Opinion

Floreal v. State Attorney

Court
District Court, S.D. Florida
Filed
Sep 22, 2020
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 20.1%

“[I]n initiating a prosecution and presenting the state’s case, the prosecutor is immune from civil suit for damages under ' 1983.”

How later courts described this case

  • “[I]n initiating a prosecution and presenting the state’s case, the prosecutor is immune from civil suit for damages under ' 1983.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

United States District Court

for the

Southern District of Florida

Remy Floreal, Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

) Civil Action No. 20-23360-Civ-Scola

State Attorney / Prosecutor, )

Defendant. )

Order

This matter is before the Court upon an independent review of the record

and a screening of the complaint (ECF No. 1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)

and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff Remy Floreal, a pretrial detainee, has filed a

civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Defendant, an

unnamed prosecutor, has violated his Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights through an unlawful arrest and continued detention. (ECF No. 1.) The

Plaintiff has listed “State Attorney/Prosecutor” as the Defendant. (Id.) Although

this matter was automatically referred to United States Magistrate Judge Lisette

M. Reid pursuant to Administrative Order 2019-2, the Court sua sponte

withdrew the referral on September 4, 2020.

I. Background

The Plaintiff is presently being held at the Miami-Dade County Pretrial

Detention Center. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) On June 4, 2019, the Plaintiff was arrested

for an armed robbery and remained in custody until July 8, 2019 when he was

released on his own recognizance. (Id. at 4.) According to the Plaintiff, the case

was closed on July 15, 2019 for lack of evidence. (Id.) On July 24, 2019,

unbeknownst to the Plaintiff, the charges were refiled. (Id.) The Plaintiff alleges

that his attorney had no contact with him and conducted hearings without him.

(Id.) On November 7, 2019, the Plaintiff was arrested for driving with an expired

tag. (Id. at 5.) After his arrest, he was unable to “bond out” and was not told why.

(Id.) He then learned that the armed robbery case had been refiled. (Id.)

Plaintiff is seeking punitive damages in the amount of $8 million from

Defendant in his official capacity. (Id.) He claims to have “suffered mental

anguish, psychological distress, deprivation of [his] freedom and emotional

distress.” (Id.)

II. Legal Standard

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), where a plaintiff is proceeding in

forma pauperis, the complaint must be dismissed if the court determines that

the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Wright v.

Miranda, 740 F. App’x 692, 694 (11th Cir. 2018). Pursuant to Section 1915, a

case is also subject to dismissal where a plaintiff seeks redress from the

government if the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

Id.

In reviewing the complaint under § 1915(e), the court takes the allegations

as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Maps

v. Miami Dade State Attorney, 693 F. App’x 784, 785 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).

Complaints filed by pro se prisoners are held to “less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972)(per curiam). Under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), courts may dismiss as frivolous

claims that are “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory" or "whose

factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327

(1989); Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d

1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001).

In order to “avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must

contain factual allegations that, when accepted as true, allow the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.”

Wright v. Miranda, 740 F. App’x 692, 694 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Waldman v.

Conway, 871 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)). Although a pro se

pleading is liberally construed, it must still “suggest that there is some factual

support for a claim.” Id.

To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that he was

deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. See Griffin

v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001).

Furthermore, the same standards govern dismissal for failure to state a

claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) and dismissal for failure to state a claim under

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997).

Thus, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the court may dismiss a complaint that

fails “to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

Although federal courts give liberal construction to pro se pleadings, courts

“nevertheless have required them to conform to procedural rules.” Albra v.

Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quotation omitted).

Rule 8 requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). There is no

required technical form, but “each allegation must be simple, concise, and

the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” 550 U.S. 544 at 555

(quotation omitted) (ellipses in original). Additionally, each separate claim should

be presented in a separate numbered paragraph, with each paragraph “limited

as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).

“Precedent also teaches, however, that a court, of course, should not

abandon its neutral role and begin creating arguments for a party, even an

unrepresented one.” Sims v. Hastings, 375 F.Supp.2d 715, 718 (N.D. Ill. 2005)

(citing Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001)). When read

liberally, a pro se pleading “should be interpreted ‘to raise the strongest

arguments that [it] suggest[s].’” Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir.

1996) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)).

III. Discussion

The Plaintiff is only seeking punitive damages; therefore the complaint

should be dismissed because the Defendant has absolute immunity from § 1983

suits for damages. A prosecutor is absolutely immune from suit for all actions

that he takes while performing his function as an advocate for the state or

government. See Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 837B38 (11th Cir. 2010),

affirmed by Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356 132 (2012). A prosecutor is charged

with initiation of criminal prosecution, appearance in judicial proceedings, and

prosecutorial conduct before grand juries. Id. A prosecutor is not entitled to

absolute immunity for fabricating evidence, as investigating and gathering

evidence falls outside the prosecutorial function, though he may be entitled to

qualified immunity for such conduct. Rehberg, 611 F.3d at 841. The prosecutor,

however, is absolutely immune from suit for his actions in this case because his

actions all related to his role as an advocate for the state. See Rehberg, 611 F.3d

at 837B38; Rowe, 279 F.3d at 1279B80; see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.

409, 431 (1976) (“[I]n initiating a prosecution and presenting the state’s case,

the prosecutor is immune from civil suit for damages under ' 1983.”). Here, the

complaint does not allege that the prosecutors engaged in misconduct outside

the bounds of prosecutorial immunity. See Rehberg, 611 F.3d at 837B38, 841.

The only inferable action of the prosecutor is a decision to charge Plaintiff with

armed robbery and to then refile the charges. These actions are clearly within

the realm of initiating prosecution for which he is immune from suit.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, the claim against the Defendant is dismissed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) because the defendant is immune from suit (ECF No.

1). Any pending motions are denied as moot. The Clerk is directed to close this

case and mail a copy of this Order to the Defendant at the address listed below.

Done and ordered, in chambers, in Miami, Florida, on September 22,

2020.

Robert N. Scola, Jr.

United States District Judge

Copies, via U.S. Mail, to:

Remy Floreal

190166484

Miami-Dade County-PDC

Pretrial Detention Center

Inmate Mail/Parcels

1321 NW 13th Street

Miami, FL 33125

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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