Williams v. Florida Department of Corrections

United States District Court

for the

Southern District of Florida

Christopher Donnell Williams, )

Petitioner )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 22-14142-Scola

)

Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,

Respondent.

Order

Before the Court is pro se Petitioner Christopher Donnell William’s petition

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF No. 1). The petition alleges four grounds of

ineffective assistance of counsel. (See generally id.). Respondent filed a response

(ECF No. 7), with an index to appendix (ECF No. 8) including attached exhibits

1–43 (ECF No. 8-1) and a notice of filing transcripts (ECF No. 9) with the trial

and sentencing transcripts attached (ECF No. 9-1). Williams thereafter filed a

reply (ECF No. 14). The Court has carefully reviewed the parties’ written

submissions, the record, and applicable law. For the reasons explained below,

the petition is denied.

1. Background

Following a series of controlled drug buys, the State charged Williams with

six counts of sale or delivery of heroin (Counts 1-6), six counts of possession of

heroin (Counts 7-12), six counts of unlawful use of a two-way communications

device (Counts 13, 15-19), and one count of driving without a valid driver's

license (Count 14). (See ECF No. 8-1 at 4–7). The State alleged the offenses

occurred on six different dates. (See id.). All the offenses were tried before a single

jury in one trial. The jury found Williams guilty on Counts 1, 2, 7, 8, 13, 14, and

15, and not guilty on the remaining counts. (See id. at 23–26).

Williams was sentenced to 180 months on Counts 1 and 2, 60 months on

Counts 7, 8, 13, and 15, and 60 days on Count 14. (See id. at 29–43). All

sentences were ordered to run concurrently. (See id.). Following his direct appeal

and litigation of multiple motions for postconviction relief, Williams docketed the

instant petition on April 19, 2022.

2. Legal Standard

Deference Under § 2254

A court’s review of a state prisoner’s federal habeas corpus petition is

governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). See

Abdul–Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 246 (2007). AEDPA “imposes a highly

deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings . . . , and demands that

state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt[.]” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S.

766, 773 (2010). “The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief

functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice

systems, and not as a means of error correction.” Ledford v. Warden, Ga.

Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016). This

standard is “difficult to meet.” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419 (2014).

According to AEDPA, a federal court may not grant a habeas petitioner

relief on any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state

court’s decision (1) “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States;” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d); see also Rimmer v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 876 F.3d 1039, 1053 (11th

Cir. 2017) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).

A state court decision is “contrary to” established Supreme Court

precedent when it (1) applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth

by the Supreme Court; or (2) confronts a set of facts materially indistinguishable

from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a result

different from Supreme Court precedent. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-

06 (2000). An “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law is

different from an incorrect application of federal law. Id. at 410. Consequently,

“[a] state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas

relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state

court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). If the last state

court to decide a prisoner’s federal claim provides an explanation for its merits-

based decision in a reasoned opinion, “a federal habeas court simply reviews the

specific reasons given by the state court and defers to those reasons if they are

reasonable.” Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).

Even summary rejection of a claim, without explanation, qualifies as an

adjudication on the merits, warranting deference. See Meders v. Warden, Ga.

Diagnostic Prison, 911 F.3d 1335, 1351 (11th Cir. 2019). If the state court’s

merits determination is unaccompanied by an explanation, federal courts should

“‘look through’ the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision

that does provide a relevant rationale” and “presume that the unexplained

decision adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1192. Furthermore,

a decision is still an adjudication on the merits when it “addresses some but not

all of a defendant’s claims.” Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 298 (2013).

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees

criminal defendants the right to assistance of counsel during criminal

proceedings. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984). When

assessing counsel’s performance under Strickland, the Court employs a strong

presumption that counsel “rendered adequate assistance and made all

significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at

690. “[T]he Sixth Amendment does not guarantee the right to perfect counsel; it

promises only the right to effective assistance[.]” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 20

(2013). “Where the highly deferential standards mandated by Strickland and

AEDPA both apply, they combine to produce a doubly deferential form of review

that asks only ‘whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied

Strickland’s deferential standard.’” Gissendaner v. Seaboldt, 735 F.3d 1311,

1323 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011)).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must

demonstrate both (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) a

reasonable probability that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88; see also Harrington, 562 U.S. at 104.

To establish deficient performance, the petitioner must show that,

considering all circumstances, “counsel’s conduct fell ‘outside the wide range of

professionally competent assistance.’” Cummings v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 588

F.3d 1331, 1356 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). Strategic

choices made after thorough investigation of the law and facts relevant to

plausible options are virtually unchallengeable. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-

91. The court’s review of counsel’s performance should focus on “not what is

possible or ‘what is prudent or appropriate, but only [on] what is constitutionally

compelled.’” Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000)

(quoting Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987)). Counsel is not ineffective for

failing to raise non-meritorious issues, see Chandler v. Moore, 240 F.3d 907, 917

(11th Cir. 2001); nor is counsel required to present every non-frivolous

argument, see Dell v. United States, 710 F.3d 1267, 1282 (11th Cir. 2013).

Regarding the prejudice component, “[t]he defendant must show that there

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in

the outcome.” Id. A court need not address both prongs of Strickland if the

defendant makes an insufficient showing on one of the prongs. See id. at 697;

Brown v. United States, 720 F.3d 1316, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013).

3. Discussion

a. Timeliness

Respondent asserts that the petition should be dismissed as untimely.

(See ECF No. 7 at 13–17). In his reply, Williams correctly notes that Respondent

fails to address the tolling effect of his Motion for Mitigation of Sentence under

Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(c) (“Rule 3.800(c) Motion”) that was filed on August 9, 2018

and denied by the postconviction court on November 20, 2020.1 (See ECF No. 14

at 2–3). The Court agrees that Respondent’s calculations are therefore incorrect

as the Supreme Court has decided that a Rule 3.800(c) motion qualifies as one

for collateral review, thus tolling the one-year statute of limitations on petitions

for federal habeas relief. See Wall v. Kholi, 562 U.S. 545, 547–48 (2011)

(abrogating Alexander v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 523 F.3d 1291, 1292 (11th Cir.

2008).

Rather than redoing the cumbersome timeliness calculations, the Court

will skip over this step as the petition is due to be denied on the merits. See

Loggins v.Thomas, 654 F.3d 1204, 1215 (11th Cir. 2011) (“When relief is due to

be denied even if claims are not procedurally barred, we can skip over the

procedural bar issues, and we have done so in the past.”).

b. Exhaustion/Procedural Default

Respondent asserts that Ground Three is unexhausted and concedes

exhaustion on all other grounds. (See ECF No. 7 at 18–21). The Court will skip

over the exhaustion/procedural default analysis and instead deny all grounds

on the merits. See Dallas v. Warden, 964 F.3d 1285, 1307 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[A]

federal court may skip over the procedural default analysis if a claim would fail

on the merits in any event.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“An application for

a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure

of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.”).

c. The Merits

Ground One

Williams alleges his “[t]rial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a

motion for severance of charges where charges were similar but happened on

different dates.” (ECF No. 1 at 7). He states that “[h]ad counsel enlightened him

1 The Court takes judicial notice of the online state court docket available at:

https://courtcasesearch.stlucieclerk.gov/BenchmarkWebExternal/CourtCase.aspx/Det

ails/2339038?digest=k%2BvasbWof9Ue65dPjgELdw. See Paez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of

Corr., 947 F.3d 649, 651 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding that district court could take judicial

notice of online state court dockets). The online docket confirms that Williams docketed

his Rule 3.800(c) Motion on August 9, 2018, and the motion was not denied by the state

court until November 20, 2020.

that he had [the] right to separate his six sales of delivery, there may have been

a different outcome of the trial.” (Id.). This claim was raised in William’s amended

postconviction motion. (See ECF No. 8-1 at 125, 145–46). The trial court denied

the claim, adopting “the State’s reasoning in finding no prejudice where

[Williams] was acquitted on four drug sale dates.” (Id. at 625). On appeal, the

Fourth District Court of Appeal (hereinafter “Fourth District”) agreed, finding in

its substituted written opinion that:

[T]he circuit court's factual findings, as adopted from the

state's response discussing the jury's verdict as compared

to the evidence, are supported by competent, substantial

evidence in the record. We also agree with the circuit court's

legal conclusion that even if the defendant's trial counsel

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness by not

moving to sever the offenses for separate trials before

different juries, the defendant was not prejudiced. The jury

convicted the defendant only for the drug-related offenses

in which he was directly recorded participating in the

transaction. The jury does not appear to have been

influenced by the non-recorded alleged transactions, even

where the confidential informant and detectives testified

that he participated in those alleged transactions, because

the jury acquitted him of those alleged offenses. Thus, the

defendant has not shown a reasonable probability sufficient

to undermine confidence in the outcome that, but for the

failure to sever the offenses, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.

Williams v. State, 311 So. 3d 30, 32–33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020). Having

carefully reviewed the record in full, the Court finds nothing unreasonable with

the state court’s rejection of this claim. Because the state court’s decision was

neither an unreasonable determination of the facts nor contrary to clearly

established federal law, Williams is not entitled to relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The Court further notes that William’s assertion that severance may have

led to a different outcome is too speculative and conclusory to warrant federal

habeas relief. See Tejada v. Dugger, 941 F.2d 1551, 1559 (11th Cir. 1991)

(recognizing that vague, conclusory, or unsupported allegations cannot support

an ineffective assistance of counsel claim and do not warrant an evidentiary

hearing). Williams fails to show a reasonable probability that the outcome of the

proceedings would have been different had his counsel moved to sever the

charges. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. As such, Ground One is denied under

the prejudice prong of Strickland. See id. at 697.

Ground Two

Williams alleges his “[t]rial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to

improper testimony of [Detective] Stubley that bolstered the State’s evidence” in

violation of his 14th and 6th Amendment rights. (ECF No. 1 at 9). Williams refers

to the detective’s testimony that “from his experience defendants usually put cell

phones in fake names, to avoid the police.” (Id.). In his amended postconviction

motion, Williams asserted that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to

such bolstering and that he was prejudiced by the testimony. (See ECF No. 8-1

at 124, 138–40). The trial court denied the claim, finding that he suffered “no

prejudice where there is evidence that [Williams] used the cell phone number

during the drug offenses.” (Id. at 624). On appeal, the Fourth District affirmed

the denial of the claim. (See id. at 1129).

The record amply supports the state court’s rejection of this claim. At trial,

Detective Stubley testified as follows:

So I'm following Mr. Williams, he's driving the rental car. I

can see him, I'm driving literally right next to him in an

undercover car. My goal was to not only make some more

observations on Mr. Williams, maybe identify another

source and supply, but to really put that phone in his hand.

And I did that by calling him when he was next to me, in the

lane next to me. And as soon as I called the number I saw

him look down, reach up, get his phone, look at it -- not

clearly not recognize the number that was calling. He

answered it on speaker phone, but he was kinda talking

with a little bit of space between his actual -- between his

face and the phone. He asked hello a couple times, who is

this. At that point I could see it was the phone that I was

intending to put in his hand, the one he had been using,

and I hung up, I terminated the call at that point[.]

(ECF No. 9-1 at 284:23–25, 285:1–13). Moreover, as noted by Respondent, text

messages arranging the drug sales used the same number, the confidential

informant identified Williams in court and testified to purchasing heroin from

him on August 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19, and identified his voice offering to sell

heroin on August 12. (See ECF No. 7 at 37). Given the weight of the evidence

against him, Williams fails to show that the result of the proceeding would have

been different had his counsel objected to the detective’s testimony. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Thus, Ground Two is denied under the prejudice

prong of Strickland. See id. at 697.

Ground Three

Williams alleges his “[t]rial counsel was ineffective for failing to object and

file a motion to suppress the audio visual recording of unknown suspect’s voice.”

(ECF No. 1 at 11). He refers to a video recording of one of the drug sales. (See id.

at 11–12). William’s face was not visible on the video, but the confidential

informant identified his voice and testified to him making the sale. (See id.).

Williams asserts that “the voice that was heard by the jury in this case could be

anybody’s voice which is so prejudicial and harmful[.]” (Id. at 12).

William’s argument, however, cuts the other way. His counsel’s strategic

decision to focus on the lack of evidence tying him to the video was reasonable.

See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91 (“Strategic choices made after thorough

investigation of the law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually

unchallengeable.”). Moreover, the recording was properly authenticated as the

confidential informant was a participant, listened to the recording, and confirmed

that the recording memorialized what occurred during the sale. (See ECF No. 9-

1 at 296:17–25, 297:1–12). As such, counsel was not ineffective for failing to

make a meritless objection. See Chandler, 240 F.3d at 917. Williams thus fails

to establish deficient performance.

Williams also cannot demonstrate how the outcome of his trial would have

been different had counsel made the meritless objection or suppression motion.

The trial court in denying this claim specifically found there was “no prejudice

where any objection would have been denied.” (ECF No. 8-1 at 625); see also

Hayes v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 2019 WL 6249274, at *2 (11th Cir. June 6, 2019)

(concluding that the defendant could not make the requisite showing of deficient

performance and prejudice for ineffective assistance of counsel claims for

counsel’s failure to move to suppress a statement and photo lineup where the

record showed no basis for suppression). Ground Three is thus denied under the

performance and prejudice prongs of Strickland.

Ground Four

Williams alleges his “[t]rial counsel was ineffective for failing to do a proffer

of the entire jury panel, or ask for a new trial or mistrial or a new jury once the

judge Mr. Levins mentioned that there may have been someone talking or

attempting to talk to the jury.” (ECF No. 1 at 14). Williams raised this claim in

Ground Twelve of his amended postconviction motion. (See ECF No. 8-1 at 147–

49). The state court denied the claim, adopting the State’s reasoning in finding

the claim “conclusory and merely speculative.” (Id. at 625). On appeal, the Fourth

District affirmed the denial. See Williams v. State, 311 So. 3d 30 (Fla. Dist. Ct.

App. 2020) (“We affirm without discussion the circuit court's denial of amended

ground[ ] . . . twelve.”).

Williams speculates and presumes that illegal communication occurred

between an outsider and the jury; however, his claim is refuted by the record.

The trial judge stated that “I have no indication that this juror -- these jurors

were talked to at all, none.” (ECF No. 9-1 at 160:8–10). Nevertheless, in an

abundance of caution, the trial judge questioned the jury as follows:

[S]ince this trial began yesterday, you were brought in here

and I -- we need to know, the bailiffs need to know if anyone

outside of court has tried to say anything to you about the

case or ask if you’re on the jury or anything like that, that

needs to be told to the bailiffs and let them know. Okay,

everybody understand that? That’s what the Rule requires.

And if anyone does say anything to you at all in any setting

outside of this courtroom about the case or even asking

what jury you’re on or anything like that, that has to be

immediately reported to the bailiffs, as it is in every criminal

case, just to let you know, okay. Everybody understand

that?

THE JURY: Yes.

THE COURT: Has that -- has that -- (indiscernible), has

anybody tried to contact anybody or anything? Anybody

have any contact or anything?

THE JURY: No.

(ECF No. 9-1 at 176:6–25, 177:1) (emphasis added). Because this claim is

meritless, counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise it. See Chandler, 240

F.3d at 917. Williams thus fails to establish deficient performance. He also fails

to show prejudice with his wholly conclusory and speculative claim. See Tejada,

941 F.2d at 1559. Ground Four is thus denied under the performance and

prejudice prongs of Strickland.

c. Evidentiary Hearing

In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish

the need for an evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 647

F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). “[I]f the record refutes the applicant’s factual

allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required

to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007);

see also Jones v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th Cir.

2016). Here, the record refutes William’s factual allegations and precludes

habeas relief. See id. Because the Court can “adequately assess [William’s]

claim[s] without further factual development[,]” he is not entitled to an

evidentiary hearing. Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003).

d. Certificate of Appealability

A prisoner seeking to appeal a district court’s final order denying his or

her petition for writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal;

rather, in order to do so, he must obtain a certificate of appealability. See 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); see also Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 183 (2009). This

Court should issue a certificate of appealability only if Williams makes “a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2). Where, as here, the district court rejects a petitioner’s constitutional

claims on the merits, the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists

“would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable

or wrong.” See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Williams does not

satisfy this burden, so the Court will not issue a certificate of appealability.

4. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, William’s petition for writ of habeas corpus

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF No. 1) is denied. A certificate of appealability is

also denied. Because there are no issues with arguable merit, an appeal would

not be taken in good faith, and thus, Williams is not entitled to appeal in forma

pauperis. The Clerk is directed to close the case.

Done and ordered, in chambers, in Miami, Florida, on i 2023.

Robert N. Scola, Jr.

United States District Judge

Copies, via U.S. Mail, to

Christopher Donnell Williams

K84073

Jackson Correctional Institution

Inmate Mail/Parcels

9563 10th Street

Malone, FL 32445

PRO SE