Brown v. State of Florida

United States District Court

for the

Southern District of Florida

Edward Revenous Brown, )

Petitioner )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 23-22090-Civ-Scola

)

State of Florida,

Respondent.

Order

Before the Court is pro se Petitioner Edward Revenous Brown’s petition

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF No. 1). The petition raises one ground for relief,

claiming that the “Petitioner’s judgment, sentence[,] and conviction[s]” are

illegal due to an invalid warrant. (See id. at 5). The Respondent filed a response

(ECF No. 9) and an appendix (ECF No. 10) with accompanying exhibits (ECF

No. 10-1–10-7). The Petitioner did not file a reply, and the time to do so has

passed. The Court has carefully reviewed the parties’ written submissions, the

record, and applicable law. For the reasons explained below, the petition is

denied on the merits.

1. Background

On July 14, 2015, the State charged the Petitioner by information with

one count of robbery using a firearm (Count 1) and two counts of attempted

second-degree murder (Counts 2 and 3).1 (See Information, ECF No. 10-1 at

56–61). Following a trial, a jury found the Petitioner guilty as charged on

Counts 1, 2, and 3. (See Verdict, ECF No. 10-1 at 63–65). The trial court

thereafter adjudicated the Petitioner guilty (see J. ECF No. 10-1 at 67–68) and

sentenced him to life imprisonment on Counts 1, 2, and 3 (see Sentence, ECF

No. 10-1 at 71).

1 The Information also charged the Petitioner with one count of being a

convicted felon in possession of a firearm (Count 4), but that count was

severed. (See Information at 60; Resp. at 2).

On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the Petitioner’s

convictions and sentence in an unelaborated per curiam decision. See Brown v.

State, 263 So. 3d 1121 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). The Third District issued its

mandate on February 8, 2019. (See Feb. 8, 2019 Mandate, ECF No. 10-1 at

207).

On December 23, 2019, the Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction

relief pursuant to Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. (See

generally Rule 3.850 Mot., ECF No. 10-1 at 209–234). Afterward, the Petitioner

filed an amended rule 3.850 motion (see generally Second Am. Rule 3.85 Mot.,

ECF No. 10-1 at 236–266)—which he labels “Second Amended Motion for Post[-

]conviction Relief 3.850(a)(1)” (id. at 236), raising the following ground for relief:

THE DEFENDANT CONTENDS THAT HIS JUDGMENT, SENTENCE

AND CONVICTION IS ILLEGAL DUE TO THE ARREST WARRANT

THAT WAS USED FOR HIS ARREST WHICH CONSTITUTES

“FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE” WHERE THE DEFENDANT

4TH AND 14TH UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS HAS

BEEN VIOLATED AS WELL AS HIS FLORIDA CON[S]TITUTIONAL

RIGHT ARTIC[LE] (I) -- DECLARATION OF RIGHTS SECTION (12)

ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE ARREST WARRANT THAT WAS

USED FOR HIS ARREST IS INVALID AND VAGUE[]

(id. at 241). On August 7, 2020, the State filed an answer opposing the

Petitioner’s Rule 3.850 motions (see generally Answer to Rule 3.850 Mots., ECF

No. 10-2 at 2–12), following which the post-conviction court entered an order,

on November 20, 2020, denying the Petitioner’s motions for post-conviction

relief (see generally Order Den. Rule 3.850 Mots., ECF No. 10-2 at 14–29). The

Petitioner appealed the post-conviction court’s order (see Notice of Appeal, ECF

No. 10-2 at 65), which the Third District affirmed in an unelaborated per

curiam decision. See Brown v. State, 317 So. 3d 1150 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021). The

Third District issued its mandate on March 22, 2021. (See Mar. 22, 2021

Mandate, ECF No. 10-2 at 69).2

2 Following the conclusion of proceedings on his Rule 3.850 motions, the

Petitioner proceeded to file a myriad of post-conviction pleadings (see generally

The Petitioner filed the instant petition on May 30, 2023 (see Pet. at 1),3

asserting that his convictions and sentence are illegal because he was

extradited and arrested pursuant to an invalid warrant (see id. at 5).

2. Legal Standard

Deference Under § 2254

A court’s review of a state prisoner’s federal habeas corpus petition is

governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). See

Abdul–Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 246 (2007). AEDPA “imposes a

highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings . . . , and

demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt[.]” Renico

v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (quotation marks omitted). “The purpose of

AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against

extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means

of error correction.” Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison,

818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38

(2011)).

According to AEDPA, a federal court may not grant a habeas petitioner

relief on any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state

court’s decision (1) “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States;” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1)–(2).

A state court decision is “contrary to” established Supreme Court

precedent when it (1) applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth

by the Supreme Court; or (2) confronts a set of facts materially

ECF Nos. 10-2–10-7)—none of which have any bearing on the resolution of the

instant petition; thus, the Court will not list those other pleadings in this order.

3 “Under the ‘prison mailbox rule,’ a pro se prisoner’s court filing is deemed filed

on the date it is delivered to prison authorities for mailing.” Williams v. McNeil,

557 F.3d 1287, 1290 n.2 (11th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless

arrives at a result different from Supreme Court precedent. Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 405–06 (2000). An “unreasonable application” of clearly

established federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.

Id. at 409–10. Consequently, “[a] state court’s determination that a claim lacks

merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could

disagree on the correctness of [the state court’s] decision.” Harrington v.

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quotation marks omitted). If the last state

court to decide a prisoner’s federal claim provides an explanation for its merits-

based decision in a reasoned opinion, “a federal habeas court simply reviews

the specific reasons given by the state court and defers to those reasons if they

are reasonable.” Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).

Even summary rejection of a claim qualifies as an adjudication on the

merits that is entitled to deference under AEDPA. See Meders v. Warden, Ga.

Diagnostic Prison, 911 F.3d 1335, 1351 (11th Cir. 2019). If the state court’s

merits determination is unaccompanied by an explanation, federal courts

should “‘look through’ the unexplained decision to the last related state-court

decision that does provide a relevant rationale” and “presume that the

unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1192.

Furthermore, a decision is still an adjudication on the merits when it

“addresses some but not all of a defendant’s claims.” Johnson v. Williams, 568

U.S. 289, 298 (2013).

Exhaustion under § 2254

“Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state prisoner must

exhaust available state remedies, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the

State the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its

prisoners’ federal rights.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (quotation

marks omitted). “To provide the State with the necessary opportunity, the

prisoner must fairly present his claim in each appropriate state court

(including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary review), thereby

alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim.” Id. (quotation marks and

other omitted); see also O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999)

(“[S]tate prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any

constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established

appellate review process.”); Johnson v. Fla., 32 F.4th 1092, 1096 (11th Cir.

2022) (“[A] state-court prisoner must present his claim to the state court in a

manner that would allow a reasonable reader to understand the legal and

factual foundation for each claim.” (quotation marks omitted)). “In Florida,

exhaustion usually requires not only the filing of a [Fla. R. Crim. P.] 3.850

motion, but an appeal from its denial.” Nieves v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 770

F. App’x 520, 521 (11th Cir. 2019) (alteration in original).

To fairly present the federal nature of the claim, “[i]t is not sufficient

merely that the federal habeas petitioner has been through the state courts,

nor is it sufficient that all the facts necessary to support the claim were before

the state courts or that a somewhat similar state-law claim was made.” Kelley

v. Sec’y for Dept. of Corr., 377 F.3d 1317, 1343–44 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275–76 (1971) and Anderson v. Harless, 459

U.S. 4, 6 (1982)). Rather, federal courts “have required a state prisoner to

present the state courts with the same claim he urges upon the federal courts.”

Picard, 404 U.S. at 276 (citations omitted). The Eleventh Circuit further has

observed that proper exhaustion “requires a habeas applicant to do more than

scatter some makeshift needles in the haystack of the state court record.”

McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1303 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks

omitted).

3. Timeliness and Exhaustion

The Respondent concedes that the Petitioner timely filed the petition and

that the petition’s sole ground for relief is exhausted. (See Resp. at 14);

Vazquez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 827 F.3d 964, 966 (11th Cir. 2016) (“States

can waive procedural bar defenses in federal habeas proceedings[.]” (quotation

marks omitted)). With such being the case, the Court shall reach the merits of

the petition.

4. Discussion

As mentioned above, the Petitioner argues that his convictions and

sentence are invalid because the warrant authorizing his extradition and arrest

was invalid. (See Pet. at 5). Specifically, the Petitioner claims that the warrant

was “vague” and did not bear a “[j]udge[’]s signature,” a “deputy clerk of

court[’]s signature,” the state “court[’]s seal,” or the date the warrant was

issued. (Id.). The state post-conviction court considered this claim, but did not

explain its reasoning for rejecting it. (See generally Order Den. Rule 3.850

Mots. at 14–29). Accordingly, the Court must presume that another “state

court adjudicated the claim on the merits” and review the state court record “to

determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported,

the state court’s decision.” Hittson v. GDCP Warden, 759 F.3d 1210, 1232 (11th

Cir. 2014) (footnote call number and quotation marks omitted). Petitioner

ultimately bears the burden “to demonstrate that there was no reasonable

basis for the decision of [the state court] to deny his claim.” Tarleton v. Sec’y,

Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 5 F.4th 1278, 1291 (11th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). And,

as explained below, the Petitioner fails to carry his burden.

The petition’s sole ground for relief is meritless because it is clearly and

conclusively refuted by the record. In the appendix, the Respondent filed the

purportedly invalid warrant (see Arrest Warrant, ECF No. 10-1 at 75); and a

cursory review of that instrument reveals that it lists with specificity the crimes

for which the Petitioner was being arrested and bears the date of issuance, the

state court’s seal, a judge’s signature, and a deputy clerk’s signature—all the

things the Petitioner claims were missing. But the Petitioner appears to know

that his claim is meritless—at least in part, as he acknowledges in his first

Rule 3.850 motion that the warrant in question was “stamped . . . [and]

date[d]” “by the clerk of court[.]” (Rule 3.850 Mot. at 218).

In sum, the Court denies the petition’s sole ground for relief as being

refuted by the record.

5. Evidentiary Hearing

In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to

establish the need for an evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of

Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). “[I]f the record refutes the

applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district

court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550

U.S. 465, 474 (2007). Here, the record refutes the Petitioner’s ground for relief,

meaning the Court can “adequately assess [the Petitioner’s] claim without

further factual development.” Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir.

2003). The Petitioner, therefore, is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

6. Certificate of Appealability

A prisoner seeking to appeal a district court’s final order denying his

petition for writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal; rather,

in order to do so, he must obtain a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. §

2253(c)(1). This Court should issue a certificate of appealability only if the

Petitioner makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Where, as here, the district court rejects a petitioner’s

constitutional claims on the merits, the petitioner must demonstrate that

reasonable jurists “would find the district court’s assessment of the

constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,

484 (2000). The Petitioner fails to make such a showing, hence the Court

declines to issue a certificate of appealability.

7. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF No. 1) is denied. A certificate of

appealability is also denied. Because there are no issues with arguable merit,

an appeal would not be taken in good faith, and thus, the Petitioner is not

entitled to appeal in forma pauperis. The Clerk is directed to deny any and

all pending motions as moot and close this case.

Done and ordered, in chambers, in Miami, Florida, on October 20, 2022.

Robert N. Scola, Jr.

United States District Judge

Copies, via U.S. Mail, to

Edward Revenous Brown

M57932

Hardee Correctional Institution

Inmate Mail/Parcels

6901 State Road 62

Bowling Green, Florida 33834

PRO SE