Bien-Aime v. Miami Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation Department

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 22-cv-24007-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes

MARSHA BIEN-AIME,

Plaintiff,

v.

MIAMI DADE CORRECTIONS

AND REHABILITATION DEPARTMENT,

Defendant.

______________________________________/

ORDER ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED

IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon the Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma

Pauperis, ECF No. [2] (the “Motion”), filed in conjunction with the Complaint, ECF No. [1] (the

“Complaint”). Plaintiff Marsha Bien-Aime (“Plaintiff”), who is proceeding pro se, has not paid

the required filing fee and, thus, the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) are applicable.

The Court has carefully reviewed the Complaint, the Motion, and the record in this case, and is

otherwise fully advised in the premises. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and the Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

I. Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis

Fundamental to our system of justice is that the courthouse doors will not be closed to

persons based on their inability to pay a filing fee. Congress has provided that a court “may

authorize the commencement, prosecution, or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or

criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees . . . therefore, by a person who submits an

affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such [person] possesses that the person is unable to

pay such fees . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); see Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305,

1306 n.1 (11th Cir. 2004) (interpreting statute to apply to all persons seeking to proceed in forma

pauperis). Section 1915(a) requires a determination as to whether “the statements in the

[applicant’s] affidavit satisfy the requirement of poverty.” Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 891 (5th

Cir. 1976).1 An applicant’s “affidavit will be held sufficient if it represents that the litigant, because

of his poverty, is unable to pay for the court fees and costs, and to support and provide necessities

for himself and his dependents.” Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307; see also Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de

Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948) (in forma pauperis status is demonstrated when, because

of poverty, one cannot “pay or give security for the costs and still be able to provide himself and

dependents with the necessities of life.”). The Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”)

poverty guidelines are central to an assessment of an applicant’s poverty. See Taylor v. Supreme

Court of New Jersey, 261 F. App’x 399, 401 (3d Cir. 2008) (using HHS Guidelines as basis for

section 1915 determination); Lewis v. Ctr. Mkt., 378 F. App’x 780, 784 (10th Cir. 2010) (affirming

use of HHS guidelines); see also Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 87 Fed. Reg.

3315 (Jan. 21, 2022). Further, the section 1915 analysis requires “comparing the applicant’s assets

and liabilities in order to determine whether he has satisfied the poverty requirement.” Thomas v.

Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit, 574 F. App’x 916, 917 (11th Cir. 2014). Ultimately, permission

to proceed in forma pauperis is committed to the sound discretion of the Court. Camp v. Oliver,

798 F.2d 434, 437 (11th Cir. 1986) (“[P]ermission to proceed [IFP] is committed to the sound

discretion of the court.”).

In the Motion, Plaintiff represents that she has been unemployed since December, 2021

and receives no wages. ECF No. [2] at 1. Plaintiff also represents that in the past twelve months,

1 Pursuant to Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981), opinions of the Fifth Circuit

issued prior to October 1, 1981, are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit.

she received $200.00 monthly in child support and $450.00 in monthly public assistance. Id. at 4.

But Plaintiff has not stated the amount she expects to receive in the future. See id. at 3-4. In

addition, Plaintiff supports her daughter, has $3,900.00 in a checking or savings account, and she

owns her home with a $415,000.00 value, and a vehicle valued at $8,000.00. Id. at 5. Plaintiff

attests to having monthly expenses totaling approximately $1,452.00, id. at 6, but she has not

explained how she has managed her expenses since becoming unemployed at the end of 2021, or

how she expects to manage her expenses moving forward. The information provided is therefore

insufficient to substantiate Plaintiff’s request for IFP. See Kareem v. Home Source Rental, 986 F.

Supp. 2d 1345, 1346 (S.D. Ga. 2013) (“It undeniably costs money to live . . . . Wary of such claims

and cognizant of how easy one may consume a public resource with no financial skin in the game,

the Court has demanded supplemental information.”).

II. The Complaint

In addition to the required showing that the litigant, because of poverty, is unable to pay

for the court fees and costs, Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307, upon a motion to proceed in forma

pauperis the Court is required to examine whether “the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or

malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief

against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). If the Court

determines that the complaint satisfies any of the three enumerated circumstances under Section

1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must dismiss the complaint.

A pleading in a civil action must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although a complaint “does not need

detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that Rule 8(a)(2)’s

pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation”). Nor can a complaint rest on “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual

enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (alteration in original)).

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Importantly, “[p]ro se

pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and [are] liberally

construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). “But the leniency

accorded pro se litigants does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to

rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading to sustain an action.” Matthews, Wilson & Matthews, Inc.

v. Capital City Bank, 614 F. App’x 969, 969 n.1 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty.

of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled in part on other grounds by

Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709 (11th Cir. 2010)).

Upon review, the Complaint in this case must be dismissed because it fails to state a claim.

Plaintiff alleges workplace harassment and bullying, and that after a human resources investigation

concluded, she was subject to a toxic and hostile environment, the harassment continued, and

Plaintiff then experienced retaliation. ECF No. [1] at 2. As a result, Plaintiff seeks damages and

reinstatement, but she has not provided a legal basis for the relief she seeks. Id. Attached to the

Complaint, Plaintiff provides correspondence from Miami-Dade County, and two (2) Right-to-Sue

letters from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). See id. at 4-8. The

correspondence from Miami-Dade County supports Plaintiff’s contention that she was subject to

harassment and discrimination, and the EEOC letters provide notice of Plaintiff’s right to institute

a civil action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., Title I

of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111, et seq., and Title V, Section

503 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12203. Id. Nevertheless, Plaintiff has alleged insufficient facts in the

Complaint.

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any

individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,

terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,

sex, or national origin. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). “Discriminatory conduct that is ‘so severe

or pervasive that it create[s] a work environment abusive to employees because of their race,

gender, religion, or national origin offends Title VII’s broad rule of workplace equality.’” Uppal

v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 482 F. App’x 394, 396 (11th Cir.2012) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys.,

Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993)). To establish a hostile work

environment claim, a plaintiff must show:

(1) that [s]he belongs to a protected group; (2) that [s]he has been subject to

unwelcome harassment; (3) that the harassment must have been based on a

protected characteristic of the employee such as national origin; (4) that the

harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of

employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment; and (5)

that the employer is responsible for such environment under a theory of vicarious

or direct liability.

Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir.2002). In addition, “Title VII

makes it unlawful ‘for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because [she]

has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice’ under Title VII.” Uppal, 482 F.

App’x at 397 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a)). “Retaliation under Title VII occurs when an

employee engages in protected activity, and suffers an adverse employment action that is causally

related to that activity.” Id. (citing Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1388 (11th

Cir.1998)). “In terms of causation, a plaintiff must show that the decision-maker was aware of the

protected conduct.” Id. (citing Shannon v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 716 (11th

Cir.2002)). Similarly, the ADA prohibits discrimination by an employer against “a qualified

individual on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). In order to state an ADA claim for

disability discrimination, a plaintiff must allege “(1) that [s]he suffers from a disability, (2) that

[s]he is a qualified individual, and (3) that a ‘covered entity’ discriminated against [her] on account

of [her] disability.” Cramer v. State of Fla., 117 F.3d 1258, 1264 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Holbrook

v. City of Alpharetta, 112 F.3d 1522, 1526 (11th Cir. 1997)).

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not specify the basis of her discrimination or any other facts that

would permit the Court to conclude that Title VII discrimination or retaliation claims are

adequately alleged. Similarly, the Complaint contains no allegations with respect to any disability

that would give rise to a claim for disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities

Act. Although the Court liberally construes pro se pleadings, the Court is not free to construct

causes of action for which adequate facts are not pleaded. Because the Complaint does not contain

sufficient facts or identify specifically the claims Plaintiff intends to assert, the Complaint must be

dismissed.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. The Complaint, ECF No. [1], is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

2. Plaintiff’s Motion, ECF No. [2], is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

3. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.

4. Plaintiff is advised that this Order does not preclude her from refiling her claims

and the Motion alleging sufficient facts and providing the requisite financial

information as more fully set forth in this Order.

Case No. 22-cv-24007-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on December 12, 2022.

BE L

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:

Marsha Bien-Aime, pro se

2345 Superior Street

Opa Locka, FL 33054