Williams v. City of Miami

United States District Court

for the

Southern District of Florida

Emanuel David Williams, Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 21-23287-Civ-Scola

)

City of Miami and others, )

Defendants. )

Order on Motion to Dismiss

This matter is before the Court on the Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

(ECF No. 7.) The Plaintiff filed an opposition (ECF No. 8), and the City filed a

reply (ECF No. 9). After careful consideration of the parties’ briefs and the

relevant legal authorities, the Court grants in part and denies in part the

Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 7.)

1. Background

One night in late September 2019, police officers with the City of Miami

were helping a woman remove property from an apartment. (ECF No. 1-1 at

¶ 9.) Emanuel Williams arrived at the apartment complex and realized that the

property was being removed from his apartment. (Id.) Alarmed, Williams

demanded information. (Id. at ¶ 10.) However, the police officers denied

Williams access to his apartment and asked that he wait on the opposite side

of the street. (Id. at ¶¶ 11–12.) Williams shared some choice words with the

woman, indicating that whatever relationship that existed between the two of

them was over. (Id. at ¶ 12.)

Williams began to record the interaction with his cell phone, and he

shared some of his concerns with the officers. (Id. at ¶¶ 15, 19.) But

throughout this interaction, Williams listened to the officers’ commands and

never interfered with the removal of property. (Id. at ¶¶ 23–25.) And at all

times, Williams remained at least fifty feet from the entrance to the apartment

complex. (Id. at ¶ 26.) Nonetheless, Officer Allen told Williams that he would be

arrested if he continued to speak to the woman. (Id. at ¶¶ 13, 18.)

After about seventeen minutes, Officers Allen and Hernandez “got in Mr.

Williams[’s] face” as Williams filmed the officers’ name tags. (Id. at ¶¶ 27–28.)

After Williams again moved to the opposite side of the street, Officers Allen,

Hernandez, and Gonzales cornered Williams by a fence. (Id. at ¶ 30.) Officer

Gonzalez slapped Williams’s cell phone out of his hand, and the three officers

“jumped on Mr. Williams[,] throwing him to the ground, punching him, and

kicking him[.]” (Id. at ¶ 31.) Williams was then arrested for disorderly conduct

and resisting arrest without violence. (Id.)

2. Legal Standards

A. Motion to Dismiss

A court considering a motion to dismiss must accept all of the

complaint’s allegations as true, construing them in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff. See Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008).

Although a pleading need only contain a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, a plaintiff must nevertheless

articulate “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “But where the well-

pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of

misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not shown—that the pleader

is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (quoting Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2)) (internal punctuation omitted). A court must dismiss a plaintiff’s

claims if she fails to nudge her “claims across the line from conceivable to

plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

B. Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Any person acting under the color of state law who violates a

constitutional right of another is liable for the injured party’s losses. See 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Moreover, this liability applies to a municipality when

“execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers

or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy,

inflicts the injury[.]” Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S.

658, 694 (1978). However, there are limits on this liability. “[A] municipality

cannot be subjected to § 1983 liability based upon theories akin to respondeat

superior[;] . . . only deprivations arising from municipal custom or policy can

result in municipal liability.” Anderson v. City of Atlanta, 778 F.2d 678, 685

(11th Cir. 1985) (internal citations omitted) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). In

other words, “[w]hen an injury is inflicted as the result of governmental policy

or custom, the government is responsible under § 1983.” Id.

In particular, to adequately state a claim for municipal liability under

§ 1983, a plaintiff must plead (1) that their constitutional rights were violated,

(2) the municipality had a “custom or policy that constituted deliberate

indifference to that constitutional right,” and (3) that policy or custom caused

the violation. McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). And to allege a “custom or

policy,” a plaintiff must plead either “(1) an officially promulgated policy or

(2) an unofficial custom or practice shown through the repeated acts of a final

policymaker for the county.” Grech v. Clayton Cnty., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th

Cir. 2003). To meet the “deliberate indifference” standard, a plaintiff must

allege that “the municipality knew of a need to train and/or supervise in a

particular area and the municipality made a deliberate choice not to take any

action.” Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998).

3. Analysis

Williams’s complaint includes nine causes of action, consisting of:

excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment; false arrest and false

imprisonment in violation of the Fourth Amendment; failure to render aid in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; state false arrest and false

imprisonment; state battery; retaliation in violation of the First Amendment

and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; intentional infliction of emotional distress; malicious

prosecution; and unlawful policy and practice against the City of Miami. The

Defendants moved to dismiss the entire complaint as a shotgun pleading and,

in the alternative, to dismiss claims VII and IX, for intentional infliction of

emotional distress and an unlawful policy and practice, respectively. The Court

will address each ground for dismissal in turn.

A. Shotgun Pleading

The Court denies the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint as a

shotgun pleading. A “shotgun pleading” is one “calculated to confuse” and

which fails “to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them

and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty.

Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1320–23 (11th Cir. 2015). The Defendants

argue that the complaint is a shotgun pleading as it repeatedly realleges all

preceding paragraphs in each cause of action. (ECF No. 7 at 3.) While a

complaint that does so can be a shotgun pleading, the hallmark is whether the

complaint gives the defendants notice of the claims against them. See Weiland,

792 F.3d at 1320–23; see also Aknin v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 17-22341-

Civ, 2017 WL 4410815, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 2017) (Scola, J.) (denying a

motion to dismiss as while the plaintiff’s causes of action each incorporated by

reference all preceding paragraphs of the complaint, the complaint gave

adequate notice of the claims against each defendant). Here, Williams’s

complaint gives adequate notice to the Defendants. Each cause of action

specifies to whom it is against, and Williams identifies each Defendant by name

when alleging specific facts. As the complaint apprises the Defendants of the

claims against them, the Court denies the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the

complaint as a shotgun pleading.

B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Under Florida law, to state a claim for the intentional infliction of

emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) deliberate or reckless infliction of

mental suffering; (2) outrageous conduct; (3) the conduct caused the emotional

distress; and (4) the distress was severe.” Vilceus v. City of W. Palm Beach, No.

08-80968-CIV, 2009 WL 2242604, at *5 (S.D. Fla. July 27, 2009) (Marra, J.).

Williams does not contest that this claim should be dismissed (ECF No. 8 at 6),

and the Court grants the Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count VII for the

reasons set out in the Defendants’ motion. Therefore, Count VII of the

complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

C. Municipal Liability

Williams’s complaint does not state a claim for municipal liability under

§ 1983. As an initial matter, Williams has not identified an officially

promulgated policy. Rather, Williams alleges that the City has “interrelated de

facto policies, practices, and customs.” (ECF No. 1-1 at ¶ 95.) A de facto policy

can constitute an unofficial custom, but it cannot be considered an “officially

promulgated policy.” See Grech, 335 F.3d at 1329. As Williams fails to identify

any officially established policy in Miami, the Court holds that Williams has

failed to allege an official policy. See Moore v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 502 F. Supp.

2d 1224, 1231 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (Gold, J.) (holding that the plaintiff failed to

plead an official policy by not identifying “any County ordinance, resolution, or

administrative order”).

Therefore, Williams may only proceed against the City by alleging “an

unofficial custom or practice . . . shown through repeated acts of a final

policymaker[.]” Id. at 1230 (quoting Grech, 335 F.3d at 1329). This custom

must be a “widespread practice that . . . is so permanent and well settled as to

constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” Brown v. City of Fort

Lauderdale, 923 F.2d 1474, 1481 (11th Cir. 1991) (cleaned up) (quoting St.

Louis v. Proprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988)). As the custom must be

widespread and repeated, “random acts or isolated incidents are insufficient to

establish a custom[.]” Depew v. City of St. Marys, 787 F.2d 1496, 1499 (11th

Cir. 1986); see also Casado v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 340 F. Supp. 3d 1320, 1328

(S.D. Fla. 2018) (O’Sullivan, M.J.) (“[T]he plaintiff must allege a ‘pattern’ of

excessive force including specific facts of numerous incidents[.]”). To plead a

pattern, the plaintiff must allege other incidents involving facts “substantially

similar to the case at hand.” See Bowe v. City of Hallandale Beach, No. 0:16-

CIV-60993, 2017 WL 5643304, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2017) (Dimitrouleas, J.);

see also Gurrera v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 657 F. App’x 886, 893

(11th Cir. 2016) (“A pattern of similar constitutional violations is ordinarily

necessary.”) (cleaned up) (quoting Craig v. Floyd Cnty., 643 F.3d 1306, 1310

(11th Cir. 2011)). Moreover, the plaintiff must allege that a final policymaker

for the municipality “know[s] about [the custom] but failed to stop it.” Brown,

923 F.2d at 1481. Last, a plaintiff must allege that the municipality was “at

fault in some sense for establishing or maintaining the policy which causes the

injurious result.” Brooks v. Scheib, 813 F.2d 1191, 1193 (11th Cir. 1987).

However, Williams has not sufficiently pled (1) a practice or custom (2) that was

sanctioned by a final policymaker for the City and (3) that contributed to his

injury.

First, Williams has not adequately alleged a repeated, widespread

unofficial custom sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. To plead such a

custom, Williams presents the following allegations: twenty-four instances of

alleged police misconduct, spanning from 2005 to 2020; a 2014 investigation

by the Civilian Investigation Panel (“CIP”) regarding structural concerns with

the CIP’s investigative powers; a 2016–2017 study by the Miami Police

Department stating that 73% of all complaints were closed with no finding; and

a 2003 Department of Justice investigation and a follow-up investigation in

2013 regarding failures of the Miami Police Department’s investigative

procedures. (ECF No. 1-1 at ¶¶ 37–38, 40–44, 48.) The City responds only to

the allegations concerning the twenty-four incidents of alleged misconduct,

essentially arguing that twenty-four occurrences of misconduct is not so bad

for a large police department. (ECF No. 7 at 10.)

The Court rejects the Defendants’ contention that twenty-four alleged

instances of police misconduct is insufficient as a matter of law. Indeed, courts

have found that fewer alleged incidents were sufficient to plead an unofficial

custom or practice. See Rivas v. Figueroa, No. 11-23195-Civ, 2012 WL

1378161, at *1, 3 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2012) (Scola, J.) (denying motion to

dismiss where the plaintiffs alleged “in great detail, sixteen alleged instances”

of officers who engaged in similar conduct and received no disciplinary action);

cf. Vasquez v. City of Miami Beach, 895 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1277–78 (S.D. Fla.

2012) (Martinez, J.) (denying motion to dismiss where the plaintiff alleged facts

relating to thirty-eight incidents involving excessive force). Moreover, contrary

to the Defendants’ motion, the size of the Miami Police Department is largely

irrelevant to Williams’s claim. Williams alleges that Miami had an unofficial

custom or practice of failing to adequately supervise and discipline officers.

(ECF No. 1-1 at ¶ 95.) A custom or practice concerning a failure to supervise

and discipline officers may exist even if it does not infect thousands of officers.

Nonetheless, Williams still fails to state a claim. First, the twenty-four

instances of alleged police misconduct do not permit a reasonable inference of

widespread practices “so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom

or usage with the force of law.” Brown, 923 F.2d at 1481. Rather, these are

largely sporadic and unrelated occurrences spanning fifteen years, and the

nature of each incident varies widely. See Bowe, 2017 WL 5643304, at *5

(noting that the alleged custom must involve facts “substantially similar to the

case at hand”). Moreover, there are not enough facts alleged to permit an

inference that each of the twenty-four instances involved misconduct, as

opposed to lawful (but perhaps unpleasant) activity. See Whitake v. Miami-Dade

Cnty., 126 F. Supp. 3d 1313, 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (Lenard, J.) (dismissing a

claim for municipal liability, in part as the plaintiffs did not allege whether the

“other shootings were deemed unjustified, unconstitutional, or were anything

other than legitimate, self-defense shootings”). Take for example the Plaintiff’s

conclusory allegations pertaining to an alleged unlawful detention at a casino

in 2017 and the threatened detention of a homeless individual in 2016. (ECF

No. 1-1 at ¶ 48(f), (k).) These, and allegations like them, do not sufficiently

allege a widespread custom or practice that is “obvious, flagrant, rampant, and

of continued duration.” Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir.

1999). The other pieces that Williams points to, such as the CIP report and

DOJ investigation, are similarly outdated and largely concern structural gaps

in investigative procedures, rather than a failure to conduct sufficient

investigations. These allegations fail to adequately plead a widespread and well-

settled custom with the force of law.

Second, Williams does not allege that any of the City’s final policymakers

knew of the alleged custom and deliberately failed to take action or were

otherwise deliberately indifferent. See Brown, 923 F.2d at 1481; see also

Whitaker, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 1324. Williams alleges that the Miami Police

Department is aware of the asserted custom and that the City sanctioned this

custom. (ECF No. 1-1 at ¶¶ 95, 98.) But Williams does not identify any

policymaker responsible for the allegations lodged against the City. See

Whitaker, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 1324. Failure to allege a final policymaker is

critical, as only such policymakers may render a municipality liable under

Section 1983. See Hill v. Clifton, 74 F.3d 1150, 1152 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Only

those officials who have final policymaking authority may render the

municipality liable under § 1983.”).

Third, Williams has failed to allege causation. Williams must allege that

the City’s failure to supervise and discipline contributed to his injury—the

beating that Williams suffered from Officers Hernandez, Allen, and Gonzalez.

See Brooks, 813 F.2d at 1193 (“[T]he municipality must be at fault in some

sense for establishing or maintaining the policy which causes the injurious

result.”). Here, Williams alleges that the alleged custom or practice led to his

injuries as the officers “knew they could abuse their power with impunity.”

(ECF No. 1-1 at ¢ 100.) This amounts to no more than a conclusory assertion.

Therefore, Williams does not allege, other than in broad conclusory terms, how

the City’s alleged failure to supervise and discipline officers in general

contributed to Officers Hernandez, Allen, and Gonzalez beating him on

September 22, 2019.

One additional point merits brief discussion. Williams argues that it

“follows from common sense” that the City conducts meaningless investigations

into complaints of officer misconduct. (ECF No. 8 at 7.) But the law does not

follow common sense. Rather, as Lord Coke famously proclaimed, law largely

abides by “artificial reason.” See Prohibitions del Roy, 12 Co. Rep. 63, 65

(1608). What may appear to be common sense to a bystander is not necessarily

sufficient to state a claim in a court of law. And while courts are tasked with

enforcing the “preservation of human liberty and human rights” embedded in

Section 1983, see Monell, 436 U.S. at 684, the fact that there are repeated

allegations of misconduct that appear to go unpunished in a police department

alone does not suffice to allege Monell liability. Otherwise, unrelated and

unpunished allegations of officer misconduct alone would render almost “every

large metropolitan police force” potentially liable. Whitaker, 126 F. Supp. 3d at

1322-23 (quoting Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 123 (D.C. Cir.

1986)). While Williams has marshalled various disparate incidents of alleged

police misconduct and asserted that these incidents went unpunished,

Williams does not allege facts permitting an inference of an illegal custom or

practice within the Miami Police Department that contributed to his injury and

that the City of Miami has sanctioned.

4. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court grants in part and denies in

part the Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 7).

Done and ordered in Miami, Florida, on October 27, 2021.

(Robert N. Scola, Jr.

United States District Judge