The opinion
United States District Court
for the
Southern District of Florida
Darlene Causey, Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 20-23765-Civ-Scola
) In Admiralty
Royal Caribbean Cruises, LTD., )
Defendant. )
Order Dismissing Complaint and
Granting Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
This matter is before the Court upon Plaintiff Darlene Causey’s
application to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 3.) Having reviewed the
motion, the record, and the relevant legal authorities, the Court grants
Causey’s motion to proceed without prepaying her fees or costs (ECF No. 3);
however, the Court dismisses her complaint, without prejudice, for the
reasons set forth below.
Causey’s complaint, filed pro se, relates to a seven-day trip she took, in
September 2019, aboard Defendant Royal Caribbean Cruises, LTD.’s Liberty of
the Seas. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Causey says that, while she was using the
restroom near ship’s Windjammer Cafe, the toilet she was sitting on broke off
the wall, falling on top of her, “crushing the right side of her body[,] injuring
her leg, ankle, knee[,] and hip.” (Id. at ¶ 11.) Based on her injuries, she sets
forth one count of negligence against Royal Caribbean, submitting the cruise
line was negligent in failing to inspect and repair “weather caus[ed] damage to
the metal surface and fixtures on the ship.” (Id. at ¶ 19.) She explains further
that according to “ASME standards, wall hung toilets should be inspected
periodically for deterioration and corrosion as a safety precaution.” (Id. at ¶ 20.)
She also alleges “the ASME standard requires that a toilet support at least 500
lbs.” (Id. at ¶ 21(b).)
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) confers discretion on a district court to dismiss
an in forma pauperis action if certain defects are evident from the complaint:
Notwithstanding any filing fees, or any portion thereof, that may
have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the
court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or
malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted;
or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
The same standard as a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) governs a dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(ii). Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d
1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is
appropriate when the facts as pleaded do not state a claim for relief that is
“plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
Additionally, § 1915 requires dismissal when the legal theories advanced are
“indisputably meritless,” Nietzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); when
the claims rely on factual allegations which are “clearly baseless,” Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992); or, when it appears that the plaintiff has
little or no chance of success, Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir.
2001).
Based on the allegations set forth in Causey’s complaint, the Court finds
she has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. “Maritime law
governs actions arising from alleged torts committed aboard a ship sailing in
navigable waters.” Tesoriero v. Carnival Corp., 965 F.3d 1170, 1177 (11th Cir.
2020). Under maritime law, a shipowner owes a passenger a duty of ordinary
reasonable care under the circumstances. Id. at 1322; Kermarec v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959). Accordingly, “[a] cruise line is
not liable to passengers as an insurer, but instead is liable to passengers only
for its negligence.” Tesoriero, 965 F.3d at 1178. To establish a maritime
negligence claim, a cruise passenger must establish “(1) the defendant had a
duty to protect the plaintiff from a particular injury, (2) the defendant breached
that duty, (3) the breach actually and proximately caused the plaintiff's injury,
and (4) the plaintiff suffered actual harm.” Id. With respect to the scope of a
cruise ship’s duty to its passengers, the standard of ordinary reasonable care
under the circumstances requires, “as a prerequisite to imposing liability, that
the carrier have had actual or constructive notice of the risk-creating condition,
at least so long as the menace is one commonly encountered on land and not
clearly linked to nautical adventure.” Id. “Liability for a cruise ship operator
thus hinges on whether it knew or should have known about the dangerous
condition.” Id.
Here, Causey has failed to allege facts showing that Royal Caribbean
either knew or should have known about the dangerous condition of the toilet.
Causey does not allege that Royal Caribbean had actual notice that the toilet
was dangerous. Nor does she allege facts showing that Royal Caribbean had
constructive notice of the dangerous condition. For example, she fails to allege
facts showing that either a “defective condition existed for a sufficient period of
time to invite corrective measures” or that “substantially similar incidents in
which conditions substantially similar to the occurrence in question must have
caused the prior accident.” Id. at 1178–79. Indeed, “constructive notice of a
risk cannot be imputed merely because a shipowner created or maintained the
premises.” Id. at 1179.
Because of this deficiency, the Court finds Causey has failed to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court, therefore, dismisses her
complaint, but without prejudice and with leave to amend. To the extent
Causey believes she can address the deficiencies in her complaint, she must
file an amended complaint, consistent with this order, on or before October
15, 2020. Causey is forewarned that if she fails to comply with this order, her
complaint will be dismissed with prejudice.
Additionally, the Court notes Causey has not alleged facts establishing
the Court’s diversity jurisdiction. Accordingly, this case will proceed under the
Court’s admiralty jurisdiction unless, in her amended complaint, Causey
alleges facts establishing the diversity of the parties.
In the meantime, while there is no operative complaint, the Court directs
the Clerk to administratively close this case. Any pending motions are denied
as moot.
The Court directs the Clerk to mail a copy of this order to the Plaintiff at
the address indicated below.
Done and ordered, at Miami, Florida, on September 24, 2020.
bane N. Scola, Jr.
United States District Judge
Copy, via U.S. mail, to:
Darlene Causey
4538 Stemway Dr.
New Orleans, LA 70126