Reyna v. Palm Beach County Mayor

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 21-CIV-81719-RAR

JOSE LUIS REYNA,

Plaintiff,

v.

PALM BEACH COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants.

___________________________/

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff, Jose Luis Reyna, a pro se pretrial detainee at Palm Beach County Jail, filed a

Complaint (purportedly) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Form [ECF No. 1]; Complaint [ECF No.

1-1]. In his Complaint, he identifies both state and federal agencies and individual actors as

Defendants. See Compl. at 1; Form at 2–3. For the following reasons, and consistent with the

Court’s authority to screen a prisoner’s complaint under § 1915A, Plaintiff’s Complaint is

DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Court “shall review . . . a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress

from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A

(emphasis added). The definition of a “prisoner” includes “any person incarcerated or detained in

any facility who is . . . accused of [or] convicted of . . . violations of criminal law.” § 1915A(c).

In conducting its screening of a prisoner’s complaint, the Court must “dismiss the complaint[] or

any portion of the complaint,” when it is (1) “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted[;]” or (2) “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

from such relief.” § 1915A(b).

To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a complaint’s factual allegations “must

be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level”—with “enough facts to state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007).

Under this standard, legal conclusions “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and are

insufficient to state a claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Moreover, “[w]here a

complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the

line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. at 678 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

ANALYSIS

“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys.”

Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). Still, that leniency “does not

give courts license to serve as de facto counsel or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in

order to sustain an action.” Shuler v. Ingram & Assocs., 441 F. App’x 712, 716 n.3 (11th Cir.

2011).

A. The Federal Defendants

Plaintiff identifies the following federal actors and agencies as Defendants in this action:

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS); Secretary for the DHS, Alejandro Mayorkas;

Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE); and Agent Damian Weston. Compl. at 1; Form at

2–3. As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against these officials and agencies fail to state

a claim because none of them are state actors. See, e.g., Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 882 n.16

(11th Cir. 2003) (explaining that § 1983 applies to “state actors”). Even if the Court were to

reconstrue Plaintiff’s claims against the individual federal actors as claims under Bivens,1 Plaintiff

1 Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

still fails to state a claim to relief. This is, in part, because it appears Plaintiff brought this action

under a theory of supervisory liability. “Supervisors can be held liable under Bivens when a

reasonable person in the supervisor’s position would have known that his conduct infringed the

constitutional rights of the plaintiffs, and his conduct was causally related to the constitutional

violation committed by his subordinate.” Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003)

(cleaned up). “The standard by which a supervisor is held liable in her individual capacity for the

actions of a subordinate is extremely rigorous.” Id. (cleaned up).

Here, the Complaint contains no allegations showing the individual federal actors had a

personal role in any constitutional violation against Plaintiff. This, of course, weakens any

indication that a causal connection is at issue. To be sure, a causal connection may be shown

“when a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to

correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so, or when the supervisor’s improper custom or

policy resulted in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights[.]” Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 1234

(cleaned up). “A causal connection can also be established by facts which support an inference

that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would

act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.” Id. at 1235.`

After careful review of Plaintiff’s Complaint, it appears he advances only bare and

conclusory allegations to support the existence of a causal connection, which is not enough to state

a claim for relief. See Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Legal

conclusions without adequate factual support are entitled to no assumption of truth.”); Womack v.

Carroll Cty., Ga., 840 F. App’x 404, 405 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[W]e need not accept as true the

plaintiff’s legal conclusions, including those couched as factual allegations.”).

Without a sufficiently constructed causal connection or any allegations of personal

participation, Plaintiff cannot even begin to show the individual federal actors committed a

constitutional violation. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“Factual allegations must be enough to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”); Michel v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 816 F.3d 686,

694 (11th Cir. 2016) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.”); cf. Lomax v. Cap. Rental Agency, Inc., 427 F. App’x 713, 714 (11th Cir. 2011)

(“Although we show leniency to pro se litigants, we will not serve as de facto counsel or rewrite

an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” (cleaned up)).

To the limited extent Plaintiff might later argue he is raising a claim against the individual

federal actors in their official capacities—as opposed to their individual capacities under a theory

of supervisory liability—he still has not stated a claim to relief under Bivens. See McNiece v. Town

of Yankeetown, 817 F. App’x 842, 846 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Bivens does not apply to a federal officer

acting in an official capacity, like the United States Attorney, or to the United States.”).

Lastly, as for the claims against the federal agencies, the Court has no jurisdiction to review

them “because Bivens does not extend to federal agencies.” Nalls v. Coleman Low Fed. Inst., 307

F. App’x 296, 298 (11th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff, therefore, has failed to state a claim to relief against

these Defendants.

B. The State Defendants

The other Defendants identified by Plaintiff are: the Mayor of Palm Beach County; Palm

Beach County; the Palm Beach County Sherriff’s Office (PBSO); and Sheriff Ric Bradshaw of

PBSO. Form at 2; Compl at 1.

The Court begins with the claim against Sheriff Bradshaw and the Mayor. Supervisory

officials “are not liable under section 1983 on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious

liability.” Belcher v. City of Foley, Ala., 30 F.3d 1390, 1396 (11th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added

and cleaned up). “Supervisors can be held ‘liable under . . . § 1983, for the unconstitutional acts

of their subordinates if they personally participated in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct or if

there is a causal connection between their actions . . . and the alleged constitutional deprivation.’”

Hendrix v. Tucker, 535 F. App’x 803, 805 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d

1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008)).

Plaintiff has not advanced any allegations establishing Sheriff Bradshaw’s personal

participation. To establish “a causal connection” under § 1983, much like the supervisory theory

against the federal actors under Bivens, Plaintiff would have to show “(1) a history of widespread

abuse [that] puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation

and he failed to do so; (2) the supervisor’s improper custom or policy led to deliberate indifference

to constitutional rights; or (3) facts support[ing] an inference that the supervisor directed the

subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to

stop them from doing so.” Hendrix, 535 F. App’x at 805 (cleaned up). Here, Plaintiff’s factual

allegations regarding a causal connection are simply legal conclusions couched as factual

allegations. See Mamani, 654 F.3d at 1153 (“Legal conclusions without adequate factual support

are entitled to no assumption of truth.”). Thus, his supervisory liability claims against Sheriff

Bradshaw and the Mayor fail to state a claim. See Michel, 816 F.3d at 694 (“A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”); Hendrix, 535 F. App’x at 805

(defining “a causal connection”).

Finally, since Plaintiff has not advanced sufficient facts to support the existence of an

unconstitutional custom or policy, his legal contentions that one exists fail to support an official

capacity claim against any of the state Defendants. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of

New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (“[W]hen execution of a government’s policy or custom,

whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent

official policy, inflicts the [constitutional] injury . . . the government as an entity is responsible

under § 1983.”). In short, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

against all Defendants. See Jones v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 787 F.3d 1105, 1106–07 (11th Cir.

2015) (“To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, a complaint

must include ‘factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

C. State Law Claims

Plaintiff also appears to raise claims rooted in state law. Compl. at 13. However, all other

claims have been dismissed; in addition, because the parties appear to reside in the same State, see

Compl. at 1–3; Form at 2–3, they do not sit in diversity, see generally 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

“Federal courts have ‘supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to

claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form a part of the same case or

controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.’” Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d

1211, 1221 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)). But “district courts may decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim” for a variety of reasons, including when it “has

dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” § 1367(c)(3). As previously

mentioned, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief, and Defendants presumably all reside in

the same State. The Court, therefore, declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law

claims.

LEAVE TO AMEND

The Court need not afford leave to amend in this case. Of course, “[w]here a more carefully

drafted complaint might state a claim, a plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend the

complaint before the district court dismisses the action with prejudice.” Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d

1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added), overruled on other grounds by Wagner v. Daewoo

Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 & n.1 (11th Cir. 2002). But here, the dismissal is

clearly without prejudice. However, if a dismissal without prejudice “has the effect of precluding

[a litigant] from refiling his claim due to the running of the statute of limitations[,] the dismissal

is tantamount to a dismissal with prejudice.” Justice v. United States, 6 F.3d 1474, 1481 n.15 (11th

Cir. 1993) (cleaned up). Accordingly, before dismissing a pro se prisoner’s case without prejudice,

the Court must satisfy itself that the dismissal will not preclude the prisoner from refiling his claims

“due to the running of the statute of limitations.” See id. The Court has made that determination

here.

“Section 1983 claims are governed by the forum state’s residual personal injury statute of

limitations, which in Florida is four years.” City of Hialeah v. Rojas, 311 F.3d 1096, 1102 n.2

(11th Cir. 2002). “[T]he statute of limitations for a civil rights action begins to run from the date

that the cause of action accrues, which occurs when ‘the plaintiff has a complete and present cause

of action’ and ‘can file suit and obtain relief.’” Villalona v. Holiday Inn Express & Suites, 824 F.

App’x 942, 942 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007)). A “cause

of action will not accrue until the plaintiff knows or should know (1) that he has suffered an injury

that forms the basis of his action and (2) the identity of the person or entity that inflicted the injury.”

Id. Claims under Bivens that transpired in Florida are subject to the same four-year limitations

period and accrual principles. See, e.g., Keira v. U.S. Postal Inspection Serv., 157 F. App’x 135,

136 (11th Cir. 2005). Based on Plaintiff’s allegations, the events giving rise to his claims accrued

as early as October 30, 2020, see Compl. at 9, so he has approximately three years to file a better

version of his Complaint. Accordingly, this dismissal will not prejudice him.

CONCLUSION

Having carefully reviewed the Complaint, the record, and governing law, it is hereby

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the Complaint [ECF No. 1] is DISMISSED without prejudice

to refiling in a separate action. Any pending motions are DENIED as moot. All deadlines are

TERMINATED. Accordingly, the Clerk is instructed to CLOSE this case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 30th day of September 2021.

RODOLFO A. RUIZ IT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ce: Jose Luis Reyna, pro se

Page 8 of 8