Opinion

Datto v. Florida International University Board of Trustees

Court
District Court, S.D. Florida
Filed
Jun 30, 2020
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 20.1%

rejecting stay where “genuine dispute” presented in parties’ papers

How later courts described this case

  • rejecting stay where “genuine dispute” presented in parties’ papers

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 1:20-cv-20360-BLOOM/Louis

JEFFREY PETER DATTO, PH.D.,

Plaintiff,

v.

FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

BOARD OF TRUSTEES, et al.,

Defendants.

________________________________/

ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant, Florida International University Board

of Trustee’s (“Defendant”), Motion to Stay Discovery Pending Ruling on Motion to Dismiss, ECF

No. [29] (“Motion”). Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition, ECF No. [33] (“Response”), to

which Defendant filed an Amended Reply, ECF No. [35] (“Reply”). The Court has reviewed the

Motion, the Response, the Reply, the record in this case, the applicable law, and is otherwise fully

advised. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is denied.

On January 28, 2020, pro se Plaintiff filed his Complaint, ECF No. [1], which asserts six

counts based on alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation

Act of 1973. Id. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant improperly denied him admission to

its medical school based on his alleged bipolar disorder diagnosis and his past litigation history

with Thomas Jefferson University’s medical school, which school he attended but was dismissed

from in the early 2000s. See generally id. He brings claims for disparate treatment, failure to

accommodate, and retaliation under both statutes. Id. On May 5, 2020, Defendant filed its Motion

to Dismiss, ECF No. [20], to which Plaintiff filed a Response, ECF No. [30], and to which

Defendant filed a Reply, ECF No. [32].

A district court “has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to

control its own docket.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997). Motions to stay discovery

“are not favored because when discovery is delayed or prolonged it can create case management

problems which impede the Court’s responsibility to expedite discovery and cause unnecessary

litigation expenses and problems.” Feldman v. Flood, 176 F.R.D. 651, 652 (M.D. FIa. 1997).

“[D]iscovery stay motions are generally denied except where a specific showing of prejudice or

burdensomeness is made.” Montoya v. PNC Bank, N.A., No. 14-20474-CIV, 2014 WL 2807617,

at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 20, 2014). The party moving for a stay of discovery has “the burden of

showing good cause and reasonableness.” Feldman, 176 F.R.D. at 652.

Defendant’s arguments in favor of staying discovery rest largely on the notion that its

motion to dismiss has the potential to dispose of the case in its entirety or to narrow the issues in

dispute. Additionally, Defendant notes that Plaintiff has five cases currently pending in Florida

District Courts and two of those courts have granted motions to stay discovery. ECF No. [29] at 2,

5-6. Overall, Defendant’s arguments are grounded in Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d

1353 (11t Cir. 1997), and its progeny. In Chudasama, the Eleventh Circuit instructed that “[f]acial

challenges to the legal sufficiency of a claim or defense, such as a motion to dismiss based on

failure to state a claim for relief, should [ ] be resolved before discovery begins.” Id. at 1367; see

also Solar Star Sys., LLC v. Bellsouth Telecomm’s, Inc., 2011 WL 1226119, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Mar.

30, 2011) (“Potentially dispositive motions filed prior to discovery weigh heavily in favor of

issuing a stay.”).

Chudasama does not state a general rule that discovery be stayed pending resolution of a

motion to dismiss. Reilly v. Amy’s Kitchen, Inc., No. 13-21525-CIV, 2013 WL 3929709, at *1

(S.D. Fla. July 31, 2013) (“[T]here is no general rule that discovery be stayed while a pending

motion to dismiss is resolved.”); Gannon v. Flood, No. 08-60059-CIV, 2008 WL 793682, at *1

(S.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 2008) (Chudasama “does not indicate a broad rule that discovery should be

deferred whenever there is a pending motion to dismiss.”); Bocciolone v. Solowsky, No. 08-20200-

CIV, 2008 WL 2906719, at *1 (S.D. Fla. July 24, 2008) (“[C]ourts have consistently rejected

any per se requirement to stay discovery pending resolution of a dispositive motion.”). In fact,

“[m]otions to stay discovery pending ruling on a dispositive motion are generally disfavored in

this district.” Flecha v. Neighbors Moving Servs., Inc., 944 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1203 (S.D. Fla.

2013); Ray v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., No. 12-61528-CIV, 2012 WL 5471793, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 9,

2012) (Chudasama court “confronted a very specific situation involving a threefold problem —

unjustifiable delay by the district court in ruling on the motion to dismiss, an erroneous decision

to compel discovery from the defendant prior to adjudicating the motion to dismiss, and an

especially dubious fraud claim that was likely to be dismissed”). Unlike the exceptional

circumstances presented in Chudasama, where the district court did not rule on a motion to dismiss

for over a year and a half, Defendant’s motion to dismiss has been ripe since only June 8, 2020,

and the instant Motion was filed on May 29, 2020 before Plaintiff even responded to the dispositive

motion.

“While it is not necessary for the Court to, in effect, decide the motion to dismiss to

determine whether the motion to stay discovery should be granted, it is necessary for the Court to

‘take a preliminary peek’ at the merits of the motion to dismiss to see if it appears to be clearly

meritorious and truly case dispositive.” Feldman, 176 F.R.D. at 652-53. “[A] motion to stay

discovery . . . is rarely appropriate unless resolution of the motion will dispose of the entire

case.” Bocciolone, 2008 WL 2906719, at *2. Further, “discovery stay motions are generally denied

except where a specific showing of prejudice or burdensomeness is made or where a statute

dictates that a stay is appropriate or mandatory.” Montoya, 2014 WL 2807617, at *2. “Ultimately,

the proponent of the stay bears the burden of demonstrating its necessity, appropriateness, and

reasonableness.” Ray, 2012 WL 5471793, at *1.

Having taken a “preliminary peek” at the pending motion to dismiss and related filings,

this case does not present the type of an “especially dubious” claim faced by the Chudasama Court

where disposing of the case by motion to dismiss would avoid “needless and

extensive discovery.” See S.K.Y. Mgmt. LLC v. Greenshoe, Ltd., No. 06-21722-CIV, 2007 WL

201258, at *1-2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 24, 2007) (rejecting stay where defendant raised colorable legal

defenses, but plaintiff presented strong rebuttal arguments that could result in its claims surviving

a motion to dismiss); Ray, 2012 WL 5471793, at *2 (rejecting stay where “the Court [could] not

say that [the] case is surely destined for dismissal”); Bocciolone, 2008 WL 2906719, at *2;

(rejecting stay where court undertook a “cursory examination of the merits of Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss and there [was] sufficient reason to question whether Defendants’ Motion will prevail

on all claims”); Montoya, 2014 WL 2807617, at *2 (rejecting stay where the court’s “incomplete

and preliminary review suggests that the motions may not be the ‘slam-dunk’ submissions the

Defendants describe them to be”); Flecha, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 1203 (rejecting stay where “genuine

dispute” presented in parties’ papers).

Here, the Court cannot conclude at this juncture that Defendant’s motion to dismiss will be

granted and, even if so, whether such dismissal would be of the Complaint its entirety and with

prejudice. Relatedly, the Court does not find that Defendant has carried its burden to demonstrate

Case No. 1:20-cv-20360-BLOOM/Louis

good cause and reasonableness. In this respect, the Court is unconvinced that Defendant would be

so burdened by engaging in discovery before the motion to dismiss is resolved.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion, ECF No. [29], is

DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on June 30, 2020.

BETH BLOOM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:

Counsel of Record

Jeffrey Peter Datto, Ph.D.

3352 W. 98th Place

Hialeah, FL 33018

215-915-4416

Email: jpdatto @ gmail.com

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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