Woods v. Reeve

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT PIERCE DIVISION

Case Number: 21-14001-CIV-MARTINEZ-MAYNARD

YOLANDA WOODS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHRISTOPHER REEVE, et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on nine motions for summary judgment: Defendant

Rick Sarcinello’s Motions for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff Andrew Coffee IV (ECF No.

138), Plaintiff Vivian Scott (ECF No. 140), Plaintiff Leslie Lowery (ECF No. 139), and Plaintiff

Yolanda Woods (ECF No. 146); Defendants Patrick White and Christopher Reeve’s Motions for

Summary Judgment against Andrew Coffee IV (ECF No. 133), Vivian Scott (ECF No. 134), Leslie

Lowery (ECF No. 160), and Yolanda Woods (ECF No. 150); and Defendant Deryl Loar’s Motion

for Summary Judgment against Andrew Coffee IV (ECF No. 125). Woods responded to Sarcinello,

White, and Reeve’s (the “Officers”) Motions for Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 189 & 191), to

which the Officers filed replies (ECF No. 197 & 199). Coffee IV also filed a response to Loar’s

Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.180), to which Loar replied (ECF No. 187). None of the

other Plaintiffs responded to the pending Motions for Summary Judgment. The Court has

reviewed the briefing, the record, and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. After careful

consideration, the Court rules as follows.

I. BACKGROUND1

This is a tragic case involving the execution of a search warrant in the early morning hours

that turned into a shootout and ended with the death of 21-year-old Alteria Woods, an innocent

bystander. SWAT executed the search warrant from the front, entry door and eastside window of

the residence. After SWAT broke through the eastside window, the shootout began when one of

the plaintiffs in this consolidated action, Andrew Coffee IV, started firing out of his bedroom and

through the eastside window. Alteria, asleep in the bed facing the eastside window, got caught in

the crossfire. Alteria’s mother, Yolanda Woods, initiated this action, as the personal representative

of Alteria, against the officers involved in the shooting. Vivian Scott, the owner of the residence,

Leslie Lowery, Scott’s friend who was spending the night at the residence, and Coffee IV, Alteria’s

boyfriend and the person who first fired his weapon, also filed complaints arising from law

enforcement’s execution of the search warrant. Those complaints were consolidated into this

action for pretrial purposes.

A. Factual Background

At around 5:30 a.m. on March 19, 2017, SWAT executed a search warrant in Vero Beach,

Florida, at a residence owned by Plaintiff Vivian Scott. (Plaintiff Yolanda Woods and Defendants

Christopher Reeve and Patrick White’s Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts (“WRW-JSMF”) ¶¶

1, 3, 14–16, 25, ECF No. 141; Plaintiff Yolanda Woods and Defendant Rick Sarcinello’s Joint

Statement of Undisputed Facts (“WS-JSMF”) ¶¶ 12–13, 20, ECF No. 151; Plaintiffs Coffee IV,

Scott, and Lowry and Defendants Reeve, White, and Sarcinello’s Joint Statement of Undisputed

Facts (“CSL-RWS-JSMF”) ¶ 12, ECF No. 130). The search warrant was based on information

1 The facts are undisputed unless stated otherwise. When the facts are in dispute, the Court

construes them in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs and draws all inferences in their favor. See

Troupe v. Sarasota Cnty., 419 F.3d 1160, 1165, 1167 (11th Cir. 2005).

collected from a narcotics investigation that targeted Andrew Coffee III (aka “Cheezy”), the father

of Plaintiff Andrew Coffee IV. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 14). During the investigation, Officer Christopher

Reeve conducted two separate controlled buys of $40 worth of crack cocaine from Coffee III using

a confidential informant. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 14; CSL-RWS-JSMF ¶ 10). Both transactions occurred

at Coffee III’s residence in Vero Beach (the “Vero Beach Residence”). (WRW-JSMF ¶ 14; CSL-

RWS-JSMF ¶ 10). The confidential informant advised Reeve that she believed there was at least

one firearm in the residence. (White and Reeve Statement of Material Facts (“WR-SMF”) ¶ 5,

ECF No. 145; Woods Resp. to WR-SMF ¶ 5, ECF No. 190; WS-JSMF ¶ 15; CSL-RWS-JSMF ¶

13). Based on information collected from the investigation, Reeve submitted an application and

sworn affidavit for a search warrant on the Vero Beach Residence, which was signed by a judge

the same day. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 15; ECF No. 127-3 at 278–91).

Reeve submitted a request for a SWAT team to execute the search warrant because he

considered it to be a high-risk operation. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 19; May 3, 2022, Reeve Dep. (“Reeve

Dep.” at 81:21–82:11, ECF No. 127-3). SWAT’s participation was approved. (WRW-JSMF ¶

19). The SWAT team’s mandate was to secure the residence and its occupants and then to turn

over control to the assigned drug unit. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 20). Officer Patrick White, a sergeant at

the time, was the team leader of the SWAT operation. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 21; WS-JSMF ¶ 14). Reeve

and Sarcinello were part of the SWAT team. (See Reeve Dep. at 20:13–21:5; May 11, 2022, Rick

Sarcinello Dep. at 25:1–19, ECF No. 127-4).

About thirty minutes before executing the warrant, the SWAT team participated in a team

briefing at the Sheriff’s Office. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 25; WS-JSMF ¶¶ 15–19). The entry team was

assigned to the northeast door of the Vero Beach Residence, which was the primary entry used for

narcotics sales. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 39). Detective Robert Ryan, who was part of the entry team, was

tasked with delivering a hand-toss, sight-delivered flashbang on the northeast entry door, if

necessary. (WRW-JSMF ¶¶ 31–32; May 5, 2022, Patrick White Dep. (“White Dep.”) at 114:23–

115:10, ECF No. 127-6).

Reeve and Sarcinello were assigned to the port team, comprised of just them two. (WRW-

JSMF ¶¶ 33, 38, 48). On command from White, Reeve was to break the eastside window—closest

to the northeast entry door—rake it clear so that Sarcinello would be able to see clearly into the

window, and make an assessment on whether anyone was in the room. (WRW-JSMF ¶¶ 36, 38;

WS-JSMF ¶ 24; CSL-RWS-JSMF ¶¶ 28–29, 31; Feb. 10, 2022, Andrew Coffee IV Dep. (“Coffee

IV Dep.”) at 29:9–30:20, ECF No. 127-1; White Dep. at 112:2–21). Reeve was in charge of

utilizing the rake-and-break tool and deploying a flashbang, while Sarcinello was assigned to be

Reeve’s cover during the rake-and-break operation. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 34; WS-JSMF ¶ 24). The

flashbang used by Reeve has a deployment apparatus at the end of the rake-and-break tool.

(WRW-JSMF ¶ 31; WS-JSMF ¶ 25). Unlike the hand-toss flashbang assigned to Detective Ryan,

the flashbang at the end of Reeve’s rake-and-break tool is typically deployed at an upward angle

toward the ceiling and the flashbang remains on the pole itself when deployed, it does not drop.

(WRW-JSMF ¶ 31).

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(ECF No. 127-6 at 217).

At the briefing, Reeve advised the team that Andrew Coffee III, Andrew Coffee IV, and

Vivian Scott lived in the Vero Beach Residence, and informed the team about the residents’

criminal histories. (WRW-JSMEF § 25; WS-JSMF 9 15-19). At the time of the search warrant, a

background check revealed that Coffee II] had 58 criminal charges and 5 felony convictions.

(Coffee III’s Rap Sheet, ECF No. 128-4; CSL-RWS-JSMF § 14; WR-SMF § 6; Woods Resp. to

WR-SMF 4 6). His arrests include possession of a firearm, discharging of a firearm, grand theft

of a firearm, discharging a firearm in public, battery on a law enforcement officer, and resisting

arrest with and without violence. (Coffee III’s Rap Sheet, ECF No. 128-4; CSL-RWS-JSMF 4 14;

WRW-JSMF § 6; Woods Resp. to WR-SMF § 6). A background check revealed that Coffee IV

had 36 criminal charges and 4 felony convictions. (Coffee [V’s Rap Sheet, ECF No. 128-5; CSL-

RWS-JSMF pg. 4, 94). His arrests include aggravated assault with a weapon, aggravated battery,

2 Paragraph 4 on page 4 of Coffee IV, Lowry, Scott, Reeve, White, and Sarcinello’s Joint

Statement of Material Facts appears to be misnumbered.

fleeing and eluding police, battery on a police dog, resisting arrest with and without violence,

battery on a police officer, and robbery with a firearm. (Coffee IV’s Rap Sheet, ECF No. 128-5;

WRW-JSMF ¶ 7; Woods Resp. to WR-SMF ¶ 7).

In addition, Reeve and White were aware that Andrew Coffee II (Jr.)—Plaintiff Coffee

IV’s grandfather—had been arrested for shooting an Indian River County Sheriff Deputy during a

traffic stop and was in custody when the search warrant on the Residence was to be executed.

(Woods Add’l Facts to WR-SMF (“Woods-AF to WR-SMF”) ¶¶ 79–81, ECF No. 190; Woods and

Reeve Resp. to Woods Add’l Facts (WR-Resp. to Woods-AF”) ¶¶ 79–81, ECF No. 198). Reeve

had watched a video of the shooting before executing the search warrant. (Woods-AF to WR-

SMF ¶ 80; WR-Resp. to Woods-AF ¶ 80). Neither Coffee III nor Coffee IV were involved in that

shooting. (Woods-AF to WR-SMF ¶ 82; WR-Resp. to Woods-AF ¶ 82). However, about a month

before the search warrant, Coffee IV was subject to a traffic stop by Indian River County Sheriff’s

deputies. (WR-SMF ¶¶ 8–9; Woods Resp. to WR-SMF ¶¶ 8–9; CSL-RWS-JSMF ¶ 15). Coffee

IV livestreamed the stop. (WR-SMF ¶ 8; Woods Resp. to WR-SMF ¶ 8). Reeve watched the

recording of the livestream. (WR-SMF ¶ 8; Woods Resp. to WR-SMF ¶ 8). Plaintiffs Coffee IV,

Lowery, and Scott, and Defendants Reeve, White, and Sarcinello agree that Coffee IV made

several statements during the stop about the shooting involving his grandfather—Coffee II—that

Reeve perceived as threats. (CSL-RWS-JSMF ¶¶ 15–16). Woods disputes that Coffee IV’s

statements during the stop were threatening. (WR-SMF ¶ 9; Woods Resp. to WR-SMF ¶ 9).

Now, back to the search warrant. The SWAT team anticipated that Coffee III, Coffee IV,

and Scott could or would be at the Residence. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 23; WS-JSMF ¶ 15). Scott lived

in the Vero Beach Residence with her son, Coffee III, and her grandson, Coffee IV. (WRW-JSMF

¶ 16; WS-JSMF ¶ 4). Alteria Woods was Coffee IV’s girlfriend. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 1). She did not

live at the Vero Beach Residence, but she would sometimes stay the night there with Coffee IV.

(WS-JSMF ¶ 5; Apr. 4, 2022, Vivian Scott Dep. (“Scott Dep.”) at 36:5–37:11, ECF No. 127-5).

The Officers did not know Alteria was at the Residence when the search warrant was executed.

(WS-JSMF ¶ 38; WRW-JSMF ¶ 6; CSL-RWS-JSMF ¶ 5).

The SWAT team executed the search warrant at about 5:30 a.m. (WS-JSMF ¶ 20; WRW-

JSMF ¶¶ 2, 24). Reeve and Sarcinello approached their assigned position at the eastside window.

(WRW-JSMF ¶ 41). Alteria’s Chevy Cruz was parked next to the Residence during the execution

of the warrant. (Woods-AF to WR-SMF ¶ 47; WR-Resp. to Woods-AF ¶ 47). Immediately before

executing the warrant, Reeve and Sarcinello attempted to look through the eastside window, but it

was covered with something, and they could not see inside the room. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 42). Because

the window was elevated, Sarcinello placed a small stepladder outside the window so that he could

step up and get a better view of the room inside. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 43).

Meanwhile, the entry team went around the corner to their assigned position at the

northside door. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 44). Before White could knock and announce, Coffee III opened

the door. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 44). White began yelling “Sheriff’s Office. Search Warrant.” (CSL-

RWS-JSMF ¶ 41; see also WRW-JSMF ¶ 45; WS-JSMF ¶ 34). After opening the door, Coffee

III began to shut the door and go back inside the house. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 46). Lieutenant Dixon

grabbed the door handle and pulled it back open. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 46). Coffee III was ordered to

stop resisting; he was holding a bag of what was later learned to be cocaine. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 46).

White then put his hands on Coffee III and tried to get him to the ground to secure his hands.

(WRW-JSMF ¶ 47; White Dep. at 129:17–131:13).

While White was attempting to secure Coffee III, Detective Ryan deployed the hand-toss,

sight-delivered flashbang in the open area of the room in front of the bed of what was Coffee III’s

bedroom. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 47; ECF No. 128-8 at 1; ECF No. 127-4 at 241; 128-13 at 79). Ryan

testified at his deposition that before he detonated the flashbang, he looked inside the bedroom,

which was illuminated from the light on the pistols and flashlights held by officers at the scene.

(Detective Robert Ryan Dep. (“Ryan Dep.”) at 41:3–13, 44:14–15, ECF No. 128-14). Further,

Ryan stated that he did not see anyone in the room before he deployed the flashbang. (Ryan Dep.

at 43:20–44:9). After Ryan deployed the flashbang, an unidentified female emerged from that

room, came to the threshold, and was taken into custody. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 47; CSL-RWS-JSMF ¶

44; Ryan Dep. at 43:1–20). Ryan testified that she was hidden from sight. (Ryan Dep. at 44:14–

15). Alteria was not harmed by the detonation of the hand-tossed flashbang through the entry

door. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 9; see also Medical Examiner Report of Alteria Woods (“Alteria Med.

Rep.”), ECF No. 128-9).

On the eastside of the Vero Beach Residence, Reeve and Sarcinello heard commotion from

the entry door area and knew the entry team had made contact with someone. (WRW-JSMF ¶¶

44–45). After securing Coffee III, White got back up on his feet, got on his radio, and ordered the

port team to “execute the port.” (WRW-JSMF ¶ 48; White Dep. at 133:23–134:24). Upon

command, Reeve began the rake-and-break procedure. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 49; Reeve Dep. at 162:23–

163:7). Woods disputes that Reeve stated “Sheriff’s Office. Search Warrant.” before executing

the rake-and-break. (WR-SMF ¶ 32; Woods Resp. to WR-SMF ¶ 32; see also Coffee IV Dep. at

192:3–17). Reeve did not have a firearm in hand while executing the procedure. (WRW-JSMF ¶

29; Reeve Dep. at 170:24–171:8). Sarcinello provided cover for Reeve during the procedure by

pointing his rifle at the eastside window. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 29). Reeve initiated the procedure by

hitting the top-glass window panel with the rake-and-break tool and clearing the glass. (WRW-

JSMF ¶ 50; WS-JSMF ¶ 36; CSL-RWS-JSMF ¶ 48). He then hit the bottom-glass panel window,

and cleared out the glass, as well as the curtains or blinds. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 50). A large television

was blocking the bottom-glass window, so Reeve knocked it over to have a clear line of sight into

the room. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 50). The television set fell on top of Coffee IV—who had walked

towards the window—from the dresser underneath the window. (Woods-AF to WR-SMF ¶ 56;

WR-Resp. to Woods-AF ¶ 56). When the window was cleared out, Reeve deployed the flashbang

inside the room in an upwards manner, in the top-right corner of the window, pointed close towards

the ceiling. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 51). The flashbang made a “boom” noise and there was a flash of

light for a moment. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 51). After the flash, the room was pitch dark; Reeve could

not see anything inside the bedroom, even though the window had been cleared. (WRW-JSMF ¶

52; Reeve Dep. at 170:18–23).

Then, Defendant Andrew Coffee IV opened fire from inside the bedroom. (WRW-JSMF

¶¶ 3–4, 53, 55; WS-JSMF ¶¶ 41–43). Alteria was still on the bed inside the room. (Woods-AF to

WR-SMF ¶ 73; WR-Resp. to Woods-AF ¶ 73). Reeve and Sarcinello did not know who was

shooting at them. (WRW-JSMF ¶¶ 10–11; see also WS-JSMF ¶ 45). Sarcinello saw round muzzle

flashes at close range and believed that the bullets were coming right at him. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 54;

WS-JSMF ¶ 44). Law enforcement officers are trained to understand that the muzzle flash is a

target, and that the person shooting the gun is the target acquisition. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 56; Reeve

Dep. at 40:6–23). Sarcinello returned fire. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 54; WS-JSMF ¶¶ 42–43). Reeve was

still holding the rake-and-break tool when the first shots came from inside the bedroom. (WRW-

JSMF ¶ 57). When the shots started, Reeve threw down the rake-and-break tool and unholstered

his pistol. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 57). At that point, Reeve believed the firing had stopped for a second,

so he leaned over to look inside the window because he thought that maybe the threat had been

stopped. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 58; Reeve Dep. at 186:21–189:2). During this lull, Sarcinello changed

magazines and called for cover. (WR-SMF ¶ 43, Woods Resp. to WR-SMF ¶ 43). Sarcinello

knew there was something wrong with his weapon. (WR-SMF ¶ 43; Woods Resp. to WR-SMF ¶

43; WS-JSMF ¶ 46). A subsequent investigation revealed that Sarcinello’s rifle had been struck

with a projectile fired by Coffee IV from the bedroom. (WR-SMF ¶ 44; Woods Resp. to WR-

SMF ¶ 44).

When Reeve looked through the window, he saw a muzzle flash directed toward him right

in front of the window. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 58). In response, Reeve ducked his head out of the

window and returned fire. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 58). Reeve was in fear of his life. (WRW-JSMF ¶

58). Sarcinello also heard more gunshots from inside and saw the muzzle flash. (WRW-JSMF ¶

59; Sarcinello Dep. at 151:25–152:4). He returned fire, too. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 59). When the

shooting stopped from inside bedroom, both Reeve and Sarcinello stopped returning fire. (WRW-

JSMF ¶ 60; WS-JSMF ¶ 49; Reeve Dep. at 192:12–193:1).

Around this time, White came over to the eastside window from the entry door. (WRW-

JSMF ¶ 61). White saw Reeve and Sarcinello on their knees under the windowsill. (WRW-JSMF

¶ 62). Reeve told White that he and Sarcinello were being shot at from the window. (WRW-JSMF

¶ 62). White stepped up on his tip toes in the middle of the window and illuminated the room with

his pistol-mounted light. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 63). From where he stood behind the windowsill, he

saw a small room with a doorway directly in front of him, a wall to his left, and that the room

opened up a little to the right. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 63; White Dep. at 142:23–143:21). The light

illuminated enough for White to see inside the room, but he could not see anybody in the room

from the angle where he stood. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 63; White Dep. at 144:1–7). Then Coffee IV

abruptly and briefly appeared in the doorway from the right side of the room and moved to the left

out of the doorframe. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 64). A muzzle flash came right at White. (WRW-JSMF ¶

65). White ducked, came back up, and fired through the window into Coffee IV’s direction.

(WRW-JSMF ¶ 65; see also WS-JSMF ¶ 50). No more shots were fired. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 66).

White then notified the team, “Tango down,” which signifies that the assailant has been

shot or is down. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 66). This assessment was incorrect, however, because moments

later Coffee IV exited the house from the dilapidated porch in the southeast corner of the house.

(WRW-JSMF ¶ 67). Sarcinello verbally ordered Coffee IV to drop to the ground and crawl away

from the porch. (WS-JSMF ¶ 52; Sarcinello Depo. at 159:11–160:8). Two officers from the

perimeter took Coffee IV into custody. (Sarcinello Dep. at 150:11–160:8). Then, Plaintiff Vivian

Scott exited the house from the porch behind Coffee IV. (Sarcinello Dep. at 159:11–160:8; Scott

Dep. at 53:11–24). Officers escorted Scott off the porch. (Sarcinello Dep. at 159:11–160:8; Scott

Dep. at 53:11–24).

While Sarcinello was ordering Coffee IV to the ground, another officer approached White

near the eastside window and gave White a ballistic shield. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 68; White Dep. at

151:2–154:10). White used a stepladder to look inside the eastside bedroom window. (WRW-

JSMF ¶¶ 68-69). When he looked inside the room, he saw Alteria on the bed and she was not

responsive to White’s commands. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 69). Alteria had been struck ten times in the

body with bullets shot by Sarcinello. (WRW-JSMF ¶¶ 5, 8; WS-JSMF ¶¶ 55–56). She died from

the gunshot wounds. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 7; WS-JSMF ¶ 56). Coffee IV was not injured from any of

the shots fired. (WRW-JSMF ¶¶ 5, 8; WS-JSMF ¶ 57). Ryan and Deputy Kelsey Zorc—another

officer at the scene—sustained gunshots by friendly fire from Sarcinello. (Sarcinello Dep. at 19:3–

25; Ryan Dep. at 60:2–61:23). In total, Reeve fired four rounds, White fired four rounds,

Sarcinello fired 16 rounds, and Coffee IV fired four rounds. (WRW-JSMF ¶ 4).

White notified Ryan over the radio—who was at the front entrance of the Residence—that

Coffee IV had exited the Residence. (Ryan Dep. at 50:4–14). In response, Ryan and Jimmy Dixon

entered into the north door bedroom of the Residence where Ryan had earlier deployed the hand-

toss grenade. (Ryan Dep. at 50:15–22). Ryan and Dixon proceeded down a hallway until they

reached an open door on the left. (Ryan Dep. at 51:14–52:7). When they went inside the bedroom

they encountered an unresponsive female without a pulse, later identified as Alteria. (Ryan Dep.

at 52:5–25). Ryan then exited the bedroom and proceeded to clear the rest of the Residence,

moving to the west. (Ryan Dep. at 57:20–58:9). Deputy Christian Mathisen located Plaintiff

Leslie Lowery—a friend of Scott’s—on the westside of the house and passed her to Ryan, who

escorted her to the threshold of the Residence where he handed her to someone outside. (CSL-

RWS-JSMF ¶ 89; Mar. 21, 2017, Christian Mathisen Dep. (“Mathisen Dep.”) at 29:22–30:4, ECF

No. 128-18; Apr. 2, 2022, Leslie Lowery Dep. (“Lowery Dep.”) at 38:3–40:8, 53:10–54:18, ECF

No. 127-2). Lowery was located in Scott’s bedroom, at the furthest point away from where the

entry team initiated the search warrant; in other words, at the opposite end of the house. (Mathisen

Dep. at 36:13–22; CSL-RWS-JSMF ¶ 81). Neither Scott nor Lowery sustained any physical

injuries as a result of the flashbangs or gunfire or from being handcuffed outside the Residence

after they exited the Residence. (CSL-RWS-JSMF ¶¶ 87, 90–92).

A few hours after SWAT executed the search warrant at the Residence, Defendant Deryl

Loar, Sheriff of Indian River County, held a press conference to address the shooting incident.

(Plaintiff Andrew Coffee IV and Defendant Deryl Loar’s Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts

(“CL-JSMF”) ¶¶ 1–2). Dressed in uniform, Loar stated that Coffee IV “cowardly used Ms. Woods

as protection.” (CL-JSMF ¶¶ 3–4).

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff Yolanda Woods, as the Personal Representative of Alteria Woods, initiated this

civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Officers in their individual capacities.

(Woods SAC, ECF No. 159). She asserts a claim against each Officer for excessive force in

violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Woods SAC ¶¶ 58–106). The Officers have

moved for summary judgment on all claims, arguing that they are entitled to qualified immunity

because there was no constitutional violation. (ECF No. 146 at 13–17; ECF No. 150 at 17–21).

In addition, Reeve and White argue that the claims against them fail for lack of causation because

the only bullets that struck Woods were Sarcinello’s. (ECF No. 150 at 21). In response, Woods

argues that the Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity, and that Reeve and White can be

liable even though their shots did not cause Alteria’s death. (ECF No. 189 at 5–16; ECF No. 191

at 6–20).

In three separate actions, Plaintiffs Andrew Coffee IV, Leslie Lowry, and Vivian Scott (the

“Consolidated Plaintiffs”) filed Complaints against the Officers, individually.3 (See Coffee IV

SAC, ECF No. 152; Lowry SAC, ECF No. 153; Scott SAC, ECF No. 154). Coffee IV also sued

Sheriff Deryl Loar in his individual and official capacity. (Coffee IV SAC ¶¶ 269–80). Those

actions were consolidated into the above-captioned case for pretrial purposes. (ECF No. 32). Each

of the Consolidated Plaintiffs asserts three claims against each of the Officers under § 1983 for

3 The Consolidated Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaints name the Indian River County

Sheriff’s Department (the “Sheriff’s Department”) as a Defendant. That appears to be a

typographical error. The parties stipulated to the dismissal of the Sheriff’s Department. (See ECF

No. 148). In response, the Court struck those Stipulations as procedural improper and required the

Consolidated Plaintiffs file Second Amended Complaints removing the Sheriff’s Department as a

party. (Id.). Those operative Complaints do not assert any claims against the Sheriff’s

Department, although they refer to the Sheriff’s Department as a Defendant in text. Because no

claims are asserted against the Sheriff’s Department, the Court does not consider it to be a party

to this action.

negligence, excessive force, and assault and battery. (See Coffee IV SAC ¶¶ 79–268; Lowery

SAC ¶¶ 80–272; Scott SAC ¶¶ 79–271). In addition, Coffee IV asserts a claim for defamation and

intentional infliction of emotional distress against Loar. (Coffee IV SAC ¶¶ 269–80). The Officers

and Loar have moved for summary judgment against the Consolidated Plaintiffs on all claims.

(See ECF Nos. 125, 133, 134, 138, 139, 140, 160). The Consolidated Plaintiffs did not respond to

the Officers’ motions for summary judgment, despite the Court providing them with an extension

of time to do so several months after the deadline to respond had passed. (ECF No. 244). Coffee

IV responded in opposition to Loar’s motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 180).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate only if the “movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is genuine if there is sufficient evidence such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for either party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Similarly, an issue is material if it may affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Id.

The moving party bears the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact.

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). At the summary judgment stage, courts

must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Chapman v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 861

F.2d 1515, 1518 (11th Cir. 1988). If the evidence advanced by the nonmoving party “is merely

colorable, or is not significantly probative, then summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson,

477 U.S. at 249–50 (citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

All Plaintiffs in this consolidated action assert civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

based on the Officers’ use of force when executing the search warrant. (See Woods SAC ¶¶ 58–

81; Coffee IV SAC ¶¶ 86–139; Scott SAC ¶¶ 79–275; Lowery SAC ¶¶ 80–276). “To obtain relief

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must meet two elements: (1) the conduct complained of must

be committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct must deprive the

plaintiff of rights or privileges secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Walker

v. Atlanta Police Dep’t Pub. Affairs Unit, 322 F. App’x. 809, 811 (11th Cir. 2009). Between all

four Complaints, Plaintiffs challenge (1) the Officers’ use of the hand-toss flashbang through the

northside entrance door; (2) the use of the rake-and-break flashbang through the eastside window

into Coffee IV’s bedroom; and (3) the shots fired inside Coffee IV’s bedroom. (See Woods SAC

¶¶ 58–81; Coffee IV SAC ¶¶ 86–139; Scott SAC ¶¶ 79–275; Lowery SAC ¶¶ 80–276). Woods

only challenges the rake-and-break flashbang and the shots inside Coffee IV’s bedroom. (Woods

SAC ¶¶ 58–81). The Court, in turn, examines whether each use of force was a constitutional

violation. It then considers Coffee IV’s state law tort claims against Sheriff Loar based on Loar’s

statement at the press conference after the search warrant was executed.

A. Qualified Immunity

The Officers argue they are entitled to qualified immunity on all Plaintiffs’ civil rights

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See ECF Nos. 133, 134, 138, 139, 140, 146, 150, 160). “Qualified

immunity shields ‘government officials performing discretionary functions . . . from liability for

civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Davis v. Waller, 44 F.4th

1305, 1312 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “In order

to receive qualified immunity, the public official must first prove that he was acting within the

scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.” Lee v. Ferraro,

284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 1487 (11th

Cir. 1991)).

If the official was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority, the burden “shifts

to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate.” Id. “To overcome the defense

of qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show first, that the defendant violated a constitutional

right and, second, that the right was ‘clearly established.’” Davis, 44 F.4th at 1312 (quoting Corbitt

v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 2019)). Because there is no dispute that the Officers

were acting within their discretionary functions when they executed the search warrant, the Court

only evaluates whether the Officers violated a constitutional right and whether the right was clearly

established. See Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004)

(explaining that whether an officer was performing a “discretionary function” focuses on whether

the conduct is “of a type that fell within the employee’s job responsibilities”).

1. The Constitutional Rights Allegedly Infringed.

Woods, on behalf of Alteria, asserts a violation of Alteria’s right to be free from excessive

force under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, while the Consolidated Plaintiffs assert such

claims only under the Fourth Amendment. “[T]he Fourth Amendment governs ‘a free citizen’s

claim that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an arrest,

investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of his person.’” Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1313 (11th

Cir. 2019) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989)). “‘[T]he Fourteenth

Amendment guards against the use of force against arrestees and pretrial detainees.’” Id. (quoting

J W ex rel. Tammy Williams v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 904 F.3d 1248, 1259 (11th Cir. 2018)).

Applying these principles here, if Plaintiffs were seized before force was used or by way of the

force, then the claims must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, but if Plaintiffs were not so

seized, then the Fourteenth Amendment applies. See Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1313.

At around 5:30 a.m. on March 19, 2017, an armed SWAT team surrounded the Vero Beach

Residence and directed their conduct towards controlling and, ultimately, restraining the

movement of its occupants. Based on these facts, the Court finds that Plaintiffs were “seized”

before or by way of the Officers’ force—the flashbangs and shots—inside the Residence because

“in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have

believed that he was not free to leave.” See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980);

Cal. v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) (“The word ‘seizure’ readily bears the meaning of a

laying on of hands or application of physical force to restrain movement, even when it is ultimately

unsuccessful.”).

That some of the Plaintiffs may have been innocent bystanders to the events surrounding

the execution of the search warrant does not impact the Court’s “seizure” analysis. Indeed, the

general principle that “‘whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom

to walk away, he has seized that person’ . . . applies with equal force in cases involving innocent

bystanders located at the scene of an active arrest.” Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1314 (quoting Michigan

v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696 n.5 (1981)). Ultimately, “an innocent bystander who is not

suspected of any wrongdoing may be seized—in some cases reasonably and in other cases

potentially unreasonably—within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Id.; see also Summers,

452 U.S. at 703–04 (concluding that the connection of an occupant to a home that is subject to a

search warrant “gives the police officer an easily identifiable and certain basis for determining that

suspicion of criminal activity justifies a detention of that occupant”). Therefore, the Court must

analyze Plaintiffs’ claims under the Fourth Amendment, not the Fourteenth. See id., 929 F.3d at

1314 n.11; see also Real v. Perry, 810 F. App’x 776, 779 (11th Cir. 2020) (“If Real was seized

when Officer Perry pointed the gun at him, then the proper analysis of this case is under Fourth

Amendment standards.”).

2. Whether the Use of Force Against Alteria was Objectively Reasonable

Finding that the Fourth Amendment governs Plaintiffs’ claims, the Court next evaluates

whether the use of force against Alteria was reasonable. “Claims of excessive force are analyzed

under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard, judging the ‘reasonableness

of a particular use of force . . . from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene . . . .’”

Croom v. Balkwill, 645 F.3d 1240, 1252 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 395–96).

“Generally, such claims require a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on

the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at

stake.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Stated differently, the Court must “weigh ‘the

quantum of force employed’ against ‘the severity of the crime at issue; whether the suspect poses

an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others; and whether the suspect actively resisted

arrest or attempted to evade arrest by flight.’” Dukes v. Deaton, 852 F.3d 1035, 1042 (11th Cir.

2017) (quoting Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir. 2015)). Courts also consider “the

need for the use of force, the relationship between the need for force and the amount of force used,

and ‘the extent of the injury inflicted.’” Lucibella v. Town of Ocean Ridge, No. 22-11056, 2023

U.S. App. LEXIS 8324, at *17 (11th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). These factors are not applied

mechanically. Dukes, 645 F.3d at 1043. The Court must evaluate reasonableness from “the facts

and circumstances confronting [the officers], without regard to their underlying intent or

motivation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (citation omitted).

But before examining the reasonableness of the Officers’ use of force, the Court pauses to

note the “considerable case law” indicating that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred with

respect to Alteria because the governmental action was not intentionally targeted at her. See

Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1323. Indeed, U.S. Supreme Court and nonbinding caselaw suggests that

“intentional governmental action directed toward the plaintiff, not accidental effects, is required”

to sustain a Fourth Amendment violation. See id. at 1318 (citing Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S.

593, 596 (1989)). Accordingly, the Court is doubtful Alteria can assert a Fourth Amendment claim

as an innocent bystander. To the extent she can, the Court evaluates the reasonableness of the

Officers’ use of force.

First, the Court considers the reasonableness of the Officers’ use of the rake-and-break

flashbang inside Coffee IV’s bedroom. When Reeve deployed the flashbang, the undisputed facts

and circumstances confronting Reeve and Sarcinello were as follows: they were executing a search

warrant at a house where illegal narcotics transactions occurred; they could not see inside the

eastside-bedroom window because it was dark; they knew the entry team had made contact with

someone; they knew that Coffee III and Coffee IV had extensive, violent criminal histories; they

knew that there was at least one firearm in the Residence; and they did not know Alteria was at

the Residence. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Alteria, the Court finds that the use

of the flashbang on the rake-and-break pole was reasonable to disorient the occupants in the room

given that the Residence had not yet been secured. Cf. Dukes, 852 F.3d at 1042–43 (commenting

how the third flashbang was gratuitous but that it was possible that the record could support the

use of the first two flashbangs, including the rake-and-break detonation to divert the attention of

the residence occupants). Notably, there is no evidence that Alteria, Coffee IV, or any other

occupant of the Residence was injured by the rake-and-break flashbang. In fact, Coffee IV testified

that he did not believe that a flashbang was deployed inside his bedroom because he was not “all

the way blinded” by it, although his ears were ringing. (Coffee IV Dep. at 152:3–154:2). While

Woods argues that there is an inference Alteria was “affected” by the rake-and-break flashbang

because she was laying on the bed turned to the left when she was struck by several gunshots, that

is nothing more than speculation. (See ECF No. 191 at 8). In sum, the use of force was reasonable

based on the facts and circumstances confronting the Officers and they did not violate the Fourth

Amendment.

Second, the Court decides whether the Officers used excessive force when they fired shots

inside the eastside window to Coffee IV’s bedroom. The answer must be no. The undisputed facts

are that after Reeve deployed the rake-and-break flashbang, Coffee IV started shooting towards

the window where Reeve and Sarcinello were located. When Reeve and Sarcinello returned fire,

neither knew that Alteria was in the bedroom. The undisputed facts also show that during a lull in

the firing from inside the bedroom, Reeve and Sarcinello stopped firing, and White looked inside

the bedroom window. White did not see anyone in the bedroom and was fired on again from inside

the bedroom. White fired back, and that was the last shot.

Viewing these undisputed facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Officers used

a reasonable amount of force when returning fire inside the eastside bedroom. “[I]t is

constitutionally permissible for an officer to use deadly force when ‘the officer has probable cause

to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others.’”

Carr v. Tatangelo, 338 F.3d 1259, 1268 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Tenn. v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11

(1985)). There is no doubt that the Officers had probable cause to believe they faced a threat of

serious physical harm from the shots fired by Coffee IV. Indeed, Sarcinello’s own weapon jammed

after it sustained a hit from one of Coffee IV’s shots—showing just how close Coffee IV’s shots

came to Sarcinello’s body. In a rapidly escalating situation involving deadly force, coupled with

police response training, the Officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner to the imminent

threat they faced by Coffee IV firing shots in their direction.

Further, the Court does not find that a warning before the Officers’ use of deadly force was

feasible given the necessity for a split-second response to Coffee IV’s shots. See Davis v. Walker,

44 F.4th 1305, 1315 (11th Cir. 2022). Moreover, when there was a lull in the shooting, and White

tried to look inside the window, Coffee IV shot again. There was no time for a warning. At

bottom, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred. See L.A. Cnty. v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 616

(2007) (“When officers execute a valid warrant and act in a reasonable manner to protect

themselves from harm . . . the Fourth Amendment is not violated.”); Singletary v. Vargas, 804

F.3d 1174, 1181 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[I]t is reasonable, and therefore constitutionally permissible,

for an officer to use deadly force when he has ‘probable cause to believe that his own life is in

peril.’” (quoting Robinson v. Arrugueta, 415 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir. 2005)).

Therefore, because the Officers’ use of force was objectively reasonable, such force did

not violate the Fourth Amendment, and the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity as to

Alteria’s claims.

3. Whether Alteria’s Constitutional Rights Were Clearly Established.

Even if the Court found that the Officers used excessive force against Alteria, it would still

find that the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity because their conduct did not violate

clearly established law. “Official conduct violates clearly established law if the ‘contours of a

right are sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is

doing violates that right.’” Dukes, 852 F.3d at 1043 (alterations adopted) (quoting Ashcroft v. Al-

Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)). A plaintiff can demonstrate that a right was clearly established

in three ways: (1) by producing “a materially similar case” decided by the U.S. Supreme Court,

Eleventh Circuit, or the Florida Supreme Court; (2) by pointing to a “broader, clearly established

principle that should control the novel facts in [plaintiff’s] situation”; or (3) by showing that an

“official’s conduct was so far beyond the hazy boarder between excessive and acceptable force

that the official had to know he was violating the Constitution even without caselaw on point.”

Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1282 (11th Cir. 2013) (first quoting Mercado v. City of

Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1159 (11th Cir. 2005) (first alteration adopted); then quoting Priester v.

City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 926 (11th Cir. 2000) (alteration adopted)).

The first and second ways a plaintiff can show the law is clearly established is through

caselaw. See Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1350–52 (11th Cir. 2002). The second way

identifies “some broad statements of principle in case law [that] are not tied to particularized facts

and can clearly establish law applicable in the future to different sets of facts.” Id. at 1351. The

first way “look[s] at precedent that is tied to the facts . . . [that] has said that ‘Y Conduct’ is

unconstitutional in ‘Z Circumstances.’” Id. at 1351–52. With respect to this first way, “a case that

is fairly distinguishable from the circumstances facing a government official cannot clearly

establish the law for the circumstances facing that government official,” but “if the circumstances

facing a government official are not fairly distinguishable, that is, are materially similar, the

precedent can clearly establish the applicable law.” Id. at 1352.

Woods, on behalf of Alteria, argues that the law is clearly established that the use of force

against Alteria violated the Fourth Amendment in all three ways. Corbitt contradicts that

proposition. In Corbitt, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed whether an officer violated the Fourth

Amendment by intentionally firing at a dog but unintentionally shooting a child who was

temporarily seized when the yard he was playing in became the scene of an arrest operation. See

Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1315, 1318. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the plaintiff could not show

through precedent that the law “clearly established that there is a Fourth Amendment violation

when an already-seized bystander . . . is accidentally harmed as an unintended consequence of an

officer’s intentional shot at something else entirely.” Id. at 1320. Indeed, as noted earlier, it is far

from clear whether this type of accidental conduct can even sustain a Fourth Amendment violation.

See id. Further, Corbitt held that the officer’s conduct did not so obviously violate the Fourth

Amendment that prior case law is unnecessary to hold the officer liable. See id. Following Corbitt,

this Court finds that the law is not clearly established that there is a Fourth Amendment violation

when officers accidentally shoot and kill an innocent bystander in the course of defending

themselves from an active shooter. See id. at 1320–21 (holding that an accidental shooting does

not constitute a clearly establish Fourth Amendment violation under any of three available ways

to show clearly established law); see also Davis v. Waller, 44 F.4th 1305, 1324 (11th Cir. 2022)

(Pryor, J., concurring) (“We largely lack guidance in what constitutes reasonable use of deadly

force when hostages or innocent bystanders are caught in the crossfire between the police and a

gunman.”)

Woods argues that four cases show that it is clearly established that deadly force cannot be

used against a suspect that poses no immediate threat to law enforcement or others: Tennessee v.

Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1984), Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2003), Morton v. Kirkwood,

707 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2013), and Robinson v. Rankin, 815 F. App’x 330 (11th Cir. 2020)

(unpublished). (ECF No. 191 at 17–18). Garner concerned an officer who shot a fleeing suspect

who did not appear to be armed; Vaughan concerned an officer who shot inside a fleeing,

accelerating pickup truck that did not present a threat of serious harm to the officer or others on

the road; Morton concerned an officer who shot at an individual over whom there was no probable

cause to believe committed a crime and who was in a parked car with his hands raised; and

Robinson concerned the shooting of an unarmed suspect that was in a car that someone else was

trying to use as a weapon but who was not himself reaching for a weapon or presenting a threat to

the officers or public. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 3–5, 11–12; Vaughan, 343 F.3d at 1326–27, 1329–

31; Morton, 707 F.3d at 1279–80; Robinson, 815 F. App’x at 333–34, 341.

These cases are not materially similar because they do not involve an innocent bystander.

They also concerned plaintiffs that were visible to law enforcement and who did not present a

threat of harm. Robinson—albeit, unpublished and not binding4—is the most comparable. There,

the driver posed a danger to the officers, but the passenger did not. The key difference between

that case and this one, though, is that the officers in Robinson were aware of and could see the

passenger. Here, it is undisputed that the Officers did not know Alteria was in the room with

Coffee IV. All they knew was that someone was shooting at them. Moreover, as the Eleventh

Circuit noted in Robinson, shooting the passenger was not going to stop the driver who was using

the car as a weapon. 815 F. App’x at 341–42. Here, returning fire at the person shooting at the

officers could subdue the threat of serious bodily injury. The Officers could not have been

shooting at Alteria because it is undisputed that they did not know she was in the room. All in all,

none of the cases cited help the Court because none are materially similar to the situation here

involving an innocent bystander caught in a shootout that was not initiated by law enforcement.

Therefore, in light of Corbitt, and because none of Woods’ cases show that the law is

clearly established that Alteria’s rights were violated, the Officers are entitled to qualified

immunity.

4 “[O]nly binding precedent can clearly establish a right for qualified immunity purposes.”

Gilmore v. Hodges, 738 F.3d 266, 279 (11th Cir. 2013).

B. Qualified Immunity as to Lowery and Scott

The Officers also move for summary judgment against Plaintiffs Leslie Lowery and Vivian

Scott, who were at the Residence when the search warrant was executed. (ECF Nos. 134, 139,

140, 160). Neither Lowery nor Scott responded to the motions for summary judgment. The

Officers, Lowery, Scott, and Coffee IV, did, however, submit a Joint Statement of Undisputed

Facts, from which the Court will analyze Lowery and Scott’s claims. (ECF No. 130).

To begin, this Court reiterates its doubt that Lowery and Scott can maintain a Fourth

Amendment excessive force claim because, as explained above, the challenged use of force was

not intentionally directed at them. To the extent they can sustain such a claim, “Fourth Amendment

jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily

carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” See

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. “In a case involving the execution of an anticipatory search warrant, . .

. ‘officers [are] authorized to exercise unquestioned command of the situation by placing all the

occupants of the Premises on the ground for several minutes while securing the home and ensuring

there was no danger to the officers or the public.’” Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1314 (quoting Croom, 645

F.3d at 1253). Moreover, “‘[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in

the peace of a judge’s chambers,’ . . . violates the Fourth Amendment.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396

(quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)).

Here, Officers used a reasonable amount of force to attempt to secure the Residence over

which they were executing a lawful search warrant. The search warrant was based on probable

cause from the illegal sale of narcotics at the Residence. The need for the flashbangs was necessary

to assert control over the situation and for officer safety.5 The Officers use of their firearms was

only in response to Coffee IV opening fire on them. Importantly, it is undisputed that Lowery and

Scott were not injured during the execution of the search warrant. In sum, the Court finds that the

Officers’ use of force was objectively reasonable. Moreover, due to their lack of response to the

pending motions for summary judgment, neither Lowery nor Scott have put forth clearly

established law showing that the force used against them was unreasonable. Therefore, the

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity on Lowery and Scott’s claims.

C. Qualified Immunity as to Coffee IV

The Officers argue they are entitled to qualified immunity as to Coffee IV’s civil rights

claims. (ECF Nos. 133, 137). For the same reasons described earlier in this Order regarding the

Officers’ use of force as to Alteria (Section III(A)(2)), the use of force against Coffee IV was

objectively reasonable. To reiterate, the Officers had probable cause to use deadly force against

Coffee IV because Coffee IV was shooting in their direction. The amount of fire deployed by the

Officers was proportional to the threat and there was no time for a warning. Further, the law is

clearly established that the use of force by the Officers was reasonable, not unreasonable. See

Carr, 338 F.3d at 1268. The Officers are entitled to qualified immunity on Coffee IV’s claims.

5 Lowery, Scott, and Coffee IV also challenge the use of the initial flashbang through the

entry door. Any challenge to this use of force is a nonstarter because there is no dispute that

Detective Ryan deployed the hand-toss flashbang, yet he is not a party to any of the Complaints.

See Troupe, 419 F.3d at 1165 (“A § 1983 claim requires proof of an affirmative causal connection

between the defendant’s acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.”). It is also

a nonstarter because there is no evidence that any of the Plaintiffs were in the room where the

hand-toss flashbang was deployed. Accordingly, the use of such force against Plaintiffs was de

minimis, at best. In any event, there is no evidence contrary to Detective Ryan’s testimony that he

deployed the hand-tossed flashbang after he confirmed there was no one in the room. (Ryan Dep.

at 43:18–25). All that to say, the hand-toss flashbang cannot sustain a Fourth Amendment claim.

D. Coffee IV’s Claims Against the Sheriff

Separately, Coffee IV asserts defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Loar based on Loar’s statement at the press conference that

Coffee IV “cowardly used Ms. Woods as protection.” (Coffee IV SAC ¶¶ 269–80; CL-JSMF ¶

4). Both claims fail because neither are viable under § 1983. See Walker v. Atlanta Police Dep’t

Pub. Affairs Unit, 322 F. App’x 809, 811 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Although imputing criminal behavior

to an individual is generally considered defamation and actionable without proof of special

damages, the Supreme Court has held that a claim of being defamed by a police officer is not

actionable under § 1983.”) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711–12 (1976)); Rubin v. City of

Miami Beach, 19-cv-20520, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 237754, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2019) (“[A]n

intentional infliction of emotional distress claim under Section 1983 is not a viable claim for

relief.”). Accordingly, Loar is entitled to summary judgment on Coffee IV’s claims.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. The Officers’ Motions for Summary Judgment, (ECF Nos. 133, 134, 138, 139, 140,

146, 150, 160), are GRANTED as stated herein.

2. Loar’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 125), is GRANTED as stated

herein.

3. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to CLOSE this case and DENY all pending

motions as MOOT.

4. The Court will enter final judgment by separate order pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 58.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 15th day of May, 2023.

¢ f

JOSE/E. MARTINEZ

UNIA/ED STATES DISTRICT JUQGE

Copies provided to:

Magistrate Judge Maynard

All Counsel of Record

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