Opinion

Griffin v. McGuire

Court
District Court, S.D. Florida
Filed
Jun 22, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 20.2%

instructing courts “not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality’ since doing so avoids the crucial question whether the official acted reasonably in the particular circumstances that he or she faced” (internal quotation marks omitted)

How later courts described this case

  • instructing courts “not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality’ since doing so avoids the crucial question whether the official acted reasonably in the particular circumstances that he or she faced” (internal quotation marks omitted)
  • affirming a district court’s decision to take judicial notice of the docket in the underlying criminal case
  • affirming district court’s sua sponte dismissal under Younger

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT PIERCE DIVISION

CASE NO. 20-14303-CIV-CANNON/Maynard

THEODORE KEITH GRIFFIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

OFFICER THOMAS MCGUIRE,

OFFICER KERN DIEUDONNE,

MIAMI-DADE COUNTY,

BROWARD COUNTY,

MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT,

OFFICER PAUL SCHEEL,

and OFFICER ALEJANDRO FALCON,

Defendants.

/

ORDER ACCEPTING IN PART AND REJECTING IN PART

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Second

Amended Complaint (“SAC”) [ECF No. 64]. On August 17, 2022, following a referral order

[ECF No. 55], Judge Maynard issued a report (“the Report”) recommending that Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss be granted in part and denied in part [ECF No. 78]. Judge Maynard

recommends that Counts I, IV, V, VI, VII and VIII of the SAC be dismissed with prejudice, and

that Defendants Miami-Dade County, Broward County, and the Miami-Dade Police Department

be dismissed from this action [ECF No. 78 p. 23]. As to Counts II and III, Judge Maynard

recommends that such counts be allowed to proceed as to Officers Thomas McGuire, Paul Scheel,

Alejandro Falcon, and Kern Dieudonne (collectively the “Officer Defendants”) [ECF No. 78

p. 23]. Defendant Dieudonne timely filed Objections to the Report [ECF No. 79], arguing that

Counts II and III should be dismissed in their entirety. The remaining officer defendants

subsequently joined his objections (hereinafter “Defendant-Officer Objections”) [ECF No. 80].

Plaintiff did not file objections of his own and did not respond to the Defendant-Officer Objections.

The Court has reviewed the Report [ECF No. 78], the Defendant-Officer Objections

[ECF No. 79], and the full record. For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees with the

Objections as to Count II and therefore dismisses Count II. With respect to Count III, the Court

agrees with the Report that it should be permitted to proceed as follows; accepting the SAC as true,

Plaintiff plausibly alleges that Officers Dieudonne and McGuire deprived Plaintiff of his clearly

established federal constitutional right to a judicial probable cause hearing within 48 hours of his

warrantless arrest. The Court further determines that the remainder of Judge Maynard’s report is

well-reasoned and correct. Accordingly, the Report [ECF No. 78] is ACCEPTED IN PART

AND REJECTED IN PART as set forth below.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

On August 31, 2020, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a one count Section 1983 claim

for false imprisonment against Officers Thomas McGuire and Kern Dieudonne only [ECF No. 1].

Officers McGuire and Dieudonne filed a Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 19], and in response,

Plaintiff amended his Complaint, adding eight counts and naming Defendants Miami Dade

County, Broward County, Miami Dade Police Department, and the Hollywood Police Department

as additional Defendants [ECF No. 23]. After the matter was reassigned to the undersigned

[ECF No. 30], the Court granted Plaintiff leave to file a Second Amended Complaint (the “SAC”)

by December 14, 2020 [ECF No. 32]. Plaintiff then filed an untimely SAC [ECF No. 34], which

the Court nevertheless accepted as the operative complaint [ECF No. 44]. In the SAC, Plaintiff

names Officers McGuire, Dieudonne, Paul Scheel, and Alejandro Falcon, Miami-Dade County,

Broward County, the Hollywood Police Department, and the Miami Dade Police Department as

Defendants [ECF No. 34]. The Court thereafter dismissed Hollywood Police Department as a

Defendant because Plaintiff failed to perfect service of process on Hollywood Police Department

within the time authorized by the Court’s extension to the Rule 4(m) deadline [ECF No. 66].

The SAC brings the following eight claims arising out of Plaintiff’s arrest on August 24, 2018:

• Count I – “Deprivation of the Privileges of Free Speech and Peaceable Assembly” (Against

Defendants McGuire, Scheel, and Falcon) [ECF No. 34 ¶¶ 1–3];

• Count II – “The Right of People to be Free from the Use of Excessive Force During Arrest”

(Against Defendants McGuire, Scheel, Falcon, and Dieudonne) [ECF No. 34 ¶¶ 4–6];

• Count III – “False Imprisonment” (Against Defendants Miami-Dade County, Broward

County, Miami-Dade Police Department, McGuire, and Dieudonne) [ECF No. 34 ¶¶ 7–9];

• Count IV – “Assault” (Against Defendants McGuire and Dieudonne) [ECF No. 34

¶¶ 10–12];

• Count V – “Violation of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Right to Not Be Deprived of

Liberty Without Due Process of Law” (Against Defendants Miami-Dade County, Broward

County, Miami-Dade Police Department, McGuire, and Dieudonne) [ECF No. 34

¶¶ 13–15];

• Count VI – “Violation of the Florida and United States Constitutions” (Against Defendants

Miami-Dade County, Broward County, Miami-Dade Police Department, McGuire,

Dieudonne) [ECF No. 34 ¶¶ 16–18];

• Count VII – “Denial of Bail” (Against Defendants Miami-Dade County, Broward County,

Miami-Dade Police Department, McGuire, Dieudonne) [ECF No. 34 ¶¶ 19–21];

• Count VIII – “Violation of State Constitution Right to Enjoy Life and Liberty and to Pursue

and Obtain Happiness and Safety” (Against Defendants McGuire, Scheel, and Falcon)

[ECF No. 34 ¶¶ 22-24].

According to the SAC, on August 24, 2018, three police officers were dispatched to a

convenience store in Hollywood, Florida, in response to an incident involving a white male

attempting to cash a stolen check [ECF No. 34 p. 2]. Plaintiff, a black male, was sitting in a legally

parked car with the ignition running at the convenience store when the officers, dressed in

camouflage, approached Plaintiff’s vehicle [ECF No. 34 p. 2]. One of the officers banged on

Plaintiff’s window, pointed a gun at Plaintiff, and ordered Plaintiff to open the door [ECF No. 34

p. 2]. Because the officers were wearing camouflage, Plaintiff believed that the officers were

either attempting to rob him or carjack his vehicle [ECF No. 34 p. 2]. Plaintiff put his car in reverse

and fled from the parking lot [ECF No. 34 p. 2]. Once Plaintiff finally pulled over in Miami,

Florida, Plaintiff alleges that he “was snatched through the window of his car, injuring his neck

and back; and held down on the hot pavement for at least five minutes, causing third-degree burns

on his body” [ECF No. 34 pp. 2–3]. Plaintiff alleges that he was then “booked on a no bond

warrant, for six days, until August 30, 2018,” when he was finally taken before a judicial officer

in Broward County for a probable cause hearing [ECF No. 34 p. 3].

The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Plaintiff is currently awaiting trial on six

felony charges arising out of the incident, including two counts of Aggravated Battery on a Law

Enforcement Officer and one count of Aggravated Fleeing/Eluding at High Speed [ECF No. 64-1

p. 3].1 Plaintiff pled not guilty to these charges, but there is a current arrest warrant against Plaintiff

for violating his pre-trial release, and Plaintiff’s whereabouts are unknown. See generally State of

Florida v. Theodore K. Griffin, Case No. 18010595CF10A (Fla. Broward County Ct.).

Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss arguing, inter alia, that Plaintiff fails to

state a claim on which relief can be granted and that the Officer Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity and/or sovereign immunity on all counts [ECF No. 64]. The Report recommends that

the Miami-Police Department be dismissed from this action because it is not an entity subject to

suit by the laws of the State of Florida [ECF No. 78]. The Report also recommends that Broward

1 “A court may take judicial notice of matters of public record, including arrest warrants, and

consider those facts in resolving a motion to dismiss.” Eiras v. Fla., 239 F. Supp. 3d 1331, 1341

(M.D. Fla. 2017) (citing McDowell Bey v. Vega, 588 F. App’x 923, 926 (11th Cir. 2014) (affirming

a district court’s decision to take judicial notice of the docket in the underlying criminal case)).

County and Miami-Dade County be dismissed from this action because Plaintiff did not allege that

his constitutional rights were violated pursuant to an official policy or custom of these counties as

required by Section 1983 and binding case law [ECF No. 78 p. 6]. Depew v. City of St. Marys,

Georgia, 787 F.2d 1496, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986). And the Report determines that Counts I, IV, V,

VI, VII, and VIII fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted and recommended those counts

be dismissed with prejudice [ECF No. 78 pp. 8, 18–23].

As to Count II, the Report recasts Plaintiff’s excessive force claim as an unlawful arrest

claim and determines that the Officer Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because

“a reasonable officer would know that detaining a person by a show of force—pointing a gun at

them—when the person is doing no more than sitting in their legally parked car, violates the

person’s clearly established constitutional rights” [ECF No. 78 pp. 8–13]. Thus, the Report

determines that “the benefit of discovery is needed to determine qualified immunity,” because

despite being titled as an “excessive force claim, Count II states a claim for unlawful arrest”

[ECF No. 78 p. 13].

With respect to Count III, the Report rejects Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff improperly

lumps together both a state and federal claim for false imprisonment under this count [ECF No. 78

p. 14]. In rejecting this argument, the Report determines that, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro

se, the Court should analyze the facts as alleged to determine if Plaintiff states a claim for false

imprisonment under either the federal or Florida standard [ECF No. 78 p. 14]. The Report

ultimately concludes that, to the extent Count III alleges a federal false imprisonment claim,

Plaintiff states a viable cause of action for a violation of the Fourth Amendment’s right to a judicial

probable cause hearing within 48 hours of a warrantless arrest [ECF No. 78 pp. 14–16]. To the

extent that Count III alleges a Florida false imprisonment claim, the Report also determines that

“sovereign immunity does not shield the individual officers from [Plaintiff’s] false imprisonment

claim,” because “there is no way to read [Plaintiff’s] allegations except that he was held without a

prompt judicial determination of probable cause in wanton and willful disregard to his rights”

[ECF No. 78 pp. 17–18]. Finally, the Report concludes that probable cause does not bar Plaintiff’s

false imprisonment claim in light of the absence of a warrant and the alleged lack of a prompt

hearing [ECF No. 78 p. 18].

Officer Dieudonne filed timely objections to the Report [ECF No. 79]. He argues that the

Report “erroneously reformulates” Count II—an excessive force claim—into a claim of false arrest

based on lack of probable cause and then improperly determines that the Officer Defendants are

not entitled to qualified immunity on Count II [ECF No. 79]. On Count III, he argues that even if

it states a claim for false imprisonment as the Report determines, the Report failed to properly

conduct a qualified immunity analysis for any such claim. Defendants Scheel and Falcon adopt

Defendant Dieudonne’s objections as to Count II [ECF No. 80]. Defendant McGuire adopts

Defendant Dieudonne’s objections as to Counts II and III [ECF No. 80]. Plaintiff did not file any

objections of his own or respond to the objections. The Report is ripe for adjudication.

LEGAL STANDARD

To challenge the findings and recommendations of a magistrate judge, a party must file

specific written objections identifying the portions of the proposed findings and recommendation

to which objection is made. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Heath v. Jones, 863 F.2d 815, 822

(11th Cir. 1989); Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 F. App’x 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006). A district court

reviews de novo those portions of the report to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or

modify in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). To the extent a party fails to object to parts of the magistrate judge’s report,

the Court may accept the recommendation so long as there is no clear error on the face of the

record. Macort, 208 F. App’x at 784. Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, even in the absence

of an objection. See LeCroy v. McNeil, 397 F. App’x 554, 556 (11th Cir. 2010); Cooper-Houston

v. S. Ry. Co., 37 F.3d 603, 604 (11th Cir. 1994).

DISCUSSION

Although the Court agrees with the Report’s well-reasoned determinations as to Counts I,

IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII, and its determination that Count III alleges a claim for false imprisonment

in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Court sustains the officers’ objection to the Report’s

evaluation of Count II and accordingly dismisses the excessive force claim alleged in Count II.

Additionally, with respect to Count III, the Court determines that Officers Dieudonne and McGuire

are not entitled to qualified immunity at this juncture because the facts alleged, accepted as true,

plausibly establish that these officers violated Plaintiff’s clearly established right to a judicial

probable cause hearing within 48-hours of his warrantless arrest. Accordingly, the Court overrules

the officers’ objections with respect to Count III and agrees with the Report’s recommendation to

permit that federal claim to proceed.

I. Count II

Count II, described in the SAC as “THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE FREE FROM

THE USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE DURING ARREST,” alleges that Officers McGuire, Scheel,

Falcon, and Dieudonne used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment when they

“snatched the plaintiff through the window of his car, slamm[ed] him to the ground, injur[ed] his

neck and back; and [held] him down on the hot pavement for five minutes, causing third-degree

burns to his body” [ECF No. 34 p. 5 & ¶¶ 4–5]. Although the allegations in Count II concern

excessive force only, and although the SAC does not otherwise allege a false arrest claim, the

Report construes Count II as an unlawful arrest claim on the ground that officers lacked probable

cause to approach Plaintiff in the first instance while he was sitting in his car at the convenience

store [ECF No. 78 pp. 8–13]. Having characterized Count II as such, the Report determines that

officers illegally seized Plaintiff in violation of the Fourth Amendment when they pointed a gun

at him and instructed him to open the door [ECF No. 78 p. 12]. Defendants object to this

reinterpretation of Count II and argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on the claim that

was pled—excessive force during arrest [ECF No. 79 pp. 3–11]. The Court agrees with

Defendants. Count II as pled is an excessive force claim; the Officer Defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity on that claim; and even if Count II did warrant reformulation as an unlawful

arrest claim, such a claim would fail on the pled facts because Plaintiff was not seized within the

meaning of the Fourth Amendment until he pulled over in Miami and was arrested. As a final

matter, and as explained below, even if Count II stated a claim for unlawful arrest, the Court would

abstain from considering such a claim in accordance with Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),

because Plaintiff still faces criminal charges in Florida state court related to his arrest.

A. Count II Alleges an Excessive Force Claim

As a pro se litigant, Plaintiff’s pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those

drafted by attorneys and thus are to be liberally construed. Evans v. Georgia Reg’l Hosp., 850

F.3d 1248, 1253 (11th Cir. 2017). However, liberal construction of pro se pleadings “does not

give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient

pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69

(11th Cir. 2014). See also Risk v. Internal Revenue Serv., No. 18-CIV-61300-Altonaga, 2018 WL

34233967, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 15, 2018) (noting that “‘Courts are not required to aid pro se

litigants in setting forth legally cognizable claims.’”) (brackets omitted) (quoting Williams v.

Donald, No. 08-CV-57, 2009 WL 2589595, at *4 (M.D. Ga., Aug. 19, 2009)).

The Report incorrectly reformulates Count II, pled as a claim of excessive force during

arrest, into an unlawful arrest claim based on allegations not present in Count II [see ECF No. 34

¶¶ 4–6]. As pled, Count II refers to events subsequent to the high-speed chase and Plaintiff pulling

his vehicle over in Miami. Specifically, in the single substantive paragraph relevant to Count II,

Plaintiff alleges that the Officer Defendants “snatched [Plaintiff] through the window of his car,

slamm[ed] him to the ground, injur[ed] his neck and back, and [held] him down on the hot

pavement for five minutes, causing third-degree burns on [Plaintiff’s] body” [ECF No. 34 ¶ 5].

Such conduct, Plaintiff alleges, “deprived [Plaintiff] of his right to be free from the use of excessive

force during arrest, under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States”

[ECF No. 34 ¶ 5]. There are no facts in Count II related to the preceding episode in the parking

lot when officers approached Plaintiff initially. And importantly, none of the counts in the SAC

asserts an unlawful arrest claim such that Plaintiff’s excessive force claim arguably could be

subsumed within such a theory. Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Under

this Circuit’s law . . . a claim that any force in an illegal stop or arrest is excessive is subsumed in

the illegal stop or arrest claim and is not a discrete excessive force claim.”). Indeed, the SAC does

not make any allegation that Plaintiff was unlawfully arrested or that Plaintiff was unlawfully

arrested when the officers approached him in the convenience store parking lot [see ECF No. 34].

For these reasons, Count II of the SAC alleges an excessive force claim, not an unlawful

arrest claim. The Court rejects the Report’s reformulation of Count II.

B. The Officer Defendants are Entitled to Qualified Immunity on Count II

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231

(2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Courts apply a two-part analysis

to a government official’s assertion of qualified immunity. Harbert Int’l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d

1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 1998). “First, the official must prove that the allegedly unconstitutional

conduct occurred while he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority.” Id. “After

the officers makes this showing . . . the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that (1) the officer

violated a constitutional right and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged

violation.” Piazza v. Jefferson Cnty., Alabama, 923 F.3d 947, 951 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing

Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1251, 1264 (11th Cir. 2016)). Courts “may

consider these two prongs in either order, and a public official is entitled to qualified immunity if

the plaintiff fails to establish either one.” Jacoby v. Baldwin Cnty., 835 F.3d 1338, 1344 (11th Cir.

2016) (citing Pearson 555 U.S. at 236). In determining whether a right is clearly established,

federal district courts in Florida look to decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the Eleventh

Circuit, and the Florida Supreme Court. Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2014).

And in the excessive force context, “[a] determination that an officer used excessive force ‘requires

careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case’ while ‘recognizing that the

right to make an arrest . . . necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical

coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1251 (11th Cir. 2022),

cert. dismissed, 142 S. Ct. 2855 (2022) (brackets omitted and ellipses in original) (quoting Graham

v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).

Here, as the Report accurately points out, “there is no dispute that the Defendant officers

were acting in their discretionary authority” [ECF No. 78 p. 10]. The SAC alleges that the officers

“were dispatched . . . in reference to a white male attempting to cash a stolen check” [ECF No. 34

p. 2]. And Plaintiff acknowledges that the officers were conducting functions associated with their

roles as dispatched police officers [ECF No. 34 p. 2]. The burden thus falls on Plaintiff to show

that the Officer Defendants violated Plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights by using

excessive force when they arrested him.

In his Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff fails to cite to

any case law—let alone U.S. Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit precedent—indicating that the

Officer Defendants violated Plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights on the facts alleged

[see ECF No. 73]. Nor does the Court’s review of Eleventh Circuit authority indicate otherwise,

as explored below.

Turning to Plaintiff’s most serious allegation—that the Officer Defendants held Plaintiff

down on the hot pavement for five minutes, resulting in Plaintiff suffering third-degree burns—

available Eleventh Circuit persuasive authority does not support a violation of clearly established

law on the facts alleged. In Marantes v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 649 F. App’x 665 (11th Cir. 2016),

the Eleventh Circuit determined that officers did not violate clearly established law when

restraining a suspect on hot pavement, because “[n]ot every reasonable officer would have known

that the pavement was hot enough to cause injurious burns, and the complaint provides no

indication that [the plaintiff] informed any of the officers that the pavement was burning him.” Id.

at 670. Similarly, in Rubio v. Lopez, 445 F. App’x 170 (11th Cir. 2011), the Eleventh Circuit held

that “it is not clearly established that the Fourth Amendment requires an officer to stop restraining

a[n] [] arrestee on the hot pavement when he complains of being burned and resume the restraining

process on a cooler surface.” Id. at 174. Returning to the allegations in this case, Count II alleges

that officers “snatched the plaintiff through the window of his car, slamming him to the ground,

injuring his neck and back; and holding him down on the hot pavement for five minutes, causing

third-degree burns on his body” [ECF No. 34 ¶ 5]. Plaintiff does not allege that he complained to

the officers about the pavement burning him. Nor does he offer any other facts to support a

suggestion that officers would have known about the pavement causing injury. On these facts,

Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden to show that the officers violated his clearly established

rights by placing him on the hot pavement.

Plaintiff’s other generalized allegations regarding the officers’ use of force in arresting

Plaintiff are similarly insufficient to overcome the Officer Defendants’ assertion of qualified

immunity. In addition to holding him down on hot pavement, Plaintiff alleges that the officers

pulled him through the window of his car and slammed him on the ground, resulting in Plaintiff

sustaining a neck and back injury [ECF No. 34 p. 5]. Although slamming an arrestee can

sometimes constitute excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, see Ingram, 30 F.4th

at 1251–54 (reversing dismissal of excessive force claim where officers slammed an already-

searched and non-resisting detainee to the ground in a head-first manner, causing detainee to

sustain a serious neck injury), the particular facts alleged here—following two opportunities to

amend—do not reach that threshold. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014) (instructing

courts “not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality’ since doing so avoids the

crucial question whether the official acted reasonably in the particular circumstances that he or she

faced” (internal quotation marks omitted)). According to the SAC, Plaintiff reversed his car away

after being ordered to open the door and then proceeded to drive across county lines from

Hollywood, Florida, to Miami, Florida, where he pulled over. At that point, the officers used force

to remove Plaintiff from the vehicle once he stopped his car and restrained Plaintiff. Plaintiff does

not cite any authority which would show that the officers acted unreasonably in violation of

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights under the specific circumstances presented. And, as the Supreme

Court has instructed, “‘the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it

the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.’” Saunders, 766

F.3d at 1269 (brackets in original) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). Neither

does the application of de minimis force, without more, support a claim for excessive force in

violation of the Fourth Amendment. Myers v. Bowman, 713 F.3d 1319, 1327 (11th Cir. 2013).

Plaintiff has therefore failed to meet his burden, after ample leave to amend, to establish that the

Officer Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim in

Count II [ECF Nos. 23, 34, 44].

C. Any Unlawful Arrest Claim Fails as a Matter of Law

Even if Count II did allege an unlawful arrest claim—it does not—such a claim would fail

as a matter of law because Plaintiff was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment

when one of the officers pointed a gun at Plaintiff and instructed him to open the car door. A

person is “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment “only when, by means of physical

force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained.” United States v. Mendenhall,

446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980). Absent physical force, a seizure requires both a show of authority and

“submission to [that] assertion of authority.” California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991).

A showing of authority can include actions such as an officer blocking a citizen’s path, requesting

identification, the language and tone of the police officer, and the officer’s brandishing of a

weapon. United States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 2011). The key inquiry is

whether the individual submitted to that show of authority. See United States v. Dolomon, 569

F. App’x 889, 892–93 (11th Cir. 2014) (determining that a criminal defendant was not seized when

officers attempted to block the defendant’s truck with their vehicles and an officer drew his firearm

because the defendant did not submit to that show of authority and instead placed his truck in

reverse, striking an officer’s vehicle, and fled the scene).

Here, although one of the officers made a show of authority by drawing his firearm and

instructing Plaintiff to open the car door, Plaintiff did not submit to that authority and fled the

parking lot, driving from Hollywood to Miami and pulling over only after that chase [ECF No. 34

p. 2 (alleging that he reversed his car and fled)]. Accordingly, the officers’ actions at the

convenience store amounted, at most, to an attempted seizure. Thus, even if Count II of the SAC

did attempt to make out an unlawful arrest claim for the initial interaction between Plaintiff and

the Officer Defendants, it would fail on the facts alleged because there was no seizure at that

juncture. The first, and only, seizure in this case occurred after Plaintiff led officers on a high-

speed chase across county lines and Plaintiff finally pulled his car over. Accordingly, Plaintiff

could not make out any unlawful arrest claim based on any purported arrest in the convenience

store parking lot.

D. The Court Would Be Required to Abstain from Hearing an Unlawful Arrest Claim

Pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), in the absence of “extraordinary

circumstances[,] a federal court must abstain from deciding issues implicated in an ongoing

criminal proceeding in state court.” Thompson v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1495, 1503 (11th Cir.

1983). Application of the Younger abstention doctrine can be raised sua sponte. See Bellotti v.

Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1976) (noting that “abstention may be raised by the [district] court

[s]ua sponte”); Boyd v. Georgia, 512 F. App’x 915, 916 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming district court’s

sua sponte dismissal under Younger). Courts should consider three factors in determining whether

to abstain from hearing a case in accordance with Younger: (1) whether there is an ongoing state

judicial proceeding; (2) whether the federal proceedings implicate important state interests; and

(3) whether there is an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional

challenges. 31 Foster Child. v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1274 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Middlesex

Cnty. Ethics Comm. V. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). All three factors

weigh in favor of abstention for any unlawful arrest claim here. Plaintiff is currently awaiting

charges—and has failed to appear after tampering with his monitor—for the same actions that

would underly any unlawful arrest claim. See generally State of Florida v. Theodore K. Griffin,

Case No. 18010595CF10A (Fla. Broward County Ct.). Any federal determination that this arrest

is unlawful would implicate Florida’s interest in prosecuting Plaintiff, and Plaintiff can challenge

the constitutionality of his arrest in his criminal case. Younger abstention applies.

II. Count III – False Imprisonment

In the Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argue that Count III is a shotgun pleading because it

lumps a state law false imprisonment claim and a constitutional false imprisonment claim under

the same count [ECF No. 64 pp. 11–12]. Although the Report did not resolve this issue, the Court

concludes that Count III is not a shotgun pleading and that Count III alleges a false imprisonment

claim in violation of the Fourth Amendment only [ECF No. 34 ¶ 8 (alleging that “Defendants

Miami-Dade County, Broward County, Hollywood Police Department, Miami Dade Police

Department, Officers Thomas McGuire and Kern Dieudonne held the plaintiff on a no bond

warrant . . . from August 24, 2018 until August 30, 2018 [] depriv[ing] [Plaintiff] of a judicial

determination of probable cause secured under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of

the United States . . .” (emphasis added)).

As the Report correctly notes, the Supreme Court has made clear the Fourth Amendment

is violated when an individual is detained for a period exceeding 48-hours without a probable cause

hearing. Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 58–59 (1991). See also United States v.

Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567, 593 (11th Cir. 2020) cert. denied sub nom. Palacios-Solis v.

United States, 141 S. Ct. 162 (2020), and cert. denied sub nom. Guagua-Alcaron v. United States,

141 S. Ct. 814 (2020) (“[W]hen a [judicial] probable cause determination does not happen within

48 hours, ‘the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide

emergency or other extraordinary circumstance.’” (quoting McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 57)). Thus,

Plaintiff had a clearly established right under the Fourth Amendment to a probable cause hearing

within 48-hours of his warrantless arrest, and the SAC plausibly alleges a violation of that right

[ECF No. 34 ¶ 8 (alleging that Officers Dieudonne and McGuire, along with other entities, “held

[Plaintiff] on a no bond warrant . . . from August 24, 2018, until August 30, 2018, . . . depriv[ing]

him of a judicial determination of probable cause”)].

While the Court is not unmindful of the generality of Plaintiff’s allegations on the particular

causal connection between his 6-day detention and the officers’ actions [see ECF No. 79 p.13], the

Court is satisfied at this juncture, accepting the SAC as true, that Plaintiff has alleged a violation

of his clearly established federal right to a prompt judicial hearing following his warrantless arrest.

It may be true that Officers Dieudonne and McGuire “did not arrest Plaintiff, did not transport

Plaintiff, and had no control or authority over where inmates partake in judicial proceedings”

[ECF No. 79 p. 12]. But such an argument contradicts the allegations of the SAC [ECF No. 34

¶ 8] and is therefore more appropriate for summary judgment. Count III against Officers

Dieudonne and McGuire survives.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. The Report and Recommendation [ECF No. 78] is ACCEPTED IN PART AND

REJECTED IN PART in accordance with this Order.

2. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 64] is GRANTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART.

a. Counts I, II, IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

No further repleading is warranted because Plaintiff has been given multiple

opportunities to amend his Complaint [ECF Nos. 23, 34, 44].

b. Defendants Miami Dade County, Broward County, Miami Dade Police

Department, Paul Scheel, and Alejandro Falcon are DISMISSED from this

action and the Clerk SHALL TERMINATE them from the docket.

3. Count III against Defendants McGuire and Dieudonne may proceed. Nothing in this

Order should be construed as a comment on the merits of that claim.

4. On or before July 12, 2023, Defendants McGuire and Dieudonne shall file an answer

to Count III of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint [ECF No. 34].

5. The Clerk SHALL MAIL a copy of this Order to Plaintiff’s last known address listed

below.

CASE NO. 20-14303-CIV-CANNON/Maynard

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Pierce, Florida this 22nd day of June 2023.

Cy M. CANNON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ce: counsel of record

Theodore Keith Griffin

475 N.W. 19th Street

Miami, Florida 33136

PRO SE

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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