Jones v. Yaffey

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 20-CV-80036-RAR

FREDERICK T. JONES,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROBERT J. YAFFEY, and

WILLIAM SNYDER,

Defendants.

____________________________/

ORDER ADOPTING IN PART AND REJECTING IN PART

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon a United States Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation [ECF No. 18] (“Report”), which screened a pro se civil rights Amended

Complaint [ECF No. 9] (“Am. Compl.”) filed by Plaintiff Frederick T. Jones. In her well-reasoned

Report, the Magistrate Judge recommends that three claims proceed, and all other claims be

dismissed. See Report at 2, 12, 22, 24, 28.1 Specifically, the Report advises the Court to permit

the following claims to proceed against Deputy Yaffey in his individual capacity: a Fourth

Amendment claim due to an unreasonable traffic stop seizure; a malicious prosecution claim; and

a selective enforcement claim. See id.

Disagreeing with the Report’s conclusions, Plaintiff timely filed objections to certain

portions of the Report. See Plaintiff’s Objections [ECF No. 26] (“Objections”). Having carefully

reviewed the Report, the Objections, the record, and governing law, it is hereby

1 In its conclusion, the Report omitted the Magistrate Judge’s previous finding that Plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment claim related to Plaintiff’s initial seizure (i.e., a traffic stop) should proceed. Compare Report

at 12, with id. at 28.

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Report is ADOPTED in part and REJECTED

in part pursuant to the modifications and supplemental information included herein.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Deputy Yaffey “erroneously and

unlawfully” pulled Plaintiff over after they passed one another on a two-lane highway at night.

See Am. Compl. at 4. Plaintiff avers that Deputy Yaffey “immediately made a U-turn” and “raced

after Plaintiff” upon seeing Plaintiff “to search his vehicle because [Deputy Yaffey] saw” a white

male passenger, Mr. Jonathan Sid Noelte (“Mr. Noelte”) in the passenger seat. Id. at 4–5.

Upon being approached by Deputy Yaffey, Plaintiff asked, “Why did you stop me?

Because I wasn’t speeding, and everything is in order on my car? Why did you pull me over

without lying?” Id. at 5 (errors in original). Deputy Yaffey “said nothing” and began using his

flashlight to illuminate the interior of Plaintiff’s vehicle. Id. Plaintiff asserts law enforcement

pulled him over twice that day—once at 7:24 P.M. and another time, which is the incident at issue

here, at 11:49 P.M.—and adds that it “d[oes] not take five (5) hours to write a citation.” Id. at 4–

5. Plaintiff began accusing Deputy Yaffey of implementing “the racist’s routine” and searching

his vehicle without his consent only because Plaintiff, who is African-American, had a white

passenger in his vehicle. Id. Deputy Yaffey reportedly exclaimed, “You either let me search the

car or I’ll have it towed. Your decision. Oh, by the way, you were speeding. 55 in a 35 mile per

hour zone.” Id. at 5.

“[A]ngrily,” as Plaintiff concedes, Plaintiff told Deputy Yaffey, “you’re not searching my

car because I don’t like your racist attitude! I cannot account for Mr. Noelte.” Id. Deputy Yaffey

never spoke to Mr. Noelte, according to Plaintiff. Id. Likewise, there is no indication in Plaintiff’s

hand-written allegations that Mr. Noelte spoke to Deputy Yaffey. See generally id. Deputy Yaffey

stated, “Back-up will be here in a minute. I’ll remove you from the car and search it any ways

(sic).” Id. Deputy Yaffey also told Plaintiff that his breath smelled of alcohol and that he had

“blood shot (sic) eyes.” Id. Plaintiff, attempting to explain the situation, told Deputy Yaffey, “If

my eyes are red it’s because I take eye drop[s]: Latanprost. The alcohol you smell is not of me but

Mr. Noelte.” Id. Further, Plaintiff was on probation, and Deputy Yaffey knew it. See id.

(“Defendant Yaffey then stated, ‘You’re on probation. When I finish writing this affidavit, your

probation officer is not going to be very happy.’”).

Once back-up arrived on the scene, law enforcement removed Plaintiff from his vehicle.

Id. at 6. At that point, Plaintiff saw a glass crack pipe beneath the brake of his vehicle and accused

Mr. Noelte of putting it on his side of the vehicle. Id. Mr. Noelte did not respond. Id. Plaintiff

told Deputy Yaffey, “if you find anything in my car[,] it belongs to Mr. Noelte. Because I do not

do drugs. You can piss-test me. Look, I’m 256 lbs. Look at him. He’s skinny as hell. I’m just

giving him a ride home.” Id.

Deputy Yaffey reportedly “made a discriminating racial slur” and exclaimed “black guys

[are] always getting white guys drugs in the community.” Id. When Deputy Yaffey confirmed

that Plaintiff would be arrested for possession of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia,

Plaintiff accused Deputy Yaffey of being a “racist” intent on framing “an innocent man” because

“[t]he glass pipe itself contain[ed] [Mr. Noelte’s] fingerprints and saliva” and a simple “piss-test”

would resolve which of the two men “c[ame] up dirty.” Id.

Plaintiff, however, appears to have overlooked that Deputy Yaffey’s arrest affidavit, which

he attached to his Amended Complaint and incorporated within his allegations, contains sworn

attestations that Plaintiff never addressed in his hand-written factual allegations. See id. at 26. For

instance, Deputy Yaffey’s affidavit reads that his “radar unit had a clear and persistent Doppler

tone and read a speed of 56 miles per hour” when Plaintiff’s vehicle sped by him on the opposite

side of the road. Id. The affidavit further explains that, upon approaching the vehicle, Deputy

Yaffey saw that Plaintiff “had bloodshot eyes” and that he “could smell the odor of alcoholic

beverages emanating from [Plaintiff’s] breath.” Id. (emphasis added). Importantly, Deputy

Yaffey swore that he “observed a small amount of chore boy, commonly used as drug

paraphernalia, [i]n the center cup holder of the vehicle.” Id. He also observed “an open and half

full 18 ounce can of beer.” Id. Mr. Noelte “advised [Deputy Yaffey that the beer] belonged to

him.” Id.

Based on his initial interaction, according to Deputy Yaffey’s affidavit, Deputy Yaffey

asked Plaintiff for his driver’s license, which Plaintiff reportedly claimed to have left at home. Id.

Deputy Yaffey ran Plaintiff’s personal information through a database. Id. As it turned out,

Plaintiff had only a learner’s permit, not an actual operator’s license. Id. When Deputy Yaffey

returned to the vehicle, “the Chore Boy was no longer where [he] had observed it.” Id.

(capitalization in original). Mr. Noelte, as Deputy Yaffey wrote in his affidavit, confirmed that he

“never had a driver license (sic).” Id. A different deputy, not identified as a defendant in this

action, “observed, [i]n plain sight, a glass stem, commonly used for crack cocaine in and around

Jones’s feet.” Id. This other deputy searched the vehicle and found a white substance “[i]n the

lower dashboard to the left of the steering wheel” driven by Plaintiff. Id.

Deputy Yaffey’s affidavit corroborates Plaintiff’s hand-written allegations that he accused

Mr. Noelte of throwing the “crack rock and stem” onto his side of the vehicle. Id. “It should be

noted,” as Deputy Yaffey clarified in his affidavit, “that from the passenger seat the small opening

[from where] the crack was recovered was not visible and blocked by the steering wheel.” Id.

Thus, in his view, “[i]t would be impossible for [Mr.] Noelte to throw any type of substances into

the opening from the passenger seat, especially without the knowledge of [Plaintiff].” Id.

One day later, Deputy Yaffey prepared an affidavit accusing Plaintiff of violating another

drug-related crime after he found ten (10) grams of cocaine in the back of his patrol vehicle. Id.

In his affidavit, Deputy Yaffey acknowledged that he searched Plaintiff before placing him into

his patrol vehicle, averred that he searched the back of his patrol vehicle after removing Plaintiff,

and found nothing both times. Id.

About one month later, Plaintiff’s girlfriend reported that Mr. Noelte used a false name,

specifically the name of his deceased brother, because there was a warrant for Mr. Noelte’s arrest.

Id. at 7. This tip led to Mr. Noelte’s speedy arrest. Id. Defendant Yaffey, then, “back dated legal

documents” in Mr. Noelte’s case and asserted in the charges that Mr. Noelte committed the drug-

related crimes that he previously attributed to Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff claims he was exonerated of

all the drug-related charges brought against him by virtue of DNA evidence. Id. at 8. And he

further insists that Deputy Yaffey “knew” Plaintiff committed no criminal violations all along. Id.

CLAIMS

The Report finds that Plaintiff has raised the following claims against Deputy Yaffey: (1)

a Fourth Amendment challenge to the initial seizure; (2) a Fourth Amendment challenge to the

search of Plaintiff’s vehicle; (3) a Fourth Amendment False Arrest/False Imprisonment claim; (4)

a Fourth Amendment Malicious Prosecution claim; and (5) a Fourteenth Amendment Selective

Enforcement claim. See Report at 11–24. The Report also finds that Plaintiff has raised a failure

to train claim against Sheriff Snyder. See id. at 25–27. Lastly, the Report concludes that Plaintiff

has sued both Defendants in their official capacities and seeks punitive damages. Id. at 27–28.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When a magistrate judge’s “disposition” has been properly objected to, district courts must

review that disposition de novo. Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). But, when no party has timely objected,

“the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to

accept the recommendation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s notes (citation omitted).

Although Rule 72 itself is silent on the standard of review, the Supreme Court has acknowledged

that Congress intended to require de novo review only where objections have been properly filed—

and not when neither party objects. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985) (“It does not

appear that Congress intended to require district court review of a magistrate [judge]’s factual or

legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party objects to those

findings.”).

“A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings objected to and the

specific basis for such objections.” Hidalgo Corp. v. J. Kugel Designs, Inc., No. 05-20476, 2005

WL 8155948, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2005). Therefore, the “[f]ailure to object to the magistrate

[judge]’s factual findings after notice precludes a later attack on these findings.” Lewis v. Smith,

855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 (5th Cir.

1982)).

APPLICABLE LAW

A court may authorize a party to proceed in forma pauperis in any suit, or appeal thereof,

so long as the party complies with the prescriptions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). In such cases,

however, the Court must perform a screening process and “shall dismiss [a] case at any time” if it

determines that “the action or appeal . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on

which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added).

To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a complaint’s factual allegations “must

be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level”—with “enough facts to state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007).

Under this standard, legal conclusions “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and are

insufficient to state a claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Moreover, “[w]here a

complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the

line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. at 678 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

ANALYSIS

Before diving into the Report and Plaintiff’s Objections, there is a fundamental issue with

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. The Magistrate Judge previously entered an Order to Amend.

See Order to Amend [ECF No. 6]. In her Order to Amend, the Magistrate Judge warned Plaintiff

that “failure to file [his] amended complaint on time and in compliance with this Court’s orders”

would probably result in “dismissal of this case.” Id. at 9 (emphasis added). The Order to Amend

clearly informed Plaintiff that shotgun pleadings are “impermissible” and, again, directed Plaintiff

that he must “follow the directives and applicable rules articulated in [that] order.” Id. at 7. A

shotgun pleading, as the Order to Amend explained, comes in four rough categories. See id. at 5.

“The most common type” of shotgun pleading—and the one pertinent here—“is a complaint

containing multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing

each successive count to carry all that came before and the last count to be a combination of the

entire complaint.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir.

2015).

As explained by the Eleventh Circuit, such a pleading deficiency generates the inherent

problem present in all shotgun pleadings—namely, that “they fail to one degree or another, and in

one way or another, to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the

grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id. at 1323. Stated differently, shotgun pleadings do not

comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) or 10(b). Barmapov v. Amuial, No. 19-12256, 2021 WL

359632, at *2 (11th Cir. Feb. 3, 2021). “[S]hotgun pleadings also ‘waste scarce judicial resources,

inexorably broaden the scope of discovery, wreak havoc on appellate court dockets, and undermine

the public’s respect for the courts.’” Id. (quoting Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291,

1295 (11th Cir. 2018))

Here, the Magistrate Judge properly identified (and expertly examined) the claims that

arguably could have been raised by a pro se litigant with similar allegations. And the Court will

certainly address those claims one-by-one in an abundance of caution. But in the Court’s view,

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint should be dismissed as a shotgun pleading. For example, Claim

One adopts all of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 27. Am. Compl. at 8. And

immediately after Plaintiff concludes briefing on Claim One in paragraph 36, Claim Two

incorporates all of the allegations from paragraphs 1 through 36. Id. at 10. Plaintiff repeats this

pattern on all subsequently listed claims. See id. at 11 (incorporating the previous 41 paragraphs);

12 (incorporating the previous 47 paragraphs); 13 (incorporating the previous 53 paragraphs); 14

(incorporating the previous 61 paragraphs).

By implementing this pleading strategy, it is unclear if there are other claims not explicitly

enumerated or otherwise identified in the Report. Thus, the Amended Complaint clearly qualifies

under the “most common” category of shotgun pleadings—those where the allegations of each

count not only adopt a general factual allegation section but also roll “into every successive count

down the line” the allegations of prior counts.2 See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321, 1324.

The Court notes that Plaintiff’s factual allegations are mostly straightforward. But his legal

contentions are not. To illustrate, Claim One is labeled “Racial Profiling” and contends Deputy

Yaffey violated the Due Process Clause because of his “racial profiling, harassment, false arrest,

and imprisonment, prejudice, unlawful conduct[,] and discrimination.” Am. Compl. at 8. Based

on these legal contentions—which are conclusory—and on the allegations at issue, the Court could

infer Claim One as being a Fourteenth Amendment selective enforcement claim or a Fourth

Amendment false arrest and false imprisonment claim. But the Magistrate Judge thought

Plaintiff’s false arrest and false imprisonment claim began on a different page. See Report at 15

(citing Am. Compl. at 11–12). And her interpretation of the Amended Complaint makes sense as

well because the heading of that claim in the Amended Complaint explicitly reads “False Arrest

and Imprisonment,” and there is a clear invocation of said doctrine beneath the heading of that

claim. See Am. Compl. at 11–12. Then again, on the following page and under a different claim,

Plaintiff, again, has the heading “False Arrest” and again invokes the Fourth Amendment. See id.

at 12. Because Plaintiff reincorporates every prior allegation and contention, it is practically

impossible to readily determine the basis for each claim and—more importantly here—where each

claim begins and ends.

2 To be clear, the Court does not maintain that a pro se complaint suffering from this technical pleading

deficiency will always warrant dismissal. In some cases, incorporating by reference a large amount of

paragraphs may result in “each claim materially increase[ing] the burden of understanding the factual

allegations underlying each [subsequent] count.” See id. at 1324. In other words, some claims make more

sense after prior claims have already been briefed. And, in other cases, it is possible that breaking down

the factual allegations with discrete subsections and titles, such as “Facts Surrounding the Shooting,” might

help steer a complaint away from shotgun territory. See id. at 1325. But this case is different.

Of course, “[a] pro se pleading is held to a less stringent standard than a pleading drafted

by an attorney and is liberally construed.” Waldman v. Conway, 871 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir.

2017); see also Torres v. Miami-Dade Cty., 734 F. App’x 688, 691 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Liberal

construction, in more concrete terms, means that federal courts must sometimes look beyond the

labels used in a pro se party’s complaint and focus on the content and substance of the

allegations.”). That leniency, however, “does not give courts license to serve as de facto counsel

or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Shuler v. Ingram &

Assocs., 441 F. App’x 712, 716 n.3 (11th Cir. 2011); Golfin v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 276 F.

App’x 908, 908 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e will not act as de facto counsel for a pro se litigant.”).

Here, because the Amended Complaint intermittently interweaves the same claims at

random points throughout each claim, and every successor count adopts the factual assertions and

legal arguments of prior counts, the shotgun nature of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint makes it

impracticable to liberally construe Plaintiff’s allegations without stepping into the role of de facto

counsel. This the Court cannot do. See, e.g., Watson v. Governor of Ga., 699 F. App’x 909, 909

(11th Cir. 2017) (“Although we construe pro se briefs liberally, we will not act as de facto counsel

for litigants . . . .”); Butler v. Broward Cty. Cent. Examining Bd., 367 F. App’x 991, 992 (11th Cir.

2010) (“[T[he district court had no duty to seek out and consider documents submitted in a previous

civil rights lawsuit in order to determine whether Butler’s complaint stated a claim pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6). Whether the documents in Butler’s previous lawsuit established a claim or not, it

is not the district court’s role to act as Butler’s de facto counsel and sua sponte seek out those

documents in order to rewrite her pleadings.”).3

3 The Magistrate Judge took judicial notice of materials that were not attached to Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint—but were part of Plaintiff’s state court criminal record. The Court, however, declines to adopt

such facts given that they are not explicitly alleged within the Amended Complaint. See Butler, 367 F.

App’x at 992.

The Magistrate Judge, without question, exhibited her strong mastery of the facts in this

case. But this particular Amended Complaint cannot proceed because its shotgun nature would

not only fail to provide fair notice to Defendants of the claims against them, but also devour the

judicial resources of this Court (and later of the Eleventh Circuit if an appeal is to be taken by any

party). Accordingly, the Amended Complaint is DISMISSED as a shotgun pleading.

The Court shall, nevertheless, address the claims analyzed in the Report, as well as

Plaintiff’s Objections. As explained below, upon doing so, the Court reaches the same conclusion:

dismissal of the Amended Complaint is warranted.

I. Objection to the Fourth Amendment claim regarding the initial seizure

The Report finds that Plaintiff’s allegations that he was not speeding are sufficient to allow

his Fourth Amendment claim regarding the initial seizure to proceed. See Report at 11–12. Setting

aside that the Court would dismiss the Amended Complaint as a shotgun pleading, the Court

disagrees. A traffic stop is constitutional if the officers have probable cause to believe that a traffic

violation has occurred or a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. See Floyd v. City

of Miami Beach, 730 F. App’x 838, 841–42 (11th Cir. 2018).

Here, Plaintiff avers that he was not speeding. Am. Compl. at 4. Noticeably absent from

his Amended Complaint, however, is any allegation addressing the doppler that Deputy Yaffey

documented as corroborating his estimation of Plaintiff driving 55 miles per hour in a 35 mile per

hour zone. See generally Am. Compl.; see also Am. Compl. at 26 (showing Deputy Yaffey’s

affidavit, which Plaintiff has relied on). If Plaintiff’s bare and conclusory allegation that he was

“not speeding” were enough to construct a Fourth Amendment claim, every disgruntled driver

claiming they were not speeding—despite the presence of official records to the contrary—would

be able to sue their citing officer. And here, the Amended Complaint contains no allegations

clarifying what the speed limit was or what speed Plaintiff was driving when he passed by Deputy

Yaffey’s patrol vehicle. In addition, Plaintiff does not provide any allegations as to how he might

later establish a conclusion that he was not speeding. This is not to say that the stop was

constitutional. Instead, this Court only finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are too bare and conclusory

to allow this claim to proceed. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

Given that the Court cannot serve as de facto counsel—and Plaintiff’s allegations are

conclusory—this claim is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the Report is REJECTED with respect to

this claim.

II. Objection to the Fourth Amendment claim regarding the search of Plaintiff’s vehicle

In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff contends that Deputy Yaffey falsely “accus[ed] him

of speeding in order to pull him over to search his car.” Am. Compl. at 10. Plaintiff objects to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that this Fourth Amendment claim be dismissed. See

Objections at 2–7. More specifically, Plaintiff insists the Magistrate Judge overlooked facts

showing that the “plain view” doctrine under the Fourth Amendment—relied upon in page 14 of

the Report—does not apply. See Objections at 2.

But the Court need not resolve the applicability of the plain view doctrine. The Report, in

the alternative, addressed the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s proscription

against unreasonable searches and seizures. Report at 13–14. That exception, of course, permits

law enforcement to search operational vehicles without a warrant if there is probable cause to

believe that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found. See United States v. Tamari, 454

F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006). Deputy Yaffey, as noted above, wrote that Plaintiff had

bloodshot eyes and his vehicle had an odor of alcohol. See Am. Compl. at 26. He also documented

seeing drugs in a cup holder. Id. Observing a driver with bloodshot eyes and drugs in a cup holder

is certainly enough to find probable cause to search the vehicle for additional drugs.

Nowhere in his Amended Complaint does Plaintiff allege that Deputy Yaffey could not

smell alcohol from outside his vehicle or otherwise allege that seeing the color of his eyes was an

impossibility under the circumstances. See generally Am. Compl. The Amended Complaint also

does not address—let alone deny—the drugs Deputy Yaffey documented seeing in the cup holder.

In fact, sworn under penalty of perjury, Plaintiff told Deputy Yaffey, “If my eyes are red it’s

because I take eye drop (sic): Latanprost. The alcohol you smell is not of me but Mr. Noelte.”

Am. Compl. at 5, 21. In addition, Plaintiff’s defensive explanation for his eyes and the smell of

his vehicle came after Deputy Yaffey had already commented as to his observations. See id. at 5.

Such an after-the-fact explanation could give a reasonable officer under the circumstances reason

to doubt Plaintiff’s protestations of innocence. Lastly, although there are troubling allegations in

this case suggesting a bias against African-Americans, Plaintiff has not constructed a plausible

inference that Deputy Yaffey lacked probable cause to search his vehicle pursuant to the

automobile exception.

Because Plaintiff never mentions—let alone challenges—the Report’s reliance on the

automobile exception in his Objections, the Report is subject to clear error review. The Court

finds no clear error and, therefore, ADOPTS the Report’s reasoning and OVERRULLES

Plaintiff’s Objections regarding this claim. This claim is therefore DISMISSED.

III. Objection to False Arrest / False Imprisonment claim

Plaintiff attacks the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim

as to his false arrest and false imprisonment claims. Objections at 7–8. Liberally construed,

Plaintiff asserts the Magistrate Judge (1) erroneously equated his “mere proximity” to drug

paraphernalia with probable cause and, in addition, suggests (2a) the Magistrate Judge overlooked

that there was “no probable cause to stop Plaintiff” or (2b) “to search Plaintiff’s vehicle as there

was no immediately apparent ‘plain view[.]’” Id. at 8.

“The Fourth Amendment permits warrantless arrests if made with probable cause.”

Williamson v. Mills, 65 F.3d 155, 158 (11th Cir. 1995). “A law enforcement officer has probable

cause to arrest a suspect if the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge, of which

he or she has reasonably trustworthy information, would cause a prudent person to believe, under

the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an

offense.” Id. (cleaned up). Importantly, “[t]he existence of probable cause . . . is an absolute bar

to a section 1983 action for false arrest.” Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1505–06 (11th Cir.

1990).

To state a section 1983 claim for false imprisonment, a plaintiff must adequately allege the

elements of common law false imprisonment and establish that the imprisonment resulted in a

violation of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Ortega v. Christian, 85 F.3d

1521, 1526 (11th Cir. 1996). The false imprisonment component requires a plaintiff to prove “(1)

intent to confine, (2) acts resulting in confinement, and (3) consciousness of the victim of

confinement or resulting harm.” Id. at 1526 n.2. If an officer has “sparse information” when they

make an arrest, this provides grounds to find the officer “knew or should have known that the

imprisonment” of that individual constituted an unlawful imprisonment. Id. at 1526.

Despite Plaintiff’s averments that the Magistrate Judge conflated his “mere proximity” to

drug paraphernalia with probable cause, Plaintiff has not addressed the inferences that law

enforcement reasonably could have drawn under the circumstances. See generally Objections.

When law enforcement encounters a driver with bloodshot eyes and the smell of alcohol emanating

from his car containing drugs in a cup holder; pronouncing that his “red eyes” are due to eye drops;

exclaiming that the smell of alcohol in his vehicle emanates from a passenger, not him; insisting

that a glass pipe found under the brake of his vehicle and drugs on the left side of his steering

wheel—a vehicle he presumably has a possessory interest in—are not his; and overlooking that

his passengers do not exhibit any manifestations of drug usage,4 a prudent officer could reasonably

believe that a crime related to the possession of those drugs or related paraphernalia was or was

about to be committed by the driver. This inference is particularly strong here because Plaintiff

never alleged that Deputy Yaffey saw Mr. Noelte hide drugs on Plaintiff’s side of the vehicle.

Thus, the Magistrate Judge correctly found that probable cause to arrest Plaintiff existed on the

scene, rendering the false arrest claim meritless.

As for Plaintiff’s arguments that there was no probable cause to arrest him because the

initial stop and subsequent search was illegal, this argument ignores the Magistrate Judge’s cogent

explanation that “even if Deputy Yaffey’s initial stop of Plaintiff’s vehicle violated the Fourth

Amendment, the fruits of the search—the drugs and drug paraphernalia—can still be considered

to determine whether Deputy Yaffey had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff” because “the

exclusionary rule does not apply in a civil suit against police officers.” Report at 16 (cleaned up);

see also Black v. Wigington, 811 F.3d 1259, 1267 (11th Cir. 2016) (“The Blacks argue that the

evidence from their trailer could not provide probable cause because it was obtained during an

illegal search, but [in so doing] they wrongly assume that the exclusionary rule applies in this civil

case.”); Rance v. Bradshaw, No. 15-CV-81210, 2016 WL 3199002, Opinion and Order at *7 (S.D.

Fla. June 9, 2016) (relying on the fruits of an allegedly illegal stop and search to show probable

cause existed at the time of an arrest because the exclusionary rule does not apply in civil

4 Plaintiff has provided no allegations indicating that Mr. Noelte manifested symptoms that would have

led an officer to believe he was under the influence of drugs. See generally Am. Compl.

proceedings). And, at any rate, Plaintiff has not set forth adequate allegations to establish a

plausible inference that his initial stop was unconstitutional.

Plaintiff’s view that a false arrest or false imprisonment transpired simply because the

“accusations against him” were later proven false “by DNA,” see Objections at 11, misses the

mark. While it is true that misidentification can form the basis of a false imprisonment claim for

a detention following a valid arrest, see Ortega, 85 F.3d at 1526 (citing Cannon v. Macon Cty., 1

F.3d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir. 1993), opinion modified on reh’g on other grounds, 15 F.3d 1022 (11th

Cir. 1994)), that kind of “over-detention” would require Plaintiff to show Deputy Yaffey failed to

release Plaintiff once he knew or should have known Plaintiff was entitled to release. See Alcocer

v. Mills, 906 F.3d 944, 954 (11th Cir. 2018) (internal citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff provides

no allegations as to when Deputy Yaffey should have known Plaintiff was innocent, rendering a

misidentification theory for false imprisonment wholly inapplicable in this case. And, based on

the events at the scene, a reasonable officer would have had little evidence of Plaintiff’s innocence

for the reasons previously stated.

Plaintiff’s Objections as to this claim are, therefore, OVERRULED. Objections at 7–12.5

Further, the Court ADOPTS the Report’s compelling legal analysis in addition to the supplemental

analysis contain herein.

5 Even if Plaintiff [had] brought it to Deputy Yaffey’s attention that Mr. Noelte’s DNA and fingerprints

[were] on the glass pipe,” Objections at 12, Plaintiff has provided no allegations that would allow this Court

to make the tremendous leap of logic necessary to infer that Deputy Yaffey could have relied on a suspect’s

on-the-scene forensics analysis as “trustworthy information” when evaluating whether probable cause to

arrest that very suspect existed. See Williamson, 65 F.3d at 158. Put another way, regardless of whether

Plaintiff was ultimately “exonerated by DNA,” see Objections at 11, that was not a reasonable inference

Deputy Yaffey could have drawn. As previously stated, based on the documentary evidence relied upon

by Plaintiff, it appears he misrepresented the fact that he only had a learner’s permit for the vehicle he drove

that night. Thus, a reasonable and prudent officer would have likely become suspicious of Plaintiff’s after-

the-fact justifications for why his eyes were bloodshot red when drugs had already been spotted in his

vehicle because, after all, Plaintiff had already demonstrated a propensity for stretching the facts. More

fundamentally, Plaintiff overlooks the fact that an officer can have probable cause to believe a crime is

afoot and later be wrong. See Baysa v. Gualtieri, 786 F. App’x 941, 944 (11th Cir. 2019) (explaining

IV. Objections as to the Official Capacity claims

Liberally construed, Plaintiff also objects to his official capacity claims not proceeding.

Objections at 13. The primary basis for his “objection” better resembles a call to action as opposed

to an actual objection to a magistrate judge’s report. This is because Plaintiff asks the Court to

allow his official capacity claims to proceed on the basis that it would “send[] a message to the

Sheriff’s office that we are not going to tolerate innocence people (sic) being framed outside the

law (sic).” Objections at 13. Axiomatically, legal claims must be supported by factual allegations,

not public policy initiatives—no matter how noble those initiatives might be. See generally Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678 (“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” (cleaned up)). This particular “objection” is, therefore,

OVERRULED.

Plaintiff, in the alternative, asserts that the Magistrate Judge erred by recommending that

the official capacity claims be dismissed because the cases she cited in her Report are pertinent

only to supervisory liability claims, not official capacity claims. Objections at 14. This assertion

is simply incorrect. See Report at 27 (citing Walker v. City of Calhoun, GA, 901 F.3d 1245, 1255

(11th Cir. 2018) and Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). Because Plaintiff in no

way refutes the Magistrate Judge’s succinct and cogent reasoning regarding official capacity

claims, see Report at 27 (“Because Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendants had a custom or

policy that caused a constitutional violation, he fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted against [any of the] Defendants in their official capacit[ies].”), Plaintiff’s Objections

probable cause “does not require an actual showing of criminal activity” or even “overwhelmingly

convincing evidence” of criminal activity) (cleaned up).

challenging the Magistrate Judge’s resolution of his official capacity claims are

OVERRULLED.6 The Court ADOPTS the Report’s reasoning on this issue.

V. Plaintiff’s Objection to the Failure to Train claim

Next, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s analysis regarding a construed failure to

train claim against Sheriff Snyder. Objections at 15–20. Plaintiff insists that Sheriff Snyder “is

well aware of the discrimination against African-Americans displayed by his department” because

he failed to adequately train his subordinates. Objections at 20. Even if that were true, Plaintiff

has not pinpointed where in his Amended Complaint he has submitted reasonably specific

allegations connected to Sheriff Snyder. See generally Objections. The Report found one “vague

and conclusory” reference to Sheriff Snyder being allegedly responsible for “fail[ing] to properly

supervise and enforce the rules of ethical standard of conduct with [respect to] Deputy Yaffey

because had [Sheriff Snyder] done so, [Deputy Yaffey] would not have committed these gross and

egregious wrongful acts against Plaintiff.” Report at 25–26 (quoting Am. Compl. at 3) (cleaned

up). The Court, in its review of the Amended Complaint, sees no other allegations implicating

Sheriff Snyder.

Based on Plaintiff’s allegations, the Report found any claims against Sheriff Snyder were

“actually based solely on a theory of vicarious liability.” Report at 25. Having reviewed the

entirety of Plaintiff’s allegations, the Court agrees. Of course, “[s]upervisory officials are not

liable under section 1983 on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Belcher v.

6 Plaintiff accuses the Magistrate Judge of purposefully “circumvent[ing]” his entitlement to sue Sheriff

Snyder and Deputy Yaffey by “misstating the law” and for addressing his official capacity claims against

all Defendants simultaneously. See Objections at 13–14. This Court—and, therefore, the Magistrate

Judge—have the authority and the obligation to screen Plaintiff’s Amended complaint for failure to state a

claim. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) (articulating the standard for IFP litigants). To the extent Plaintiff’s

baseless and conclusory accusations of bias could be interpreted as an objection, that objection is

OVERRULED.

City of Foley, Ala., 30 F.3d 1390, 1396 (11th Cir. 1994) (cleaned up). “Supervisors can be held

‘liable under . . . § 1983, for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates if they personally

participated in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct or if there is a causal connection between

their actions . . . and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Hendrix v. Tucker, 535 F. App’x 803,

805 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008)).

To establish a causal connection, a plaintiff must show “(1) a history of widespread abuse

puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation and he failed

to do so; (2) the supervisor’s improper custom or policy led to deliberate indifference to

constitutional rights; or (3) facts support an inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates

to act unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from

doing so.” Hendrix, 535 F. App’x at 805 (cleaned up). Here, the Report found no allegations

sufficient to establish a causal connection. The Court agrees. In addition, Plaintiff has not

identified any allegations in his Objections that the Magistrate Judge might have overlooked.

Thus, Plaintiff’s Objections regarding this claim are OVERRULED, and the Magistrate Judge’s

analysis on this claim is ADOPTED.

VI. Malicious Prosecution claim

In her Report, the Magistrate Judge finds that Plaintiff has raised a claim of malicious

prosecution against Deputy Yaffey with respect to the drugs found in Deputy Yaffey’s patrol

vehicle and recommends that this claim proceed. Report at 19–22 (citing Am. Compl. at 8–11).

However, the Court finds that the portion of the Amended Complaint cited in the Report

does not invoke a malicious prosecution claim with respect to the drugs found in Deputy Yaffey’s

vehicle—at least not definitively. From what the Court can decipher, that section of the Amended

Complaint relates to the drugs and related paraphernalia found in Plaintiff’s vehicle, not Deputy

Yaffey’s. The Court’s finding is in no way a criticism of the Magistrate Judge’s thoughtful

analysis—but simply evidences the incredibly shotgun nature of Plaintiff’s pleading. And the

shotgun nature of the Amended Complaint, as previously mentioned, is all the more compounded

by Plaintiff incorporating by reference every allegation and legal contention.

Because the Court does not find that Plaintiff has established a malicious prosecution

claim, in part due to the shotgun nature of Plaintiff’s pleading, the Court REJECTS the Report to

the extent it finds a malicious prosecution claim related to the drugs found in Deputy Yaffey’s

patrol vehicle. The Court shall now address whether Deputy Yaffey violated Plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment rights because of his malicious prosecution with respect to the drugs and related

paraphernalia found in Plaintiff’s vehicle—the claim the Court does see in the Amended

Complaint.

“To establish a federal claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove

(1) the elements of the common-law tort of malicious prosecution and (2) a violation of his Fourth

Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.” Blue v. Lopez, 901 F.3d 1352, 1357

(11th Cir. 2018). Malicious prosecution claims arise under the Fourth Amendment and are viable

constitutional torts under section 1983. Id. The first element is met if a plaintiff establishes the

following: “(1) a criminal prosecution instituted or continued by the present defendant; (2) with

malice and without probable cause; (3) that terminated in the plaintiff accused’s favor; and (4)

caused damage to the plaintiff accused.” Id. (quoting Kjellsen v. Mills, 517 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th

Cir. 2008)) (internal citation omitted).

The Court has already found that Deputy Yaffey would have had probable cause based on

Plaintiff’s allegations and the documentary evidence he incorporated. And, in her Report, the

Magistrate Judge agreed that such a malicious prosecution claim challenging the drugs and related

paraphernalia in Plaintiff’s vehicle would fail to state a claim. See Report at 22 n.7. Accordingly,

the Court DISMISSES any malicious prosecution claim raised in this proceeding. The Court

ADOPTS the Report to the extent it finds no malicious prosecution claim has been stated with

respect to the drugs and related paraphernalia in Plaintiff’s vehicle. See Report at 22 n.7. In

addition, the Court REJECTS the Report to the extent it finds a malicious prosecution claim

related to the drugs found in Deputy Yaffey’s patrol vehicle for the reasons previously stated

herein. See Golfin, 276 F. App’x at 908 (“[W]e will not act as de facto counsel for a pro se

litigant.”).

VII. Selective Enforcement claim

The Magistrate Judge recommends that Plaintiff’s selective enforcement claim proceed in

this case. Report at 24. Pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,

“the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race.”

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). A selective enforcement claim requires a

plaintiff to show “(1) he was treated differently from other similarly situated individuals, i.e. others

outside of his group in similar situations were not prosecuted, and (2) he was singled out for

different treatment because of his association with an identifiable group, such as those of a

particular race or religion, or a group exercising constitutional rights.” Lozman v. City of Riviera

Beach, 39 F. Supp. 3d 1392, 1418 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (emphasis added); see also Campbell v.

Rainbow City, Ala., 434 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[D]ifferent treatment of dissimilarly

situated persons does not violate the equal protection clause.” (cleaned up)).

Here, the question is whether Plaintiff received dissimilar treatment from Mr. Noelte. See

generally Taylor v. Pekerol, 760 F. App’x 647, 653–54 (11th Cir. 2019) (requiring plaintiff to

show “similarly situated” individuals were not prosecuted and that “discriminatory animus was

behind the disparate treatment”). The Magistrate Judge constructed a strong argument as to why

Plaintiff’s selective enforcement claim should proceed, but the Court disagrees with her ultimate

recommendation. Many of the points she emphasized certainly bear on the question of bias—an

element Plaintiff could establish at this stage with his assumed-as-true allegations. But, to show a

claim of racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, there must also be a showing of

“similarly situated individuals” who experienced disparate treatment and a showing that

“discriminatory animus” is what motivated that variance in treatment. See Taylor, 760 F. App’x

653–54.

The Court does not see Plaintiff and his passenger, Mr. Noelte, as “similarly situated

individuals.” While the two men were in the same vehicle, the drugs and drug paraphernalia were

found on Plaintiff’s side of the vehicle—a vehicle he presumably owned. Nowhere in his

Amended Complaint does Plaintiff allege that Mr. Noelte had bloodshot eyes or manifested telltale

signs of drug usage. Viewed together, Plaintiff’s possessory interest in the vehicle, bloodshot eyes,

and proximity to the drugs provide enough factors to distinguish the two men from one another

during the traffic stop.

Notably, implicit in Plaintiff’s repeated assertions that his “mere proximity” to the drugs

and drug paraphernalia should not have been enough to find probable cause to arrest him is a

concession that there was even less probable cause to arrest Mr. Noelte based on his greater

distance than Plaintiff from the drugs and drug paraphernalia because, after all, they were found

on Plaintiff’s side of the vehicle. In other words, using Plaintiff’s logic of “mere proximity” to

drugs and drug paraphernalia, Plaintiff has inadvertently conceded that Mr. Noelte is not his

comparator.

Thus, while the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Deputy Yaffey exhibited a bias

towards African-Americans based on Plaintiff’s assumed-as-true allegations, Plaintiff’s selective

enforcement claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim because Mr. Noelte was not a

similarly situated comparator under the circumstances. In sum, the Court DISMISSES this claim

and REJECTS the Report to the extent Plaintiff meant to raise a selective enforcement claim

under the Equal Protection Clause.

VIII. Plaintiff’s Objections related to Punitive Damages

The Report recommends that the demand for punitive damages against Deputy Yaffey

proceed and that it be dismissed against Sheriff Snyder. Report at 27–28. In essence, Plaintiff

objects on the grounds that his ability to demand punitive damages against all Defendants should

proceed. Objections at 22. Since the Court finds that Plaintiff has not stated a claim against any

of the identified Defendants in this action, the Report is REJECTED on this issue and the

Objections are OVERRULED as moot. See Inlet Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Childress Duffy, Ltd., Inc.,

615 F. App’x 533, 544 n.5 (11th Cir. 2015) (concluding a moot case makes any demand for

punitive damages moot as well).

CONCLUSION

Having carefully reviewed the record and governing law, the Report is ADOPTED in part

and REJECTED in part pursuant to the modifications and supplemental analysis stated herein.

Plaintiff’s Objections, which were reviewed de novo, are OVERRULED. Accordingly, the

Amended Complaint is hereby DISMISSED as an impermissible shotgun pleading and, in the

alternative, DISMISSED for failure to state a claim. All pending motions, if any, are DENIED

as moot. All deadlines are TERMINATED. The Clerk shall CLOSE this case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 23rd day of February, 2021.

RODOLFO A. RUIZ II

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

cc: Frederick T. Jones

638 6th Street

West Palm Beach, FL 33401

PRO SE

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