Taylor v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd

United States District Court

for the

Southern District of Florida

Pamela Taylor, Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

Civil Action No. 20-22161-Civ-Scola

)

Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., a )

Liberian Corporation, Defendant. )

Order Granting Motion to Dismiss

This maritime action arises from damages Plaintiff Pamela Taylor

sustained when she was injured while a passenger aboard the Allure of the

Seas, a cruise ship owned and operated by Defendant Royal Caribbean Cruises

Ltd. (“RCCL”). (Am. Compl. (“Compl.” Or “complaint”), ECF No. 6 at ¶¶ 9-10.)

The Court struck Taylor’s initial complaint because it was a shotgun pleading,

impeding the Defendant’s and the Court’s assessment of Taylor’s claims. Taylor

filed the instant version of her complaint on June 23, 2020, which fixed some

of her earlier complaint’s shortcomings. The complaint asserts three counts.

Count I is for Negligent Failure to Warn, Count II is for Negligent Maintenance

of the Gangway Flooring, and Count III is for Negligent Failure to Follow

Disembarkation Policies and Procedures. RCCL moved to dismiss, Taylor filed a

response, and RCCL filed a reply. (Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 11; Pl.’s Resp., ECF No.

12; Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 13.) After careful consideration, the Court agrees with

the Defendant and grants the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 11.)

1. Background.1

Taylor was severely injured aboard the Allure of the Seas on or about May

26, 2019, “when she tripped and fell,” resulting in a surgery to treat a left tibial

plateau fracture, while “disembarking the vessel on a dangerous condition.”

(ECF No. 6 at ¶¶ 18, 20.) One of the “busiest” areas of the ship is the gangway,

a pedestrian walkway, or “ramp,” that connects the ship to land for

embarkation and disembarkation. (Id. at ¶¶ 15-16.) Embarkation and

disembarkation appear to be prone to crowding and bottlenecks. From its

launch in 2009 until June 2016, the Allure of the Seas was the world’s largest

passenger vessel. (Id. at ¶13.) At maximum capacity, it can carry almost 9,000

individuals. (Id. at ¶14.)

1 The Court accepts Taylor’s factual allegations as true for the purposes of evaluating RCCL’s

motion to dismiss. Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th

Cir. 1997).

The complaint alleges that RCCL’s failure to make the disembarkation

process safe resulted in Taylor’s injury. Specifically, it alleges that RCCL is

aware that due to the high traffic during disembarkation, “there is a need for

Defendant to provide sufficient warnings, order, and organization so as to

maintain a safe and even-flow of passengers . . . .” (Id. at ¶16.) Additionally, the

complaint alleges RCCL knew that a lack of organization, warnings, and

direction during disembarkation “can cause jams, slowed exiting, and packed

crowds, resulting in potential pushing and shoving and people tripping, falling

and injuring themselves on the uneven gangway exiting the vessel.” (Id.)

Relatedly, RCCL allegedly knew that “a lack of maintenance and inspection of

its gangway flooring and surrounding area create dangerous conditions, which

can cause – and have in the past – trip and fall incidents . . . .” (Id.)

2. Legal Standard

When considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all the complaint’s allegations as

true, construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v.

McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). A pleading must only contain

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In

assessing the legal sufficiency of a complaint’s allegations, the Court is bound

to apply the pleading standard articulated in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That is,

the complaint “must . . . contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna

Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

570). “Dismissal is therefore permitted when on the basis of a dispositive issue

of law, no construction of the factual allegations will support the cause of

action.” Glover v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 459 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006)

(internal quotations omitted) (citing Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall

Cnty. Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A court must dismiss a plaintiff’s claims if

he fails to nudge his “claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

Thus, a pleading that offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not survive

dismissal. See Id. at 555. “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure

from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not

unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than

conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

3. Analysis

“To prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) the

defendant had a duty to protect the plaintiff from a particular injury, (2) the

defendant breached that duty, (3) the breach actually and proximately caused

the plaintiff’s injury, and (4) the plaintiff suffered actual harm.” Guevara v. NCL

(Bahamas) Ltd., 920 F.3d 710, 720 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotations omitted). “With

respect to the duty element in a maritime context, a shipowner owes the duty

of exercising reasonable care towards those lawfully aboard the vessel.” Id.

(quotations omitted). To prevail on a negligence or failure-to-warn claim with

respect to a dangerous condition, a plaintiff must show that the defendant “had

actual or constructive notice of a risk-creating condition, at least where, as

here, the menace is one commonly encountered on land and not clearly linked

to nautical adventure.” Id. (quotations and alterations omitted); Keefe v.

Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 867 F.2d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1989) (requiring

notice with respect to a duty-to-warn claim); Horne v. Carnival Corp., 741 Fed.

App’x 607, 609 (11th Cir. 2018) (requiring notice with respect to a failure-to-

maintain claim).

Each Count of the complaint must be dismissed because the complaint

fails to adequately allege causation. The Court is mindful that notice pleading

does not require the pleader to allege a “specific fact” to cover every element or

to plead “with precision” each element of a claim, but it is still necessary for a

complaint to “contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the

material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal

theory.” Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir.

2001). As explained below, at no point does the complaint meet the third

element of negligence; namely, that “the breach actually and proximately

caused the plaintiff’s injury.” Guevara, 920 F.3d at 720. As the complaint fails

to satisfy this threshold requirement, the Court need not and does not reach

the question of RCCL’s notice of the purportedly dangerous condition.

Count I, for negligent failure to warn, must be dismissed for failure to

properly allege causation. In Flaherty v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., the

Court held that the plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead that the defendant’s

failure to warn proximately caused his injury, as the complaint ““fail[ed] to

allege any facts that would put Royal Caribbean on notice of what caused

Plaintiff to fall.” Case No. 15-22295, 2015 WL 8227674 at *4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 7,

2015) (Lenard, J.) (alteration added; emphasis in original). The same result is

warranted here. Taylor’s complaint alleges that the gangway, which is used for

embarkation and disembarkation, was “uneven.” (ECF No. 6 at ¶16.) The

complaint also alleges that crowding on the gangway “can cause jams, slowed

exiting, and packed crowds, resulting in potential pushing and shoving and

people tripping . . . .” (Id. (emphasis added).) The complaint goes on to allege

that RCCL “is aware that a lack of maintenance and inspection of its gangway

flooring and surrounding area create dangerous conditions, which can cause –

and have in the past – trip and fall incidents while passengers are walking on

the gangway.” (Id. (emphasis added).)

While the complaint repeatedly alleges that the purportedly dangerous

conditions “can cause” injuries, at no point does it affirmatively allege that the

dangerous conditions did cause Taylor’s injuries. Was the gangway so crowded

that she could not see its unevenness? How uneven was the gangway? The

complaint describes the gangway as a “ramp,” which would make it sloped, or

“uneven,” by definition. (ECF No. 6 at ¶16.) The complaint also suggests that

Taylor could have been “push[ed] and shov[ed].” (Id.) The complaint only raises

these and other questions. It does not answer them. Leaving the causation-in-

fact inquiry to guesswork falls short of the pleading standard. Additionally, at

least one of these potential causes – pushing and shoving – is particularly

problematic because if the “Plaintiff was injured after being pushed by a fellow

tourist[,] [s]uch an incident would likely be a supervening cause absolving

Defendant of liability.” Brown v. Oceania Cruises, Inc., Case No. 17-22645-CIV,

2017 WL 10379580, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2017) (Altonaga, J.).

The Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Brown by arguing that the complaint

in that case did not explicitly state that Ms. Brown fell – rather, the complaint

in that case “jump-cuts” from describing the dangerous condition (traversing

over “treacherous rocks and boulders”) to describing Ms. Brown’s injury. (ECF

No. 12 at 5-6.) However, the court’s concern in Brown was not that the

complaint did not allege that Ms. Brown fell. The Brown court, like this Court,

was expressly concerned with the proximate cause of the injury. See id. at *5

(“The Court does not know one way or the other whether a failure to warn by

Defendant could have plausibly been a proximate cause of Plaintiff's injury.”).

Although the actual cause of an injury might be the blunt force trauma arising

from a fall, neither Ms. Brown nor Taylor alleged the proximate, or legal, cause

of the injury. Without alleging what caused Taylor’s fall (and the resulting

injury), the complaint does not give RCCL notice as to what warnings would

have been adequate to help Taylor avoid the fall.

The additional allegations specific to Count II, for negligent maintenance

of the gangway flooring, fare no better. Count II alleges that RCCL breached its

duty of care to Taylor by “failing to reasonably maintain the flooring, including

but not limited, to inspecting the gangway for worn and damaged treading,

unreasonably large gaps in the flooring, loose screws in the flooring, as well as

structural and other components of the flooring that was [sic] not in proper

condition . . . .” (ECF No. 6 at ¶29.) The Court accepts these allegations as true.

But even if RCCL breached its duty to maintain treading, close gaps in the

flooring, and tighten screws, the complaint does not allege that these failures

caused Taylor’s injuries. Again, RCCL is left to guess whether Taylor slipped on

substandard treading, lost her balance after her foot fell into one of the

“unreasonably large gaps,” or tripped on a loose screw. In her response to the

motion to dismiss, Taylor argues that she alleges that the cause of injury was

the “unevenness of the gangway flooring surface.” (ECF No. 12 at 8.) Taking

that as true, the complaint does not allege that maintaining the treading,

closing gaps, or tightening “screws in the flooring” would have removed the

“unevenness.” A plaintiff cannot recover for a breached duty without showing

that said breach caused her injuries.

The Court also dismisses Count III, which alleges that RCCL failed “to

follow its own policies and procedures . . . .” (ECF No. 6 at ¶31.) Those policies

and procedures include “limiting the number of passengers exiting the gangway

at a single time, reducing the flow of passengers’ movement off the vessel,

permitting too many passengers to carry luggage and other items off the vessel,

having only the scheduled passengers exit during their proper disembarkation

time, for the benefit and safety of passengers.” (Id.) The failure to adequately

allege causation plagues Count III as well, and the allegations specific to Count

III only amplify the complaint’s shortcomings by introducing the possibility that

luggage may have had a role in Taylor’s injury. Two things can be true at the

same time: (1) RCCL permitted too many passengers to carry luggage and other

items off the vessel; and (2) excess luggage on the gangway had no causal

relationship to Taylor’s injuries. In other words, Taylor did not allege that the

failure to follow policies and procedures is related to her injuries.

4. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants RCCL’s motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim (ECF No. 11). The Court dismisses Taylor’s

claims against RCCL without prejudice and without leave to amend. Avena

v. Imperial Salon & Spa, Inc., 740 Fed. App’x 679, 683 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e’ve

rejected the idea that a party can await a ruling on a motion to dismiss before

filing a motion for leave to amend.”) (noting also that “a motion for leave to

amend should either set forth the substance of the proposed amendment or

attach a copy of the proposed amendment”) (quotations omitted).

The Clerk is directed to close this case. Any pending motions are denied

as moot.

Done and ordered, in Miami, Florida on November 19, 2020.

fone N. Scola, Jr.

United States District Judge