The opinion
United Statfoesr tDhies trict Court
Southern District of Florida
Maria Eugenia Blanco, Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
Civil Action No. 21-24023-Civ-Scola
)
Anand Adrian Samuel and Lindsey )
Adams Finch, Defendants. )
Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff Maria Eugenia Blanco seeks the recovery, from Defendants
Anand Adrian Samuel and Lindsey Adams Finch (together, the “Parents”), of
overtime payments she says she is due under the Fair Labor Standards Act for
her work for them as a nanny/housekeeper. (Compl, ECF No. 1-1.) Blanco says
that, from January 2019 through August 2021, she worked 79 hours a week in
the Parents’ home, caring for their children, and was paid only her regular,
hourly rate for all hours worked, without receiving time-and-half overtime
payments for all hours worked in excess of forty each week. Blanco now seeks
summary judgment as to (1) her status as the Parents’ covered employee under
the FLSA; (2) her resulting entitlement to overtime wages; and (3) the Parents’
inability to escape liquidated-damages liability. (Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 45.) The
Parents have responded, opposing the motion (Defs.’ Resp., ECF No. 52) and
Blanco has timely replied to that opposition (Pl.’s Reply, ECF No. 58). In
addition, both sides have presented voluminous records in support of their
statements of facts. After careful review and for the reasons that follow, the
Court denies Blanco’s motion (ECF No. 45). The Court also sets this matter, as
explained in the conclusion section, for hearing on Wednesday, August 10,
2022, at 9:00 a.m.
1. Factual Background1
Many of the facts the parties present in their statements have no bearing
on the merits of Blanco’s motion. Instead, the Court recounts just the facts and
portions of the record pertinent to the actual issues raised in the briefing.
After initially working in the Parents’ home on a part-time basis, Blanco
began working there full time in January 2019. (Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 57, ECF
No. 47.) At that time, the Parents had four children, ranging in age from less
than a year to seven years old, and lived in a three-bedroom, two-bath home in
Surfside, Florida. (Id. ¶ 5.) The Parents shared one of the bedrooms and one of
the bathrooms. (Id. ¶ 6.) The two other bedrooms and remaining bathroom were
1 Except where indicated, the facts are undisputed.
shared by Blanco and the four children, with Blanco and the two youngest
children in one bedroom and the other two children in the third bedroom. (Id.)
Blanco did not have any of her own private space and always brought a change
of night clothes, with her overnight bag, when she arrived for her shifts. (Id. ¶¶
8–9.)
Blanco worked a twenty-three-hour shift, beginning on Sundays at 10am,
until Monday, the following day, leaving the residence at 9am. (Id. ¶ 57.) She
would then return to the residence that same evening, on Monday, at 7pm, and
work a night shift, for fourteen hours, until 9am the following day. (Id. ¶ 9.)
Blanco worked this same overnight shift, starting on Tuesday, Wednesday, and
Thursday evenings, as well, ultimately working a total of 79 hours each week,
for which she received $800.2 (Id. ¶¶ 58, 73; Defs.’ Stmt. of Facts ¶ 58, ECF No.
54.) Blanco was off the clock (and left the residence) after each shift, including
from Fridays at 9am until her day shift on Sundays began at 10am. (Pl.’s Stmt.
¶¶ 9, 58.) When not at the Parents’ residence, Blanco resided with her aunt, in
North Miami. (Id. ¶ 10.) Blanco stopped working at the Parents’ residence in
August 2021. (Id. ¶ 31.) There does not appear to be any real dispute that, for
at least part of Blanco’s shift, while the children were sleeping, she also slept
and otherwise had time available to herself. (Id. ¶ 78; Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 78.)
The parties dispute whether the Parents were Blanco’s employers. Blanco
says Amazing Gracie, LLC, the entity which both sides agree issued her
paychecks,3 was simply a front, through which the Parents actually controlled
all aspects of her employment. (E.g., Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 1–2, 75.) According to
Blanco, Finch directed Grace Trask, the daytime nanny, who started in 2018, to
create the LLC, though which all the nannies and housekeepers would be paid.
(Id. ¶¶ 61, 64.) There is no dispute that Amazing Gracie’s only income came
from Finch, as the Parents were the company’s only client. (Id. ¶ 66; Def.’s
Stmt. ¶ 68.) And, as Blanco describes it, Trask had no authority to hire or fire
and was simply a regular nanny along with Blanco and the other staff. (Pl.’s
Stmt. ¶ 76.)
On the other hand, the Parents maintain they did not control Blanco’s
work schedule, had no input as to how money was apportioned among the staff,
and no authority over the agency’s personnel policies or decisions. (Def.’s Stmt.
2 While the Parents don’t dispute Blanco’s representation that she earned $800 a week, they
also say, elsewhere, that Blanco was paid $880 a week. (Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 117.) In reply, Blanco
acknowledges she was paid between $800 and $880 each week. (Pl.’s Reply Stmt. ¶ 117, ECF
No. 59.) Regardless, the exact amount Blanco was paid does not affect the Court’s analysis of
the issues raised in the briefing.
3 Finch acknowledges paying Blanco, for about eight weeks, before Amazing Gracie was created,
directly, by way of a personal check, using a payroll company, NannyChex, LLC, to make
payments to the taxing authorities and to issue W-2s. (Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 101.) Blanco says, in
addition to these payments, Finch herself also made “numerous payments” to Blanco, even
¶¶ 2, 73, 75–76, 106.) They say they simply paid Amazing Gracie one lump sum
for all services provided. (Id. ¶ 101.) They also say that the idea to create
Amazing Gracie, which they refer to as a “nanny agency,” came from Trask’s
aunt, not from Finch. (Id. ¶ 64, 67.) The parents further relay that they
compensated Amazing Gracie for Trask’s processing the nannies’ payroll and
directing the entirety of the nanny operation. (Id. ¶ 67.) Blanco disputes this,
insisting that Trask was never compensated for these undertakings. (Pl.’s Stmt.
¶ 67.) Blanco also says that Trask did not decide how much to pay her, or the
other nannies, and that Trask was never given the authority to direct any of
Blanco’s work. (Id. ¶ 70.)
2. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is proper if following discovery, the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits and admissions on file show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. “An issue of fact is ‘material’ if, under the
applicable substantive law, it might affect the outcome of the case.” Hickson
Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259–60 (11th Cir.2004). “An issue of
fact is ‘genuine’ if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact
to find for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 1260. All the evidence and factual
inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144, 157 (1970); Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1280 (11th
Cir. 2004).
Once a party properly makes a summary judgment motion by
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, whether or not
accompanied by affidavits, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings
through the use of affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
admissions on file and other documents, and designate specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323–24. The
nonmovant’s evidence must be significantly probative to support the claims.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The Court will not
weigh the evidence or make findings of fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249;
Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 924 (11th Cir. 2003). Rather, the
Court’s role is limited to deciding whether there is sufficient evidence upon
which a reasonable juror could find for the nonmoving party. Id. “If more than
one inference could be construed from the facts by a reasonable fact finder, and
that inference introduces a genuine issue of material fact, then the district
court should not grant summary judgment.” Bannum, Inc. v. City of Fort
Lauderdale, 901 F.2d 989, 996 (11th Cir. 1990).
3. Analysis
In seeking summary judgment, Blanco maintains there are no genuine
issues of material fact regarding (1) her entitlement to overtime wages; (2) her
status as the Parents’ covered employee under the FLSA; or (3) the Parents’
inability to escape liquidated-damages liability. In opposition, the Parents argue
that, because Blanco resided in their home, she was exempt from overtime
wages under the FLSA; that Amazing Gracie—the limited liability company—
was Blanco’s employer, not the Parents; and that they had a good-faith basis to
presume that Blanco was exempt from overtime. After careful review, and as
detailed below, the Court finds Blanco’s motion fails on all three bases: she has
failed to establish an absence of any disputed material facts with respect to her
overtime-wage entitlement; her status as the Parents’ covered employee; or her
entitlement to liquidated damages.
A. Blanco has failed to establish she is entitled to summary judgment
as to her overtime claims.
In opposing Blanco’s motion for summary judgment, the Parents submit
that Blanco’s position as a live-in, domestic employee exempts her from earning
overtime wages afforded to employees under 29 U.S.C. § 207, the FLSA’s
“maximum hours” provision.4 In support, they point to an exemption set forth
in § 213. That exemption provides that the overtime entitlements of § 207 do
not apply to (1) “any employee who is employed in domestic service,” (2) “in a
household,” and (3) “who resides in such household.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(21). In
turn, say the Parents, Department of Labor regulations and interpretive
guidance explain that this live-in, domestic-service exemption can apply not
only when the employee resides on the employer’s premises “permanently,” but
also when the employee resides there for “extended periods of time.” Application
of the Fair Labor Standards Act to Domestic Service, 29 C.F.R. Part 552, 78 FR
60,454, 60,474 (Oct. 1, 2013) (“2013 Final Rule”); see also 29 C.F.R. § 785.23.
Further, posit the Parents, an employee is considered to reside on an
employer’s premises for “extended periods of time” if the employee spends “five
consecutive days or nights” “working and sleeping on the employer’s premises.”
2013 Final Rule, 78 FR at 60,474. And, they continue, since there is record
evidence that Blanco spent five consecutive days or nights working and sleeping
at the Parents’ home, from 2019 through 2021, Blanco cannot prevail on her
motion for summary judgment. The Court agrees with the Parents: Blanco has
failed to demonstrate that she is entitled to summary judgment regarding her
overtime claims.
4 This provision requires an employer to compensate an employee “at a rate not less than one
and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed” for each hour worked in excess of
To start, the parties do not dispute that Blanco was employed in domestic
service, in a household, thus satisfying the first two elements of the overtime
exemption. Where the parties diverge is the third element: whether Blanco has
established she did not “reside” in that household. Blanco’s argument rests on
her interpretation of the way the exemption provision uses the word “resides.”
In promoting her definition, Blanco looks to the word’s common usage and
dictionary definition and applies concepts related to when an employer may
exclude, altogether, time spent sleeping from the number of hours an employee
is deemed to have worked. In light of the Department of Labor’s rules and
guidance, however, the Court finds Blanco’s arguments miss their marks.
In 2013, the Department of Labor issued a final rule, in accordance with
its broad grant of authority to do so. See Home Care Ass’n of Am. v. Weil, 799
F.3d 1084, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (noting that “[t]he 1974 Amendments”—to the
FLSA which, among other things, extended certain protections to household
domestic employees—“included a broad grant of rulemaking authority
empowering the Secretary of Labor to ‘prescribe necessary rules, regulations,
and orders with regard to the amendments made by this Act.’”) (quoting 1974
Amendments, Pub. L. No. 93–259, § 29(b), 88 Stat. 76). Within that 2013 Final
Rule, the Department recites the exemption at issue here, that “any employee
who is employed in domestic service in a household and who resides in such
household” is not entitled to overtime. 2013 Final Rule, 78 FR at 60473
(quoting 29 U.S.C. 213(b)(21). As the Rule points out, the Department’s
regulations distinguish between, on the one hand, the requirement that all
domestic-service employees, regardless of whether they reside in the household
where they are employed or not, be paid at least a minimum wage for all hours
worked and, on the other, the statutory exemption from overtime that applies
only to “live-in worker[s].” 2013 Final Rule, 78 FR at 60473 (citing 29 C.F.R. §
552.102(a), titled “Domestic Service Employees—Overview” and noting that the
Department also refers to “[d]omestic service employees who reside in the
household where they are employed . . . as ‘live-in domestic service
employees.’”)
As the Department noted, it “received several comments requesting
clarification on the definition of a live-in domestic service employee” in response
to its notice of proposed rulemaking. 2013 Final Rule, 78 FR at 60473. In
addressing the various concerns raised, the Department further explained there
was no proposed change to the definition of a “live-in domestic service
employee,” who is exempt from overtime compensation under the FLSA, and
that the Department intended “to continue to apply its existing definition of
live-in domestic service employees.” Id. Elaborating, the Department explained
that “an employee will be considered to be a live-in domestic service employee
under § 552.102 if the employee: (1) meets the definition of domestic service
employment under § 552.3 and provides services in a private home pursuant to
§ 552.101; and (2) resides on his or her employer’s premises on a permanent
basis or for extended periods of time.” 2013 Final Rule, 78 FR at 60474 (cleaned
up) (emphasis added). The Department then identified two different sets of
criteria that would qualify as residing on an employer’s premises for an
extended period of time: (1) working and sleeping on the employer’s premises
for five days a week (120 hours or more) or, (2) for an employee working fewer
than 120 hours per week, working and sleeping on the employer’s premises for
five consecutive days or nights. Id.
Courts in this district have not hesitated to apply these criteria in cases
raising the § 213(b)(21) exemption. See Romero v. Diaz-Fox, 1:18-CV-21218,
2021 WL 3619677, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 2021) (Gayles, J.) (applying the
2013 Final Rule criteria but concluding the exemption did not apply because
the employee only slept at the employer’s home two nights a week, “when she
worked a double shift on Saturdays and Sundays”); Kefeenie v. Gloria Martin
Tr., 17-24346-CIV, 2018 WL 4301558, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 2018) (Gayles,
J.) (applying the 2013 Final Rule criteria and finding the employee exempt from
overtime because she “was required to sleep overnight seven days a week, and
worked 136 hours per week”); Quintero v. Lopez, 15-21162-CIV, 2016 WL
7508264, at *7 (S.D. Fla. June 6, 2016) (Lenard, J.) (reciting the 2013 Final
Rule criteria but finding them inapplicable because, “although [the employee]
was a full-time domestic service employee, she only served as a live-in domestic
service employee temporarily for five days while filling in for a co-worker”)
(emphasis in original). Blanco herself seems to agree that the Department’s
2013 Final Rule applies but complains that the Parents rely on it “too heavily.”
(Pl.’s Reply at 5 (emphasis in original).) Ultimately, Blanco fails to convince that
the Court should not look to the Department’s own rule in order to discern the
definition of the word “reside.”
Part of Blanco’s argument is that the “exemption is not automatically
triggered by the ‘(5) nights weekly’ language,’” in the 2013 Final Rule, but
rather, the number of nights spent at an employer’s residence should merely be
considered one of many factors in determining whether the employee actually
“resided” at the residence. (Pl.’s Reply at 3.) In support, she cites 29 C.F.R. §
785.23, which acknowledges that, in some cases, an employee residing on his
or her employer’s premises may not actually be working the entire time he or
she is on the premises. For example, as that section explains, an employee,
residing on the premises, may, for some periods, still “engage in normal private
pursuits and thus have enough time for eating, sleeping, entertaining, and
other periods of complete freedom from all duties when he may leave the
premises for purposes of his own.” 29 C.F.R. § 785.23. Based on this
complication, which renders it “difficult to determine the exact hours worked,”
the Department provides that, “under these circumstances,” “any reasonable
agreement of the parties which takes into consideration all of the pertinent facts
will be accepted.” Id. Without fully explaining why, Blanco interprets this to
mean that, since all her hours at the Parents’ residence were considered
“working time,” she could not, then, be regarded as residing there. (Pl.’s Reply
at 58.) The Court is not persuaded.
Importantly, the final rule is straight forward: if an employee (1) works
fewer than 120 hours per week; and (2) both works and sleeps on the
employer’s premises; (3) for five consecutive days or nights, the Department
considers her to reside on the premises for an extended period and to thus fall
under the overtime exemption. Nothing in § 785.23 thwarts the application of
these straightforward criteria in this case. There is no dispute that Blanco
worked fewer than 120 hours a week. And while Blanco quibbled regarding the
definition of sleep, during her deposition, at times insisting she never truly fell
asleep (e.g., Blanco Dep., 74:2–7 (submitting that “[s]leep is when one sleeps in
one’s bed resting, calm, without having to attend or see to anything,”), she also
acknowledged actually having slept during her overnight shifts (id. at 70:22–
71:2 (admitting that she couldn’t say she “never” slept at the residence and that
at “times” she fell “into a sleep like state”); 71:9–11 (admitting that she was at
times in a “state of semi sleep” and possibly snoring). More importantly, in her
statement of material facts, Blanco pointedly maintains that she “always slept
with the Defendants’ 2 youngest daughters” “during the night shift” (Pl.’s Stmt.
¶ 7) and that her “‘sleep time’ with the Defendants[’] children” was considered
“compensable time” (id. ¶ 78). Similarly, in her motion, Blanco says, without
qualification, that she “always slept with the Defendants’ daughters” (Pl.’s Mot.
at 2) and that the “essential requirements” of her job “involved her sleeping in a
bedroom with the Defendants[’] two youngest daughters” (id. at 7). Regardless,
for the purposes of Blanco’s motion, she certainly has not shown an absence of
a factual dispute as to whether or not she, in fact, slept at the Parents’ house,
during her night shifts. And, finally, there is no dispute that Blanco spent five
consecutive nights at the Parents’ house from 2019 to 2021. (Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 58
(noting that Blanco worked overnight shifts on Sunday, Monday, Tuesday,
Wednesday, and Thursday).) Notably, there is no requirement in the 2013 Final
Rule that the employee must remain on the property continuously, for five
consecutive twenty-four-hour periods. Instead, the Rule is unambiguously
phrased in the disjunctive, requiring that the employee work and sleep on the
premises for five consecutive days or nights only, thus clearly contemplating
prolonged absences.
Blanco’s contrary approach is unavailing. That all her time on the
premises—the 79 hours—was considered compensable time, even though she
may not have been actually working, is not necessarily at odds with a finding
that she resided on the property. It simply means that she and the Parents
agreed that she would be compensated for all those hours—regardless of
whether she was sleeping herself or tending to private matters, such as
studying English, while the children slept. (Blanco’s Dep. at 70:16–21
(mentioning that she “would study English with Duolingo” while the children
slept).) In other words, “tak[ing] into consideration all of the pertinent facts,” 29
C.F.R. § 785.23, the parties here appear to have reached an agreement that,
even though Blanco may not have been performing actual work for all 79 hours
she was at the residence, she would, nonetheless be compensated for all those
hours.
Blanco’s reliance on the fact that she did not have her own private
quarters, to show that she did not reside on the premises is similarly
unpersuasive. In making this argument, Blanco has conflated two different,
albeit related, issues under the FLSA: (1) whether time spent sleeping can, by
agreement, be excluded from the number of hours worked for purposes of
calculating an employee’s minimum wage and overtime compensation, under
29 C.F.R. § 785.23—not at issue in this case—versus (2) whether the employee
is exempt from the FLSA’s overtime provisions, under 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(21)
and 29 C.F.R. § 552.102(a). That is, Blanco has improperly imposed the
requirements for excluding sleeping time or time during which an employee has
freedom from all work obligations onto the separate question—and the question
at issue in this case—of whether an employee qualifies as exempt from
overtime. In sum, Blanco’s reliance on precedent and regulatory language
dealing with the exclusion of sleep-time, or truly personal-time, from
determining an employee’s total compensable hours, is misplaced. None of
those cases or regulations offers guidance on determining whether a domestic-
service employee is exempt from overtime under the FLSA. See United States v.
Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 257 (2d Cir. 2010) (recognizing, for example, that a
Department of Labor opinion letter, focused on providing guidance for
calculating the number of hours a group-home employee worked, “inapposite”
to the question of determining whether an employee should be considered to
“reside in a household” for purposes of the § 213(b)(21) exemption). At bottom,
simply because some regulations and cases note that an employee who does
have private quarters, in a home-like environment is considered to reside on an
employer’s premises, does not mean that an employee must have such private
quarters in order to qualify as exempt from overtime.
Finally, the Court is also not convinced that it should look to the
dictionary definition of “reside” rather than the Department’s definition or to
cases that predate the definition as published by the Department in its 2013
Final Rule. “Where an agency rule sets forth important individual rights and
duties, where the agency focuses fully and directly upon the issue, where the
agency uses full notice-and-comment procedures to promulgate a rule, where
the resulting rule falls within the statutory grant of authority, and where the
rule itself is reasonable,” all as exhibited in conjunction with the 2013 Final
Rule, “then a court ordinarily assumes that Congress intended it to defer to the
agency’s determination.” Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158,
173–74 (2007). In short, Blanco provides no reason why, in this case, the Court
should ignore the Department’s straightforward definition of “reside,” as set
forth in the Rule, in favor of outdated caselaw or a contrary dictionary
definition.5
B. Blanco has failed to establish her entitlement to summary judgment
on the issues of whether the Parents were her employer under the
FLSA or their liability for liquidated damages.
As to the issue of whether the Parents were her employer under the FLSA,
the Court, once again, finds Blanco’s presentation lacking. In seeking summary
judgment in her favor that she “was a covered FLSA employee of the
Defendants,” she simply recites a list of disjointed facts, not all of which pertain
to the issue, and then follows that with a series of legal concepts, some relevant,
some not. She makes no attempt, however, to link the two to each other or to
the point she is trying to make about whether, under the FLSA, the Parents
were, in fact, her employers.
Further, the Parents, in response, have supplied facts indicating that, for
the vast majority of Blanco’s employment, a limited liability company, Amazing
Gracie, LLC, was actually Blanco’s employer. (E.g., Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 97.) In
addition, the Parents set forth other facts that, if true, would show that they
were not Blanco’s joint employers, with Amazing Gracie, either. (Id. ¶¶ 100–107;
109–117.) Whether the Parents’ version of the facts would carry the day, of
course, remains to be seen. But there is no denying that the facts as they
present them, and when read in the light most favorable to them, as the
nonmoving party, show that there is indeed a genuine issue of material fact as
to this issue, to be resolved through trial.
5 The Court notes that Blanco has copied and pasted vast swaths of excerpts from various
cases, without providing any context or elaboration as to how the legal analyses and facts
within those cases apply here. (E.g., Pl’s Mot. at 9–11, 13–17 (citing, verbatim, pages and pages
from Manrique v. Schoenbaum, 1:09-CV-3212-SCJ, 2011 WL 13269434, at *7 (N.D. Ga. Aug.
12, 2011); Canizales v. Lawrence, CV H-07-3796, 2009 WL 10719452, at *15 (S.D. Tex. Feb.
18, 2009); and Chao v. Jasmine Hall Care Homes, Inc., 205-CV-1306-GEB-KJM, 2007 WL
4591438, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2007).) Simply reproducing portions of these opinions,
verbatim, without tying the analyses or legal concepts set forth within them to the facts of this
case, is unhelpful. See McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995-96 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Issues
adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed
argumentation, are deemed waived. It is not sufficient for a party to mention a possible
Finally, based on the above findings, that Blanco’s motion fails with
respect to both her overtime claims as well as her position that the Parents were
undisputedly her employers, the Court also denies her motion with respect to
the liquidated-damages issue. Because there has been no finding that the
Parents are liable for Blanco’s claimed unpaid overtime pay under the FLSA, a
finding in this regard, on a motion for summary judgment, would be premature.
Davila v. Menendez, 717 F.3d 1179, 1186 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Before making a
determination as to [the employee’s] entitlement to liquidated damages, the
district court was required to await the finding of the jury about willfulness. The
willfulness or good faith question must be answered first by the jury to
determine the period of limitations and then, if there is a verdict for the
employee, again by the district court to determine whether to
award liquidated damages.”) (cleaned up).
4. Conclusion
As set forth above, the Court denies Blanco’s motion for summary
judgment. (ECF No. 45.)
Additionally, although the Parents themselves did not move for summary
judgment, they raise the specter of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f)(1),
which provides that a court may nonetheless enter summary judgment in favor
of the non-moving party “where a legal issue has been fully developed, and the
evidentiary record is complete.” See Artistic Entertainment, Inc. v. City of Warner
Robins, 331 F.3d 1196, 1202 (11th Cir. 2003); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)(1) (“After
giving notice and a reasonable time to respond, the court may . . . grant
summary judgment for a nonmovant.”). Because there may be some merit to
applying this rule here, the Court sets this matter for oral argument, to allow
Blanco to explain why, based on the facts presented, the Court should not enter
summary judgment in the Parents’ favor. In particular, in conjunction with the
Court’s interpretation of the overtime exemption, as set forth above, the Court
points to Blanco’s acknowledgment of the following key facts:
(1) Blanco worked as a full-time domestic employee from 2019 through 2021
(e.g., Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 1);
(2) Blanco worked fewer than 120 hours each week (e.g., id. ¶ 58);
(3) Blanco stayed at the Parents’ residence for five consecutive nights each
week. (e.g., id. ¶¶ 9, 58); and
(4) Blanco slept and studied English during her shifts (e.g., id. ¶¶ 7, 78;
Blanco Dep. at 70:16–71:2, 71:9–11; Pl.’s Mot. at 2, 7; Pl’s Reply at 4).
The Court sets this issue for hearing on Wednesday, August 10,
2022, at 9:00 a.m., at the Wilkie D. Ferguson, Jr. Federal Courthouse,
Courtroom 12-3, 400 North Miami Avenue, Miami, Florida 33128. Based on
this setting and the Court’s ruling on Blanco’s motion for summary judgment,
the Court denies the Parents’ motion for oral argument (ECF No. 70).
Done and ordered at Miami, Florida, on August 5, 2022.
N. Scola, Jr.
United States District Judge