“Establishing Monell liability based on evidence of inadequate training or supervision requires proof of ‘deliberate indifference’ on the part of the local government.”
How later courts described this case
- “Establishing Monell liability based on evidence of inadequate training or supervision requires proof of ‘deliberate indifference’ on the part of the local government.”
- “It has long been established that there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
ROBERT HUMES, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 3:19-CV-3050
)
SAMUEL ROSARIO, in his official )
and individual capacities; KENNY )
WINSLOW, in his official and )
individual capacities; and THE )
CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS, )
)
Defendants. )
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
In February 2019, Plaintiff Robert Humes filed a five-count
Complaint against Defendants Samuel Rosario, who was at all
times relevant employed as a police officer for the City of
Springfield; Kenny Winslow, the Chief of Police; and the City of
Springfield, Illinois. Officer Rosario and Chief Winslow are sued in
their official and individual capacities. Plaintiff brings claims
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Officer Rosario
unreasonably seized Plaintiff and deprived Plaintiff of liberty
without due process of law in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution (Count
One) and alleging that Chief Winslow and the City of Springfield
failed to train Officer Rosario and other officers in the Springfield
Police Department (Count Two). Plaintiff also brings state law
claims against Officer Rosario for assault and battery and against
the City under a respondeat superior liability theory (Counts Three
through Five).
The City and Chief Winslow move to dismiss the claims
against them. The Motion to Dismiss (d/e 4) is GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART. Count Two is dismissed without
prejudice for failure to state a claim. Count Five states a claim
that the City is liable under a theory of respondeat superior for
Officer Rosario’s alleged assault and battery of Plaintiff.
I. JURISDICTION
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff
brings claims based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law. See 28
U.S.C. ' 1331 (AThe district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States@). The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Venue is
proper because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to Plaintiff=s claims occurred in this district. 28 U.S.C.
' 1391(b)(2).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the
complaint. Christensen v. Cty. of Boone, Ill., 483 F.3d 454, 458
(7th Cir. 2007). To state a claim for relief, a plaintiff need only
provide a short and plain statement of the claim showing the
plaintiff is entitled to relief and giving the defendants fair notice of
the claims. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir.
2008).
When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true and
construing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor. Id.
However, the complaint must set forth facts that plausibly
demonstrate a claim for relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 547 (2007). A plausible claim is one that alleges factual
content from which the Court can reasonably infer that the
defendants are liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Merely reciting the elements of a cause
of action or supporting claims with conclusory statements is
insufficient to state a cause of action. Id.
III. FACTS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT
The following facts come from the Complaint and are accepted
as true at the motion to dismiss stage. Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1081.
On February 27, 2017, Officer Rosario arrived at
Plaintiff’s residence to investigate a possible crime committed
by an individual other than Plaintiff. Compl. ¶ 9. During
Officer Rosario’s official investigation of the possible crime, he
had a conversation with Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 10. During the
conversation with Plaintiff, Officer Rosario suddenly “assaulted
and beat” Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 11. Officer Rosario tackled Plaintiff,
physically restrained him, and repeatedly punched Plaintiff on
his face, head, and other parts of his body. Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff
did not verbally or physically provoke Officer Rosario. Id. ¶
12. Officer Rosario did not witness Plaintiff commit a crime or
have probable cause to believe Plaintiff committed any crime.
Id. ¶ 15. Officer Rosario’s assault on Plaintiff resulted in
Plaintiff being physically and emotionally injured and made to
suffer public ridicule and personal embarrassment. Id. ¶ 18.
Plaintiff further alleges that Chief Winslow and the City
were responsible for the administration of the Springfield
Police Department and the development of policy and training
of said department. Compl. ¶¶ 19, 20. Chief Winslow and the
City failed to properly train and instruct Officer Rosario and
officers of the Springfield Police Department and this failure
resulted in Plaintiff being subjected to an unjustified assault.
Id. ¶ 28. Chief Winslow and the City knew that their course
and habits of conduct violated known and established
constitutionally protected rights and that their acts were
carried out willfully, wantonly, maliciously, and with deliberate
indifference to the rights of Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 30, 31.
In May 2019, the City and Chief Winslow filed a Motion
to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Defendants move to dismiss Count Two, the failure
to train claim against the City and Chief Winslow, and Count
Five, the respondeat superior claim against the City.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Count Two is Dismissed For Failure to State a Claim
The City moves to dismiss Count Two, the failure to train
claim, arguing that the Complaint consists solely of conclusory
allegations unsupported by any accompanying facts other than
Plaintiff’s own experience of alleged excessive force. Chief Winslow
moves to dismiss Count II against him in his official capacity for the
same reasons raised by the City. Chief Winslow further argues that
the claim against him in his individual capacity fails because
Plaintiff does not allege any direct or personal involvement or
participation by Chief Winslow regarding the incident and the
alleged injuries suffered by Plaintiff.
Plaintiff responds that Officer Rosario’s alleged assault of
Plaintiff, while knowing his conduct was being video recorded, is a
clear indication of either Officer Rosario’s lack of training or the
failure to train by the City or Chief Winslow. Plaintiff asserts that
Officer Rosario’s “brazen misconduct” alone suggests a widespread
practice.
A municipality can be liable under § 1983 where a custom,
policy, or practice effectively caused or condoned the alleged
constitutional violations. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City
of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978); see also Matthews v. City
of E. St. Louis, 675 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2012). A claim against
a city employee in his official capacity is treated as a claim against
the city. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985).
To state a Monell claim, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he has
suffered the deprivation of a constitutional right and (2) that an
official custom or policy of the local government caused that
deprivation. See Wagner v Washington Cty., 493 F.3d 833, 836
(7th Cir. 2007). A plaintiff may establish an official policy or
custom by showing: (1) an express policy that, when enforced,
causes a constitutional deprivation; (2) a widespread practice that,
although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy,
is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a “custom or
usage” with the force of law; or (3) an allegation that the
constitutional injury was caused by a person with final
policymaking authority. Palmer v. Marion Cty., 327 F.3d 588, 594-
95 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
In limited circumstances, a municipality’s decision not to train
employees can rise to the level of a government policy. Connick v.
Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). A municipality’s failure to train
and supervise employees constitutes a policy or custom if it
“amount[s] to ‘deliberate indifference to the rights persons with
whom the [untrained employees] come into contact.’” Id. (quoting
City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)); see also
Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, Ill., 434 F.3d 1006, 1029 (7th Cir.
2006) (“Establishing Monell liability based on evidence of
inadequate training or supervision requires proof of ‘deliberate
indifference’ on the part of the local government.”).
“A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained
employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate
indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Connick, 563 U.S. at
62 (quoting Bd. of Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,
409 (1997)) (further noting that “[w]ithout notice that a course of
training is deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers can
hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training program that
will cause violations of constitutional rights”). However, in rare
cases, a single incident may be sufficient to demonstrate deliberate
indifference if the unconstitutional consequences of failing to train
are obvious. Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n. 10 (giving hypothetical
example that city policymakers know that officers will be required to
arrest fleeing felons and arm the officers with guns to allow them to
do so; therefore, the need to train the officers in the constitutional
limitation on the use of deadly force is so obvious that the failure to
do so could be characterized as deliberate indifference).
Here, Plaintiff’s “failure to train” claim against the City and
Chief Winslow is too conclusory to state a plausible claim for relief.
Plaintiff alleges the City and Chief Winslow failed to train officers,
knew their conduct violated established constitutional rights, and
acted willfully, wantonly, maliciously, and with deliberate disregard
to Plaintiff’s rights. Plaintiff also alleges that the failure to train
resulted in Plaintiff’s injury. However, these are only conclusory
allegations. Plaintiff sets forth no facts that plausibly demonstrate
a custom or policy of the City or conduct by Chief Winslow that
caused the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege facts from which it can be
inferred that this is a case involving a single incident that is
sufficient to demonstrate deliberate indifference because the
unconstitutional consequences of failing to train are obvious.
Merely reciting the elements of a cause of action is insufficient to
state a claim. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.”)(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555-56). Therefore, Count II is dismissed without prejudice and
with leave to amend.
B. Plaintiff States a Respondeat Superior Claim Against the
City Based on the Alleged Assault and Battery
The City next moves to dismiss Count Five. In Count Five,
titled “Respondeat Superior,” Plaintiff alleges that the City of
Springfield Police Department is vicariously liable for all of the
actions of Officer Rosario as described in the Complaint because his
actions were performed in the course of his official employment.
Compl. ¶ 44.
The City asserts Count Five must be dismissed because
Plaintiff fails to include a prayer for relief, the allegations are
conclusory, and a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983
on a respondeat superior theory. The City also notes that
Paragraphs 42 and 43 reference the “City of Springfield Missouri
police department,” and the City of Springfield, Missouri is not a
defendant in this lawsuit.
Plaintiff’s reference to Missouri appears to be a typographical
error. Plaintiff clearly intended to refer to the City of Springfield,
Illinois, the named defendant. In addition, Count Five incorporates
by reference Paragraphs 35 and 40, which are the prayers for relief
set forth in Count Three—the state law assault claim—and Count
Four—the state law battery claim—against Rosario. The Court will
not dismiss Count Five on these grounds.
The City is correct that a municipality cannot be held liable
under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. Rodriguez v.
Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 822 (7th Cir. 2009) (“It
has long been established that there is no respondeat superior
liability under section 1983.”). However, the Complaint contains
two state law tort claims. Under Illinois law, an employer can be
liable for the tort of an employee if the tort was committed within
the scope of employment. Adames v. Sheahan, 233 Ill.2d 276, 298
(2009). The employer’s vicarious liability extends to “the negligent,
willful, malicious or even criminal acts of its employees, when those
acts are committed within the scope of employment.” Id. Therefore,
the Court will deny the motion to dismiss Count Five to the extent
that Plaintiff brings a state respondeat superior claim against the
City alleging vicarious liability for Officer Rosario’s alleged assault
and battery.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Motion to Dismiss (d/e 4) is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Count Two is dismissed
without prejudice. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint on or
before June 26, 2019. If Plaintiff does not file an amended
complaint, the City shall file an answer on or before July 8, 2019.
ENTERED: June 12, 2019
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE