Evans v. Hyppolite

United States District Court

for the

Southern District of Florida

Jimmie M. Evans, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 23-20208-Scola

)

S. Hyppolite, et. al.,

Defendants.

Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Before the Court is the Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 12) filed

on February 15, 2023. Therein, the Defendants argue for dismissal of Claims

One, Two, and Four of the complaint (ECF No. 1-1) and for dismissal of all official

capacity claims. The Court has considered the motion, the entire record, and is

otherwise fully advised.1 As discussed below, the Court grants the motion.

1. Background

On January 18, 2023, the Defendants filed a notice of removal (ECF No.

1) of the Plaintiff’s complaint for violations of civil rights (ECF No. 1-1). On

January 25, 2023, the Court accepted and retained jurisdiction over this action

and ordered that the case proceed as to all defendants and claims in the

complaint (ECF No. 5). The complaint alleges four claims against the Defendants,

Correctional Officers S. Hyppolite and C. Lattibeaudiere, stemming from four

different incidents that took place while the Plaintiff was in the custody of the

Miami-Dade County Corrections and Rehabilitation Department (“MDCR”) and

housed in the mental health unit at Turner Guilford Knight Correctional Center.

(See generally ECF No. 1-1).

Claim One asserts that Defendant Hyppolite retaliated against the Plaintiff

in violation of his First Amendment rights and violated his Eighth Amendment

1 The Plaintiff has not filed a response and the time to do so has passed. See Local Rule 7.1(c)

(“[E]ach party opposing a motion shall file and serve an opposing memorandum of law no later

than fourteen (14) days after service of the motion. Failure to do so may be deemed sufficient

cause for granting the motion by default.”). Although the Court could grant the motion to dismiss

by default, it will instead dismiss on the merits.

rights to sanitation, hygiene, and safe conditions. (See id. at 2). Claims Two and

Three assert that Defendant Hyppolite used excessive force against the Plaintiff.

(See id. at 3–4). Claim Four asserts that Defendant Hyppolite and Defendant

Lattibeaudiere violated the Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from

cruel and unusual punishment. (See id. at 5). The Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief

as well as compensatory and punitive damages. (See id. at 8).

2. Standard of Review

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a pleading to contain “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual

allegations,” it must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (explaining that Rule 8(a)(2)’s pleading standard “demands more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”). In the same

vein, a complaint may not rest on “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual

enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. These elements are required to

survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, which requests dismissal for “failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

When reviewing a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court generally must

accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true and evaluate all plausible inferences

derived from those facts in the plaintiff’s favor. See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians

of Fla. v. S. Everglades Restoration All., 304 F.3d 1076, 1084 (11th Cir. 2002).

“‘Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by

attorneys’ and are liberally construed.” Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175

(11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263

(11th Cir. 1998)). “Yet even in the case of pro se litigants this leniency does not

give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an

otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air

Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc.

v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998)).

3. Discussion

A. Official Capacity Claims

The Plaintiff sues Defendants Hyppolite and Lattibeaudiere in their

individual and official capacities. (See ECF No. 1-1 at 1). A plaintiff who sues a

municipal officer in his or her official capacity is, in reality, suing the

municipality for whom that officer is an agent. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.

159, 165–66 (1986). The Court thus construes the Plaintiff’s official capacity

claims as claims against Miami-Dade County.

The Defendants assert that “[w]hatever attempt Evans makes to hold the

County liable by raising claims against the officers in their official capacities,

that attempt fails because the complaint does not plausibly state that any

violation of constitutional rights he allegedly suffered was caused by an official

policy or unofficial custom of the County.” (ECF No. 12 at 3).

A county or municipality “may be held liable under § 1983 only when the

deprivation at issue was undertaken pursuant to city ‘custom’ or ‘policy,’ and

not simply on the basis of respondeat superior.” Brown v. City of Fort Lauderdale,

923 F.2d 1474, 1479 (11th Cir. 1991). The Plaintiff fails to allege any official

custom or policy that resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. (See

generally ECF No. 1-1). Without this requisite allegation, the § 1983 claim

against Miami-Dade County must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. See

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694–5 (1978).

B. Claims One and Two

The Defendants assert that Claims One and Two should be dismissed for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform

Act (“PLRA”). (See ECF No. 12 at 5).

A prisoner “may not bring any action absent exhaustion of available

administrative remedies.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 638 (2016) (cleaned up).

“To exhaust administrative remedies in accordance with the PLRA, prisoners

must ‘properly take each step within the [prison’s] administrative process.’”

Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1378 (11th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up).

The Plaintiff agrees that he did not exhaust administrative remedies on

these claims; however, he asserts he failed to do so because the procedure was

unavailable to him. (See ECF No. 1-1 at 6); see also Geter v. Baldwin State Prison,

974 F.3d 1348, 1354 (11th Cir. 2020) (“A remedy has to be available before it

must be exhausted.”) (cleaned up). But, as noted by Respondent, “[t]he courts of

this District, including this Court, have continually upheld MDCR’s grievance

procedure as available when dismissing complaints for failure to exhaust.” (ECF

No. 12 at 6) (citations omitted). And at least one court has found that MDCR’s

procedure was available to this same Plaintiff. See Evans v. Thompkins, No. 19-

25021, 2020 WL 9211282, at 3–4 (S.D. Fla. June 12, 2020) (Reid, MJ.), adopted,

2020 WL 9211280 (S.D. Fla. June 30, 2020) (Martinez, J.). Addressing the

Plaintiff’s claims of unavailability, the R. & R. noted that a counselor had

processed over 30 grievances and appeals on the Plaintiff’s behalf. See 2020 WL

9211282, at 3–4.

This Court also finds that the Plaintiff’s claims of unavailability are not

credible. The Plaintiff attached the grievances concerning Claims Three and Four

to the complaint. (See ECF No. 1-1 at 11–22). He also attached the appeals from

the denials of those grievances. (See id.). Moreover, Claim One is based on the

allegation that Defendant Hyppolite retaliated against him expressly because he

had filed grievances. (See id. at 2). In sum, the record refutes the Plaintiff and

his bald assertions concerning unavailability are insufficient. See Kingcade v.

Parker, 949 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1239 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (Altonaga, CJ.) (“[B]ald

assertions that attempts at exhaustion were thwarted by jail staff are

insufficient.”).

Accordingly, the Court concludes that MDCR’s grievance procedure was

available to the Plaintiff after Incidents One and Two, but he did not file

grievances about those incidents. Because he failed to exhaust administrative

remedies under the PLRA, Claims One and Two are dismissed.

C. Claim Four

Defendants Hyppolite and Lattibeaudiere assert that Claim Four should

be dismissed because they are entitled to qualified immunity. (See ECF No. 12

at 8). In this claim, the Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hyppolite told Defendant

Lattibeaudiere that the Plaintiff had “display[ed] a sharp object to him[.]” (ECF

No. 1-1 at 5). He alleges that Defendant Lattibeaudiere then came to his cell and

pepper sprayed him.2 (See id.). The Plaintiff states that no sharp object was

found. (See id.).

“Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil

damages for torts committed while performing discretionary duties unless their

conduct violates a clearly established statutory or constitutional right.” Hadley

v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2008). The Court first finds that the

Defendants were acting within their discretionary authority as correctional

officers. See Howard v. Gee, 538 F. App’x 884, 887 (11th Cir. 2013) (correctional

officer was acting within his discretionary authority while supervising inmates

and maintaining security). Moreover, to state a claim against Defendant

Lattibeaudiere for excessive force under the Eighth Amendment, the Plaintiff

must plausibly allege that she used force “maliciously and sadistically rather

than as part of a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.” Wilkins v.

Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 40 (2010) (cleaned up). The Court must “give a wide range

of deference to prison officials acting to preserve discipline and security,

including when considering decisions made at the scene of a disturbance.” Sears

v. Roberts, 922 F.3d 1199, 1205 (11th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).

The parties agree that Defendant Lattibeaudiere came to the Plaintiff’s cell

after Defendant Hyppolite told her that the Plaintiff had shown him a sharp

object. The Court finds it common sense that a sharp object in the hands of an

inmate—especially one in a mental health unit—constitutes a threat to that

2 There is no allegation of use of force by Defendant Hyppolite in Count Four.

inmate and others. The Court thus infers that Defendant Lattibeaudiere used

pepper spray against the Plaintiff to disarm him or otherwise secure the sharp

item she believed he possessed. See Am. Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d

1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (courts reviewing a motion to dismiss “may infer

from the factual allegations in the complaint obvious alternative explanation|s],

which suggest lawful conduct rather than the unlawful conduct the plaintiff

would ask the court to infer.”) (cleaned up). In sum, the Plaintiff fails to show

that Defendant Lattibeaudiere acted “maliciously and sadistically”, Wilkins, 559

U.S. at 40, and the Court infers that she instead acted “to preserve discipline

and security|.]” Sears, 922 F.3d at 1205. With no Eighth Amendment violation,

the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and Claim Four is thus

dismissed.

4. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, it is ordered and adjudged that the Defendant’s

motion to dismiss (ECF No. 12) is granted. Claims One, Two, and Four of the

Plaintiffs complaint (ECF No. 1-1) are dismissed. All official capacity claims

against all Defendants are also dismissed. Accordingly, Defendants C.

Lattibeaudiere and Miami-Dade County are dismissed from this action. Only

Count Three remains.

Done and ordered, in chambers, in Miami, Florida, on March 7, 2023.

Robert N. Scola, Jr.

United States District Judge

Copies, via U.S. Mail, to

Jimmie M. Evans

180138414

Miami-Dade County-PDC

Pretrial Detention Center

Inmate Mail/Parcels

1321 NW 13th Street

Miami, FL 33125

PRO SE