The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION
JESSE GUARDIOLA, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2:19-cv-2287
)
F. ENTZEL, )
)
Respondent. )
ORDER & OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Jesse Guardiola’s Petition for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1). At the Court’s direction, the
Government filed a Response (Doc. 2) and Petitioner has filed a Reply (Doc. 7). The
matter is therefore ripe for review. For the reasons stated herein, the Petition is
DENIED.
BACKGROUND
A lengthy background is unnecessary. In October 2016 Petitioner pled guilty
to five counts of possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
In Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), the Supreme Court held the word
“knowingly” in § 922(g) applies to the status making it unlawful to possess a firearm,
in addition to knowledge that the object possessed was a firearm. It appears
uncontested that Petitioner was not told he needed to know he had been convicted of
a felony or asked about such knowledge in colloquy—at the time, the scienter
requirement was not understood to apply to knowledge of one’s status. Petitioner
therefore filed the instant petition arguing he ought not remain imprisoned pursuant
to his plea.
LEGAL STANDARD
A legal labyrinth confronts prisoners held pursuant to a federal sentence
seeking relief through 28 U.S.C. § 2241. A person may only challenge a federal
conviction or sentence under § 2241 if 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), the “savings clause,”
allows. Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1135 (7th Cir. 2015) (en banc). Section
2255(e) permits recourse through § 2241 only where the motion provided under §
2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality” of the challenged detention. §
2255(e); Webster, 784 F.3d at 1135. The Seventh Circuit has held § 2255 is inadequate
or ineffective where:
(1) the claim relies on a statutory interpretation case, not a
constitutional case and thus could not have been invoked by a successive
§ 2255 motion; (2) the petitioner could not have invoked the decision in
his first § 2255 motion and the decision applies retroactively; and (3) the
error is grave enough to be deemed a miscarriage of justice.
Beason v. Marske, 926 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 2019).
The claim must also not be procedurally defaulted, which is to say it must have
been raised on direct review. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998). If a
claim has been procedurally defaulted, a petitioner may only raise it upon a showing
of either cause and prejudice or actual innocence. Id. Only if a claim meets all these
requirements may a court consider a petition on the merits.
Finally, Petitioner is proceeding pro se. Pro se filings are to be liberally
construed. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
DISCUSSION
The Government argues as an initial matter Petitioner cannot utilize § 2241
because he never filed a § 2255 petition and thus is not barred by § 2255(h)(2). This
issue is far from open and shut, as the Government suggests.
The Seventh Circuit’s precedent on § 2255(e) springs from In re Davenport, 147
F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 1998). As the Seventh Circuit explained, one of the petitioners in
that case “could not use a first motion under [§ 2255] to obtain relief on a basis not
yet established by law. He could not use a second or other successive motion to obtain
that relief because the basis on which he seeks relief is neither newly discovered
evidence nor a new rule of constitutional law.” Id. at 610. There is no doubt that issues
with § 2255(h)(2), according to the Seventh Circuit, form a structural inadequacy with
§ 2255 sufficient to allow a § 2241 petition.
However, there may be a similar structural issue with § 2255(f). That section
sets a one-year statute of limitations for filing § 2255 motions, which runs from the
date on which: (1) the judgment becomes final, § 2255(f)(1); (2) an impediment created
by the United States is removed, § 2255(f)(2); (3) the Supreme Court decides a new
rule of constitutional law (which must also be made retroactive), § 2255(f)(3); or (4)
evidence supporting a claim could have been discovered with reasonable diligence, §
2255(f)(4). Subsection (f)(3) parallels subsection (h)(2) and similarly fails to take into
account the potential for a new statutory interpretation case. Both subsections cut off
federal prisoners’ access to habeas relief where their claim is statutory while allowing
similarly situated constitutional claims. So a petitioner might be unable to bring a §
2255 motion within the statute of limitations because the law on which he seeks to
rely does not yet exist but not be able to bring a later one because the statute has run
and the claim relies on a new case of statutory interpretation.
At least one Seventh Circuit judge construed at least one Seventh Circuit panel
as recognizing the similarity between (f)(3) and (h)(2) and allowing a § 2241 petition
where a § 2255 petition would not have been allowed under § 2255(f). Brown v.
Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 596 (7th Cir. 2013) (Easterbrook, C.J., statement concerning
circulation under Circuit Rule 40(e)) (“Relying on [Davenport], the panel concludes
that a § 2255 motion is ‘ineffective’ when the prisoner relies on a non-constitutional
decision rendered after the statute of limitations in § 2255(f) expired.”). The Seventh
Circuit’s opinion was not quite as clear as the statement on this point—frankly, the
Court is uncertain whether the Seventh Circuit has conclusively decided this issue.
The Court also has some serious reservations about not allowing recourse
through § 2241 in these circumstances under the current Seventh Circuit § 2241
precedent. Chief among them is the horribly skewed incentive structure; a prisoner
who filed an utterly frivolous and incomprehensible § 2255 within a year of conviction
would be able to file a § 2241 while a similarly situated litigant who forbore straining
the judicial system in recognition of the meritless nature of his claims would
effectively be penalized for having done so. However, Petitioner, proceeding pro se,
does not adequately address this issue in his Reply, the Government has not provided
citations for its argument that § 2255(e) will not admit of a potential structural error
with § 2255(f), and the Court’s unaided research is no match for the proper
functioning of the adversary system. The Court is loath to answer a tricky doctrinal
question on such sparse argumentation.
The Court will therefore turn to the Davenport test and assume, for the sake
of argument, the lack of a renewed statute of limitations following a new statutory
Supreme Court decision presents the sort of structural problem which could allow a
prisoner to turn to § 2241.
The Court finds Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a miscarriage of justice;
his petition must accordingly be denied. In his Reply, Petitioner concedes he knew he
was a felon, but argues he believed his rights were restored so he did not know he
was forbidden to possess firearms. (Doc. 7 at 14). The Western District of Wisconsin
recently encountered a materially indistinguishable case and concluded:
The government did not need to prove that petitioner specifically knew
that he was legally prohibited from possessing a firearm. Rather, as
applied to this case, Rehaif required the government to prove that
petitioner knew that he was a felon at the time he possessed a firearm.
Assuming that the government failed to put in evidence sufficient to
prove that petitioner knew he was a felon, any error was harmless.
Petitioner does not deny that he knew he had been convicted of a felony
at the time he possessed a firearm. He states that he stipulated at trial
that he was a felon, and court records from his criminal case show that
he had been convicted of at least five prior felonies, including three for
violent robberies. . . . In light of his extensive criminal history, petitioner
has provided no basis to conclude that a reasonable juror could have
inferred that he was somehow unaware that he had been convicted of
one or more felonies when he possessed the firearm. Therefore, the
government’s failure to prove this element of the offense was harmless,
and did not amount to a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, petitioner
has not shown that he is entitled to relief under § 2241.
Benson v. Marske, No. 19-CV-644-BBC, 2019 WL 6683508, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 6,
2019). This Court agrees. The only argument that might exist utilizing Rehaif
through § 2241 is that a person was unaware of his or her status, but this Petitioner
clearly was and concedes that point. His argument must therefore fail.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner Jesse Guardiola’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28
U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) is DENIED and this matter is TERMINATED.
SO ORDERED.
Entered this 7th day of January 2020.
s/ Joe B. McDade
JOE BILLY McDADE
United States Senior District Judge