United States v. Hernandez

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 18-20783-CIV-ALTONAGA/Goodman

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ, et al.,

Defendants.

________________________________/

ORDER

THIS CAUSE came before the Court on Magistrate Judge Jonathan Goodman’s Report

and Recommendations [ECF No. 114], entered on August 10, 2023. In the Report, the

Magistrate Judge makes findings of fact giving rise to his recommendations that the Court hold

Defendant Hugo Gimenez in contempt for violating the terms of the October 31, 2018 Injunction

[ECF No. 44] but not Defendant Francisco Hernandez. (See generally Report). Gimenez filed

timely Objections [ECF No. 115] to the Report, to which the Government filed a Response in

Opposition [ECF No. 116]. The Court then held a hearing on October 30, 2023. (See Oct. 30,

2023 Hr’g [ECF No. 119]).

The Court has carefully reviewed the Report, the parties’ written submissions, the

evidentiary hearing transcripts, the record, and applicable law. For the following reasons, the

Report is affirmed and adopted, and Gimenez’s Objections are overruled.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 1, 2018, the Government filed a Complaint [ECF No. 1] alleging Defendants

Hernandez and Gimenez, both tax preparers at Francisco Hernandez Tax Services, LLC, engaged

in fraudulent conduct when preparing customer tax returns. The parties thereafter submitted a

stipulated injunction (see generally Joint Mot. for Entry of Inj. as to Specific Conduct Submitted

by Stipulation & Consent & Req. for Hr’g [ECF No. 40]), which the Court entered on October

31, 2018 (see generally Inj.). In addition to requiring compliance with all laws and regulations

applicable to tax preparers, the Injunction imposed additional due diligence and documentation

obligations on Defendants, such as requiring them to collect Customer Information Organizers

and Customer Information Modules (collectively “Customer Organizers”) with customers’

supporting documentation. (See generally id.). The Injunction also authorized the Government

to request documents from Defendants to monitor their compliance with the Injunction. (See id.

11).1

The Injunction was set to expire on December 31, 2021, but after more irregularities

surfaced in tax returns prepared by Defendants, the parties stipulated to modify the Injunction

and extend it by an additional year. (See generally Joint Mot. to Modify Inj. as to Specific

Conduct [ECF No. 49]). The Court modified the Injunction accordingly. (See generally Dec.

27, 2021 Order [ECF No. 50] (implementing modifications to the content and handling of

Customer Organizers but otherwise retaining the terms of the original Injunction)).

By the end of 2022, the Government again detected violations of the Injunction which it

characterized as “deliberate.” (Mot. for Order to Show Cause [ECF No. 53] 2). The

Government moved to hold Defendants in contempt, asserting they had

engaged in conduct subject to penalty under 26 U.S.C. [section] 6694; fabricated

customer deductions and credits; falsely claimed a dependent on the return of at

least one customer; and failed to comply with the verification requirements of the

Injunction and the internal revenue laws and regulations.

1 The Court uses the pagination generated by the electronic CM/ECF database, which appears in the

headers of all court filings. Cita tions to deposition testimony rely on the pagination and line numbering

in the original document.

(Id. 6 (alteration added)). Once the Motion was fully briefed, the Court referred the matter to the

Magistrate Judge. (See Mar. 13, 2023 Order [ECF No. 76]).

The Magistrate Judge held an evidentiary hearing on May 25 and 26, 2023, where five of

Defendants’ customers, one employee from Defendants’ place of work, and Hernandez testified.

(See generally May 25, 2023 Tr. [ECF No. 102]; May 26, 2023 Tr. [ECF No. 101]). Gimenez

invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and declined to answer the

Government’s questions. (See May 25, 2023 Tr. 47:4–72:7). At the hearing, the Magistrate

Judge ordered briefing on the appropriateness of drawing an adverse inference against Gimenez

for his invocation of his Fifth Amendment right not to testify (see May 26, 2023 Order [ECF No.

95]); he then issued an Order explaining he would apply such an inference against Gimenez, but

that the inference alone was insufficient to justify a recommendation of contempt for either

Defendant (see Order on Potential Adverse Inferences [ECF No. 110] 2).

The Magistrate Judge issued his Report and Recommendations on August 10, 2023. (See

generally Report). As to Hernandez, the Magistrate Judge finds the allegations against him are

unfounded and recommends the Court not hold him in contempt. (See id. 53–64). No party

objected to this finding, and the Court does not further address it. As to Gimenez, the Magistrate

Judge concludes Gimenez willfully violated the Injunction and recommends the Court hold him

in contempt. (See id. 38–52). Gimenez timely objected. (See generally Objs.). The Court held

a final hearing on October 30, 2023, where the parties presented their arguments regarding the

Magistrate Judge’s findings. (See Oct. 30, 2023 Hr’g).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Contempt. “Civil contempt proceedings may be employed to coerce a contemnor into

compliance with the court’s order and to compensate a complainant for losses sustained.” Bank

of Am., N.A. v. United Cities Grp., Inc., No. 08-21917-Civ, 2009 WL 855987, at *4 (S.D. Fla.

Mar. 31, 2009) (citation omitted). “The party seeking contempt bears the initial burden of

showing, by clear and convincing evidence, a willful disregard for the authority of the court

through failure to comply with a court order.” Id. (citing Ga. Power Co. v. NLRB, 484 F.3d

1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2007); other citation omitted). “The clear and convincing evidence must

establish that: (1) the allegedly violated order was valid and lawful; (2) the order was clear and

unambiguous; and (3) the alleged violator had the ability to comply with the order.” Ga. Power

Co., 484 F.3d at 1291 (emphasis and citation omitted). “[O]nce the moving party makes a prima

facie showing that the court order was violated, the burden of production shifts to the alleged

contemnor to show a present inability to comply that goes beyond a mere assertion of

inability[.]” Howard Johnson Co., Inc. v. Khimani, 892 F.2d 1512, 1516 (11th Cir. 1990)

(alteration added; citations and quotation marks omitted).

The Eleventh Circuit has held that “‘[i]n determining whether a party is in contempt of a

court order, the order is subject to reasonable interpretation, though it may not be expanded

beyond the meaning of its terms absent notice and an opportunity to be heard.’” Ga. Power Co.,

484 F.3d at 1291 (alteration added; quoting Riccard v. Prudential Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 1277, 1296

(11th Cir. 2002)). Moreover, the court should “construe any ambiguities or uncertainties in such

a court order in a light favorable to the person charged with contempt.” Id. (citation omitted).

The focus in a civil contempt proceeding “is not on the subjective beliefs or intent of the alleged

contemnors in complying with the order, but whether in fact their conduct complied with the

order at issue.” Howard Johnson, 892 F.2d at 1516 (citation omitted).

Whether a litigant’s actions constitute contempt is ultimately left to the discretion of the

district court. See id. at 1522 (concluding “the district court’s finding of contempt and

imposition of sanctions was within its discretion” (footnote call number omitted)); McGregor v.

Chierico, 206 F.3d 1378, 1383 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted) (explaining that a court of

appeals reviews the grant or denial of a motion for civil contempt under an abuse of discretion

standard). Moreover, “[d]istrict courts are afforded wide discretion in fashioning an equitable

remedy for civil contempt.” Id. at 1385 n.5 (alteration added; citation omitted).

Review of Magistrate Judge’s Report. Magistrate judges have limited power to address

contempt. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(e). Where, as here, a motion for civil contempt has been referred

to a magistrate judge, a certification process is used. See, e.g., Longhi v. AMG Fin. Grp., Inc.,

No. 19-23047-Civ, 2020 WL 9460327, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 1, 2020), report and

recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 3855898 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 2021). Specifically,

the magistrate judge shall forthwith certify the facts to a district judge and may

serve or cause to be served . . . an order . . . to show cause [before the district

judge] why that person should not be adjudged in contempt by reason of the facts

so certified. The district judge shall thereupon hear the evidence as to the act or

conduct complained of[.]

28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(6) (alterations added).

“‘The certification of facts under section 636(e) serves to determine whether the moving

party can adduce sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of contempt.’” Lapinski v.

St. Croix Condo. Ass’n, Inc., No. 16-cv-1418, 2018 WL 4381168, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2018)

(quoting Church v. Steller, 35 F. Supp. 2d 215, 217 (N.D.N.Y. 1999)). Along with this

certification, “a magistrate judge may recommend that certain sanctions be imposed by the

district court upon a finding of contempt.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Therefore — as with other dispositive matters referred to a magistrate judge — a report

and recommendation is issued, and the parties may file objections to the magistrate judge’s

findings. See, e.g., id. at *1; Sream, Inc. v. S&T Tobacco Int’l, Inc., No. 18-cv-1733, 2021 WL

8201486, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 11, 2021), report and recommendation adopted sub nom., Roor

Int’l BV v. S&T Tobacco Int’l, Inc., 2021 WL 8201489 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2021). District courts

must review de novo “any part of [a] magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly

objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3) (alteration added). “It is critical that the objection be

sufficiently specific and not a general objection to the report.” Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 F.

App’x 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 7 (3d Cir. 1984)). A district

court reviews the parts of a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation that were not properly

objected to for clear error. See Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 F. App’x 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006)

(“Most circuits agree that ‘[i]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not

conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the

face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.’” (alteration adopted; citation

omitted)).

III. DISCUSSION

Gimenez objects to the Magistrate Judge’s findings, arguing that the Magistrate Judge

impermissibly modified the Injunction’s duration, incorrectly characterized the Injunction’s

requirements, improperly weighed the credibility of witness testimony, and improperly applied

an adverse inference against Gimenez for his invocation of his Fifth Amendment right not to

testify. (See generally Objs.). The Court addresses each argument and concludes Gimenez

violated the Injunction’s provisions and a finding of contempt is warranted.

A. The Injunction is valid and lawful.

As explained, the Court entered the parties’ stipulated Injunction on October 31, 2018

and modified it, also by consent of the parties, on December 27, 2021. (See generally Inj.; Dec.

27, 2021 Order). Gimenez’s sole argument regarding the validity of the Injunction is that despite

the parties’ intent to extend the Injunction through the end of 2022 (see Joint Mot. to Modify Inj.

as to Specific Conduct 1), the Court’s modification did not explicitly state a new expiration date

and therefore did not serve to extend the Injunction’s duration (see Objs. 6). Gimenez contends

that by concluding the Injunction indeed remained in effect through December 31, 2022, the

Magistrate Judge impermissibly modified the Injunction. (See id.).

Gimenez is correct that the original Injunction was set to expire on December 31, 2021

and that the December 27, 2021 Order modifying the Injunction did not explicitly extend this

deadline. (See generally Inj.; Dec. 27, 2021 Order). But the December 27, 2021 Order includes

compliance dates in 2022, clearly contemplating an extension of the Injunction’s provisions.

(See Dec. 27, 2021 Order 1 (setting a January 9, 2022 deadline to finalize the substance and form

of Customer Information Modules)). Further, the parties indisputably agreed to the extension

and acted as if the Injunction were in place through December 31, 2022. (See Report 8).

As the Magistrate Judge notes, “[a]n injunction should be strictly construed, but it

‘should not be pressed to a dryly logical extreme’ giving rise to technical loopholes.” (Report 7

(alteration added; quoting Alley v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 590 F.3d 1195, 1206

(11th Cir. 2009))). The Court will not indulge the “narrow literalism” Gimenez proposes. Alley,

590 F.3d at 1206 (citation omitted). The parties and the Court have at all times intended the

Injunction to remain in place through December 31, 2022 and proceeded as such. (See Report 3–

8). Continuing to rely on this understanding does not amount to an impermissible

“modification” of the Injunction with “retroactive effect.” (Objs. 6 (citation omitted)).

B. The Injunction is clear and unambiguous.

The Injunction imposed several requirements on Defendants beyond those typically

expected of tax preparers. (See generally Inj.). These included, for example, conducting due

diligence and collecting additional documentation when claiming Head of Household status or

preparing a Schedule C to claim tax deductions for certain expenses. (See id. 4–10). The

Magistrate Judge summarizes the provisions of the Injunction relevant to this proceeding, which

are numerous; the Court does not repeat them here. (See Report 9–12). While Gimenez

challenges whether his conduct can be properly interpreted as a violation of the Injunction, he

does not argue any relevant provision of the Injunction is unclear or ambiguous. (See generally

Objs.). In any case, the Court finds that the Injunction’s requirements are clear and

unambiguous. (See generally Inj.).

C. Gimenez had the ability to comply with the Injunction but did not do so.

The Magistrate Judge concluded based on “credible” witness testimony and documentary

evidence that Gimenez failed to comply with the terms of the Injunction despite having the

ability to do so. (Report 20). The Magistrate Judge’s findings focused on tax returns Gimenez

prepared for customers Yunier Cabrera, Ayleen Garcia, Ana Teresa Milanes-Baez, and Nathaly

Hernandez. (See id. 21–25, 29–35).

First, the Magistrate Judge found that Gimenez violated the Injunction when preparing

Cabrera’s tax return. Gimenez

inadequately considered Cabrera’s minimal English language skills and lack of

knowledge on tax laws[;] . . . asked questions to elicit responses that would

support deductions without reviewing documents that might undermine the

deduction and without asking for additional details[;] . . . [and] simply directed

Cabrera to sign his return and its accompanying forms without any explanation.

(Id. 21–22 (alterations added; citation omitted)). Gimenez prepared a Schedule C for Cabrera

that claimed multiple expenses that were in fact not deductible. (See id. 22–23). In doing so,

Gimenez failed to verify “that the expenses were accurate and supported by receipts, bank

statements, and other documents” (id. 22), as required by the Injunction (see Inj. 5–7). Gimenez

also “claimed a credit for COVID[]relief on Cabrera’s return, even though Cabrera credibly

testified that he told Gimenez that he did not contract COVID in 2021 and never missed work for

any COVID-related reason.” (Report 23 (citations omitted)).

Second, Gimenez improperly claimed Head of Household status on Garcia’s tax return.

While Garcia indicated on her Customer Organizer that she was unmarried, Gimenez did not

confirm this information despite also preparing Garcia’s husband’s tax return, the husband being

present at Garcia’s appointment, and Gimenez reviewing property tax information and mortgage

statements that listed Garcia’s husband as an owner of the property. (See id. 24). Gimenez also

claimed two non-cash charitable donations on Garcia’s return that were unsupported by

documentation (see id. 25), as required by the Injunction (see Inj. 8–9 (allowing Defendants to

claim charitable deductions only where provided with “a verifiable (i.e. third party) receipt from

a qualifying charity for each donation”)).

Third, Gimenez reported multiple deductions on Milanes’s tax return “without oral

verification from Milanes or support from bank statements, receipts, and other documents[.]”

(Report 30 (alteration added)). For example, Gimenez incorrectly claimed Milanes wore a

uniform to work and claimed Milanes’s personal telephone bill as a business expense even after

she told Gimenez the bill included two additional lines for her children. (See id. 31). As with

Cabrera, Gimenez also claimed a credit for COVID relief despite Milanes telling him she had not

contracted the illness. (See id. 32).

Finally, Nathaly Hernandez “credibly testified that when she and her husband met with

Gimenez, Gimenez tore the page listing her marital status off her packet (knowing they were

married) and destroyed it in his document shredder.” (Id. 34 (citation omitted)). Gimenez then

“instructed her to complete a new one without her husband’s information so that she could

instead file as ‘Head of Household.’” (Id. (citation omitted)).

In all four instances, Gimenez certified that the information provided to him in preparing

these returns did not appear to be “incorrect, incomplete, or inconsistent.” (Id. 25 (citation

omitted); see also id. 23–24 32, 35 (citations omitted)). In fact, Gimenez either intentionally

failed to ask critical questions that would have revealed inaccuracies and inconsistencies between

the information provided by customers and the information reflected on the tax returns; or

willfully fabricated deductions without documentation and based on unreasonable positions.

(See id. 39–53).

Moreover, the Magistrate Judge reasoned that even if each of these customers signed

their tax returns, “the weight accorded to the signatures is affected by their context.” (Id. 39).

Because many of the customers spoke little or no English and understood little about tax laws,

their signatures must be understood to reflect the customers’ “knowledge and belief that

Gimenez prepared the return in accordance with the tax laws.” (Id.). The Magistrate Judge thus

concluded that the Government demonstrated Gimenez violated the Injunction by clear and

convincing evidence. (See id. 39–53).

Gimenez challenges three aspects of this analysis: the Magistrate Judge’s characterization

of the Injunction’s requirements; the weight ascribed to witness testimony; and the application of

an adverse inference against Gimenez for asserting his Fifth Amendment right not to testify.

(See generally id.). The Court addresses each objection in turn.

1. The Injunction’s Requirements

Gimenez argues the Injunction required him to “merely collect[] customer-provided

substantiation for expenses and income[,]” not verify or audit this information when completing

the tax returns. (Objs. 4–5 (alterations added)). In addition, Gimenez stresses that the Injunction

required him to seek confirmation that adequate documentation had been provided and then

“‘rely on said confirmation from the taxpayer’” to complete the return. (Id. 5 (emphasis omitted;

quoting Inj. 6)). According to Gimenez, his failure to review supporting documentation cannot

form the basis of a willful violation of the Injunction. (See id. 5–6). The Court does not agree.

Even if a tax preparer “is not required to audit, examine or review books and records,

business operations, documents, or other evidence[,]” he “may not ignore the implications of

information furnished to [him] or actually known by [him]” and “must make reasonable inquiries

if the information as furnished appears to be incorrect or incomplete.” 26 C.F.R. § 1.6694-1(e)

(alterations added); (see Inj. 2–3 (requiring that Defendants comply with the provisions of 26

C.F.R. section 1.6694-1); see also Resp. in Opp’n 4–5). Further, the Injunction required

Gimenez to collect such documentation and enjoined him from including any income or expense

on a taxpayer’s Schedule C if such documentation was not provided. (See Inj. 5–6).

The Magistrate Judge found Gimenez fabricated deductions despite a lack of

documentation and evidence that the deductions were inappropriate. (See, e.g., Report 42–44).

This is clearly a violation of the Injunction and applicable tax laws and regulations. See 26

C.F.R. § 1.6694-1(e); (see, e.g., Inj. 3 (enjoining Defendants from “[p]reparing Forms 1040 that

claim false credits, expenses, deductions, and income” (alteration added))). The Magistrate

Judge also found that Gimenez intentionally failed to ask questions in order to “absolve[]

him[self] of liability for reporting a fraudulent item on the customer’s tax return.” (Report 40

(alterations added)). By not asking Garcia whether she was married or whether Milanes’s

telephone bill was for personal use, for example, Gimenez failed to “make reasonable inquiries”

regarding information before him. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6694-1(e). This, too, amounts to a clear

violation of the Injunction’s provisions.

2. Witness Testimony

Gimenez next argues the Magistrate Judge “ascribe[d] inappropriate weight to witness

testimony impeached by inconsistent sworn statements.” (Objs. 3 (alteration added)).

According to Gimenez, the four taxpayers’ signatures and accompanying verifications that their

tax returns were accurate render their testimony attributing inaccuracies to Gimenez incredible.

(See id. 3–4). Gimenez asks the Court to revisit the Magistrate Judge’s credibility

determinations de novo. (See id. 4).

“When objections are made to findings which the magistrate judge made based upon the

testimony of witnesses,” the district court must “review the transcript or listen to the tape-

recording of those proceedings.” Willis v. United States, 346 F. App’x 404, 406 (11th Cir. 2009)

(alteration added; quotation marks and citation omitted). But the Court is not required to discard

a magistrate judge’s credibility findings. To the contrary, “[c]redibility determinations are

typically the province of the fact finder because the fact finder personally observes the testimony

and is thus in a better position than a reviewing court to assess the credibility of witnesses.”

United States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2002) (alteration added; citation

omitted). Therefore, in evaluating a factual version of events, a court “should defer to the

magistrate judge’s determinations unless his understanding of the facts appears to be

‘unbelievable.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Rivera, 775 F.2d 1559, 1561 (11th Cir. 1985)).

Here, the Magistrate Judge issued a thorough and well-reasoned analysis of both the

witness testimony and Gimenez’s arguments regarding the import of sworn signatures, ultimately

concluding that the witnesses were credible and that less weight should be afforded to the

signatures given the context in which they were given. (See Report 39–53). The record and

evidentiary transcripts are consistent with these conclusions, and the Court will not disturb the

Magistrate Judge’s credibility determinations. (See generally May 25, 2023 Tr.; May 26, 2023

Tr.). Moreover, the Court held a hearing following issuance of the Report in accordance with 28

U.S.C. section 636(e)(6)(B), at which Gimenez presented no persuasive evidence to reweigh the

Magistrate Judge’s credibility findings. (See generally Oct. 30, 2023 Hr’g). The Court therefore

adopts the Magistrate Judge’s determination that the witnesses credibly testified to providing

Gimenez with information that was inconsistent with or contrary to what Gimenez included on

their tax returns.

3. Adverse Inference

According to Gimenez, a “key driver” of the Magistrate Judge’s findings was his

“discretionary decision to take an adverse inference against Gimenez for invoking his Fifth

Amendment right to decline to testify[.]” (Objs. 1 (alteration added)). Gimenez explains he was

pushed to invoke his Fifth Amendment right because the Government foreshadowed criminal

charges against him on a theory the Magistrate Judge ultimately found to be unsupported. (See

id. 2–3; Report 8–9 (finding no evidence was presented that Defendants hid information from

customers)). Because the Government could have dropped these criminal insinuations or offered

immunity to Gimenez but did not do so — and because the allegations were ultimately

unfounded — Gimenez argues an adverse inference did not properly balance the “‘competing

interests of the party asserting the privilege, and the party against whom the privilege is

invoked[.]’” (Objs. 2 (alteration added; quoting Doe ex rel. Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d

1258, 1265 (9th Cir. 2000))).

Contrary to Gimenez’s assertions, the adverse inference was not a “key driver” of the

Magistrate Judge’s analysis. Rather, the Magistrate Judge mentioned the inference once in the

65-page Report, and applied it only “to the extent there might be a question about the impact of

the signatures of Gimenez’s clients[.]” (Report 41 (alteration added)). As explained, the Court

accepts the Magistrate Judge’s credibility findings and finds that the facts certified sufficiently

support a finding of civil contempt even without the adverse inference.

* * *

The facts and records before the Court, as well as the testimony and arguments presented

during the three hearings, indicate Gimenez violated the Injunction. Thus, the burden is on

Gimenez to show an inability to comply. Because Gimenez nowhere argues he was unable to

comply with the Injunction’s provisions (see generally Report; Objs.), he fails to satisfy this

burden, and a finding of civil contempt against him is warranted.

The question remains as to what sanction should be imposed. Civil contempt sanctions

“may serve to either (1) coerce the contemnor to comply with a court order, or (2) compensate a

party for losses suffered as a result of the contemnor’s act.” McGregor, 206 F.3d at 1385 n.5;

see also Serra Chevrolet, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 446 F.3d 1137, 1147 (11th Cir. 2006)

(explaini ng that a civil contempt sanction should be “remedial, and for the benefit of the

complainant” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). The Government requests that Gimenez

be enjoined from working as a tax preparer for anyone other than himself and be disbarred from

practicing before the IRS in any capacity. (See Mot. for Order to Show Cause 15). Gimenez

requests that any sanction revoking his preparer tax identification number and barring him from

preparing returns “be without prejudice to Gimenez’s ability to move for modification of the

injunction after an appropriate time.” (Objs. 7). During the October 30, 2023 hearing, counsel

for Gimenez indicated a year would be an appropriate amount of time within which to seek

modification.

CASE NO. 18-20783-CIV-ALTONAGA/Goodman

The Court determines that an injunction on Gimenez’s ability to prepare tax returns for

anyone other than himself with the opportunity to seek modification within one year is an

appropriate civil sanction.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. The Report and Recommendation [ECF No. 114] is AFFIRMED AND ADOPTED.

2. Defendant’s Objections to the Report [ECF No. 115] are OVERRULED.

3. The Court finds Defendant Hugo Gimenez in contempt for violating the terms of the

October 31, 2018 Injunction [ECF No. 44]. Gimenez is ENJOINED from acting as an

income tax preparer for anyone other than himself. Gimenez may seek modification of

this injunction within one year of its effective date.

DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 5th day of January, 2024.

(oe Li. 4G,

CECILIA M. ALTONAGA

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ce: counsel of record

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