Goodley v. Greene

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 21-CIV-61284-RAR

JAY GOODLEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHARLES M. GREENE, individually and in his

official capacity as a Justice of the Seventeenth

Judicial Circuit Court of Broward County,

Defendant.

__________________________________/

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint [ECF

No. 9] (“Motion”), filed on July 19, 2021. The Court having carefully reviewed Defendant’s

Motion, Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition [ECF No. 11] (“Response”), and Defendant’s Reply

[ECF No. 12] (“Reply”), and being otherwise fully advised, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 9] is

GRANTED for the reasons set forth below.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Jay Goodley filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a

deprivation of a right under color of state law against Defendant, Charles Greene, a judge of the

Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Court of Broward County. See Mot. at 1. This action stems from a

probate matter concerning the guardianship of a relative of the Plaintiff. See Mot. at 2. Defendant

was briefly assigned to the probate case, in which Plaintiff was also a litigant. On February 5,

2018, Defendant recused himself from the probate case involving the Plaintiff. [ECF No. 9-1] at

25.1 Plaintiff alleges that after Defendant recused himself, he continued to take actions related to

the case, causing Plaintiff financial losses, as well as pain and suffering. [ECF No. 1] at 2.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Court relies on two legal standards in order to address the instant Motion: Article III

standing and the doctrine of judicial immunity. Each will be addressed in turn.

I. Article III Standing

Article III of the United States Constitution limits federal court jurisdiction to actual cases

and controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Standing, ripeness, and mootness are the three

traditional doctrines governing whether a case or controversy exists. Muransky v. Godiva

Chocolatier, Inc., 979 F.3d 917, 924 (11th Cir. 2020). Standing is treated as a jurisdictional issue

and rulings based on such are treated as a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). See Cone Corp. v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 921 F.2d 1190, 1203,

n.42 (11th Cir. 1991) (citations and internal quotations omitted).

To demonstrate standing, a “plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is

fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by

a favorable judicial decision.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). With

respect to “injury in fact,” a plaintiff must plead facts to show that he suffered an “‘invasion of a

legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not

conjectural or hypothetical.’” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (quoting Lujan,

504 U.S. at 560).

1 The Court takes judicial notice of Defendant’s Exhibit A, Docket PRC160001493, pertaining to the

probate case in which Plaintiff was a litigant. [ECF No. 9-1]. It is well established that courts may take

judicial notice of court documents when a motion to dismiss is before the court. See Lowman v. City of

Riviera Beach, 713 F.3d 1066, 1075 n.9 (11th Cir. 2013). Taking judicial notice of a state court docket (a

matter of public record) does not convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See

Klopfenstein v. Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc., 592 F. App’x 812, 816 (11th Cir. 2014).

An injury must be both particularized and concrete, with neither alone being sufficient to

establish injury in fact. Id. “For an injury to be ‘particularized,’ it ‘must affect the plaintiff in a

personal and individual way.’” Id. (citations omitted). A concrete injury is one which exists. Id.

Further, insofar as a plaintiff is seeking declaratory relief, he must allege from facts that there is a

“substantial likelihood that he will suffer injury in the future.” Malowney v. Fed. Collection

Deposit Grp., 193 F.3d 1342, 1346 (11th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).

II. Judicial Immunity

“A judge enjoys absolute immunity from suit for judicial acts performed within the

jurisdiction of his court . . . regardless of whether he made a mistake, acted maliciously, or

exceeded his authority . . . unless [the judge] acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”

McCullough v. Finley, 907 F.3d 1324, 1330–32 (11th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). A judge acts

in the clear absence of all jurisdiction if the matter upon which he acts is clearly outside the subject

matter jurisdiction of the court over which he presides. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,

357-359 (1978). The scope of a judge’s jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is

the immunity of the judge. Id. at 356. Four factors inform whether the nature and functions of

alleged acts are judicial: (1) the precise act complained of is a normal judicial function; (2) the

events involved occurred in the judge’s chambers; (3) the controversy centered around a case then

pending before the judge; and (4) the confrontation arose directly and immediately out of a visit

to the judge in his official capacity. McCullough, 907 F.3d at 1331.

ANALYSIS

Defendant seeks dismissal of the Complaint on five grounds: lack of justiciable

controversy; lack of standing; Eleventh Amendment Immunity; the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; and

judicial immunity. Mot. at 3. In response, Plaintiff maintains that Defendant was without judicial

jurisdiction; consequently, his actions invaded Plaintiff’s right to equal protection and procedural

due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Resp. at 15.

As explained below, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish Article III

standing—and even if not for lack of standing, the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity bars the

Defendant from suit. The Court declines to wade into Defendant’s remaining grounds for

dismissal.

I. Plaintiff Lacks Standing and Fails to Show He is Entitled to Declaratory Relief

As described above, courts treat a lack of standing as a jurisdictional issue. If the plaintiff

fails to demonstrate standing, the case must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1). Defendant, in his

Motion and Reply, challenges the first prong of the standing analysis: whether Plaintiff suffered

an injury in fact. See Mot. at 6-7; Reply at 3-4.

In an effort to establish an injury in fact, Plaintiff asserts that “multiple actions were taken

by Judge Charles M. Greene post his being recused by court order . . . causing financial losses as

well as pain and suffering to the Plaintiff.” See Compl. at 2. In support of this assertion, Plaintiff

describes four different actions taken by Defendant following his recusal. Id. at 2-5. But none of

these actions satisfy his burden to show standing—even when liberally construed. See Waldman

v. Conway, 871 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2017) (recognizing that “[a] pro se pleading is held to

a less stringent standard than a pleading drafted by an attorney and is liberally construed.”)

(cleaned up). The Court will address each action taken by Defendant in turn.

i. March 2018 Orders

First, Plaintiff takes issue with a March 8, 2018 order signed by Defendant. The order

singles Plaintiff out by name. [ECF No. 9-2] at 2. In doing so, Plaintiff claims Defendant was

“treating Plaintiff differently from other litigants while it also altered an existing statute along with

other irregularities.” Compl. at 3. The order states, “[t]he authority of the Emergency Temporary

Guardian is hereby extended until the dispositive motions filed on behalf of Jay Goodley are

addressed by this Court or a permanent guardian is appointed.” [ECF No. 9-2] at 2. Other than

noting he was singled out by name, Plaintiff does not explain nor offer any support for how this

statement may have caused him harm.2 The Court therefore fails to see how this statement—which

simply acknowledged the existence of outstanding motions in the case affecting the appointment

of a permanent guardian—alleges either a concrete or particularized injury in fact.

ii. April 25, 2018 Hearing

Next, Plaintiff discusses an April 25, 2018 telephonic hearing, in which Defendant stated

that “once the Court enters an order of recusal, the Court is not possessed of jurisdiction . . . . ”

Compl. at 3. During the hearing, Defendant refused to proceed with making any decisions in the

case and stated that he was “being extremely cautious pursuant to the Rules of Judicial

Administration.” Resp. at 25; 33. The Court has confirmed that Judge Greene did not enter any

court orders after the April 25, 2018 hearing. [ECF No. 9-1] at 22. And again, Plaintiff fails to

show how this hearing, where no action was taken, harmed him. If anything, Defendant acted in

accordance with his order of recusal by refusing to proceed further with the case.3

2 Plaintiff also claims that Defendant altered the relevant statute pertaining to emergency temporary

guardianship and “the altering of this law . . . may have enriched attorneys . . . .” Resp. at 7. But again,

Plaintiff fails to allege any type of particularized or concrete harm that arose from this alleged alteration.

A vague assertion that attorneys “may” have been enriched in no way establishes that either (1) attorneys

were actually enriched; and (2) that the enrichment of attorneys caused injury to Plaintiff.

3 While not addressed by Plaintiff in his Complaint, it is worth noting that on June 13, 2018, Defendant’s

colleague, Judge Weinstein, granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate Orders of Defendant post-recusal. [ECF

No. 9-3] at 2 (“Motion to Vacate”). Judge Weinstein’s order stated: “(1) All orders signed by Judge Greene

after February 5, 2018 shall be vacated & considered null and void; (2) The Rulings contained in the Orders

signed by Judge Greene after February 5, 2018 are hereby extended until further order of this Court.” Id.

As a judicial officer in the state of Florida, Judge Weinstein is required to “perform the duties of judicial

office impartially and diligently.” Code of Judicial Conduct for the State of Florida, Canon 3. It is this

Court’s belief that Judge Weinstein did just that, and in performing his own judicial diligence, found that

the orders entered by Defendant were both appropriate and legally sound. Thus, even if Plaintiff were able

iii. October 19, 2018 Hearing

The next issue raised by Plaintiff occurred during an October 19, 2018 hearing held in front

of a different jurist—Judge Weinstein. Plaintiff alleges that Judge Weinstein left the courtroom to

confer with Defendant, suggesting that this conferral was related to Plaintiff’s case. Compl. at 4.

Defendant notes that this assertion is “pure speculation that the conversation had anything to do

with the Plaintiff at all.” Mot. at 3. The Court agrees. Defendant and Judge Weinstein preside in

the same courthouse together. There are many reasons—wholly unrelated to Plaintiff or his case—

why Defendant could have requested to see Judge Weinstein. Plaintiff cannot show a

particularized injury (i.e. affecting the Plaintiff in a “personal and individual way”) based on pure

guesswork. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548.

iv. February 2020 Orders

Finally, Plaintiff takes issue with two orders entered in February 2020. Defendant signed

an Agreed Order settling the probate case on February 26, 2020. [ECF No. 9-1] at 4. The next

day, an order was entered vacating the February 26, 2020 order—apparently in error. Id.

Consequently, on March 2, 2020, a second Agreed Order was entered settling the case. Id. Again,

Plaintiff fails to show how this apparent mistake caused him any concrete harm. The mistake was

timely corrected within 24 hours, Defendant had no further involvement in the matter, and

ultimately the same Agreed Order was adopted, without any further objections noted on the docket.

[ECF No. 9-1] at 3-4.

In sum, none of the four aforementioned actions taken in Plaintiff’s state court probate case

evidence any concrete harm. On the contrary—they are precisely the type of “conjectural or

to somehow assert an injury in fact from the actions taken before Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate was granted,

those injuries are no longer redressable as the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Court of Broward County has

taken the corrective action it deemed appropriate in this case. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.

hypothetical” harm insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction due to a lack of standing.

See Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1548. Moreover, insofar as Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, he has also

failed to allege facts showing a “substantial likelihood” that he will suffer injury in the future. See

Malowney, 193 F.3d at 1346. In an effort to establish such future injury, Plaintiff attempts to assert

that Defendant’s position of power will likely cause Defendant to retaliate against Plaintiff in the

future. Resp. at 16. But the record rebuts this argument. The case at issue here was discharged

on October 6, 2020. [ECF No. 9-1] at 1. There have been no further proceedings in the matter.

Id. Thus, there is no likelihood of future harm to Plaintiff by Defendant.

II. Defendant is Entitled to Judicial Immunity

In order to determine whether Defendant’s actions are protected by judicial immunity, the

Court applies the two-part test laid out in Stump. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 361-62. As explained

below, both parts of the test are satisfied here, and Defendant is thus entitled to judicial immunity.

i. All actions taken by Defendant are judicial in nature

As discussed above, Plaintiff’s Complaint focuses on four incidents: the March 6, 2018

hearing and resulting orders; the April 25, 2018 hearing; the October 19, 2018 hearing; and two

orders issued in February 2020. When assessing whether these were judicial acts, the Court looks

to the four factors laid out in McCullough. 907 F.3d at 1331. Naturally, judicial proceedings and

the entry of judicial orders are normal judicial functions. All of these events occurred within the

courthouse. Each hearing and order addressed Plaintiff’s state probate matter. And each of these

four incidents arose directly out of interactions with Judge Greene or another Judge assigned to

the probate case. Thus, the McCullough factors are satisfied, and each of Defendant’s actions were

judicial in nature.

ii. Defendant did not act in clear absence of all jurisdiction

So long as a judge did not act without clear jurisdiction, judicial acts are protected by

absolute judicial immunity. See Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1072 (11th Cir. 2005). “A judge

acts in clear absence of all jurisdiction only if he lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.” McCullough,

907 F.3d at 1332 (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also Stump, 435 U.S. at 357; accord

Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 943 (11th Cir. 1985) (“We . . . reassert the common law doctrine

that a judge enjoys absolute immunity where he or she had subject matter jurisdiction over the

matter forming the basis for such liability.”). Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s February 5, 2018

Order of Recusal stripped him of all jurisdiction over the case, meaning that all judicial acts taken

by Defendant after that date were “in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Resp. at 6; 13.

“Whether a judge’s grant of a recusal motion divests him of all jurisdiction for purposes of

the judicial immunity analysis is a question of state law, and [Plaintiff] has identified no authority

for the proposition that recusal strips a judge of subject matter jurisdiction.” Muhammad v. Bethel-

Muhammad, No. 11-0690, 2013 WL 5531395, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 7, 2013) (citing Sibley, 437

F.3d at 1069-72). In fact, Florida law indicates otherwise.

As an initial matter, there is no doubt that the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Court of

Broward County had proper jurisdiction over the probate matter in which Plaintiff was a litigant—

a fact Plaintiff does not refute. See Fla. Const. art. V, § 20; see also Lovett v. Lovett, 112 So. 768,

775 (Fla. 1927) (holding subject-matter jurisdiction is conferred on a Florida court by the state

constitution and applicable statutes). And under Florida law, jurisdiction is vested in the court

itself, not in any individual judge of the court. Kalmanson v. Lockett, 848 So. 2d 374, 380 (Fla.

5th DCA 2003) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). As explained in Kalmanson, the recusal of

one judge does not diminish the jurisdiction of the circuit court over the case; indeed, Kalmanson

rejected the argument that a judge is stripped of absolute judicial immunity for acts taken in his

judicial capacity after he recuses from a case. Id. at 380; see also Sibley v. Lando, No. 03-21728,

2005 WL 6108991, at *8-9 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2005) (holding that a judge was entitled to judicial

immunity for acts taken after he recused himself from a case because the acts may have been in

excess of his jurisdiction, but were not in clear absence of jurisdiction).

Here, the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Court retained jurisdiction throughout the pendency

of the probate matter, and because jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in an individual judge,

Defendant did not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. At a minimum, there is “at least a

colorable argument that, even if [Defendant’s alleged] return to the case was improper, any such

impropriety did not preclude him from having subject matter jurisdiction over the case . . . [and]

a colorable argument is all that [Defendant] needs to retain his judicial immunity.” Muhammad,

2013 WL 5531395, at *4 (“Immunity is lost only by an utter, obvious lack of jurisdiction; if

jurisdiction existed and [Defendant] merely exceeded that jurisdiction, he remains immune.

Indeed, even if subject matter jurisdiction was actually lacking but the jurisdictional question is

colorable, his immunity is unbroken.”).

Ultimately, it is clear that Defendant’s acts were done within his judicial capacity, and he

did not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction. Thus, even if Defendant were to have somehow

acted erroneously, maliciously, or in excess of his authority, judicial immunity still applies.4

4 Notably, some courts have held that a claim for prospective declaratory relief is an exception to judicial

immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Snow v. King, No. 17-1048-VEH, 2018 WL 656032 at *6 (N.D.

Ala. Feb. 1, 2018). Here, however, Plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief appears to be retrospective in

nature. Compl. at 5. Thus, Plaintiff’s requested relief does not bar Defendant from claiming judicial

immunity—nor is the Court prevented from holding that judicial immunity applies. See id.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss Complaint [ECF No. 9] is GRANTED. The Court notes that dismissal for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not a judgment on the merits and is entered without prejudice.

Stalley ex rel. U.S. v. Orlando Regional Healthcare System, Inc., 524 F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir.

2008). But given that Defendant is entitled to judicial immunity, he is immune from suit regarding

the judicial acts addressed in Plaintiff's Complaint. Accordingly, this action is DISMISSED with

prejudice and the Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 17th day of September, 2021.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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