Lawson v. Montoya

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 23-CV-14240-RAR

AVION LAWSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

OFFICER E. MONTOYA, et al.,

Defendants.

__________________________________/

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Plaintiff Avion Lawson’s pro se Complaint filed

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Complaint (“Compl.”) [ECF No. 1]. Plaintiff has also filed a

motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). See IFP Motion [ECF No. 4]. In his Complaint,

Plaintiff alleges various correctional officers at Martin Correctional Institution (“Martin C.I.”)

have “beaten [him] repeatedly . . . as a means of ‘premeditated design of murder’ to deter [Lawson]

from filing lawsuits and grievances against prison staff,” and that the prison’s administrators have

repeatedly ignored his grievances. Compl. ¶¶ 16, 21. Plaintiff admits, right off the bat, that he has

filed dozens of meritless cases in federal court and that he qualifies as a “three-strike” litigant

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), but insists that he meets the “imminent danger” exception due the

persistent and constant threat of physical harm he faces from Martin C.I. staff. See generally

Compl. at 3–6; Memorandum of Law (“Memo.”) [ECF No. 3] at 1. After careful review, the Court

declines to address whether Plaintiff meets the “imminent danger” exception and will instead

DISMISS the Complaint as frivolous and malicious.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Court “shall review . . . a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress

from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A

(emphasis added). The definition of a “prisoner” includes “any person incarcerated or detained in

any facility who is . . . accused of [or] convicted of . . . violations of criminal law.” Id. §

1915A(c). In conducting its screening of a prisoner’s complaint, the Court must “dismiss the

complaint[] or any portion of the complaint,” when it is (1) “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted[;]” or (2) “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who

is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). Similarly, under § 1915(e)(2), “the court shall

dismiss [a] case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action” fails for the same enumerated

reasons articulated under § 1915A. Id. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added).

To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a complaint’s factual allegations “must

be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level”—with “enough facts to state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007).

Under this standard, legal conclusions “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and are

insufficient to state a claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Moreover, “[w]here a

complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the

line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. at 678 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

“To commence a civil lawsuit in federal district court, the general rule is that initiating

parties must prepay a filing fee.” Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 722 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a)), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). A person

that is “unable to pay such fees or give security therefor” can avoid prepaying the filing fee by

filing a motion to proceed IFP. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). However, the statute also provides a major

exception to this rule:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment

in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has,

on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any

facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States

that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the

prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

Id. § 1915(g). The purpose of this provision, also known as the “three-strikes rule,” is “to curtail

abusive prisoner litigation” by only allowing “a prisoner to file three meritless suits at the reduced

rate provided by that section. After the third meritless suit, the prisoner must pay the full filing

fee at the time he initiates suit.” Dupree v. Palmer, 284 F.3d 1234, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting

Vanderberg v. Donaldson, 259 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2001)). If, after receiving three

“strikes,” a prisoner files a new suit while moving to proceed IFP, “a court must dismiss the

prisoner’s case.” Medberry v. Butler, 185 F.3d 1189, 1192 (11th Cir. 1999).

ANALYSIS

The Complaint is a quintessential “shotgun pleading”: it is “replete with conclusory, vague,

and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action[,]” it does not

separate “into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief[,]” and it does not clearly

specify which defendants are responsible for which specific constitutional violations. Weiland v.

Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1322–23 (11th Cir. 2015). Instead, the Complaint

takes the form of a long and rambling narrative, which attempts to inform the Court about an

allegedly four-year campaign of reprisal by Martin C.I. officials against Plaintiff for events that

took place in other Florida Department of Corrections facilities and because of Plaintiff’s status as

a serial litigant. See Compl. ¶¶ 11, 17–18. As best the Court can tell, Plaintiff alleges that the

following unconstitutional acts occurred to him while at Martin C.I.:

• On August 23, 2019, “Officer V. Maldonado” “falsely accused [Lawson] of

lewd behavior[.]” Officer Maldonado threated to kill Plaintiff and then directed

Officers Gibson and Whipple to “strike [Lawson] in the back, legs, ribs, and

back of his head.” He also alleges that he received “no medical treatment” after

this attack occurred. See id. ¶¶ 13–14. Plaintiff filed a § 1983 suit against

Officer Maldonado and other Martin C.I. officials, but U.S. District Judge

Aileen M. Cannon dismissed the case because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies. See Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, Lawson v.

Maldonado, No. 19-CV-14356 (S.D. Fla. June 10, 2021), ECF No. 55.

• On November 24, 2019, “Officer W. Demas” reportedly retaliated against

Plaintiff for filing his lawsuit against Officer Maldonado by falsifying a

disciplinary report and having Plaintiff placed in disciplinary confinement.

While in confinement, Officer Gibson tampered with and withheld food and

threatened Plaintiff with additional harm. See Compl. ¶¶ 61–63, 67–68.

Plaintiff also sued Officer Demas for this, but U.S. District Judge K. Michael

Moore dismissed the case for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be

granted. See Order of Dismissal, Lawson v. Simmons, No. 22-CV-14249 (S.D.

Fla. Mar. 6, 2023), ECF No. 23.

• On February 21, 2022, Officer Montoya purportedly “stopped Avion Lawson

from going to his callout at the law library” and threatened to physically harm

him for filing lawsuits. During this confrontation, Officer Montoya yelled out

to the nearby inmates that Plaintiff was “a fucking rat ass snitch” and

encouraged the inmates to kill Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 76–79.

• On April 19, 2022, Officer “Jane Doe” “searched [Plaintiff’s] cell, ripped up

his sheets, took his blanket, and tossed [his] toothbrush in the toilet, stating,

‘We never walk alone!’” One week later, the same officer “threatened to lock

[Plaintiff] up and slammed his cell door shut with him inside, almost chopping

his fingers off.” Id. ¶¶ 84–85.

• On May 18, 2022, Officer Foster “made [Plaintiff] dump his tray in the chow

hall without taking a bite, telling him, ‘We got something for you! Wait and

see!’” Id. ¶ 87.

• On May 20, 2022, Plaintiff was told that he was supposed to be the target of a

hit that killed another inmate. Plaintiff claims that this hit occurred in response

to Officer Montoya’s actions on February 21, 2022. See id. ¶¶ 80–81.

• On April 1, 2023, Officer Price “approached [Plaintiff] . . . [and said] he better

get his skinny Black ass in the cell before she lock [sic] his ass up.” Officer

Price also “promise[d]” to make Plaintiff’s life “a living hell.” Id. ¶¶ 92–93.

• On May 4, 2023, Officers Fortt, Welcher, Reuda called Plaintiff a “snitch” in

front of other inmates. When Plaintiff protested, the officers handcuffed

Plaintiff and then “slammed” Plaintiff to the ground. See id. ¶¶ 112–17.

• Finally, on July 21, 2023, Plaintiff “was attacked by his cellmate who stated

Officer Reuda paid him to kill [Plaintiff].” Martin C.I. officials did nothing to

stop or prevent the attack. See id. ¶¶ 125-31.

Since Plaintiff did not prepay the filing fee, he is subject to the provisions of § 1915(g) if

he has accumulated three or more strikes. See Dupree, 284 F.3d at 1236. Plaintiff admits that §

1915(g) applies, and the Court agrees. See Memo. at 1, 3. Last year, U.S. District Judge Donald

M. Middlebrooks concluded that Plaintiff had accumulated at least four “strikes” under § 1915(g)

for filing multiple frivolous and malicious lawsuits in federal court. See Order of Dismissal,

Lawson v. Uncle Al’s Cookies, Inc., No. 22-CV-14208 (S.D. Fla. June 13, 2022), ECF No. 4 at 3.1

The Court adopts Judge Middlebrooks’s well-reasoned order and concludes that Plaintiff is a

“three-strikes” litigant under § 1915(g).

The only exception to the three-strikes rule is when the prisoner alleges that “he is under

imminent danger of serious physical injury.” Medberry, 185 F.3d at 1192. The plaintiff must

affirmatively “allege facts showing that he was in any danger of imminent harm” at the time he

filed his complaint. White v. Lemma, 947 F.3d 1373, 1379 (11th Cir. 2020). Plaintiff contends

that he has “met the § 1915(g) standard and under serious physical injury and is imminent at the

1 The Court finds that one of those four cases, Lawson v. Maldonado, No. 19-CV-14356 (S.D. Fla. June

10, 2021) no longer counts as a “strike” since the Eleventh Circuit now holds that “a dismissal for failure

to exhaust administrative remedies [is] a ‘strike’” only when “the failure to exhaust appears on the face of

the prisoner’s complaint.” Wells v. Brown, 58 F.4th 1347, 1350 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc). But that does

not change Plaintiff’s status as a three-striker since: (1) Plaintiff still has at least three strikes, and (2)

Plaintiff accumulated another strike after Judge Moore dismissed another one of Plaintiff’s cases. See Order

of Dismissal, Lawson v. Simmons, No. 22-CV-14249 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2023), ECF No. 23 at 7 (dismissing

case for “failure to raise a valid claim”).

time of the filing of this complaint.” Memo. at 3 (errors in original). As proof, Plaintiff points to

the “repeated and constant retaliation by the named prison officials [who have] terrorized

[Plaintiff] for years.” Compl. ¶ 88. The Court need not address this exception, however, since the

Complaint is still due to be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). See White, 947 F.3d at 1379

(“So though a court must procedurally dismiss without prejudice the claim of a prisoner who has

struck out under the three-strikes provision and failed to pay the filing fee, the court may also

consider the merits to dismiss the case with prejudice instead.”).

The Eleventh Circuit has explained that a “duplicative complaint is an abuse of the judicial

process and is properly dismissed without prejudice as malicious under [§ 1915A(b)(1)].” Daker

v. Ward, 999 F.3d 1300, 1308 (11th Cir. 2021). In contrast, a complaint is “frivolous” when “it

lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

Plaintiff’s Complaint is virtually identical to a complaint he filed in this same Court about a year

ago. Compare Compl., with Complaint, Lawson v. Simmons, No. 22-CV-14249 (S.D. Fla. July

11, 2022), ECF No. 1. The only difference between the two complaints is that the instant

Complaint references more alleged misconduct that has taken place in 2023. See generally Compl.

¶¶ 89–132. Judge Moore dismissed the Complaint with prejudice, finding that most of the

Complaint was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel and that the remainder of the

Complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. See Order of Dismissal, Lawson v.

Simmons, No. 22-CV-14249 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2023), ECF No. 23 at 7.

For the past four years, then, Plaintiff has attempted to relitigate the same claims over and

over again2—adding more details as time passes—in an attempt to achieve a different result. The

2 This pattern has gone on for even longer than that. Even before being transferred to Martin C.I., Plaintiff

has had a long history of accusing prison officials around the State of Florida of: (1) targeting Plaintiff

because of his prolific lawsuits and grievances, (2) physically abusing him, (3) falsifying disciplinary

reports to retaliate against Plaintiff, (4) frequently threatening Plaintiff with future physical harm and death,

Complaint, therefore, is a malicious abuse of judicial resources and cannot be tolerated. See Daker,

999 F.3d at 1308. The Complaint is also frivolous since it raises the same allegations that have

already been rejected as legally insufficient by this Court. See Mallon v. St. Lucie Cnty. Public

Defender’s Off., No. 22-CV-14396, 2022 WL 17477010, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 6, 2022) (dismissing

complaint where the plaintiff presented “the same frivolous claims our colleagues have tossed out

several times before”).

Since dismissing Plaintiff’s duplicative and frivolous complaints have not curtailed

Plaintiff’s abuse of the judicial process, the Court now finds it appropriate to warn Plaintiff about

sanctions. It is sometimes proper to restrain “particularly abusive prisoner[s]” from having

unfettered access to the courts when he or she has demonstrated a proclivity for filing lawsuits

designed “to either harass those in positions of authority or to grind the wheels of the judicial

system to a halt.” Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1071–72 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc).

Several judges in the Northern District of Florida have found that Plaintiff is a malicious filer who

has repeatedly provided false information in his pleadings. See Report and Recommendation,

Lawson v. Leavins, No. 5:15-CV-76 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2015), ECF No. 5 at 3 (“The court will

not tolerate false responses or statements in any pleading or motion filed before it. Here, Plaintiff

falsely responded to questions on the complaint form, as detailed above.”); Report and

Recommendation, Lawson v. Marshall, No. 5:15-CV-199 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 24, 2015), ECF No. 5

at 4 (“In view of Plaintiff’s failure to truthfully disclose his filing history, for which he has

previously been sanctioned by the Court with a dismissal of a case . . . the Court concludes that

and (5) enlisting other inmates to harm Plaintiff. See, e.g., Complaint, Lawson v. Brannon, No. 5:18-CV-

84 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2018), ECF No. 1; Complaint, Lawson v. Churchwell, No. 3:16-CV-487 (N.D. Fla.

Sept. 27, 2016), ECF No. 1; Complaint, Lawson v. Barber, No. 5:15-cv-150 (N.D. Fla. June 29, 2015), ECF

No. 1; Complaint, Lawson v. Leavins, No. 5:15-CV-112 (N.D. Fla. May 22, 2015), ECF No. 1. The eerie

similarities between all of Plaintiff’s complaints over the past decade are hard to ignore.

this case should be dismissed.”). And the Court has documented Plaintiff's history of abusive and

repetitive filings in this District. For these reasons, this Order shall serve as a warning to Plaintiff

that continuing to file meritless lawsuits in federal court will result in the entry of sanctions against

him—which can include restrictions on his ability to file new lawsuits and/or monetary penalties

against him. See Barash v. Kates, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (“The only

limitation on the court’s discretion to enjoin abusive litigation is that courts are not permitted to

completely bar all access to the courts.” (citing Procup, 792 F.2d at 1074)).

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Complaint

[ECF No. 1] is DISMISSED with prejudice as frivolous and malicious under 28 U.S.C. §

1915A(b). All pending motions are DENIED as moot. The Clerk shall CLOSE the case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 11th day of August, 2023.

foam A. RUIZ I

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ce: Avion Lawson

DC # W38414

Martin Correctional Institution

Inmate Mail/Parcels

1150 SW Allapattah Road

Indiantown, FL 34956

PRO SE

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