“We hardly need add that if delay is attributable to the defendant, then his waiver may be given effect under standard waiver doctrine.”
How later courts described this case
- “We hardly need add that if delay is attributable to the defendant, then his waiver may be given effect under standard waiver doctrine.”
- “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
URBANA DIVISION
MICHAEL A. PAYNE, II, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. 20-cv-2293
)
ANTONIO BROWN, )
Sheriff, Macon County )
)
Respondent. )
ORDER AND OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
Now before the Court is Petitioner Michael A. Payne’s Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1).
Payne is a state pre-trial detainee being held at the Macon County
Jail in Decatur, Illinois. He claims his constitutional rights to a
speedy trial are being violated and that his bond should not have
been forfeited. For the reasons below, the Court concludes that the
Petition does not survive preliminary review under 28 U.S.C. § 2243
and Rule 1(b) and Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254
Proceedings for the United States District Courts and the Petition is
SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
I. BACKGROUND
Payne is detained and awaiting trial for criminal charges
brought in Macon County, Illinois. He has also been released on
bond pursuant to criminal charges brought in Montgomery County.
Payne filed the instant Petition (Doc. 1) on October 16, 2020. Payne
argues that his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights
under the United States Constitution are being violated. He
specifically mentions his speedy trial rights, complains that
warrants for his arrest should not have been issued, and that his
bond should not have been forfeited.
The Court takes judicial notice of the dockets in Payne’s
multiple state court proceedings. See Ennenga v. Starns, 677 F.3d
766, 774 (7th Cir. 2012). On March 2, 2020, Payne was charged by
Information with two counts of failing to register as a sex offender in
Macon County Circuit Court, Case No. 2020-CF-302. Also in
Macon County Circuit Court, on March 4, 2020 in Case No. 2020-
CM-142, an Information charged Payne with criminal trespass to a
vehicle. In both cases were continued on Motion of the defendant in
the beginning of May 2020. Payne was released on bond on or
about May 12, 2020. The dockets then show that Payne failed to
appear for hearings in both cases on June 2, 2020. A notice of
hearing in Case No. 2020-CF-302 was mailed to his last known
address, but Payne again failed to appear for hearings in both cases
on June 19, 2020. At this time, his bond was revoked in Case No.
2020-CF-302 and the court granted the state’s motion for a no-
bond bench warrant. The warrant was not prepared and signed,
however, until August 20, 2020.
In Case No. 2020-CM-142, the case was continued to August
3, 2020. Payne again did not appear, and the case was continued
on motion of the defendant until August 25, 2020 and notice was
mailed to Payne. Payne did not appear at his August 25, 2020
hearing. On September 15, 2020, a bench warrant was issued with
a bond set at $5,000.
Payne also has a pending charge for failure to register as a sex
offender in Macon County Circuit Court, Case No. 2020-CF-1059,
opened on August 25, 2020.
Meanwhile, Payne was arrested and charged with possession
of less than 5 grams of methamphetamine in Montgomery County
Circuit Court, Case No. 2020-CF-214, on or about July 27, 2020.
Payne was released on bond in this case on September 29, 2020,
but the docket notes that he was to be released to Macon County
pursuant to the bench warrants.
Payne states that he was picked up by Macon County officials
on October 2, 2020. Since then, Payne has been in custody on the
Macon County charges and detained at the Macon County Jail in
Decatur, Illinois. A disposition hearing has been set in his original
case, 2020-CF-302, for October 29, 2020.
II. DISCUSSION
Payne argues that he is entitled to federal habeas corpus relief
because his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights are
being violated by delays in his state court criminal proceedings.
However, generally, as long as the state court provides an
opportunity to raise federal claims, federal courts must abstain
from interfering in state court proceedings unless “exceptional
circumstances” exist. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43, 91 S. Ct.
746 (1971); Stroman Realty, Inc., v. Martinez, 505 F.3d 657, 662
(7th Cir. 2007). For this reason, federal habeas corpus is not
available “absent ‘special circumstances,’ to adjudicate the merits of
an affirmative defense to a state criminal charge prior to a judgment
of conviction by a state court.” Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit
Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 489, 93 S. Ct. 1123, 1127 (1973).
Exceptional circumstances do exist where a petitioner is seeking “to
demand enforcement of the Commonwealth’s affirmative
constitutional obligation to bring him promptly to trial” and “he has
exhausted all available state court remedies for consideration of
that constitutional claim.” Id. at 490. See also, Cole v. Beck, 765
Fed. Appx. 137, 138 (7th Cir. 2019) (“A well-founded claim that a
petitioner’s right to a speedy trial has been violated can be an
exceptional circumstance because immediate federal intervention is
necessary to prevent the challenge from becoming moot.”).
Here, the majority of Payne’s Petition focuses on alleged
violations of Illinois statutory rights that are not cognizable in
federal habeas review regardless of the Younger abstention doctrine.
Payne alleges he has been denied his right to a preliminary hearing
within thirty days of the date he was taken into custody on his
criminal trespass to a motor vehicle case in Macon County Circuit
Court, Case No. 2020-CM-142 . See 725 ILCS 5/109-3.1(a), Ill.
Const. art. I, § 7 (“No person shall be held to answer for a crime
punishable by death or by imprisonment in the penitentiary unless
either the initial charge has been brought by indictment of a grand
jury or the person has been given a prompt preliminary hearing to
establish probable cause.”). Payne also argues that he has been
denied his Illinois state right to a trial within 160 days. See 725
ILCS 5/103-5 (“Every person on bail or recognizance shall be tried
by the court having jurisdiction within 160 days from the date
defendant demands trial” barring certain exceptions). However, the
federal writ of habeas corpus is only available to Payne if he is being
held “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Therefore, Payne’s allegations of
Illinois state law violations are not cognizable in federal habeas
review. Payne’s challenge to his bond forfeitures are also not
cognizable in federal habeas review for the additional reason that
they do not concern his custody. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241; Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (“[T]he essence of habeas
corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody.”). Accordingly, these claims are summarily dismissed.
To the extent Payne’s Petition also alleges his Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial is being violated, this could
present an “exceptional circumstance” wherein the Younger
doctrine does not apply. However, Payne has not attempted to
exhaust his state court remedies regarding his constitutional claim.
None of the dockets in his criminal case reference any motions
related to Payne’s speedy trial rights, and Payne’s Petition only
states that he filed motions to quash his subpoenas, nothing related
to his speedy trial rights.
Moreover, the Court finds Payne cannot show that his right to
a speedy trial has been violated. The Sixth Amendment guarantees
that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Supreme
Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192
(1972), set forth the standard governing Sixth Amendment speedy
trial violations. Pursuant to Barker, the Court must consider
“whether delay before trial was uncommonly long, whether the
government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that
delay, whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a
speedy trial, and whether he suffered prejudice as” a result of the
delay. Ashburn v. Korte, 761 F.3d 741, 751–52 (7th Cir. 2014)
(citations omitted).
The first Barker factor is the length of delay. This factor “acts
as a triggering mechanism; unless a presumptively prejudicial
amount of time elapsed in the district court, it is unnecessary to
conduct a searching analysis of all the factors.” United States v.
Oriedo, 498 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 2007). The Seventh Circuit has
generally found delays approaching one year to be presumptively
prejudicial and trigger a more thorough analysis. Id. (citing United
States v. White, 443 F.3d 582, 589-90 (2006)). Here, the original
Macon County cases have not even been pending for eight months.
Accordingly, at this time, the delay has not reached the “bare
minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim.”
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2691
(1992).
With regard to the second Barker factor—the cause for the
delay—this factor weighs heavily against finding any constitutional
violation. The delays are almost exclusively attributable to Payne,
and, therefore, the delays act as a waiver of his speedy trial rights.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 529 (“We hardly need add that if delay is
attributable to the defendant, then his waiver may be given effect
under standard waiver doctrine.”). Here, Payne’s cases have mostly
been delayed due to his failure to appear in court or due to defense
continuances. While Payne states in his Petition that he “notified
his court appointed attorney every time he could not appear in
Court,” this certainly does not transfer responsibility for the delay
to the state. Again, this factor does not favor finding a speedy trial
violation.
The third Barker factor is whether Payne has asserted his
right to a speedy trial. Payne does not allege that he has done so in
his Petition, and the dockets in his criminal cases do not contain
any references to alleged speedy trial violations. Accordingly, this
factor does not help Payne either.
The final Barker factor assesses the prejudice to the
defendant. Prejudice should be assessed in light of the interests the
speedy trial right was designed to protect, specifically, “(i) to prevent
oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and the
concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the
defense will be impaired.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. Payne has only
been detained for part of the eight-month period related to his
Macon County charges—at this time it appears he was detained two
and a half months prior to his May 12, 2020 release on bond and
another half a month since he was picked up from Montgomery
County. Moreover, Payne has made no claims that any defense
witnesses will become unavailable or that his defense is otherwise
tangibly impaired.
As none of the four Barker factors lean in his favor, the Court
finds that Payne’s claim that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy
trial has been violated does not have merit. Accordingly, this claim
is summarily dismissed as well.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Petitioner Michael P. Payne’s
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(Doc. [1]) is SUMMARILY DISMISSED. This case is CLOSED.
ENTER: October 20, 2020
FOR THE COURT:
/s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE