The opinion
United States District Court
for the
Southern District of Florida
Michelle Maupin, Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
Civil Action No. 23-21392-Civ-Scola
)
The School Board of Miami-Dade )
County, and others, Defendants. )
Order Adopting Report and Recommendations
on the Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment
This matter is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Eduardo I.
Sanchez’s November 15, 2023, report and recommendations (the “Report”),
recommending that the Court deny the Plaintiff Michelle Maupin’s motion for
final default judgement as to the Defendants Rachelle Thermitus, Charmaine
Austin, Marlen Calix, Stephanie Robinson, Monica German, and Rashima
Bynum (the “Parent Defendants”). (R&R, ECF No. 35.) Though the Parent
Defendants did not file any objections to the Report, Maupin, appearing pro se,
timely filed her objections. (See P.’s Objs., ECF No. 36.) The Court has reviewed
the Report, the record, and the relevant legal authorities. For the reasons set
forth below, the Court adopts Judge Sanchez’s recommendations (R&R, ECF
No. 35), thus denying Maupin’s motion for final default judgment and
dismissing her claim against the Parent Defendants. (Mot., ECF No. 30.)
In this case, Maupin seeks to recover damages resulting from the alleged
retaliation, harassment, and discrimination she suffered in her employment as
a teacher at Young Men’s Preparatory Academy (“YMPA”), in Miami, Florida.
(See generally Compl., ECF No. 1.) On April 14, 2023, Maupin filed a four-
count complaint against the Miami-Dade County School Board, six of the
School Board’s employees, and the six Parent Defendants. (Id. ¶¶ 8–20.) As
relevant here, in the complaint, Maupin alleges that six YMPA students made
“false defamatory statements . . . in reference to [her] profession[,]” that the
“statement were calculated to injure [her] reputation[,]” and that “[d]ue to the
statements . . . [she] was removed from her workplace.” (Id. ¶ 81.) Based on
these allegations, Maupin brings a defamation per se claim against the parents
of the students, claiming that the Parent Defendants are liable for the tortious
acts of their children. (See id.)
On September 8, 2023, following the entry of Clerk’s defaults as to each
of the Parent Defendants (see ECF Nos. 26, 28), Maupin filed the motion for
final default judgment that is the subject of the instant order. (Mot., ECF No.
30.) In essence, Maupin argued that her “well-pleaded allegations establish
liability of the parents regarding statements made by their minor children
pursuant to defamation law in the state of Florida.” (Id. at 3.)
On November 15, 2023, Judge Sanchez issued the Report,
recommending that the Court deny Maupin’s motion and dismiss her
defamation per se claim on the ground that Maupin’s complaint fails to state a
cause of action for defamation against the Parent Defendants or provide a
sufficient basis for that relief. (R&R, ECF No. 35.) In particular, the Report
explains that Maupin’s defamation per se claim must fail because “in Florida it
is ‘established law that a parent is not liable for the tort of a minor child
because of the mere fact of paternity.’” (Id. at 2 (quoting Snow v. Nelson, 475
So. 2d 225, 226 (Fla. 1985).) Because Maupin’s complaint relies exclusively on
the fact of paternity to impose liability on the Parent Defendants for the alleged
tortious statements of their children, the Report concludes, Maupin is not
entitled to entry of default judgment as to the Parent Defendants and her claim
should be dismissed. (Id. at 2–3.) Maupin timely objected to the Report, raising
three arguments against its adoption. (See P.’s Objs., ECF No. 36.) However, for
the reasons that follow, the Court finds Judge Sanchez’s Report cogent and
compelling, and adopts the Report in its entirety.
“In order to challenge the findings and recommendations of the
magistrate judge, a party must file written objections which shall specifically
identify the portions of the proposed findings and recommendation to which
objection is made and the specific basis for objection.” Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208
F. App’x 781, 783 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Heath v. Jones, 863 F.2d 815, 822
(11th Cir. 1989)) (alterations omitted). The objections must also present
“supporting legal authority.” Local Mag. J. R. 4(b). Once a district court
receives “objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above,” it must
“make a de novo determination of those portions of the report to which
objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the
findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Macort, 208 F.
App’x at 783-84 (quoting Heath, 863 F.2d at 822) (alterations omitted). To the
extent a party fails to object to parts of the magistrate judge’s report, those
portions are reviewed for clear error. Macort, 208 F. App’x at 784 (quoting
Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir.1999)).
Maupin’s first objection is that Judge Sanchez’s Report should not be
adopted because she was not given an opportunity to conduct discovery and
resolve certain discovery disputes before the Report issued. This objection is
not compelling because Judge Sanchez’s recommendation that Maupin’s
defamation per se claim be dismissed is based on the legal sufficiency of her
allegations, not on whether she can prove those allegations to be true. In other
words, even if Maupin were able to gather evidence by way of discovery to prove
that the students made the alleged defamatory statements against her, her
defamation per se claim would still fail because it was lodged against the
students’ parents, and in Florida “[i]t is ‘basic and established law that a
parent is not liable for the tort of a minor child because of the mere fact of
paternity.’” Perez v. Rodriguez, 204 So. 3d 92, 95 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting
Snow v. Nelson, 475 So. 2d 225, 226 (Fla. 1985)). Moreover, Maupin fails to
otherwise explain the significance of her discovery efforts to the sufficiency of
her pleading or why they are relevant to Judge Sanchez’s recommendations.
Maupin’s next objection is that Judge Sanchez erred in relying on
pleading deficiencies that were not raised by the Parent Defendants themselves
to recommend that her motion for default judgment be denied. Because the
Parent Defendants failed to respond to her complaint, Maupin reasons, it was
error for Judge Sanchez to consider the legal sufficiency of her defamation per
se claim in recommending that her motion for default judgment be denied and
that the claim be dismissed. Maupin is incorrect in this regard because, as
Judge Sanchez’s Report explains, “entry of default judgment is only warranted
when there is a sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment entered, with
the standard for ‘a sufficient basis’ for the judgment being akin to that
necessary to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Singleton
v. Dean, 611 F. App’x 671, 671 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Surtain v. Hamlin
Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2015)). Thus, by moving for
default judgment as to the Parent Defendants, Maupin herself necessarily
subjected her defamation per se claim to scrutiny as to its legal sufficiency.
Finally, Maupin objects that Judge Sanchez’s sua sponte
recommendation that her defamation per se claim be dismissed (as opposed to
her motion for default judgment merely being denied) violates her due process
rights. Maupin argues that dismissal of her defamation per se claim without
the notice and opportunity to defend that would be provided by a motion to
dismiss would unfairly prejudice her and deny her a full and fair adjudication
of her claims. However, Maupin is also incorrect here because, in the Eleventh
Circuit, a district court may, “in denying a motion for entry of default
judgment, sua sponte dismiss a complaint, even where the defaulting
defendant fails to respond to either the Complaint or the motion for entry of a
default judgment.” See RooR v. Sanz Bros., LLC., No. 16-61429-CIV, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 34534, at *14 n.11, 2018 WL 1881287, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 1,
2018) (Simonton, M.J.), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 38239, at *1, 2018 WL 1875621, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 7, 2018)
(Williams, J.). For example, in Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found, the Eleventh
Circuit explained that a district court need not provide a plaintiff with notice of
its intent to sua sponte dismiss an action or an opportunity to respond “when
amending the complaint would be futile, or when the complaint is patently
frivolous.” 789 F.3d 1239, 1248 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Tazoe v. Airbus S.A.S.,
631 F.3d 1321, 1336 (11th Cir. 2011)); see also Singleton v. Dean, 611 F. App’x
671, 671 (11th Cir. 2015) (same). Here, amendment of Maupin’s defamation
per se claim as to the Parent Defendants would be futile because the basis of
her claim is legally flawed. And, importantly, Maupin’s objections fail to suggest
any reason why amendment would not be futile or why her claim is not
patently frivolous. Indeed, the objections fail to engage with the Report’s
substantive reasons for dismissal at all.
Accordingly, the Court, therefore, affirms and adopts Judge Sanchez’s
report and recommendations (R&R, ECF No. 35), overruling Maupin’s
objections (P.’s Objs., ECF No. 36), thus denying Maupin’s motion for final
default judgment (Mot., ECF No. 30), and dismissing Count Four of her
complaint for defamation per se against the Parent Defendants (Compl., ECF
No. 1). This case will remain open because Maupin’s claims against the other
Defendants remain pending.
Done and ordered, in Miami, Florida, on January 31, 2024.
Robert N. Scola, Jr.
United States District Judge