Jones v. Miami Police

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 23-cv-24583-BLOOM/Torres

MATTHEW JONES,

Plaintiff,

v.

MIAMI POLICE,

Defendant.

_______________________________/

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon a review of pro se Plaintiff Matthew Jones’

(“Plaintiff”) Complaint, ECF No. [1]. Plaintiff has not paid the filing fee and filed a Motion for

Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, (“Motion”), ECF No. [3]. The Court has carefully

considered the, the record in this case, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons that follow,

Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed without prejudice and the Motion is denied as moot.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his Complaint against the Miami Police seeking damages of $125,000,

compensatory damages, special damages, and costs based upon allegations of rape and abuse he

suffered as a minor from late June through early July of 2000. ECF No. [1]. Plaintiff alleges that

he was trafficked throughout U.S. Route 13 by a family member where he was raped, tortured,

and otherwise violently attacked across sixteen states, by multiple police departments and state

troop forces, by family members, and by members of the religious congregation that his aunt

belonged to in Georgia. Id. at 1-4. However, the sole named Defendant is the “Miami Police.” Id.

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Negligence; Equal

Protection provisions of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; 10 Del. C. § 4011(c); the

Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA); 10 U.S.C. § 920 – Art. 120; 10 U.S.C. § 843 Art. 431;

18 U.S.C. §§ 2031 – 32 (repealed, Nov. 14, 1986)2; and 2471.18 U.S.C. § 2 for crimes against

the United States. Id. at 5-10. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges a negligence claim, stating that all

Defendants owed him a duty of care, and were negligent, reckless, and/or wanton in that they:

were negligent, violated his Eighth Amendment rights; violated his rights under 42 U.S.C. §

1983; censored his First Amendment rights; and caused assault and battery to him. Id. at 10-11.

Plaintiff also references the United States Constitution, art. 3 § 2, and art. 6 § 2, and the doctrine

of respondeat superior. Id.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Pleading Standards

Courts must “construe pro se pleadings liberally, holding them to a less stringent standard

than those drafted by attorneys.” Arrington v. Green, 757 F. App’x 796, 797 (11th Cir. 2018)

(citing Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003)). Still, a pro se party must abide by

“the relevant law and rules of court, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Moon v.

Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989). In assessing whether a plaintiff may proceed in

forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires a court to dismiss a case at any time if the court

determines that the case is frivolous or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. The

same standard as a dismissal under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) governs a

dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d, 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997).

1 Title 10 of the U.S. Code applies to the United States Armed Forces.

2 Sections 2031 and 2032 prescribed penalties for the commission of rape and for carnal

knowledge of a female under sixteen, respectively, within special maritime and territorial

jurisdictions. Both were repealed pursuant to Pub. L. 99-646, § 87(c)(1), Nov. 10, 1986, 100 Stat.

3623; Pub. L. 99-654, § 3(a)(1), Nov. 14, 1986, 100 Stat. 3663.

Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant who has not paid the Court’s filing fee, the screening

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) apply. Under the statute, a “court shall dismiss the case at

any time if the court determines that … (B) the action or appeal … (i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a

defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). If the Court determines that

the complaint satisfies any of the three enumerated circumstances under § 1915(e)(2)(B), the

Court must dismiss the complaint.

In discussing what is frivolous in the context of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), the

Eleventh Circuit has held that “[a] district court may conclude a case has little or no chance of

success and dismiss the complaint before service of process when it determines from the face of

the complaint that the factual allegations are ‘clearly baseless’ or that the legal theories are

‘indisputably meritless.’” Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993).

In determining whether an action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, the

following standards are relevant. A pleading in a civil action must contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not

do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009) (explaining that Rule 8(a)(2)’s pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned,

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”). Nor can a complaint rest on “‘naked

assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 557 (alteration in original)). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570). Importantly, “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than

pleadings drafted by attorneys and [are] liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148

F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). “But the leniency accorded pro se litigants does not give a

court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading

to sustain an action.” Matthews, Wilson & Matthews, Inc. v. Capital City Bank, 614 F. App’x

969, 969 n.1 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359,

1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled in part on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709

(11th Cir. 2010)).

a. Shotgun Pleading

“A complaint that fails to articulate claims with sufficient clarity to allow the defendant

to frame a responsive pleading constitutes a ‘shotgun pleading.’” Lampkin-Asam v. Volusia Cnty.

Sch. Bd., 261 F. App’x 274, 277 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075,

1128-29 (11th Cir. 2001)). “Shotgun pleadings, whether filed by plaintiffs or defendants, exact

an intolerable toll on the trial court’s docket, lead to unnecessary and unchanneled discovery, and

impose unwarranted expense on the litigants, the court and the court’s parajudicial personnel and

resources. Moreover, justice is delayed for the litigants who are ‘standing in line,’ waiting for

their cases to be heard.” Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1356-57 (11th Cir. 2018)

(quoting Cramer v. Fla., 117 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 1997)).

Overall, shotgun pleadings do not establish a connection between “the substantive count

and the factual predicates . . . [and] courts cannot perform their gatekeeping function with regard

to the averments of [the plaintiff’s claim].” Wagner v. First Horizon Pharm. Corp., 464 F.3d

1273, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 2006). The Eleventh Circuit has identified four types of shotgun

pleadings:

The most common type—by a long shot—is a complaint containing multiple

counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing

each successive count to carry all that came before and the last count to be a

combination of the entire complaint. The next most common type, at least as far

as our published opinions on the subject reflect, is a complaint that does not

commit the mortal sin of re-alleging all preceding counts but is guilty of the

venial sin of being replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not

obviously connected to any particular cause of action. The third type of shotgun

pleading is one that commits the sin of not separating into a different count each

cause of action or claim for relief. Fourth, and finally, there is the relatively rare

sin of asserting multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying

which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of

the defendants the claim is brought against. The unifying characteristic of all

types of shotgun pleadings is that they fail to one degree or another, and in one

way or another, to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them

and the grounds upon which each claim rests.

Merch. One, Inc. v. TLO, Inc., No. 19-CV-23719, 2020 WL 248608, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 16,

2020) (quoting Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1321-23 (11th Cir.

2015) (footnotes omitted)). Shotgun pleadings are condemned by the Eleventh Circuit, which has

specifically instructed district courts to dismiss shotgun pleadings as “fatally defective.” B.L.E. v.

Georgia, 335 F. App’x 962, 963 (11th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

a. Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Plaintiff alleges that he was the victim of rape and abuse across sixteen states and

perpetrated by twenty-nine law enforcement entities, as well as his own family and members of a

church. However, Plaintiff has only named the Miami Police as a Defendant. One paragraph sets

forth the allegations against the Miami Police: “we left Georgia for Florida. In Florida, I was []

raped and tortured in Jacksonville, Tampa Bay, and Miami. The Florida Highway Patrol-Troop

G, the Tampa Police Department, and the Miami Police Department participated.” Id. at 3.

Even construing the Complaint liberally, and to a less stringent standard than one drafted

by an attorney, there are insufficient factual allegations against the Miami Police to state a

plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550, 556 U.S. 544 (2007)). Here, Plaintiff has asserted that the Miami Police

participated, but provides no facts to support the allegation. Here, as to the sole defendant,

Plaintiff alleges that he was raped in Jacksonville, Tampa Bay, and Miami. . . . and the Miami

Police participated.” Id. There is no specificity as to what is being alleged by “participation.” As

such, the Complaint as to the Defendant rests on a plain assertion “devoid of ‘further factual

enhancement.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). Plaintiff has failed to state a claim as to the Defendant upon which

relief may be granted. Therefore, under the relevant pleading standards, the case must be

dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

b. Complaint is a shotgun pleading

The Complaint presents a traumatic experience. However, even construing the pleading

liberally and to a less stringent standard than a complaint drafted by an attorney, Plaintiff has

listed a list of factual allegations but fails to connect the factual allegations to the counts he

attempts to put forth. As such, the Complaint falls within the second and third categories of

shotgun pleadings set forth in Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1321-

23 (11th Cir. 2015). Shotgun pleadings “fail to one degree or another, and in one way or another,

to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which

each claim rests.” Id. 1323.

The second class of shotgun pleading is one “replete with conclusory, vague, and

immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action.” Id. (footnotes

omitted). Plaintiff has set forth a harrowing list of allegations against twenty-nine law

enforcement agencies, his family, and of a church congregation) of rape and abuse. However,

there is only one named defendant. Therefore, almost all allegations in the Complaint are

immaterial to his claim against the Miami Police. For example, Plaintiff lists attacks by the

Maryland State Police, the Delaware state police, the Virginia State Police “Division 7 area 9.”

ECF No. [1] at 2. Plaintiff also alleges that the North Carolina State Highway Patrol and the

Jacksonville Police Department tortured him for three hours and then dragged him through a dirt

path in a tire yard to an office where the attacks continued. Id. These, and other similar

allegations in the Complaint, are not connected to any claim against the Miami Police. When a

complaint is filled with facts unconnected to any cause of action, the complaint fails. Weiland

792 F.3d at 1323. The Eleventh Circuit will condemn a complaint “replete with [immaterial]

factual allegations [and where] any allegations that are material are buried beneath []

irrelevancies.” Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001).

The third category of shotgun pleading set forth in Weiland is one that fails to separate

“each cause of action or claim for relief” into different counts. 792 F.3d 1323. Here, Plaintiff at

times fails to separate the causes of action. For example, in setting forth a negligence claim,

Plaintiff asserts:

Defendants were negligent, reckless, and/or wanton in that they:

a. Were negligent in their actions;

b. Violated the Plaintiff’s 8th Amendment rights;

c. Violated the Plaintiff’s rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983;

d. Censored the Plaintiff’s 1st Amendment rights to freedom of speech and

of press;

e. Caused Assault and Battery to the Plaintiff.

ECF NO. [1] at ¶17. Plaintiff has put forth several distinct causes of action as subsets of a claim

of negligence. As such, Plaintiff’s Complaint also falls within the third category of shotgun

Case No. 23-cv-24583-BLOOM/Torres

pleadings and is due to be dismissed for this reason as well. The pleading standards for an in

forma pauperis party requires “the court [to] dismiss the case at any time if the court determines

that. . . the action . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”

28 US.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)ai).

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. Plaintiff's Complaint, ECF No. [1], is DISMISSED without prejudice.

2. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case. If Plaintiff files a new

Complaint, he must do so by opening a new case.

3. To the extent not otherwise disposed of, any scheduled hearings are

CANCELED, all pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT, and all deadlines

are TERMINATED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, 4 y anuary 3, 2024.

BETH BLOOM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:

Counsel of Record