Fripp v. Bradshaw

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 22-cv-80317-BLOOM

JAWAYNE FRIPP,

Plaintiff,

v.

RICK BRADSHAW, et al.,

Defendants.

/

ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on pro se Plaintiff JaWayne Fripp’s civil rights

complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Complaint”), ECF No. [1], and his Application to

Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs (“Application”), ECF No. [3]. For

reasons set forth below, the Application is granted, and the Complaint is dismissed with leave to

amend.

I. APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

The Application is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). A prisoner granted leave to proceed

in forma pauperis is required to pay the $350.00 filing fee but may do so in installments. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff must make an initial payment of “20 percent of the greater of — (A)

the average monthly deposits to the prisoner’s account; or (B) the average monthly balance in the

prisoner’s account for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or

notice of appeal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). In addition to the initial filing fee, Plaintiff must “make

monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s

account.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). This filing fee will be collected even if the Court dismisses the

case because it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or

seeks money damages against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2).

Plaintiff is incarcerated at the Palm Beach County Jail and submitted his inmate account

statement from July 1, 2021, through January 25, 2022. ECF No. [3] at 3-5. At the time of filing

the Application, Plaintiff attested that he had a balance in his checking or savings account of $0.00.

ECF No. [3] at 2. Plaintiff has established that he cannot at present pay even the partial filing fee.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (“In no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action

or appealing a civil or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no

means by which to pay the initial filing fee.”).

II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is a pre-trial inmate currently housed at the Palm Beach County Jail. He alleges

that on April 19, 2021, he was housed at the West Detention Center. ECF No. [1] at 3. That

evening, between the hours of 7:30 PM and 11:00 PM, Plaintiff attended a disciplinary hearing for

an unrelated incident. Id. During the hearing, Plaintiff had his back to the “Open Bay Dayroom of

Delta 1[,]” when another inmate suddenly struck him in the head with a feeding tray. Id.

(alterations added). Plaintiff states that his head split open from the force of the feeding tray and

caused him to become dizzy. Id. He states that the inmate continued to assault him, forcing him to

defend himself. Id. While the assault was ongoing, Officer Smith discharged pepper spray, causing

a still-dizzy Plaintiff “to be unable to see.” Id. The instigating inmate then grabbed ahold of

Plaintiff and slammed him to the ground. Id. Officer Smith and Officer Martin were then able to

handcuff both Plaintiff and the instigating inmate. Id. Plaintiff was taken to medical where he

received treatment for his injuries. Id. at 4. Plaintiff states Officer Smith was negligent for failing

to “make sure all trays were picked up” after dinner ended around 4:00 PM that evening. Id. at 4.

Plaintiff seeks compensation of $1,000,000.00 in damages for mental anguish and physical

injuries. Id.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), as partially codified at 18 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii), requires courts to screen prisoner complaints and dismiss as frivolous claims

that are “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory” or “whose factual contentions are clearly

baseless.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992); Pullen v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No.

19-11797-C, 2019 WL 5784952, at *1 (11th Cir. Sept. 4, 2019) (“[A]n action is frivolous if it is

without arguable merit either in law or fact.”) (quoting Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531

(11th Cir. 2002)).

Under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), a complaint may be dismissed if the court determines that the

complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Wright v. Miranda, 740 F. App’x

692, 694 (11th Cir. 2018). The standard for determining whether a complaint states a claim upon

which relief can be granted is the same whether under section 1915(e)(2)(B) or Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). See Pullen, 2019 WL 5784952, at *1 (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490

(11th Cir. 1997)).

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). There is no required

technical form, but “each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1).

The statement must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon

which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotation marks omitted).

Thus, “a complaint must allege sufficient facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face.”

Pullen, No. 19-11797-C, 2019 WL 5784952 at *1 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009)). The “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative

level.” Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). Plaintiff is obligated to allege “more

than mere labels and legal conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action will not do.” Quality Auto Painting Ctr. of Roselle, Inc. v. State Farm Indemnity Co., 917

F.3d 1249, 1262 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555).

Although the Court must liberally construe pro se pleadings, “pro se litigants are

nonetheless required to conform their pleadings to procedural rules.” Hanna v. Florida, 599 F.

App’x 362, 363 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Pro se litigants “cannot simply

point to some perceived or actual wrongdoing and then have the court fill in the facts to support

their claim . . . judges cannot and must not ‘fill in the blanks’ for pro se litigants; they may only

cut some ‘linguistic slack’ in what is actually pled.” Hanninen v. Fedoravitch, No. 08-23172-CIV,

2009 WL 10668707, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2009) (citation omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff names Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Officers, Officer Smith, Officer Martin, and

Sheriff Rick Bradshaw, as Defendants in the Complaint. ECF No. [1] at 1-2. Based on the

allegations, which must be construed liberally at this preliminary stage, Plaintiff raises failure to

protect claims against all named Defendants. See generally ECF No. [1]. “While the conditions

under which a convicted inmate are held are scrutinized under the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, the conditions under which a pretrial detainee are

held are reviewed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Jacoby v.

Baldwin Cnty., 835 F.3d 1338, 1344 (11th Cir. 2016). Because Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee at the

Palm Beach County Jail, the Court analyzes his claims under the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment.

a. Failure to Protect/Deliberate Indifference - Individual capacity

“A prison official’s deliberate indifference to a known, substantial risk of serious harm to

an inmate violates the Fourteenth Amendment.” Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1331

(11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1358 (11th Cir. 2003)). A deliberate

indifference claim thus consists of three elements: “(1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the

defendants’ deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) causation.” Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50

F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). To satisfy the subjective component, a plaintiff must allege facts

that would allow a jury to conclude that the defendant actually knew that the plaintiff faced a

substantial risk of serious harm. See Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1099

(11th Cir. 2015). To satisfy the objective component, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the

defendant disregarded that known risk by failing to respond to it in an objectively reasonable

manner. See id.

Here, Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded an individual capacity failure to protect claim

against any of the Defendants. Plaintiff states that on April 19, 2021, another inmate attacked him

from behind by striking him across the head with a feeding tray. ECF No. [1] at 3. Plaintiff

describes the attack as “sudden” and states that he was forced to defend himself. Id. As Plaintiff

was fighting with the instigating inmate, Officer Smith first pepper sprayed Plaintiff before he and

Officer Martin were finally able to separate and handcuff Plaintiff and the instigating inmate. Id.

According to Plaintiff, the attack occurred several hours after dinner and long after Officer Smith

should have collected all feeding trays. Id. at 4. Sheriff Bradshaw is not mentioned in the

Complaint.

Setting aside any consideration of whether Plaintiff has alleged a substantial risk of serious

harm, Plaintiff has not stated a plausible claim against any of the Defendants. First, Sheriff

Bradshaw had no personal involvement in Plaintiff’s attack and thus has no individual capacity

liability for failing to protect Plaintiff from the attack. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (under § 1983

“each Government official . . . is only liable for his or her own misconduct” (alteration added)).

Next, the only allegations in the Complaint pertaining to Officer Martin state that he broke

up the fight and placed Plaintiff and the instigating inmate in handcuffs. ECF No. [1] at 3. Such

allegations are insufficient to show that Officer Martin actually knew of a substantial risk of harm

to Plaintiff or that he failed to respond to the risk in an objectively reasonable manner. To the

contrary, Officer Martin allegedly broke up the fight and secured both parties. Id.

Finally, although Officer Smith failed to collect the feeding tray after dinner, that omission

does not constitute gross negligence. See Lumley v. City of Dade City, 327 F.3d 1186, 1197 (11th

Cir. 2003) (stating that a showing of mere negligence is insufficient to make out a constitutional

violation); see also Hoffer v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 973 F.3d 1263, 1270 n.2 (11th Cir. 2020)

(“[N]o matter how serious the negligence, conduct that can’t fairly be characterized as reckless

won’t meet the Supreme Court’s standard.” (alteration added)). Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege

that Officer Smith was aware of the attack prior to its occurrence. In fact, Plaintiff describes the

initial attack as “sudden[].” ECF No. [1] at 3 (alteration added). Nor has Plaintiff alleged that the

actions Officer Smith took to break up the fight were objectively unreasonable. Plaintiff

acknowledges that after he was struck with the feeding tray, he was forced to defend himself. Id.

It was not until after he started fighting back that Officer Smith discharged pepper spray before

finally separating and handcuffing Plaintiff and the instigating inmate. Id. Thus, Plaintiff’s

allegations against Officer Smith fail to state a claim for relief for failure to protect.

b. Supervisory Liability

It is well settled that supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the

unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Barr v. Gee, 437 F. App’x 865, 875 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting West v. Tillman, 496 F.3d 1321,

1328 (11th Cir. 2007)). A supervisor can only be held liable under § 1983 if he “personally

participated in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct or if there is a causal connection between

[his] actions . . . and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” West, 496 F.3d at 1328 (quoting

Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003) (alteration added; internal quotation marks

omitted)).

To state a supervisory liability claim, the plaintiff must allege: (1) the personal involvement

of the supervisor in the violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights; (2) the existence of either

a custom or policy that resulted in deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights; (3)

facts that support an inference that the supervisor directed the unlawful action or knowingly failed

to prevent it; or (4) a history of widespread abuse that put the supervisor on notice of an alleged

constitutional deprivation that he then failed to correct. See West, 496 F.3d at 1328-29 (listing

factors in context of summary judgment). However, a supervisor is not liable under § 1983 for

mere negligence in the training or supervision of his employees. Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829,

836-37 (11th Cir. 1990). The mere fact a defendant occupies a supervisory position is not enough.

Instead, a plaintiff must “show that the supervisor either participated directly in the

unconstitutional conduct or that a causal connection exists between the supervisor’s actions and

the alleged constitutional violation.” Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11th Cir. 2014)

(citation omitted).

Plaintiff names Sheriff Bradshaw as a Defendant but fails to allege that he had any personal

involvement in the attack. Nor does Plaintiff allege that Sheriff Bradshaw directed subordinates to

take “unlawful action” or that he was aware that Plaintiff would be attacked and “knowingly failed

to prevent” it. See West, 496 F.3d at 1328-29. Because Plaintiff does not allege Sheriff Bradshaw

“either participated directly in the unconstitutional conduct or that a causal connection exists

between the supervisor’s actions and the alleged constitutional violation[,]” and because Plaintiff

cannot hold Sheriff Bradshaw liable under a theory of respondeat superior, Plaintiff has not alleged

a basis to impose liability on him. Harrison, 746 F.3d at 1298 (alteration added).

c. Official Capacity

Plaintiff alleges official capacity claims against all Defendants. “[O]fficial-capacity suits

generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is

an agent[.]” Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978) (alterations

added). “Such suits against municipal officers are therefore, in actuality, suits directly against the

[municipality] that the officer represents.” Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir.

1991) (alteration added). As to Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, the governmental entity that

the Defendants represent, Palm Beach County is the real party in interest. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S.

21, 25 (1991). Therefore, Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against Defendants are really claims

against Palm Beach County and should be treated as such.

Regarding Palm Beach County, “[a] municipality may be held liable under § 1983 if the

plaintiff shows that a ‘custom’ or ‘policy’ of the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the

constitutional deprivation.” Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488, 489 (11th Cir. 1997)

(alteration added; citation omitted). “A plaintiff . . . has two methods by which to establish a

county’s policy: identify either (1) an officially promulgated county policy or (2) an unofficial

custom or practice of the county shown through the repeated acts of a final policymaker for the

county.” Grech v. Clayton Cnty., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 2003) (alteration added).

However, “an inquiry into a governmental entity’s custom or policy is relevant only when a

constitutional deprivation has occurred.” Rooney v. Watson, 101 F.3d 1378, 1381 (11th Cir. 1996).

Here, Plaintiff has not stated a facially plausible failure to protect claim against any

individual Defendants. Neither has he alleged the existence of an officially promulgated Palm

Beach County policy, custom, or practice that was the moving force behind the Defendants alleged

failure to protect. Thus, Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable Monell claim against Palm Beach

County and his official capacity claim must be dismissed.

The Court permits Plaintiff an opportunity to rectify the Complaint. Plaintiff is instructed

to follow the directives and applicable rules articulated in this order if he still wishes to pursue this

action. Consistent with the goal of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, the amended complaint and its memorandum

shall not exceed twenty pages in length.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. Plaintiff=s Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs,

ECF No. [3], is GRANTED.

2. Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. [1], is DISMISSED with leave to amend. On or

before March 25, 2022, Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint, signed under

penalty of perjury, providing a short and plain statement of a claim for relief, a basis

for federal jurisdiction, and a demand for judgment.

3. The amended complaint must be labeled “Amended Complaint” and must show

Case No.: 22-CV-80317-BLOOM, so that it will be filed in this case.

4. The amended complaint must contain a separate paragraph as to each defendant

explaining what that defendant did and the supporting facts to show why that person

is being sued. Plaintiff is reminded that his amended complaint should at the very

least cure the factual deficiencies identified to state a plausible claim for relief. The

amended complaint shall be the sole operative pleading in this case. Plaintiff may

not incorporate by reference any allegations contained in his previous filings or in

any supplemental filings.

5. Plaintiff is warned that failure to timely file the amended complaint will result in

dismissal of this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

6. The Clerk is DIRECTED to provide Plaintiff with a copy of the form for a

Case No. 22-cv-80317-BLOOM

complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside this Order.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on March 4, 2022.

BETH BLOOM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:

Counsel of Record

JaWayne Fripp, Pro Se

#0432794

Palm Beach County Jail

Inmate Mail/Parcels

Post Office Box 24716

West Palm Beach, FL 33416

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