Harris v. Miami-Dade County

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No.: 1:19-cv-22799-GAYLES

SYBIL HARRIS, as Personal Representative

of the Estate of Jamar Edward Rollins,

Plaintiff,

v.

MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants.

______________________________________/

ORDER

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Defendants’, Miami-Dade County and Jesus

Coto, Motion to Dismiss Counts I and IV of the Fourth Amended Complaint (the “Motion”) [ECF

No. 102]. The Court has reviewed the Motion and the record and is otherwise fully advised. For

the following reasons, the Motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND1

On December 30, 2016, at approximately 6:40 p.m., Detectives Andrew Garcia and Jesus

Coto of the Miami-Dade County Police Department were patrolling the West Perrine

neighborhood in Miami-Dade County, Florida, in an unmarked vehicle. Detectives Garcia and

Coto activated their red and blue visor lights and attempted to initiate a traffic stop on Jamar

Rollins for failing to make a complete stop at a stop sign. A passenger in the vehicle, Devin Smith,

leaned out of the car while it was still moving and pointed a firearm at the detectives’ vehicle.

Smith then jumped out of the moving vehicle and fled on foot.

1 As the Court is proceeding on a Motion to Dismiss, it takes Plaintiff’s allegations in the Fourth Amended Complaint,

[ECF No. 101], as true. See Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997).

One report indicates that Detective Garcia subsequently chased Smith while Detective Coto

remained in the unmarked police vehicle. Yet, another report states that both officers got out of

their vehicle where Detective Coto initiated pursuit of the passenger and Detective Garcia

advanced toward the passenger door of Rollins’ vehicle. Detective Coto reports that he observed

Detective Garcia look inside the open passenger’s side door of Rollins’ vehicle. Detective Garcia

claims he saw Rollins with a handgun, despite multiple eyewitness accounts that Rollins did not

have a gun. Detective Garcia shot Rollins multiple times while Rollins was still in the vehicle.

Multiple eyewitness accounts state that Detective Garcia shot Rollins after he complied with the

detective’s order to exit the vehicle. Rollins (hereafter “Decedent”) was pronounced dead at the

scene.

Plaintiff, Decedent’s mother and appointed personal representative, initiated this action on

December 27, 2018, in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida. [ECF

No. 1-1]. On July 8, 2019, the defendants removed this action to this Court pursuant to federal

question jurisdiction. [ECF No. 1]. On October 12, 2021, Plaintiff filed her Fourth Amended

Complaint2 (the “Complaint”) against Miami-Dade County, Detective Coto, and Detective Garcia.

[ECF No. 101]. As to Miami-Dade County and Detective Coto, Plaintiff brings two counts: (1) a

42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Miami-Dade County under municipal liability theory (Count I);

and (2) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for failure to intervene against Detective Coto (Count IV). In

response, Defendants Miami-Dade County and Detective Coto filed the instant Motion requesting

that Counts I and IV be dismissed with prejudice. [ECF No. 102].

2 The Complaint is titled “Fourth Amended Complaint”, but this is only Plaintiff’s third amended complaint.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6), a claim “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This means the complaint must contain “factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. The pleadings are construed broadly, Levine v. World Fin. Network Nat’l Bank, 437

F.3d 1118, 1120 (11th Cir. 2006), and the allegations in the complaint are viewed in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, Hawthorne v. Mac Adjustment, Inc., 140 F.3d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir.

1998). On a motion to dismiss, the court need not determine whether the plaintiff “will ultimately

prevail . . . but whether [her] complaint [is] sufficient to cross the federal court’s threshold.”

Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011).

III. DISCUSSION

Relevant here, the Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s same claims against Miami-Dade

County and Detective Coto. [ECF No. 92]. Specifically, the Court found that (1) the § 1983 claim

against Miami-Dade County did not sufficiently allege the existence of a custom or practice; and

(2) the § 1983 claim against Detective Coto did not sufficiently allege that he had the opportunity

to intervene.

A. Count I Against Miami-Dade County

Plaintiff sues Miami-Dade County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for depriving Decedent’s

constitutional rights pursuant to a governmental policy. Under § 1983, any person under the color

of law may be liable for any deprivation of constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ordinarily, a

municipality or local government may not be sued under § 1983 for injuries inflicted by its

employees. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). However, the

law provides an exception when the injury inflicted is the result of a government custom or

practice. Id. To impose § 1983 liability against a municipality, Plaintiff “must show: (1) that his

constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted

deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the

violation.” McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing City of Canton, Ohio

v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989)). “Because a [municipality] rarely will have an officially

adopted policy of permitting a particular constitutional violation, most plaintiffs . . . must show

that the [municipality] has a custom or practice of permitting the constitutional violation and that

the [municipality’s] custom or practice is the moving force behind any alleged constitutional

violation.” McGirt v. Broward Coll., No. 15-cv-62324, 2016 WL 6138043, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Oct.

21, 2016) (quotations omitted). Furthermore, the plaintiff must show that a final policymaker for

the municipality adopted the official policy or endorsed the unofficial policy. Williams v. Miami-

Dade County, 859 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1301–02 (S.D. Fla. 2012), affirmed in relevant part, 516 F.

App’x 899, 900 (11th Cir. 2013).

‘“[I]dentification of policymaking officials is a question of state law,’ and ‘a federal court

would not be justified in assuming that municipal policymaking authority lies somewhere other

than where the applicable law purports to put it.’” Blue v. Miami-Dade Cnty, Fla., No. 10-23599-

CIV, 2011 WL 1099263, at *3 (S.D. Fla. June 15, 2011) (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik,

485 U.S. 112, 124 (1988)) (modification in original). Here, Plaintiff simply alleges that the

“Miami-Dade State Attorney is the authorizing decision maker” for Miami-Dade County with no

factual allegations to lend support. [ECF No. 101 at ¶ 69]. But “[t]his Court has repeatedly stated

that final policymaking authority for Miami-Dade County resides in the Board of County

Commissioners or the County Manager.”3 Blue, 2011 WL 1099263, at *3. And Plaintiff does not

alternatively allege that the Miami-Dade State Attorney was delegated final policymaking

authority. Therefore, Count I is dismissed.

B. Count IV Against Detective Coto

Plaintiff asserts a claim under § 1983 against Detective Coto for failure to intervene.

Defendants claim that Detective Coto is entitled to qualified immunity. Courts apply a two-part

test to determine whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity. Harbert Int’l v.

James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 1998). First, the government official “must prove that the

allegedly unconstitutional conduct occurred while he was acting within the scope of his

discretionary authority.” Id. Next, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the government

official’s conduct violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right. Id. Here, Plaintiff

alleges, and Defendants agree, that Detective Coto was acting within the scope of his duties as an

officer. See [ECF No. 101 ¶ 10]; [ECF No. 102 at 12]. Thus, the burden shifts to Plaintiff.

Once again, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to sufficiently allege that Detective Coto had time,

or a reasonable opportunity, to intervene and was in a position to do so. See Marantes v. Miami-

Dade Cty., 649 F. App’x 665, 672 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[P]laintiff must show that the non-intervening

officer was in a position to intervene yet failed to do so.”). Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that

Detective Coto was in the vicinity of and could see Detective Garcia and Decedent fail to suffice.

And Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege that Detective Coto could have anticipated the shooting.

Id. (affirming dismissal of failure to intervene claim because neither the officer holding the

plaintiff down nor the officer watching the incident had time to intervene and prevent another

3 Defendants state that the Mayor, not the County Manager, now has final policymaking authority. [ECF No. 102 at

7]. In Blue, the Court noted the same representation and declined to decide whether an amendment made that change

as it was unnecessary to the ruling. 2011 WL 1099263, at *3 n.3. The same is true here.

officer’s rapid, successive kicking). Cf Riley v. Newton, 94 F.3d 632, 635 (“[Officer] observed no

use of excessive force which might have given rise to a duty to intervene to stop it, nor did he have

an indication of the prospective use of excessive force—none occurred until Newton’s weapon

fired.”). Accordingly, Count IV is dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts I and IV of the Fourth Amended Complaint,

[ECF No. 102], is GRANTED.

2. Counts I and IV are DISMISSED with prejudice.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 10th day of August, 2022.

Cf

DARRIN P. GAYLES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE