no due process violation because state claims court is adequate post-deprivation remedy
How later courts described this case
- no due process violation because state claims court is adequate post-deprivation remedy
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ELIZABETH PETERS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 17-cv-01494-JES-JEH
)
KATHLEEN TREANOR and ZHIHONG )
ZHANG, )
Defendants. )
ORDER AND OPINION
This case comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 55) for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Defendants filed a supporting memorandum (Doc. 56), and Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. 61).
For the reasons that follow, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a pro se litigant seeking relief against employees of McFarland Mental Health
Center for (1) reporting false information to the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), causing
a loss of three months of social security payments and (2) wrongfully withholding her
prescription medications and Catholic Bible when she left the facility. Doc. 33, p. 4. Originally,
Plaintiff brought this case against the institution of McFarland itself and the Social Security
Administration—she sought and received default judgment against McFarland when they failed
to respond to her claims, and the claim against the Social Security Administration was dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction. Doc. 22; September 4, 2018 Text Entry. However, McFarland
successfully moved to vacate that judgment on October 24, 2018 by indicating to the Court that
McFarland is an arm of the Illinois Department of Human Services, which is immune from suit
under the Eleventh Amendment. Doc. 25. The Court therefore vacated the judgment and gave
Plaintiff the opportunity to amend her complaint, noting that the deprivation of Plaintiff’s
property by a state entity was likely best addressed by the Illinois Court of Claims and that any
suit against individual employees of McFarland would likely be limited to prospective injunctive
relief. Doc. 29, p. 6.
Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint (Doc. 33) against two individual employees of
McFarland, whom she claims are responsible for her lost Social Security wages, prescription
medications, and Bible. These Defendants now move to dismiss the Amended Complaint on two
grounds: (1) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief with respect to the lost Social Security
wages, as she was prohibited by law from receiving Social Security benefits while she was at
McFarland and the employees played no role in causing her confinement there, and (2) this Court
lacks jurisdiction to grant her relief with respect to the medications and Bible because the Illinois
Court of Claims Act provides the Court of Claims with exclusive jurisdiction over suits against
state employees that would operate to subject the State to liability. Doc. 56, pp. 2–6. Plaintiff
contends that “The State of Illinois Court of Claims cannot address the violation of plaintiff’s
constitutional and civil rights by the defendants, which is documented in the filings on the case
docket. This is a federal court complaint and will not be solved in the State of Illinois Court.”
Doc. 61, p. 3. She further contends that the defendants were acting outside of their capacities as
State of Illinois employees when they committed the alleged acts. Id. This Order follows.
LEGAL STANDARD
Courts may dismiss complaints for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). In evaluating a complaint for subject matter jurisdiction, courts
accept all well-pleaded facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, but may
look outside the pleadings to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. See Evers v.
Astrue, 536 F.3d 651, 656 (7th Cir. 2008); St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago,
502 F.2d 616, 625 (7th Cir. 2007). Additionally, courts may dismiss complaints that fail to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Courts
likewise accept all well-pleaded facts as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff in determining whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 670 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)).
DISCUSSION
The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for which her sought Social Security
wages are available as relief. While Plaintiff alleges that she did not receive Social Security
benefits because of a clerical error involving the entry of a criminal conviction date into a Social
Security database, the records attached to Defendants’ motion clearly indicate (and Plaintiff does
not dispute) that she was confined to McFarland from April 2017 until July 2017 as unfit to stand
trial for a criminal charge. Doc. 56, Exhs. 1–4. Under 42 U.S.C. § 402(x)(1)(A), Plaintiff was not
eligible to receive these benefits while she was confined at McFarland in connection with her
criminal trial. As such, the relief she seeks in the Complaint is unavailable, even taking as true
her assertions that Defendants entered false criminal convictions into a Social Security database.
The Court therefore GRANTS dismissal with respect to Plaintiff’s claim for monetary damages
arising from nonpayment of Social Security benefits.
Plaintiff’s remaining claims involve Defendant Treanor’s alleged wrongful withholding
of Plaintiff’s prescription medications and Bible. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Treanor’s
failure to return her prescription medications and Bible violated clearly-established federal law
and her constitutional right to due process, given that she received neither pre- nor post-
deprivation hearings with respect to that property. Doc. 33, pp. 6–9. Plaintiff claims that she
asked Defendant Treanor to include her prescriptions and Bible with her property when she
learned she would be discharged, and that Defendant Treanor assured her those would be
included with her property, yet they ultimately were not. Id. at p. 27.
Defendants hold that Plaintiff’s claims for her personal property are barred by sovereign
immunity, even if Defendant Treanor wrongfully withheld Plaintiff’s medications and Bible.
That is, because she was a state employee allegedly breaching a duty that only arose due to her
employment with the state, sovereign immunity applies and the only remedy available is through
the Illinois Court of Claims. See Fritz v. Johnston, 807 N.E.2d 461, 466–67 (Ill. 2004); see also
Murdock v. Washington, 193 F.3d 510, 513 (7th Cir. 1999) (no due process violation because
state claims court is adequate post-deprivation remedy). The Court finds that because Plaintiff’s
claim against Defendant Treanor (whether in her individual or official capacity) is based on an
alleged breach that arose solely from her employment with the state entity of McFarland,
sovereign immunity bars jurisdiction over that claim. The Court GRANTS dismissal on the
personal property claims as well, for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiff is reminded that the Illinois
Court of Claims is an appropriate forum in which to seek recovery of her belongings against a
state institution.
On July 22nd, 2019, Plaintiff filed a document entitled “Notice of Transfer.” Doc. 68.
The filing is unclear about its intended effect—Plaintiff cites Fed. R. Civ. P. 3, asks that the
Seventh Circuit “hear the above complaint,” and requests a hearing “for the appellees/defendants
to pay the appellant/plaintiff’s money, which are not disputed dollars.” Doc. 68, p. 3. Plaintiff
has previously attempted to appeal in this case, filing an appeal while awaiting an answer to her
Amended Complaint. Doc. 36. As the Seventh Circuit noted at that time, Plaintiff’s case was not
yet at an end, and the appellate court therefore lacked jurisdiction. Doc. 44 (Mandate in Case No.
19-1129). To the extent that Plaintiff intended for this recent filing to act as a motion for an
interlocutory appeal, and in the interest of saving Plaintiff an additional $505 filing fee, the
motion is moot in light of this dispositive order.1 If Plaintiff is inclined to appeal this order, she is
directed to file a Notice of Appeal within 30 days of the entry of the judgment or order appealed
from, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 55) is GRANTED for
lack of jurisdiction. The Clerk is directed to forward Plaintiff a copy of Appellate Form 1, Notice
of Appeal to a Court of Appeals From a Judgment or Order of a District Court. This matter is
now terminated.
Signed on this 24th day of July, 2019.
/s James E. Shadid
James E. Shadid
United States District Judge
1 For clarity, if Plaintiff were granted leave to file an interlocutory appeal, she would be obligated to pay a $505
filing fee. When that interlocutory appeal concluded, she would be directed back to the district court, and an appeal
of a final order on the motion to dismiss would require an additional $505 filing fee. Because this order terminates
the matter, an appeal by Plaintiff after this point will only require one filing fee.