Hudson Hale v. Wells Fargo Bank

SUONUITTEHDE RSTNA DTIESTS RDIICSTTR OIFC TF LCOORUIRDTA

CASE NO. 21-CV-80309-RAR

MICHELLE HUDSON HALE,

Plaintiff,

v.

WELLS FARGO BANK, et al.,

Defendants.

________________________________/

ORDER DISMISSING PRO SE COMPLAINT

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon an initial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915. Plaintiff filed her Complaint [ECF No. 1] and Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma

Pauperis [ECF No. 3] on February 11, 2021. The Complaint in this case is identical to that in

seven other cases filed by Plaintiff in this District. One such case was immediately dismissed as

frivolous, see Order [ECF No. 4], Hudson Hale v. Computershare, No. 21-CIV-80311 (S.D. Fla.

Feb. 12, 2021), and the remaining six were transferred to the undersigned and consolidated with

the instant case, see Order Consolidating Cases [ECF No. 4].

On February 25, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma

Pauperis [ECF No. 5]. The relevant statute governing in forma pauperis proceedings provides

that a court “shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . fails

to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (emphases added).

Therefore, upon granting Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court is required to

assess the merits of the Complaint before allowing Plaintiff to proceed any further. See Copeland

v. Schwartz, No. 07-CIV-60818, 2007 WL 9717317, at *1 (S.D. Fla. July 10, 2007); see also

Mehmood v. Guerra, 783 F. App’x 938, 940 (11th Cir. 2019) (“[U]nder § 1915(e), district courts

have the power to screen complaints filed by all IFP litigants, prisoners and non-prisoners alike.”);

Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[S]ection 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), directs the

district court to dismiss the complaint of any plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis if the court

determines that the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”) (quotations

omitted).

Here, upon initial screening of the Complaint, the Court finds that it fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED for the

reasons set forth herein.

ANALYSIS

Although generally, pro se complaints are held to a less stringent pleading standard than

pleadings drafted by lawyers, see Abele v. Tolbert, 130 F. App’x 342, 343 (11th Cir. 2005), “liberal

construction of pro se pleadings does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a

party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Smitherman v.

Decatur Plastics Prod. Inc., 735 F. App’x 692, 692 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Campbell v. Air

Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014)) (internal quotations omitted). In other

words, the “leeway” afforded to pro se litigants “is not limitless.” Weil v. Phillips, 816 F. App’x

339, 341 (11th Cir. 2020).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading contain a “short and plain

statement of the claim” showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).

Thereunder, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “To state a plausible claim for relief, the

plaintiff[] must plead ‘factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252,

1268 (11th Cir. 2009) (alteration added) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

“Shotgun pleadings do not adhere to these basic requirements.” Weil, 816 F. App’x at 341

(citation omitted). “A complaint is a shotgun pleading if it: (1) ‘contain[s] multiple counts where

each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry

all that came before and the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint’; (2) ‘is . . .

replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular

cause of action’; (3) does not ‘separat[e] into a different count each cause of action or claim for

relief’; or (4) ‘assert[s] multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of

the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim

is brought against.’” Id. (quoting Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313,

1321-23 (11th Cir. 2015)). “Shotgun pleadings are flatly forbidden by the spirit, if not the letter,

of” the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Barmapov v. Amuial, 986 F.3d 1321, 1321 (11th Cir.

2021).

Plaintiff’s Complaint—the factual contours of which are difficult to follow—contains 52

pages of repetitive allegations against seven defendants who were allegedly involved in the

administration of various trusts and the estate of Plaintiff’s deceased husband. Plaintiff complains

that Defendants refused to liquidate various family trust accounts allegedly belonging to her late

husband before his death, and deprived him of funds necessary to support himself and to obtain

medical treatment. The request to liquidate funds was made in 2009, Compl. [ECF No. 1] at 14,

and the lack of funds allegedly resulted in Plaintiff’s home being foreclosed on in 2015, id. at 9,

32. Plaintiff alleges that if the trust accounts had been closed in 2010, her husband could have

received better medical care that could have extended his life expectancy. Id. at 42. She asserts

claims of negligence, “tort fraud,” breach of fiduciary duty, negligent infliction of emotional

distress, “failure to uphold a duty of trust,” “failure to uphold a duty of fairness,” and unfair

business practices.

Even under the relaxed pleading standard afforded to pro se litigants, Plaintiff’s Complaint

fails to meet the foregoing standards. First, the Complaint is a quintessential example of an

impermissible shotgun pleading. Plaintiff does not specify what each Defendant did to incur

liability, so the Complaint boils down to “an across-the-board allegation that every [D]efendant”

engaged in wrongdoing. Weil, 816 F. App’x at 341. Thus, the Complaint “fails to notify each

defendant of the specific claims against it and the grounds on which each claim rests.” Id. (citation

omitted). Although the Complaint delineates sections for each alleged claim, “[b]y the time a

reader of the pleading gets to the final section, it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to know

which allegations pertain to that [section] (according to its label), to separate the wheat from the

chaff.” Id. (quoting Keith v. DeKalb Cty., 749 F.3d 1034, 1045 n.39 (11th Cir. 2014)). The

Complaint is also “replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected

to any particular cause of action.” Id. Consequently, Plaintiff has fallen woefully short of

“plead[ing] factual content that allows the [C]ourt to draw the reasonable inference that [each]

[D]efendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. Because the

Complaint is a shotgun pleading, it is due to be dismissed.

Second, the discernible allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint are frivolous and thus subject

to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). According to the Complaint, the request to liquidate

the trusts’ assets was made in 2009 and refused in 2010. See Compl. at 9, 42. The various parties

are residents of New York, Massachusetts, and Florida, so the purportedly wrongful conduct

allegedly took place in one or more of these states. But no matter which state’s law applies, the

claims are barred by the statute of limitations. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(3), (5) (one-year statute

of limitations for intentional torts and three-year statute of limitations for negligence actions);

M.G.L.A. 260 § 11 (two-year statute of limitations for act made or done by any person acting as

trustee, guardian or conservator); M.G.L.A. 260 § 2A (three-year statute of limitations for tort

actions); Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(a), (0) (four-year statute of limitations for claims founded on

negligence or intentional torts). Claims barred by the statute of limitations are properly dismissed

as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(). See, e.g., Ledea v. Metro-Dade Cty. Police

Dep’t, No. 1:13-cv-23117, 2018 WL 11239706, at *1 (S.D. Fla. July 16, 2018).

The dismissal of Plaintiffs claims is with prejudice. Although district courts generally

give plaintiffs at least one chance to amend a deficient complaint before dismissing it with

prejudice, that need not be the case “(1) where there has been undue delay, bad faith, dilatory

motive, or repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed; (2) where

allowing amendment would cause undue prejudice to the opposing party; or (3) where amendment

would be futile.” Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001). Here, even a more

carefully drafted complaint could not state a valid claim because, regardless of the specific cause

of action asserted, an amended complaint would be barred by the applicable statutes of limitation

for the reasons discussed above. See also Jemison v. Mitchell, 380 F. App’x 904, 907 (11th

Cir. 2010) (dismissal of a pro se plaintiff's complaint with prejudice “is proper .. . if a more

carefully drafted complaint could not state a valid claim.”).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff’ □

Complaint [ECF No. 1] is DISMISSED with prejudice. All pending motions are DENIED as

moot. The Clerk is instructed to CLOSE this case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 26th day of February, 2021.

bs A. RUIZ II

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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