their subordinates).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed for failure to articulate a
constitutional violation. The Court will allow Plaintiff time to file an amended
complaint if he can clarify his allegations. The amended complaint must include all
claims and defendants and must stand complete on its own without reference to any
previous filing.
If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he must state whether he was
ever disciplined by the Administrative Review Board and if so, what discipline he
received. Plaintiff should also name the Defendants directly responsible for his
allegations. If he is unsure of a specific name, he can instead provide a description such
as job title and to the extent possible, hours worked and physical description.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.
2) Plaintiff may file a proposed amended complaint on or before December 15,
2020. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint on or before December 15,
2020 or fails to follow the Court’s instructions, his case will be dismissed without
prejudice.
3) The Clerk is to provide Plaintiff with a blank complaint form to assist him and
reset the internal merit review deadline within 30 days of this order.
Entered this 20th day of November, 2020.
s/James E. Shadid
_________________________________________
JAMES E. SHADID
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE