“Under our precedents, officers are entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 unless (1) they violated a 7 federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was “clearly established at the time.”
How later courts described this case
- “Under our precedents, officers are entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 unless (1) they violated a 7 federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was “clearly established at the time.”
- “The Rooker–Feldman doctrine generally bars federal district courts ‘from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto appeal from a state court judgment.’” (quoting Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004)
- “the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
ELIZA MAHEALANI NAHINU, ) CIVIL NO. 23-00148 SOM/WRP
)
Plaintiffs, ) ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT;
) ORDER DENYING AS MOOT
vs. ) APPLICATIONS TO PROCEED IN
) FORMA PAUPERIS
STATE OF HAWAII; )
JUDGE COURTNEY NASO; )
JUDGE CATHERINE REMIGIO; )
JUDGE DENISE KAWATACHI; )
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY WALTER )
KELAEN; )
DPA DEREK PETERSON; )
PROSECUTOR JOHN DOE; )
POLICE OFFICER J. HARVEY; )
PROSECUTOR JOHN DOE II; )
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL DAVID )
WILLIAMS; )
PUBLIC DEFENDER MELISSA LAM; )
TRACEY ZHANG, STATE OF HAWAII )
CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICE OR )
CHILD WELFARE SURFACE; )
ATTORNEY RONALD TONGG, )
)
Defendants. )
_____________________________ )
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT; ORDER DENYING
AS MOOT APPLICATIONS TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
I. INTRODUCTION.
On March 24, 2023, Plaintiff Eliza Mahealani Nahinu
filed a Complaint and an Application to Proceed in District Court
Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (“IFP Application”). See ECF
Nos. 1, 3. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), this court has
screened the Complaint and determined that it fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted. Accordingly, the court
dismisses the Complaint and denies the IFP Application as moot.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND.
Nahinu’s Complaint contains almost no factual
allegations. At best, it appears that the present dispute began
in state court. It appears that she names as Defendants every
person she came in contact with having anything to do with that
case. Nahinu does not explain what happened or why she is suing
any Defendant.
III. STANDARD.
To proceed in forma pauperis, Nahinu must demonstrate
that she is unable to prepay the court fees, and that she has
sufficiently pled claims. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,
1129 (9th Cir. 2000). The court therefore screens Nahinu’s
Complaint to see whether it is (1) frivolous or malicious;
(2) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from
such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Denton v. Hernandez,
504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992) (the in forma pauperis statute “accords
judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power
to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and
dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly
baseless . . . . Examples of the latter class . . . are claims
describing fantastic or delusional scenarios.”).
2
IV. ANALYSIS.
There are almost no factual allegations in Nahinu’s
Complaint, much less allegations supporting a viable claim. As
noted in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007), the factual allegations in a complaint, when assumed to
be true, must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level. See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (“the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require
‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”). A
“plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of [her]
‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A
complaint is required to “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 677.
Nahinu’s allegations are so limited and unclear that
they do not indicate what claims are being asserted against which
Defendant and why. Nor do the allegations clearly explain how
Plaintiff was hurt by any Defendant’s conduct or where that
3
conduct occurred. The court gleans from the nature of the titles
Nahinu includes for named Defendants that Nahunu was involved in
a state-court case. She alleges that her rights as a woman have
been violated, that she was harassed by government actors into
signing agreements, and that government actors took her home, her
livelihood, and her family. She brings a civil action under 42
U.S.C. § 2000aa-6, which allows civil actions for persons
aggrieved by searches and seizures. But there are no factual
allegations concerning a specific search or seizure. She also
alleges a violation of “Title 42(a)(1)(2)(c)(e)(f)(g)(h),” but
the court cannot discern what that refers to. Simply put, the
allegations in Nahinu’s Complaint are insufficient to support any
viable claim, as the court cannot tell what happened and why any
particular Defendant is being sued. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
Complaint is dismissed and her IFP Application is denied as moot.
V. CONCLUSION.
The Complaint is dismissed, and the IFP Application is
denied as moot. The court grants Plaintiff leave to file a
“First Amended Complaint” that states a viable claim or claims no
later than April 28, 2023. Plaintiff may submit another IFP
Application at that time. Failure to file an Amended Complaint
by April 28, 2023, as well as to pay the applicable filing fee or
submit a new IFP Application, will result in the automatic
dismissal of this action.
4
The court provides some guidance to Nahinu if she
decides to file a First Amended Complaint. First, Nahinu should
include as the title of her new document “First Amended
Complaint.” Nahinu may, but need not use a court form from this
court’s website, available at
https://www.hid.uscourts.gov/court-forms/civil (last visited
March 30, 2023). The Clerk of Court is directed to provide to
Nahinu copies of Form Pro Se 1 (Complaint in a Civil Case) and AO
240 (Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees &
Affidavit), but the court notes that other forms may be more
applicable. If Nahinu uses a court form, she may write the words
“First Amended” before the word “Complaint.”
Second, Nahinu should identify each Defendant and state
in simple language what each Defendant allegedly did and what
statute, law, or duty was supposedly breached by that Defendant.
In other words, Nahinu should allege facts with respect to what
each Defendant allegedly did and what each Defendant should be
held liable for. Any First Amended Complaint should contain
enough factual detail for a person unfamiliar with the matter to
understand why Nahinu is suing each Defendant. Nahinu may not
simply refer to other court files or cases, and she may not
incorporate anything by reference (including her original
Complaint) in the First Amended Complaint. Instead, the First
5
Amended Complaint must allege the factual detail underlying the
claims asserted in it.
Third, Nahinu should articulate the relief she is
seeking. That is, if she is seeking monetary damages or
prospective injunctive relief, she should say so clearly and
identify the Defendant(s) from whom she is seeking such relief.
Fourth, as a general principle, this court may not
exercise appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,
482–86 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16
(1923); Wolfe v. George, 486 F.3d 1120, 1124 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007)
(“The Rooker–Feldman doctrine generally bars federal district
courts ‘from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit
that is a de facto appeal from a state court judgment.’” (quoting
Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004)).
This means that Nahinu’s First Amended Complaint should not try
to appeal the decisions of state courts to this federal court.
Fifth, Nahinu should be aware that certain Defendants
may have immunity from her claims. For example, judges generally
cannot be sued for their judicial actions. See Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). The Supreme Court has stated
that “[f]ew doctrines were more solidly established at common law
than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts
committed within their judicial jurisdiction[.]” Pierson v. Ray,
6
386 U.S. 547, 553–4 (1967). This immunity is only forfeited when
either the judge did not perform a judicial act or the judge
“acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump, 435
U.S. at 356-57.
Similarly, absolute prosecutorial immunity immunizes a
prosecutor from damages liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for actions taken in his or her role as a prosecutor. See Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). Prosecutorial immunity is
based on “the nature of the function performed, not the identity
of the actor who performed it.” Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d
1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). “[A]cts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for
the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which
occur in the course of his role as an advocate for State, are
entitled to the protections of absolute immunity.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). On the other hand,
“[w]hen a prosecutor performs the investigative functions
normally performed by a detective or police officer,” the
prosecutor is entitled to only qualified immunity. See Buckley
v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993).
Police officers and other state actors may be entitled
to qualified immunity. See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S.
Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (“Under our precedents, officers are entitled
to qualified immunity under § 1983 unless (1) they violated a
7
federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the
unlawfulness of their conduct was “clearly established at the
time.”).
Finally, a federal court may not exercise jurisdiction
over a case unless (1) it raises a federal question, or (2) the
parties are diverse and more than $75,000 is in issue. A
complaint should contain enough information to allow a court to
determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction. To the
extent Nahinu claims diversity jurisdiction based on what she
alleges is her citizenship in the “Republic of Hawaii,” that
claim is not likely to justify jurisdiction, as nothing in the
Complaint demonstrates that the “Republic of Hawaii” is a
presently recognized entity.
To summarize, Nahinu may file a First Amended Complaint
stating one or more viable claims no later than April 28, 2023.
She may submit another IFP Application by that deadline, or she
may pay the applicable filing fee. Failure to meet this deadline
will cause this action to be dismissed.
8
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, March 30, 2023.
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Nahinu v. State of Hawaii, et al; Civ. No. 23-00148 SOM/WRP; ORDER DISMISSING
COMPLAINT; ORDER DENYING AS MOOT APPLICATIONS TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS